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In its broadest ambition, sociology aims to better understand the human predicament. 
Despite this, modern social theory is grounded in a decidedly Western disciplinary 
rationality-modernist, developmentalist, naturalistic, and secular. Yet, the fact is that 
human beings exist in multiple diverse traditions, including transcendental, 
authentic/liberative, and religious. A paradigm of comparative social theory, then, 
would enlarge our craft's theoretical apparatus: A "hermeneutic cultural positivity" 
model that has both intercivilisational and existentialistic aspects will put at 
sociology's disposal a vast array of comparative and analytical concepts to address 
contemporary global issues in an intercivilisational dialogue. Specifically, social 
theory which considers major problems in relation to existential questions reveals 
commonalities among Western and Muslim intellectual traditions. The major 
elements of "social" theory-human nature, community, religion, the sacred, the 
secular, and authenticity-are here deconstructed from both perspectives, as 
understood by two representative theorists from each tradition, who all agree that 
modernity poses both a possibility for and a danger to human existence. Goffman's 
sociology is based on symbolic and discursive social theory, while Giddens defends 
social democracy and the "Third Way. " Despite these theorists' absence of 
transcendental consciousness both focus strongly on existential concerns (as 
distinguished from religious concerns). By the same token, in the Muslim tradition of 
liberation theology, existential concerns are equally crucial social issues in Iqbal's 
modern traditionalism and Shariati's post-colonial 
Islamist modernisation. 
Considering these four thinkers within this comparative model can create a new vision 
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for tackling world problems by demonstrating their respective theories' inherent 
strengths and weaknesses-i. e., their potential contributions. Without understanding 
both intellectual traditions in these seemingly different civilizations, we are not able 
to reach the constructive understanding at the basis of meaningful co-existence. On 
the modern global stage, reinventing the sociological tradition on an intercivilisational 
basis can bring fundamental change to intellectual engagements. Rather than 
incommensurable agents imprisoned by our mental and social structures, we can 
choose between disagreement, clash, confrontation, and dialogue. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Towards Intercivilisational Social Theory 
The methodology of this study is that of scholarly assessment, comparison and 
theoretical projection. It is designed to combine general analytical and normative 
argumentation with a detailed understanding of how the general issues can be 
witnessed in the work of four specific thinkers, and how reflection on their interaction 
can further the general project that concerns me. I call this project `intercivilisational 
social theory' and seek not so much to give a definitive account of such a perspective 
as to explore its possibilities and obstacles, using what I believe are six indispensable 
concepts for that purpose. At the very least, these should contribute towards an 
appropriate idea of comparative appraisal across different cultural and social 
traditions. 
In order to achieve these aims, I have constructed the history of modern social 
theory in a dualistic sense. My overarching background assumption is that the history 
of social theory is a complex subject that cannot be considered entirely as a secular 
project, although it has been presented mainly in this fashion. Nevertheless the history 
of sociology could be construed as a dual process where two schools of social theory, 
namely the developmentalist school and the authentic school, have developed in 
parallel. The major trend within the developmentalist school has been one of 
secularism, while the authentic school can be divided into two major sub-schools, 
namely those of religious authenticity and secular authenticity. 
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The religious school can symbolically be associated with thinkers such as 
Pascal, Kirkegaard, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Komiakov, Jacques Maritain and Eliul, as 
well as contemporary figures such as Charles Taylor and Muslim thinkers including 
Iqbal, Shariati, Soroush, al-Attas, Nasr, Mutthari, Taleghani and Baqir al-Sadr among 
others. The secular school of authenticity, meanwhile, can be associated with 
Rousseau, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Fanon and so on. My research has led me to 
realise that if the history of social theory is viewed along the lines of considering the 
role of `religious thought' in relation to major social theoretical problems, then there 
are a great many similarities between Western and Muslim intellectual traditions, 
particularly when the theme of comparison focuses upon human existence and the 
existential questions that touch us all. Such an approach would enhance the scope of 
disciplinary sociology by enlarging the theoretical apparatus of our craft and putting 
at sociology's disposal a greater array of comparative and analytical concepts, and 
guiding images that would enable us better to address fundamental contemporary 
global issues. 
If it is be assumed that each human civilisation is like a human language that 
embodies in its system `letters', `characters', `grammatical rules', `syntactical 
exceptions' and `terms' (words and concepts), then it might be possible to go 
beyond 
the philosophy and philosophers of 'incommensurability'. For this very brief analogy 
at the outset should serve as a first daring attempt to know and 
learn about the `other' 
- whoever and whatever that other 
is. If the average person armed with an average 
intellectual ability, for instance, can learn a language other than their mother tongue, 
then it should come as no surprise for a scholar to want to set off on the path of 
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understanding a particular tradition and attempting to introduce it to a new audience. 
This attempt is what I mean by an `intercivilisational dialogue', which imbues the 
overall framework of this work. 
Modern social theory is not a simple or homogenous project that can be 
defined in a single sentence approved by all modern academic thinkers and social 
scientists. There are some theoreticians who see the origins of social theory in Athena 
or Christianity and many others still who view the birth of social theory as 
concomitant to the birth of what we today call `industrial society' (and its various 
recent evolutionary components). I am not about to discuss these issues here or 
adjudicate between the historico-sociological views on the birth of `society' or `social 
theory' as such. On the contrary, I attempt to deconstruct six significant elements - 
`human nature', `community', `religion', `sacred', `secular' and `authenticity' - as 
major indicators of any feasible theory on the 'social'. It is my argument that any 
theory that claims to be about the `social' cannot help but be concerned with `human 
being' (as an existential reality) - and s/he is a phenomenon different from inanimate 
objects, plants, or animals). 
Based on this argument, which will unfold in the body of this thesis, I have 
chosen the above-mentioned topics in accordance with my understanding that a social 
theory is an attempt to situate `human being' in the scheme of things and that these 
things are not all of the same nature or character. There are issues within any social 
theory that ultimately relate to the problem of worldview or Weltbild, which 
inevitably involves human self and his/her sociological and meta-sociological 
relations. These relations (self and community, self and sacred, self and profane, self 
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and religion, self and authenticity) can be rendered more constructively when one has 
an intercivilisational dialogue in mind for they underlie the ethereal dimension of any 
world civilisation. If the `social turn' has been followed and challenged to a degree in 
mainstream thought by the `cultural turn', then there is a strong argument for 
considering the current emergence of a reconstructed `spiritual turn'. 
It would be remiss of me to assume that great scholars of both East-West and 
South-North have not already studied the problem of Islam and modernity 
assiduously. The problems or issues caused by modernity and modernisation to other 
civilisational units or non-Christian world religions have been at the heart of the 
social theories of Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Comte, Spencer, Parsons, Freud, 
Jung, Louis Masignion, Ernest Gellner, Frazer, Tylor, Engles and Mircea Eliade, as 
well as the many contemporary scholars who have specifically looked at the 
relationship between Islam and modernity, such as Bryan S. Turner, Michael 
Foucault, Noam Chomsky and Immanuel Wallerstein (in his later writings since 
1990), or indeed social thinkers such as Samuel Huntington and Fukuyama. Here I am 
not disputing the value or the relevance of these studies for a better understanding of 
our emerging global society, which is composed of many forces such as the modern, 
the traditional, the religious, the secular, obscurantism, progressivism, regressivism 
and economy, as well as many other known and unknown forces. On the contrary, this 
study is an intellectual exercise in exploring the relevance of Islamic intellectual 
tradition in terms of social theoretical thought in relation to the Western body of 
academic knowledge conceived as `social theory'. 
Modern European thinkers have posed important questions and have provided 
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similarly profound answers in their respective discourses, which, on my reading, 
demonstrate limits as well as breakthroughs. As in all human situations, when we 
encounter a problem we try to find a solution. And if our current tool box does not 
contain the appropriate instrument, then we must seek to find the necessary resources 
elsewhere if the problem at hand is to be rectified. Of course, many of the issues that 
concern me have been tackled extensively in the matrix of modem social theory (in 
the absence or collapse of Christian theo-philosophical metaphysics) and I have 
identified six of the major concepts which help bring the key questions into focus. In 
addition, I attempt to give the general questions a specific grounding by seeing how 
they play out in the work of four selected authors (Goffman, Giddens, Igbal and 
Shariati). This, I believe, provides a rounded view of the current and potential 
relationship between the Western disciplinary tradition of social theory and the 
Muslim non-disciplinary tradition of liberation social theology. 
Having explicated these issues based on my reading of Goffman and Giddens, 
I have come to realise that within the Western disciplinary tradition the catchwords 
are `society', `social' and `culture' - which includes all aspects of man in history - 
rather than God, religion or transcendental philosophy as is the case with Muslim 
intellectual tradition. For example, if one thinks of `religion' in post-Christian 
European Enlightenment tradition, one does so in a way that assumes that religion is 
one of the many complementary elements of `social life', `civilisation' and by 
implication even the very being and existence of human self qua an existential being. 
This simple, but highly relevant, observation is the high point of 
distinction between 
`secular thought' as a Weltbild and Islamic thought as presented in the works of Iqbal 
and Shariati in this study. What is 
deemed the `social' in the occidental tradition of 
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social theory, which functions as an overarching theoretical umbrella, is what these 
Muslim thinkers call `been' (literally translated as `religion', although the best 
equivalent for this Arabic term is Weltanschauung). 
Although there are existential, epistemological and ontological differences 
between `been' and `social', nevertheless there are significant similarities in the ways 
these respective organising ideas are employed in relation to Man's collective 
dimension. In addition, it should be mentioned that `been' is not one of those cultural 
elements that gives shape to society, community, moral, ethics, law, self, human 
nature, worldview, and so on. On the contrary, the above-mentioned Muslim thinkers 
studied here argue that `been' is the fountainhead of what in secular tradition is called 
`civilisation' and more importantly for the purpose of this comparative study, the 
`sustainer' and `guarantor' of humanity - without which it cannot do. 
What unites all four thinkers (Goffman, Giddens, Iqbal and Shariati), despite 
their many areas of disagreement, are the ideas of `modernity' and those `existential 
dilemmas' that have enveloped the existence of modem humanity at all levels 
(collective and individual). All four thinkers, I believe, agree that modernity, both as a 
civilisational force and a philosophical project, poses both a possibility and a danger 
to human existence. However, it would be a mistake to think that each discourse 
produced by the respective thinkers in this study supplies a homogenous or 
monolithic, secular or religious answer. Each discourse is different and more 
importantly is formulated in relation to `Enlightenment tradition' from a distinct 
theoretical point of departure. Although each discourse attempts to `overcome' the 
dangers posed by modernity, its success or failure cannot be judged at such an early 
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stage. For instance, if one agrees with the idea of Iqbal being the spiritual father of 
Islamic State of Pakistan, as many historians and politicians of modern Pakistan do, or 
Shariati being the ideological father of Islamic Republic of Iran, then it does not take 
a genius to note that their respective social philosophies if taken as `social policy' are 
doomed to fail. Both cases speak for themselves after more than 50 years (in the case 
of Pakistan) and 25 years (in the case of Iran). So, it should be noted that there are 
elements of what in European tradition of social theory is termed `utopianism' in the 
works of these thinkers. If these are not taken in the spirit of utopianism or idealism 
(ie seeking for a higher and more ideal form of life both for the individual and 
collectively), then the whole fabric of society becomes endangered. This is one 
important dimension in the thoughts of Muslim intellectuals that needs more attention 
and in my view is something that these thinkers have not even begun to realise. 
On the other hand, the political significance of Giddens' social theory or 
Goffman's political irrelevance are matters of great debate and their respective 
importance in a global intercivilisational context has not yet been realised. However, 
the idea of modernity or `Tajadood' is at the heart of igbal's and Shariati's respective 
discourses regardless of how sceptical they are towards modernity as a philosophical 
programme and civilisational force. Western thinkers from Marx, Whitehead, 
Weber, 
Russell, Durkheim, Taylor, Heidegger, Dewey, James and Freud to Christian thinkers 
and theologians such as Thomas Aquinas and Tillich are among the 
discussants in 
their respective discourses on religion, Islam, philosophy, modernity, man, 
eschatology, history, science, technology, 
faith and authenticity. 
Iqbal, for instance, takes issue with modern philosophy and the founding 
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fathers of social psychology such as William James. Shariati, as another 
contemporary example, considers himself as man of ideology, who knows modern 
philosophies (analytic tradition and existential philosophy-cum-continental 
philosophy) and sociologies of both Liberals and Marxists and attempts, in turn, to 
discredit their respective ideological claims to 'legitimacy'. Goffman, on the other 
hand, takes modernity as a frame of analysis (more in a sense of what Erich Fromm 
calls the philosophy of humanism) and departs from a secular perspective in 
understanding human dilemmas within the context of society. And last but not least, 
Giddens is a synthesising social theorist, who takes modern civilisation as a whole 
and critically remoulds the very fabric of Enlightenment tradition on different 
accounts and at different levels, while being faithful to the grand claim of secularity in 
matters of worldview or metaphysics. 
In other words, we have in this study a Coffman who is considered a great 
thinker on human nature based on symbolic and discursive social theory (Ashworth, 
2000); a Giddens who is thought of as the sole defender of social democracy and the 
`Third Way'; an Igbal who is a `modernist traditionalist'; and finally a Shariati who is 
a `post-colonial Islamist moderniser'. The most significant dimension in all these 
discourses which make them inter-civilisationally interesting is their concern with the 
`social' aspects of human existence that carry a profound resonance of existentialistic 
concerns within their overall matrix of analysis and reflection. 
This thesis has nine main chapters. Chapter One discusses the way in which 
social theory, sociology, meta-social theory and philosophy, postmodernity, 
multiculturalism, feminism and anti-Eurocentric post-disciplinary 
discourses have 
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brought us all to a point where some of the hallmarks of `Western' disciplinary 
rationality, and some of the underlying assumptions of social theory in general, have 
led to a greater reflexive awareness of ethnocentrism, and of a plurality of meaningful 
starting and finishing points for social theory. Also, of course, this is taking place in a 
`globalising' world, which itself can be understood in different ways, for example by 
highlighting a plurality of modernities and a range of `civilisational' reference points. 
In this context, the main point is to see what is involved in a critique of Westernness 
by identifying the background and state of play in contemporary critical discourses 
that, in turn, will allow my intercivilisational questions and interests to emerge as 
worthwhile in the following chapters. 
The aim of Chapter Two is to furnish the theoretical basis of intercivilisational 
dialogue within the paradigm of sociology against a topical background of 
existentialist concerns that are instrumental in a cross-cultural study. To achieve this 
aim, Chapter Two is a theoretical attempt to build a model that has both 
intercivilisational dimension and existentialistic aspects that will help us in our search 
for points of encounter between Western tradition of social theory and Muslim 
intellectual tradition. 
In Chapter Three, I attempt firstly to portray Erving Goffman's worldview as 
it emerges from the contemporary secondary literature. However, I think it is possible 
to draw other conclusions from Goffman's theoretical heritage. In order to 
demonstrate how my own reading could prove cross-culturally more fruitful, I have 
analysed Goffman's social theory in terms of a conceptual device based on three pairs 
of concepts, ie self-community, secular-sacred and authenticity-religion. By assessing 
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Goffman's thought within this framework, I conclude that there is a dialogical 
possibility in his social theory in relation to Muslim intellectual tradition. I argue that 
although in Goffman one can certainly discover a `lack' of religious thinking, at the 
same time there is a strong `presence' in his work of existential concerns that is of 
major significance in relation to a cross-cultural intellectual engagements. It is my 
contention that in the dialogical interaction between these two poles, ie `lack' and 
`presence', there are significant intercivilisational possibilities that could enrich our 
dialogical understanding within any sociological frame of deliberation. The aim of 
this thesis is to create an intellectual platform for in-depth discussion around 
existentialist issues that will be taken further as the work progresses. 
In Chapter Four the conceptual tools of `self and community', `sacred and 
secular', and `religion and authenticity' are used to maintain that there is a `lack' 
within Anthony Giddens' sociological discourse in relation to `religious 
consciousness'. By displaying the lack of this feature within Giddensian discourse, I 
try to lay bare an intellectual space in relation to my overarching theoretical 
framework through a more focused approach to existentialist concerns. The 
Giddensian approach highlights the strong `presence' of existential concerns within 
sociology, and is of profound significance to the overall concern of the thesis. By 
distinguishing between `religious concerns' and `existential concerns', Giddens has 
undoubtedly provided points of commonality, that can be utilised 
in the context of 
intercivilisational engagement. At the same time, as with Goffman I detect in Giddens 
a lack of `transcendental concern', and this is worth emphasising as the 
basis of 
`dialogue', because such concern, in principle at least, is the point of departure in the 
Muslim intellectual tradition. This chapter is based on a brief portrayal of Giddens in 
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contemporary literature and an interpretive analysis of Giddens' social thinking within 
the framework of my conceptual construction that will be instrumental in paving the 
way for my project of intercivilisational dialogue based on existentialist concerns. 
As it is argued in Chapter One modern rationality has been criticised on 
various accounts from different points of departure. But at the same time I contend 
that the critiques themselves are not entirely convincing because they point only to the 
shortcomings within the secular frame of reference without considering the 
commonalities. In order to make this point coherently within sociological discourse, I 
put forward the idea of `hermeneutic cultural positivity', which is a theoretical 
attempt to find the point of existential commonality between secular tradition and 
Muslim tradition. The logic of my overall argument is that of course there are 
shortcomings within secular tradition and it has not provided a universal frame of 
reference. But these are natural consequences of human thinking and one cannot 
expect human thought to be all-comprehensive and all-embracing at all levels of 
existence. In order to illustrate this in Chapters Three and Four, I point out the 
shortcomings within the discourses of two well-known modern Western social 
theorists in relation to the overarching framework of argument in my thesis, ie 
intercivilisational dialogue. 
Across Chapters One to Four I am working towards the view that secular 
intellectuals do not `speak for the world' and that what they take as `the world' is not 
only the modern Western world but also the modern 
Western perception of reality. 
This, consequently, opens up a space that allows me to 
introduce a different 
perspective, one that views social 
issues and human problems from a transcendental 
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point of departure. But these two points would not be instrumental in a dialogical 
approach if the parameters of debate were in conflict. On the contrary, the logic of my 
argument is to demonstrate that the very absence of transcendental consciousness 
within secular tradition as evident within Giddens and Goffman does not disqualify 
them in terms of existential concerns, which are of significant import within the 
parameters of intercivilisational dialogue. The point is to identify a clear and 
significant area of commonality between Muslim intellectuals and secular theorists. 
Developing this area further, I move ahead in Chapters Five and Six to 
critically assess the works of Iqbal and in Chapters Seven and Eight that of Shariati by 
demonstrating that it is possible to think of `social issues' within the parameters of 
religious tradition itself. This approach does not necessarily need to be `feudalist' or 
`regressive' in nature if it is allied with and expressed within a religious frame of 
reference. In demonstrating this, I conduct an exegesis of Iqbal's central thesis in 
relation to three pairs of social theoretical concepts of modernity, namely self- 
community, sacred-secular, and authenticity-religion. This is necessary due to the 
general neglect of Iqbalian dialogue within contemporary social theory and social 
philosophy. The aim of Chapter Five and Six is thus to present these ideas in a more 
accessible form and set the scene for a subsequent more critical appraisal of his 
thought based on an existentialistic reading of intercivilisational dialogue. 
In Chapters Seven and Eight I have continued with these themes and my 
methodology is to expose Shariati's main 
ideas in relation to my conceptual 
framework by paving the way for the final chapter where I discuss the respective 
existentialist concerns of the 
four thinkers and the relevance of such concerns in an 
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intercivilisational dialogue in a global context in which religious (Shariati-Igbal) and 
naturalistic (Goffman-Giddens) views of the world are in dire need of interaction and 
dialogue. Because both paradigms claim to explain the world and the `experienced 
world', one of the main reasons for such an arduous intellectual enterprise is to lift 
humanity beyond the confines of race, nationality, religious denomination, ethnicity, 
colour, and whatever else divides humankind from achieving what Giddens and 
Goffman may call enlightenment and Shariati and Iqbal may call illumination. The 
fruits of each cannot be tasted if we do not embark upon the path of dialogue, for 
without knowing what the arguments of the respective groups are we are unable to 
reach any constructive understanding that is the basis of all meaningful co-existence. 
On a global scale, as Thrower (1999) rightly holds, the argument between these two 
grand paradigms has only just begun. My thesis is a contribution to this debate with 
an overall aim in mind, ie how these seemingly different traditions are amazingly 
similarly concerned with the humanity of human being in an existential sense. This is 
what makes me think that a dialogue is possible and that, despite what many may 
think we are not incommensurable agents imprisoned by our mental as well as social 
structures. 
In the final chapter I have taken issue firstly with the respective portrayal of 
the selected authors in this thesis as they appear in the contemporary literature and 
presented my own view by arguing how from an intercivilisational perspective the 
issues of existential concerns could prove more constructive and how these concerns 
and engagements could be put into operation. By choosing the popular sociological 
concept of `alienation', I have tried to demonstrate 
how both the disciplinary 
approach of Goffman and Giddens and the non-disciplinary approach of 
Iqbal and 
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Shariati display an existentialist concern about human existence and more importantly 
what they aim to rectify in a vital sense. Further I have attempted to depict a model 
where all these four selected thinkers could be employed to create a new vision for 
tackling world problems across different cultures by demonstrating both the inherent 
strengths and weakness in their respective thinking. Finally I debate the overarching 
issues that distinguish these two traditions (as exemplified by my choice of these four 
thinkers) and propose strategies proposed for further intercivilisational engagements 
not only between Muslim tradition and Western tradition but on a more pluralistic 
stage. 
In the brief conclusion to this thesis, I summarise the ontological as well as 
epistemological differences that lead us to realise that we are faced with two major 
models of understanding human predicament, ie the naturalistic and the 
transcendental, which have come to the fore for the first time on a truly global stage 
and present us with a choice between disagreement or dialogue. Nevertheless I have 
stated that there are certain unresolved issues within both discourses (as represented 
by Goffman-Giddens and Iqbal-Shariati), which need serious rethinking and profound 
re-engagement. 
A final introductory remark is needed to clarify why exactly I chose to 
conduct the dialogue between Western (post-Enlightenment) and Muslim intellectual 
traditions. That is, why Muslim rather than Eastern, or Shinto or Christian or Buddhist 
or another essentially non-Western religion. I chose the Muslim intellectual tradition 
for the simple reason of accessibility: I am more knowledgeable about its intellectual 
tradition in comparison to other religious traditions (including Christianity). But my 
choice was based on another major factor too, the `absence' of 
Muslim intellectuals as 
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`Founding Patrons or Matrons' of social theory as it is evident in all standard 
historiographical narratives within disciplinary branches of social theory. Following 
this latter point, we can find the absence of other traditions too. In other words, it 
would not make any substantial difference if we chose Buddhist intellectual tradition 
or Zoroastrian intellectuals, because both are also absent in contemporary social 
theoretical discussions. Because again both are absent in contemporary social 
theoretical discussions. Moreover, I hope this research will encourage others in 
embarking upon such intercivilisational dialogue. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The `Westernness' of the social theoretical tradition 
1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the way in which social theory, sociology, meta-social theory 
and philosophy, postmodernity, multiculturalism, feminism and anti-Eurocentric post- 
disciplinary discourses have brought us all to a point where some of the hallmarks of 
`Western' disciplinary rationality, and some of the underlying assumptions of social 
theory in general, have led to a greater reflexive awareness of ethnocentrism, and of a 
plurality of meaningful starting and finishing points for social theory. Also, of course, 
this is taking place in a `globalising' world, which itself can be understood in different 
ways, for example by highlighting a plurality of modernities and a range of 
`civilisational' reference points. In this context, the main point is to see what is 
involved in a critique of Westernness by identifying the background and state of play 
in contemporary critical discourses that, in turn, will allow my intercivilisational 
questions and interests to emerge as worthwhile in the following chapters. 
At the outset of this discussion one thing needs to be clarified about the use of 
the adjective `Western' in the context of this thesis. I have taken it to apply to all 
spheres of thought, whether `social', `natural', or `technological'. 
In this sense, when 
one argues that, for instance, modern science 
has its origins in Western civilisation, 
there should be no doubt that its evolution 
includes the episteme in various branches 
of knowledge pursuit and is not necessarily confined 
to the natural order; that is to say 
that the realm of modern Weltanschauung 
includes social, psychological, ethical and 
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religious realms. To be more accurate, the very distinction of these realms is itself a 
by-product of modern episteme in first place. 
Modern scientific rationality and rational ethos have developed within 
Western civilisation, and they are the results, or products, of particular historical 
events and cultural conditions. In recent years, it has become a matter of some 
importance and no little controversy to determine in what ways modern rationality 
bears the imprint of the civilisation in which it emerged. Is there a Western bias built 
into the methods and uses of modern scientific method? This chapter explores this 
question and attempts to discover the underlying themes within this paradigm 
(Westernness) with respect to meta-theory, society and industrialism from three 
critical dimensions (romanticism, socio-ecologism and social theory - which, in turn, 
are based on three critiques, namely feminism, anti-Eurocentrism and 
multiculturalism). 
2. The Westernness of rationality 
There is a broad lack of agreement about what in reality constitutes Western 
rationality. For some critics, the `Westernness' of modern episteme lies in what is 
purported to be its distinctive Weltbild, its underlying attitudes to nature, reality, 
humanity and knowledge; for others it is the social system and/or institutional 
structure within which knowledge production is embedded; while for still others the 
answer lies in the technological applications and more general economic development 
strategies that are in some way seen to be derived from, or intertwined with, modern 
scientific ethos. It may thus be useful at the outset to endeavour to characterise the 
various dimensions of Western scientific tradition 
before turning to the criticisms that 
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have been levelled against it. Part of the problem with the critiques of Western natural 
and social science (or some would argue human sciences) is that they have been 
partial critiques and have failed to provide what might be considered feasible 
alternatives to the entirety of Western episteme. The alternatives, like the critiques, 
have all too often been too narrow to be effective. 
The meta-theoretical aspect 
Let us commence with what might be called the meta-theoretical aspect of Western 
rationality, which incorporates both cosmological issues (that is, discussions of 
leading Weltbilds and attitudes to nature of reality and reality of nature) and 
epistemological questions: methodology, truth criteria, etc. Indeed, it is sometimes 
considered to be characteristically Western to divide the two: to divide philosophers 
from scientists, to differentiate those who are concerned with the nature of reality 
from those who are concerned with discovery of true knowledge about reality 
(Cunningham and Jardine, 1990; Nasr, 1968). From the early nineteenth century, 
when the founding father of sociology Auguste Comte saw in the expansion of the 
`positive' sciences a new rational basis for society that superseded religion and 
metaphysics, positivists have seen philosophy and moral issues in general as being 
extraneous to the production of knowledge. The `spiritual crisis' of the West is, at 
least in part, to be seen as the resultant separation between facts and values and the 
more deep-rooted secularisation of society and knowledge that came with it: what 
Max Weber called `disenchantment of the world'. 
While not every thinker, be they a natural scientist or a social scientist, 
working in the modern world has shared the same theoretical suppositions, there 
has 
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none the less been a distinctive Western approach to nature of reality (at various 
levels - natural, social, psychological, etc), derived from classical traditions and 
applied to scientific inquiry. The chief constituents of this position are objectification 
and reductionism. Non-human nature is seen as existing for man, and nature is viewed 
as a realm of objects for man's potential use and benefit without any inherent 
subjective interests of its own. Against all vitalist and animist teachings, Western 
science has come to embody an objectifying, mechanising way of knowing and doing 
and to a certain extent up to the collapse of positivism this view was popular among 
scientists within various fields of applications. Furthermore, it has sought to reduce an 
understanding of reality down to its basic elements. Epistemologically, Western 
rationality can be said to be a deconstructive way of knowing: knowledge of reality is 
derived through analytical deconstruction of nature of reality into its component parts. 
Synchronously, the identity of Occidental reason is of a kind of knowledge that has no 
higher metaphysical or religious justification. It is an intrinsically instrumental 
knowledge, neither moral nor immoral in its ulterior motivation, in that morality as 
such is irrelevant to its mode of operation. By objectifying reality and reducing it to 
its component parts, the defenders of modern Weltanschauung have claimed to be 
able to provide a knowledge that is superior to, and more useful than, knowledge 
based on more speculative or holistic philosophies (Popper, 1963). Even though the 
`truths' of Western episteme are intrinsically limited to those processes that can be 
investigated in the form of experiments or experiment-like operations, the knowledge 
that is produced has a reliability - and, most crucially, a verifiability (or falsifiability) 
- that knowledge produced 
by other means does not possess (Ziman, 1978, p 48). 
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Reductionism - literally the reducing of nature of reality to experimental 
demonstration (or inter-subjective demonstrable discourses) - has been the overriding 
methodological principle since the seventeenth-century scientific revolution did away 
with holism and organicism in the name of objectivity. Since that time, the 
epistemological norm by which Western scientific method can be said to generate a 
separate form of truth has been based on experimental, or `objective', methods of 
discovery and rational, or `logical', criteria of verification or falsification. In this 
respect, Western rationale is one possible way of ordering the reality of things 
(animate, inanimate, human or non-human) with specific ideas of what is to be 
considered true and accurate. 
From the seventeenth century onwards, science in the West has been 
principally defined in terms of its methods, although different philosophers have 
emphasised various different dimensions according to what they consider to be the 
most vital. For those pursuing an inductive, or empiricist, tradition identified with 
British social philosophers such as Francis Bacon and John Stuart Mill, science has 
been defined by its use of observational and experimental methods, ie by the approach 
in which its practitioners go about discovering or constructing the empirical `facts' of 
reality. For others, following a deductive, or rationalist, tradition associated more 
often with continental philosophers such as Descartes and Kant, science has been 
defined by its use of mathematically based logical explanation. In this tradition, it is 
predominantly through its rational methods of argumentation that science is seen to be 
able to produce true knowledge, procedures derived from mathematics and logic 
rather than from any necessarily observable external reality. Science, from this point 
of departure, is an adventure of the mind: the uniqueness of the modern, Western 
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variety is due to the rigour of its logic rather than the quality of its experimental 
techniques. Western rationale is thus most properly seen as not one but at least two 
different knowledge traditions, one associated with experimentation, the other with 
mathematical logic (Kuhn, 1977). 
In the twentieth century, as the philosophy of sciences has itself developed 
into a professional form of analysis, a number of philosophers have attempted to 
merge the two epistemological traditions; one of the more influential efforts has been 
Popper's theory of falsification, which seeks to depict a `logic of discovery' in the 
connection between experimentation and theory building. Theories, according to 
Popper, are conjectures that are formulated in order to be refuted by experimental 
testing. The knowledge based on science is thus not the same thing as truth, but is 
better viewed as a process of growth toward ever-closer approximations to truth. It is 
the process that is objective rather than any one particular result, a process that Popper 
has described as falsification (Popper, 1972). 
A theory, for Popper, is ceaselessly provisional, without agreeing that this 
statement itself is `provisional' too. Popper's methodology of science depicts 
scientific investigation as an ongoing, living process, rather than a set of finished 
statements; scientific rationality was a part of what he came to term the `open society' 
with a sceptical and critical attitude to truth (Popper, 1976). Like many contemporary 
thinkers, his philosophy aims to enunciate the way in which scientific knowledge is 
actually produced, rather than provide an idealised vision of what rationality should 
be. For him and his followers, science progresses by constantly subjecting its findings 
to appreciation and critical assessment. And even though Popper's critical empiricism 
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has come to be seen as ideological in its own right - for how many scientists really act 
the way Popper says they should? - it has helped to open up the philosophy of science 
to a closer involvement with sociology, history, and science itself. 
In the 1960s, Imre Lakatos reformulated Popper's empiricism to take into 
account some of the background postulations and `research programmes' that also 
affect the research process (Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970), and in recent years, 
philosophers have come to focus more on the process of experimentation itself rather 
than Popper's somewhat idealised portrayal of experimenting (Hacking, 1983, p 29). 
Popper's empiricism, which seems to exclude a good deal of modern thought from its 
exacting criteria (many theories simply cannot be experimentally falsified), has also 
come to be challenged by what might be called neorationalism, a kind of common- 
sensical view of science that limits epistemology to the semantic reconstruction of 
scientific statements (Putnam, 1988). While some philosophers have moved closer to 
the actual research process, others have taken what has been termed a linguistic turn 
and have come to concern themselves with the way in which scientific theories are 
constructed, formulated and expressed (Giere, 1988). 
Whatever their divergences, however, both modern-day rationalists and 
empiricists usually consider themselves `realists' and tend to close ranks against the 
various relativist philosophies that have been developed in recent years and that form, 
as we shall see, part of the contemporary critique of Western secular tradition. Where 
relativists or constructivists see scientific methods as context-bound and the resultant 
findings as limited in their applicability, realists stress the operational, even universal, 
nature of scientific truth. Because of the particular methods of science, especially their 
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reliance on experimental investigation and thus repeatable interactions with reality 
that produce verifiable data, science provides the most objective and unbiased 
knowledge that humans are able to produce. The realist truth claim is thus limited but 
nonetheless universal in its range. 
It seems safe to state that almost all philosophers of science have shared a 
common `scientistic' faith; whether inductivists or deductivists, empiricists or 
rationalists, they have taken more or less for granted the superiority of scientific 
methods over other systems of knowledge or belief. Scientism, in this sense, is an 
outgrowth of the positivism first systematised by the founding father of sociology 
Auguste Comte in the nineteenth century, who contended that the growth of science 
marked a decisive, historical break, a huge cognitive step forward beyond 
metaphysics and religion (Kolakowski, 1972). In accordance with positivism, science 
is to be distinguished from religion, metaphysics, even philosophy itself, by its 
reliance on impersonal, rational, objective methods. Even more than any particular 
epistemology or attitude to nature of reality, it is the positivist heritage, which today 
has taken the form of a scientistic mentality or belief system, that most of the more 
philosophically minded critics of modernity are attempting to challenge. 
The societal aspect 
In contrast to the meta-theoretical discourse, which locates the Westernness of 
modern episteme in its epistemology and Weltanschauung, there can also be said to be 
a conspicuously sociological or organisational element to Western rationality. What 
makes science Occidental at this stage is the way it has come to be organised in 
society and the corresponding social ethos or norm systems it has built up (Scheler, 
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1980). Modern episteme, now international and global, took on much of its existing 
character in Western Europe in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
the period that has come to be known, among other things, as the scientific revolution. 
As European societies moved away from feudalism towards industrialism - or 
capitalism - the modern episteme transpired as a kind of synthesis of medieval 
scholarship and traditional artisanship, with precursors among the practitioners of art 
and engineering of the Renaissance and Reformation (Rossi, 1970). 
The scientific academies of the seventeenth century, such as the Royal Society 
in England, the Accademia del Cimento in Italy and the Academie des Sciences in 
France, provided some of the first organised social centres anywhere in the world for 
carrying out scientific inquiry and communicating scientific results. No longer was 
scientific experimentation restricted to private or secret laboratories; instead, 
experiments were carried out in public, with new, often state-financed instruments 
and under the auspices of royal, state patronage and support. In 1928, Martha Ornstein 
wrote that "it cannot be sufficiently stressed that it was the experimental character of 
science which encouraged the creation of scientific societies" (Ornstein, 1928, p 
67). 
More recently, the imperative significance of these societies in providing 
`experimental spaces' has been discussed by a number of sociologists from many 
different disciplines (Shapin and Schaffer, 1986, p 30). 
The academies were the first institutions of modern science, although 
museums, schools and observatories in classical 
Greece and Rome, as well as in 
China, Africa, and the Islamic cultural sphere, had earlier provided temporary homes 
for the development of systematic technical and natural knowledge (Mason, 
1962). 
27 
The distinction can be described as the difference between collecting information and 
producing knowledge, or, more colourfully perhaps, between hunting-gathering (and 
speculation) and conscious cultivation (and accumulation). A specific institutional and 
organisational form has characterised scientific pursuit, in its Western guise, a distinct 
`social relations' of knowledge production (Mendelsohn et al, 1977). 
With the seventeenth-century scientific revolution, scientific ethos in the West 
came to be identified with experimental practice, mediated by technical instruments; 
the conscious development of instruments and experimental apparatus to accumulate 
what Francis Bacon termed `useful knowledge' is a principal component of 
Occidental scientific identity, as is the conscious combination of practical skill and 
speculative thought (Rossi, 1968). What remained separated in other parts of the 
world, divided into the separate realms of scholarly endeavour on the one hand and 
practical learning on the other was combined in Europe in an academic scientific 
praxis (Zilsel, 1976). With the coming of the political and industrial revolutions of the 
late eighteenth century, science entered the universities and, what had until then been 
a fairly subsidiary cultural pursuit was transformed into a societal profession. 
The links with technology and industrial development were intensified during 
the nineteenth century, in new types of scientific universities, industrial research 
laboratories and technological colleges, so that by the early twentieth century, 
scientific rationality had become a legitimate and highly significant part of Western 
civilisation. It was this institutionalised episteme that was transferred to, or imposed 
upon, the rest of the world in the `age of imperialism', supplanting other, indigenously 
generated, forms of knowledge production and dissemination (Pacey, 1990). By the 
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time of the Second World War, modernity had spread throughout the world, and it is 
as a global, international ethos, a shared possession of all mankind, that is known 
today. But as a form of human praxis it bears the marks of a particularly Western 
mode of organisation, with certain characteristic institutional imperatives or norms 
(Barber, 1952). 
Modern episteme, it has been claimed, subscribes to a norm of universalism, 
by which its findings can be duplicated anywhere in the world by scientists of any 
race or ethnic background. In the words of one of the key contemporary sociologists, 
namely Robert Merton, who formulated the norm in an influential essay in 1942, "The 
acceptance or rejection of claims entering the lists of science is not to depend on the 
personal or social attributes of their protagonist; his race, nationality, religion, class 
and personal qualities are as such irrelevant. Objectivity precludes particularism.... 
The imperative of universalism is rooted deeply in the impersonal character of 
science" (Merton, 1957, p 553), For Merton, working in the midst of the Second 
World War, when Nazi Germany sought to impose a nationalist `Aryan' ideology on 
its science, the universalism of Western science was a progressive attribute, indeed a 
central condition of progressive emancipation itself. Universalism was linked to 
objectivity, or what Merton called `organised scepticism' and `disinterestedness' to 
establish a set of values that could ensure a knowledge free from ideological bias and 
was central to a Western democratic societal developmental process. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, Merton's sociological approach complemented the 
neoempiricism that Karl Popper was developing within the philosophy of science. 




as the type of rationale that had emerged in Western Europe in the seventeenth 
century, a combination of experimentation and logic, a `hypothetico-deductive' 
knowledge linking the worlds of the craftsman/inventor to those of the 
scholar/mathematician. This episteme emerged in a particular kind of institutional 
setting and it established particular roles and functions within the emerging industrial 
capitalist society (Ben-David, 1971). Indeed, as an organisational form, Western 
science since the seventeenth century can be defined as the kind of knowledge 
production that has taken place in specifically designated scientific institutions: first 
academies, then research laboratories, and finally disciplinary institutional 
establishments. It is thus an expert knowledge, a kind of understanding that is 
considered legitimate and professional within a certain kind of society. It was to be 
distinguished from religious knowledge and metaphysical knowledge not only 
through a more all-enveloping philosophical goal or ambition, but also through its 
organisational structure and the roles it played in industrial society. 
The industrial aspect 
Particularly since the Second World War, the Westernness of modern episteme has 
come to be seen not merely in philosophical or sociological terms; as scientific 
rationality has become ever more important in the industrial and `post-industrial' 
political economy, attention has come to be directed to the productive, economic uses 
of scientific knowledge. What is seen as characteristic of Western science is no longer 
merely internal truth criteria and attitude to reality nor institutional norms and social 
roles: Western episteme has come to be seen as integral to industrialisation itself 
(Landes, 1969, p 75). There has developed, among economic social theorists, the 
notion of the innovation chain, by which basic scientific results are transformed 
into 
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industrial products. It is its place in the innovation process, the capacity of Western 
scientific ideas to be turned into profitable products, that is now seen by many to be 
most significant characteristic of Western scientific ethos. For those involved in the 
planning, administration and bureaucratisation of science (as demonstrated by Max 
Weber), the particularly Western styles of management and application have come to 
be seen as most significant. Even more, it is the integration of scientific ethos and its 
application, the very industrialisation of science and the transformation of knowledge 
itself into a commodity that is seen as most characteristic of the Western style of 
knowledge production (Ravetz, 1971). 
The economic dimension involves the ways in which scientific knowledge is 
linked to the commodity form characteristic of the historical development of Western 
industrial capitalism. It was in the age of what the founding father of critical social 
theory Karl Marx called modern industry, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, 
that economic development has come to be based on the results of systematic 
scientific investigations into the properties of natural phenomena and, increasingly, 
the functions of man-made artefacts. Western rationality is thus that form of 
knowledge that is `oriented' to instrumental use and application (Krohn et al, 1978). It 
is also, and perhaps most centrally for many of those who have criticised it, that form 
of knowledge production that has lent itself to technocratic visions and developmental 
strategies. It is, as such, indistinguishable from Western instrumental application, 
which in its `neo-imperialist' pattern of transfer to non-Western societies is often 
identified as one of the main contributors to underdevelopment itself (Rodney, 1972). 
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3. The critiques of Westernness 
There is nothing particularly new about criticising either the objective methods or the 
societal uses of modern episteme or Western rationality; there have been critiques of 
scientific rationality as far back as one wishes to go. It falls outside the scope of this 
thesis to say much about the earlier critiques, however. For our purposes, what is 
significant are the ways in which alternative traditions have come to be rediscovered 
in recent years and applied to contemporary concerns. At least since the publication of 
Thomas Kuhn's The structure of scientific revolutions in 1962, the contemporary 
view of Western episteme has undergone what might be called a contextual 
revolution, as practitioners of science and their discoveries have come to be viewed in 
their historical and social contexts more and more. Among anthropologists and other 
social scientists, as well as among philosophers, the truth claims of Western episteme 
have been relativised (perhaps most dramatically and influentially in Feyerabend 
(Feyerabend, 1975), and for the past 30 years, it has become increasingly respectable 
to contrast Western episteme with other belief systems and ways of knowing 
(Mendelsohn and Elkana, 1981). Occidental reason provides a kind of knowledge that 
works, but does it lead to wisdom or enlightenment? The relativisation of the 
scientific mind involves an enquiry into its underlying premises and motivations 
(Maxwell, 1984) and into its social-psychological and more personal, subjective, 
meanings (Traweek, 1988). 
On the one hand, there has been a rediscovery of the various spiritual and 
holistic sciences and pseudo-sciences that have 
been based on different philosophical 
points of departure (Elzinga and Jamison, 
1981, p 91). Both alchemy and astrology, 
for example, have in recent decades come to 
be studied not only by mystically minded 
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initiates, but also by social scientists and philosophers seeking to unravel the various 
crises of modern society (Feyerabend, 1978). There has also been a growing concern 
with the limited capacity of the Western mindset to address moral and ethical issues 
and fulfil what might be considered the ideal of self-enlightenment that has often been 
traditionally associated with the pursuit of knowledge. In general, from the 1960s 
onwards, there has been a marked `return to cosmology' or `return to grand issues' 
and a rather widespread questioning of the previously hegemonic Weltanschauung 
assumptions of Western frame of mind (Toulmin, 1982). 
Particularly influential have been the re-examinations of the role that magic, 
religion and alchemy played in the formation of the modem Western framework 
(Yates, 1964, p 30). The historical record has come to be rewritten with increased 
emphasis on figures such as Paracelsus and Bruno, who had sought to give early 
modern mindset a far broader and more spiritual orientation than it ended up 
receiving. The hermetic and gnostic texts of the early modern period have been re- 
examined, and have been seen to have played an important role in developing the 
more visionary, utopian sides of Western episteme (Manuel, 1979). Even Isaac 
Newton himself, the father of mechanical philosophy, has been shown by social 
historians who have investigated his alchemical research and his concern with biblical 
cosmology to have been a much more complicated personality than had earlier been 
imagined. 
Social historians of later periods have also come to direct their attention to the 
alternative undercurrents within Western philosophy. The history of Western episteme 
has, as it were, been broken up into distinct historical periods characterised by debates 
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and even struggles over different approaches. Thus, Paracelsian medicine, Goethe's 
science of colours, and Whitehead's organicism have been re-evaluated and shown to 
offer explanations and approaches to natural phenomena that challenge the dominant 
approaches of Western mentality. Particularly with the advent of feminism, there are 
many who actively work to show that Western rationality has been limited and biased 
in significant ways, and the critiques that have emerged have come to exert a 
substantial influence in several disciplinary fields (Tuana, 1989). What has been at 
work, according to feminist critics, is a particularly masculine way of conceptualising 
reality, which has superimposed socially constructed patterns and relationships onto 
natural-social processes (Longino, 1990). 
It may be helpful to group the critiques in three main thematic categories, 
corresponding to the three dimensions of Western scientific rationality discussed 
above. On the one hand, there is what might be termed a philosophical or romantic 
critique, which has rediscovered the critical writings of poets and artists about the 
`single vision' of Western episteme, and reinterpreted the significance of mystical and 
occult traditions. Here attention is directed primarily at what I have called the meta- 
theoretical or cosmological aspect of modernity, the worldview assumptions and 
methodological precepts that are seen as characteristic of modern thought. A second 
category of critique can be labelled industrial, taking its point of departure from a 
series of problems ranging from environmental destruction to socio-structural 
problems in Millsian sociology of `personal troubles' and `public 
issues' that have 
been associated with modernity in its totality. In relation to the discussion above, this 
category of criticism focuses more on the technocratic 
dimensions of modernity than 
on the disciplinary scientific research activity 
itself. Thirdly, there is the growing 
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social theoretical critique divided into three interrelated positions: feminist critique of 
Western episteme, anti-Eurocentric critique a la Frank, and multicultural critique. The 
feminist critique that has emerged during the past 40 years has focused on the gender 
biases at work in both the institutions and concepts of disciplinary research. This is 
the most vocal, and probably the most significant, kind of criticism directed against 
what I have termed above the sociological dimension of modern episteme, the ways in 
which research is organised and institutionalised in modem societies. 
In reviewing the feminist critique, I will briefly mention some of the other 
critical voices within the sociology of science. The anti-Eurocentric critique is a very 
broad and compounded term, which covers various positions within social and 
cultural (philosophical) discourses by arguing against what Immanuel Wallerstein 
calls modern Avatars due to their uncertainty and creativity. Within this line of 
critique it is assumed that there are essential forms of discourses that have shaped the 
axioms of Western historiography and by doing so have diverted scholars from their 
true mission, which is to depict the true nature of social reality, both grandly and 
minutely. The final critical discourse presented under `social theoretical critique' 
is 
that levelled by multiculturalists. It is argued that the common thread between those 
who are loosely labelled `multiculturalists' is their attempt to promote 
`cultural 
pluralism'. The proponents of multiculturalism attempt to expand the canon of 
recognition, difference and equality in all spheres of social praxis 
in contrast to the 
tendency of modern societies towards cultural unification and universalisation. 
As 
Gregor McLennan rightly contends, the `cultural turn' in social theory has helped 
underscore the second half of the multicultural 
label, while the overwhelmingly 
pluralist cast of contemporary thought 
has affirmed the 'multi'. Accordingly, 
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multiculturalism has resisted subsumption under apparently more singular and 
materialist projects such as anti-racism, political economy and radical 
postcolonialism. Yet until recently there have been few systematic attempts to 
articulate and defend the idea of multiculturalism, or to work out its full consequences 
for concrete understanding (McLennan, 2001a). However, it is undeniable that the 
critique initiated by multiculturalists has paved the way for sociological discussions 
on the `search for alternative' at different levels of conceptual significance. 
Within each category, we can further distinguish between what might be 
termed `internal' and `external' types of criticism, the first coming from within the 
scientific community and thus proposing alternatives that fall within the overall 
framework of scientific thought and behaviour, the second coming from outside the 
halls of science and thus being much more open to and supportive of non-scientific, 
even anti-scientific, paths to knowledge or wisdom. 
The romantic critique 
Within this type of critique, there are those who have searched for incentive in the 
alternative traditions of Occidental civilisation, as well as in the spiritual approaches 
of Western traditions. Significant sources are the writings of Joseph Needham and 
his 
collaborators on the history of science in China and the studies of many others on 
sacred science. These projects - and the further developments they 
have encouraged - 
have shown, in impressive detail, how Western science of the modern era 
is based on 
the findings and insights of non-Western scientific traditions. According to 
Needham, 
all the world's civilisations have contributed to modem science; 
it is a world science 
that needs to recognise the crucial importance of the contributions of non-Western 
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peoples for its development (Needham, 1969). Needham has never sought an 
alternative to Occidental episteme; his objective has rather been to rectify the sense of 
omnipotence and omniscience, in short the scientism that has been an integral part of 
a particular metatheoretical interpretation of Occidental rational inquiry (Needham, 
1976a). 
For others, modern rationality has reduced what was a far richer and more 
spiritual scientific quest in the traditional world (Needham, 1976b). Western science 
is, for a great many spiritual critics, a pale reflection of what was, in other cultures, a 
more integrated social activity based on an attitude of harmonious contemplation 
rather than exploitation of nature. In the 1960s, the works of Needham, and of Frances 
Yates and others, on the mystical and magical roots of Western science helped inspire 
the international `counter-culture' with its rather substantial interest in Eastern 
religions and other modes of consciousness. Also significant were the explorations of 
magical and mystical traditions in the academic writings of Mircea Eliade (1971) and 
the tremendously fashionable books of Carlos Castaneda such as The teachings of 
Don Juan: a yaqui way of knowledge. 
Theodore Roszak's Where the wasteland ends (1972) is an excellent 
illustration of this genre of critique in combining the rejection of the mechanical 
universe with the resuscitation of romanticism. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's veneration of 
nature and later William Blake's critique of the industrial spirit - as well as Goethe's 
holistic science - all contribute to Roszak's project. Romanticism, for Roszak, 
is not a 
lost historical tradition but a necessity for spiritual survival in a technological age; in 
Roszak's words, "romanticism is the struggle to save the reality of experience from 
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evaporating into theoretical abstraction or disintegrating into the chaos of empirical 
fact.... Whatever we must leave behind of the Romantic style, we can scarcely afford 
to abandon its steady determination to integrate science into a greater vision of reality, 
to heal and make whole the dissociated mind of its culture" (1972, pp 256-8). The 
counter-culture of the 1960s, which had a profound influence on many literary 
intellectuals and artists, such as Roszak, can be seen as a kind of romantic 
renaissance, leading to the revival of occultism and mysticism that is such a 
noticeable presence in the world today. Much of what is left of this revival is 
degenerate in that it turns critique into sectarianism and a kind of escape from society; 
but, particularly in some of the so-called `new age' formulations of, for example, 
Fritjof Capra (1982), attempts are made to apply holistic and romantic approaches to 
physics and economics. 
For the purposes of this chapter, the most significant contemporary versions of 
the romantic critique are those that have been directed against the (high-)technology 
culture. Of sociological significance is Roszak's critique of the `cult of information' 
that has, through the widespread diffusion of computers in education, sought to 
promulgate a new data-processing model of knowledge upon Western societies, and 
increasingly upon the non-Western world as well (Roszak, 1986). For Roszak, the 
information revolution has imposed a new level of machine dependence in both 
education and scientific, even humanistic, research, and, even more seriously, 
information ideal tends to reduce human thinking to machine manipulation. 
The romantic critique of modernity builds, of course, on a long legacy of 
thinkers; and, in their responses to the new advanced technologies, neoromantics such 
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as Roszak and Langdon Winner have drawn on Lewis Mumford's ideas about the 
megamachine and `authoritarian technics', as well as Jacques Ellul's conception of an 
autonomous technology that has grown out of human and social control (Ellul, 1964, 
pp 55,99). Other important sources of inspiration have been the critical social 
theorists and philosophers of the 1940s and 1950s - Heidegger in Germany, Paul 
Tillich in Germany and the United States, Sartre in France, Marcuse in the United 
States - who tried to apply new philosophical approaches to the postwar technological 
society. 
The socio-ecological critique 
In the United States, Jeremy Rifkin has initiated a number of significant discourses on 
the role of `Eurocentric' values of modern episteme and the underpinning 
assumptions that hold this systemic totality (and all its branches - natural, social, 
technological, psychological, biological, environmental, etc) as a whole by opposing 
the technological applications of genetic manipulation. Rifkin has combined the 
romanticism of the counter-culture - with its poetic imagination and its distrust of 
modern technology - with a second category of criticism, which can be labelled 
environmentalism. While Roszak has questioned the information ideal of knowledge 
as a fundamental challenge to earlier conceptions of human thinking, Rifkin has seen 
the new biotechnological `products' as a challenge to earlier conceptions of nature. 
"Two futures beckon us", according to Rifkin. "We can choose to engineer the life of 
the planet, creating a second nature in our image, or we can choose to participate with 
the rest of the living kingdom. Two futures, two choices: An engineering approach or 
an ecological approach" (Rifkin, 1983, p 252). 
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What is at issue among environmental, or ecological, critics of `rationality' is 
not so much the power and control embodied in Western scientific Weltanschauung as 
the anthropocentrism and species reductionism of much of Western science. Ecology, 
as both science-philosophy and life-style, has been presented as an alternative way of 
approaching nature and of managing the various crises of pollution, overpopulation 
climatic change, etc. What ecology offers for its proponents is a systemic view of 
nature, derived as much from field biology as from cybernetics (Worster, 1977, p 65). 
Nature is seen not in a reductionist way, in terms of its component parts, but in its 
interrelations and underlying patterns. Particularly in some of the newer formulations 
of the Green Party and other environmental groups, a so-called `deep ecology' of 
empathy for all living things has challenged many practices of mainstream Western 
science, such as animal experimentation, genetic manipulation and the manufacture of 
nuclear power. The alternative is a `kinder' science that draws on the organismic and 
even animistic philosophies of the past while making use of the feedback and 
systemic understandings of computer science (Devall and Sessions, 1985). An 
influential source of inspiration is Gregory Bateson, whose attempts to delineate the 
`ecology of mind' among both the Balinese and contemporary Western scientists, has 
provided insights for biologists, anthropologists, psychologists and students of 
human 
sciences in general. 
In Norway, the philosopher Arne Naess has, under the influence of 
environmentalism, developed a new kind of ecological social philosophy, 
based on 
the idea of species egalitarianism. Naess and the Australian 
Peter Singer, author of 
Animal liberation, and the American social theorist (from anarchist tradition) Murray 
Bookchin, have been among those who have sought to take the environmental critique 
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of modernity to what might be called a new metaphysical level (Singer, 1976, p 9). 
Also significant in this domain is the propagation of the so-called Gaia hypothesis 
(Lovelock, 1987), by which the Earth and its inhabitants are seen as part of one 
overall process of life. In our terms, they have criticised the meta-theoretical 
dimension of modernity, while most environmental activists have criticised the 
particular technological uses or applications of Western science. Animal rights and 
the preservation of virgin natural regions are concerns that require a new attitude to 
nature, a non-exploitative worldview that, in many ways, is similar to pre-modern and 
non-Western attitudes. For many sociologically conscious critical ecologists, 
American Indians and other `primitive' peoples offer alternative modes of interacting 
with the natural environment, both practically and cognitively. And, as it becomes 
gradually evident in a global scale, the rediscovery of more `ecological' traditions is 
also becoming significant within environmental movements in developing countries, 
where a U-turn to `authentic' traditions has given political impetus to many, to 
employ Wallerstein's terminology, contemporary anti-systemic movements. 
The ecological critique is not alone in opposing the uses to which modem 
sciences are put. The British philosopher Bertrand Russell was for many years a 
leader in the international efforts to oppose the increasing militarisation of science and 
technology and the consolidation of a military-industrial complex (Russell, 1962). 
The social theoretical critique 
The third critical category can itself be divided into the three sub-categories of 
feminism, anti-Eurocentrism and multiculturalism. 
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The feminist critique 
Feminism has come to exercise an ever-growing influence on scientists, particularly 
women scientists, of all disciplines (natural, social and cultural) throughout the world. 
At issue here are both what is called the `gender bias' of Western science, as reflected 
in the concepts, theories, and even experimental methods of many sciences, and the 
overall philosophical or epistemological criteria that are used to validate scientific 
findings (Harding, 1986). On the one hand, feminists claim that Western science 
portrays and investigates nature in particularly aggressive and exploitative ways, 
following Francis Bacon in articulating a `masculine' conception of science and using 
a particularly sexist kind of rhetoric to portray both the natural world and technical 
artefacts (Keller, 1985); on the other hand, Western science as such is seen as 
following a particular masculine form of logic, being competitive rather than dialogic, 
monopolistic rather than pluralistic, individualistic rather than collective (Longino, 
1990). The feminist critique thus becomes both epistemological and sociological and 
supports attempts to develop a social epistemology whereby the verification of truth 
claims is seen as dependent on the social contexts in which scientific results are 
produced or 'manufactured'. In this way, feminist critique has both fostered and been 
enriched by the more general social theorising of science that has been growing 
among sociologists and philosophers in recent years. 
In this social theorising or sociological critique, attention has been 
concentrated on the professional or institutional systems of modern episteme. 
Modern 
scientific edifice has been criticised for its hierarchical or authoritarian social 
relations, with a small number of leaders or managers 
dominating the majority of 
scientific workers (Gorz, 1976). 
Science has been seen in terms of its production 
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organisation or labour process, and, particularly in the 1970s, when Marxism regained 
popularity within many academic fields, science and technology came to be criticised 
in class terms. It was the relationship between modern episteme and capitalist 
corporations that was questioned and challenged. In the 1990s, much of this 
sociological criticism disappeared, while feminism took over and focused the critique 
on the particular sphere of gender relations. 
The critiques of Western science are, of course, not limited to romanticism, 
environmentalism and social theoretical criticism but the three categories do indicate 
both the range and the variety of contemporary critical voices. What might have been 
seen as conventional wisdom among intellectuals some 30 years ago -a more or less 
common `scientistic' belief that the methods, institutions and technological 
applications of modern episteme were superior to other modes of knowledge 
production - has increasingly come to be challenged. These critiques have fostered a 
growing relativism or agnosticism among sociologists of science, who have 
increasingly come to see science as merely one form of social activity among others. 
For Latour and Woolgar (Latour and Woolgar, 1979), science is seen as a way of life 
rather than a path to truth, and for Mulkay (1984), science is a kind of language game, 
constructing concepts and `discourses' like any other literary activity. The dominant 
sociological view of scientific episteme today is that of social constructivism, whose 
practitioners are not so critical of Western science or anxious to provide alternative 
ways of producing knowledge as they are sceptical of its aims and social 
implications. 
The feminist and sociological critics seek to expand the scientific enterprise into 
something more pluralistic and variegated: sciences 
instead of science (Cozzens and 
Gieryn, 1990). 
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The anti-Eurocentric critique 
The question of `Eurocentrism' is a vexing one, not only for academia but also for 
belles-lettres in general. In the broadest sense, Eurocentrism can be understood as the 
implicit view that societies and cultures of European origin constitute the `natural' 
norm against which one can assess the rest of the world. 
One particular aspect of this vast area of debate has been the object of intense 
scrutiny among scholars: the real or alleged centrality of Europe's role in the factors 
that have shaped the modern world: economic, scientific and technological 
advancements, the Enlightenment and the expansion of the role of the individual, and 
intensified exploitation and colonial conquest in the rest of the world. All these things, 
taken together, are commonly seen as synonymous with capitalism. It is precisely this 
identification that is challenged by postmodernists, anti-Eurocentrists, world-system 
theorists and multiculturalists. Others, including postcolonial theorists and Third 
World writers, have argued that Eurocentric assumptions have permeated the left's 
theorisation of the origins of modernity as thoroughly as they have dominated 
conventional `modernisation' theory. 
The postcolonial scholarship on `Eurocentrism' has often produced extremely 
important results by challenging the idea - which comes in many different forms - 
that `the West' has always been, for one reason or another, superior to all other 
civilisations and is destined to remain so. But there are certain things about the anti- 
Eurocentric critique that seem to be problematical. For example, it would be 
dangerous to assume that the many and varied writers on `Eurocentrism' all focus on 
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Europe in the same way and all share the same contempt for non-Europeans. In fact, 
writers in this category include racists who insist on the natural superiority of 
Europeans over Asians, Africans, and indigenous Americans; cultural chauvinists 
who think that, for whatever reason, `the West' has achieved a higher level of cultural 
development and `rationality' than the rest of the world which has given it an 
advantage in every other respect; environmental determinists who believe that Europe 
has some distinct ecological advantages; non-racist historians who fail to give enough 
attention to the role of Western imperialism in European history; and Marxists who 
are neither racists, nor cultural chauvinists, nor ecological determinists, nor inclined to 
underestimate the evils of imperialism, but who believe that certain specific historical 
conditions in Europe, which have nothing to do with European superiority, have 
resulted in certain specific historical consequences, such as the rise of capitalism. 
But despite the problematic aspects of the concept of `Eurocentrism', no one 
can deny that there is such a thing as European `cultural arrogance', and we do have 
to accept that there are more than enough reasons to challenge conceptions of history 
that place Europeans at the centre of the universe, to the detriment, or the exclusion, 
of everyone else. The idea of `Eurocentrism', for all its faults, should at 
least put us 
on guard against such cultural practices. 
That is why anti-Eurocentric histories are extremely puzzling, especially the 
histories of capitalism. What is most puzzling about them 
is that, without exception 
(as far as I know), they are based on the most 
Eurocentric - not to mention bourgeois 
- assumptions 
(Wood, 2001 a). Let us look first at one of the most critically perceived 
`Eurocentric' account by Andre Gunder Frank. 
In Re-Orient, Frank is charting new 
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territory by challenging Eurocentric approaches to the vicissitudes of world economic 
changes and continuity. He takes on the entire tradition of modern historiography, 
Western and non-Western, left and right, on the world system. Among the revered 
icons he has attempted to knock down are Karl Marx, Max Weber, Karl Polayni, 
Talcott Parsons, Arnold Toynbee, Charles Kindleberger, Fernand Braudel, Immanuel 
Wallerstein and `most other contemporary social theorists' (1998, p xvi) such as Perry 
Anderson and Benjamin Barber on the left and W. W. Rostow, Samuel Huntington 
and Francis Fukuyama on the right (ibid, p xvi). 
The thesis of Re-Orient is quite straightforward: a truly global perspective is 
needed in studying macro-historical changes in the world - the rise and fall of 
empires, the industrial revolution, the decline of the East and the corresponding rise of 
the West, colonialism in India and American revolution, etc. The whole is greater than 
the sum of its parts, and, as Frank repeatedly tells us, the parts can only be understood 
in relation to the whole. Adopting such a global perspective is no easy task, however, 
as most of our contemporary social science, history included, is trapped in a 
Eurocentric ideology masquerading as universal science. Frank sets out to debunk this 
Eurocentric myth by marshalling an impressive array of evidence, mostly from 
secondary literature, that suggests the dominance of Asia (mainly Ming and Qing 
China and Mughal India) in an interconnected world economy from 1400 to 1800. 
According to Frank, Europe was only a marginal player in global trade and production 
during the early modern period. It remained an economic backwater compared with a 
more productive and expansive Asia until 1800 when a number of conjunctural 
factors (Amin, 1989), including global economic contraction and European access to 
American silver, led to Europe surpassing the East in industrial capacity. 
Frank 
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stresses that nothing extraordinary or transformative (eg industrial revolution, the 
emergence of the modern state system, capitalist reorganisation of European 
economy, etc) from within Europe contributed to its rise. Rather, cyclical change in 
the global economy plus serendipity (Europe chancing upon American silver and 
gold) it is the explanation. 
Samir Amin once wrote that Eurocentrism is not simply the sum of all the 
prejudices, errors and blunders of Westerners with respect to other peoples. "If that 
were the case, " he said, "it would only be one of the banal forms of ethnocentrism 
shared by all peoples at all times" (1989, p vii) To both Amin and Frank, 
Eurocentrism is a knowledge system that is historically specific and is rooted in 
particular configurations of power and material interests. Eurocentric thinking 
attributes to the West an almost providential sense of historical destiny, manifested in 
its continuous advances in science, technology, industrialism, rationality and 
economic institutions from time immemorial. (Guang, 2000) It takes European 
experience as universal and envisions the world from a single privileged point that is 
Europe. The world is thus bifurcated into `the West' and `the Rest', and a system of 
knowledge is constructed around a series of binary hierarchies with Europe invariably 
occupying the higher position: Western nation, non-Western tribe; Western religion, 
non-Western superstition; Western capitalism, non-Western petty commodity 
production; Western technology, non-Western craftsmanship; Western progress, non- 
Western stagnation; and so on. 
Frank's analysis is aimed at debunking the Eurocentric myths organised 
around such binary constructions. 
The main culprits, Frank found, were the 






nineteenth-century European historians, chiefly Marx and Weber. Frank agreed with 
Braudel's observation that "Europeans invented historians and then made good use of 
them" (1998, p 2). In this regard, what Frank attempts to do here is quite similar to 
what Edward Said and Bryan S. Turner, along with many other scholars, aspired to do 
many years ago with their critique of Orientalism. This time, however, Frank is 
focusing on the historical discourse on political economy and is bent on 
demonstrating the `falsehood' of conventional claims by checking them against 
'facts'. Frank is no constructionist or postmodernist who takes `knowledge' or 
`discourse' as the proper object of analysis. He insists on the materiality of the world 
system. He would challenge anyone to come up with any single `idea' that has 
transformed the world. Unlike Said who was interested in tying knowledge to power, 
Frank wanted to suggest that `true' knowledge can emerge if only one takes a careful 
look at the `empirics' and adopts a truly global perspective on the world system. 
To Frank, a truly global perspective means to put Europe in its rightful, 
provincial place. Europe was but one part of a world-encompassing system of 
political economy, and its fortune was tied to the cyclical changes that would bedevil 
the system every half millennium. There was no European exceptionalism. Neither 
capitalism (cf. Marx), nor Protestant ethic or modern bureaucracy (cf. Weber), nor the 
Westphalian state system (cf. almost all contemporary scholars of international 
relations) explains Europe's post-1800 rise and the shape of the modern world system. 
It seems as though Frank is suggesting that we abandon altogether such notions as 
`capitalism', `class', `mode of production', `feudalism', and `inter-state system'. 
Globalism, not capitalism, has been with us all along. As a result, explanations of 
Europe's rise and concomitant changes in the world system should 
be turned upside 
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down. Global systemic changes, with a centre of dynamism located in Asia in the 
early modern days, led to the evolution of European institutions. The trading of places 
between East and West was merely the latest continental shift of fortune in the 
existing world system. In Frank's favourable metaphor, provincial Europe "did not 
pull itself up by its own economic bootstraps... ". Rather it "climbed up on the back of 
Asia, then stood on Asian shoulders-temporarily" (1998, pp 4-5). 
Frank contends that going beyond Eurocentrism does not mean a return to 
Asian-centrism (eg Sino-centrism or Indocentrism), Afro-centrism, or any other form 
of ethnocentrism. Other forms of ethnocentrism, according to Frank, are only less 
harmful than Eurocentrism because they are not as powerfully imposed on people 
around the world. But they are just as incomplete or incorrect as are Eurocentric 
perspectives on history and global change. Frank's globalist vision would entail a 
"telescopic perspective capable of encompassing the whole world and all its parts... " 
(1998, p 338). His Archimedean point - the fact that he acknowledges its existence 
sets himself apart from postmodernists - for explaining the vicissitudes of human 
history lies not within Europe, Asia or Africa but in points of connection outside of 
the regions, or in Frank's words, nodes of "horizontal integration". 
For Frank, abandoning Eurocentric provincialism and adopting a global 
perspective means that we have to rescale the `world system' to make 
it a truly all- 
encompassing global system. His attempt to up-scale the 
`world system' led to his 
unstinting critique of Wallerstein's world-system analysis as 
Eurocentric. Frank 
argued, indirectly in Re-Orient and more 
directly in an earlier work The world system: 
five hundred or five thousand years, that a spatially and 
historically continuous world 
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system has been with us for 5,000 years rather than 500 years as conventionally 
argued by the world-system theorists (Frank and Gills, 1993). Capital accumulation, 
trade and growth, according to Frank, existed well before the modern period as well 
as outside of the West. One would be mistaken to assume that Frank merely attempted 
to extrapolate Wallerstein's analysis back in time and cast it in a wider geographical 
context encompassing the entire world. Such `extrapolation' is no mere extension in 
time and space. It sets him off on an intellectual path from which he could challenge 
core Eurocentric assumptions underlying conventional world-system theory. 
The Frankian argument could be conceived to purport emphatically that the 
world system was not born in 1500; it did not arise in Europe; and it is not distinctly 
capitalist. Frank's `world system' is not only pre-modern and pre-European, but it 
conditioned the rise and decline of sub-systemic economies. The causal arrow flows 
from the system to the parts, not the other way around. His materialism 
notwithstanding, Frank mounts a sharp criticism of orthodox Marxism for its 
Eurocentric bias and historical `stagism'. He rejects the view that history is a series of 
transitions from one mode of production to another. On this he was in agreement with 
Wallersteinian world-system theorists. He believes in a cyclical view of history based 
on "world market competitive pressure and exigencies" (Frank, 1998, p 331). As a 
result, his excellent criticisms of the received wisdom are not matched by a clearly 
delineated model of explanation beyond the call for global humano-centric 
perspectives on world history. It may not be his intention at all to set up an alternative 
theory or model in this very book, but he did call for an "alternative, more realistic" 
and "more holistic global social theory" that would overcome 
Eurocentrism (Frank, 
1998, p 322). 
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The first question is whether Frank's is a structural or conjunctural analysis. 
This is not an either-or question, but one ought to be clear about the causal model 
operating in Frank's framework. A structural analysis holds the structure - in this case 
the world economy - as embedding the ultimate causal power that sets everything in 
motion. Everything else is a derivative of that structure. Frank has strongly suggested 
that his is a structural analysis. A conjunctural analysis, on the other hand, may take 
seriously the enabling and constraining conditions of the structure, but would attribute 
change to the simultaneous occurrences of multiple factors that may not all be 
entailed by the overarching structure. The causal claim is much weaker in the case of 
a conjunctural analysis. Frank has alluded to numerous such factors, for example 
demographic change and micro-economic variables like price, wage and capital stock, 
in his explanation of the `temporary' rise of the West. Of course, many world-system 
theorists acknowledge that structural and conjunctural analyses are not mutually 
exclusive, since the uneven structure changes through conjunctural factors. But how 
does one specify what conjunctural factors are causally significant for systemic 
change? Frank seems not to provide a clear answer to this question. 
The second question relates to the role of institutions - institutions like the 
`state' and the 'market'. Where would they fit in Frank's global approach? On the one 
hand, Frank seems to reject any autonomous role of institutions in socio-political 
change; his discourse asserts that institutions are only derivative and 
facilitative, not 
determinative of change. On the other hand, we are also led to believe that the wealth 
of the Americas, extracted by the Europeans on the strength of mercantilist states, 
played a key, if fortuitous, role in the rise of the 
West. Isn't the modern state system, 
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which happened to consolidate first in Western Europe, part of the story of the rise of 
the West? How does the state matter? And one could pose the same question in terms 
of another powerful institution - academia. As Frank rightly asserts, history as an 
academic discipline is largely responsible for producing and disseminating the 
Eurocentric ideology. Frank's work itself can be read as an intervention with the aim 
of shaping institutional culture. If institutions like academia do not matter, why 
initiate such a discourse? If they do, where do institutions fit in Frank's global 
framework? 
Thirdly, a question not unrelated to the first: if global structure is so confining, 
where do we locate possibilities of change? Is accident (such as the Europeans' 
stumbling upon American silver) the only way? What is the role of human agency? 
Marx remarked that men make their own history, but not in conditions of their own 
choosing. Social theorists do mainly accept that structural conditions are constraining 
and have to be taken seriously, but they equally believe that men `make' their history. 
Frank himself might concede, in anticipation of feminist criticisms, that his theory 
does not deal with women per se, nor with men for that matter. Indeed, he wrote, "this 
structural analysis does not seem to deal with any people at all" (Frank, 1998, p 40). 
To be fair to Frank, he seems not to intend his structural approach to preclude an 
analysis of world history focusing on human agency. He certainly does not allege that 
his `objective' studies of the global system leave no room for individual, community, 
civilisational, cultural, political, or similarly `subjective' processes. 
But how could a 
structuralist incorporate such `subjective' processes, while at the same time not 
vitiating any claim about the efficacy of structure? 
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This kind of argument seems to me to be a regression that forfeits much of the 
progress historians such as Brenner and Ellen Meiksins Wood have made in 
challenging the Eurocentric model. The real breakthroughs in opposing that model 
have come from historians - mainly Marxists, but also historians like Karl Polanyi - 
who have undermined the naturalisation of capitalism, the view that capitalism is 
basically a natural extension of certain universal human practices that would itself 
have become universal if only all the world's peoples were as rational and free as 
Europeans (Hilton, 1976). 
By insisting on the historical specificity of capitalism, they have dealt a fatal 
blow to the most Eurocentric principle of all: that the European path of development 
culminating in industrial capitalism is the natural order of things and that non- 
European civilisations that did not take that path, or faltered somewhere along the 
way, failed because they were somehow fatally flawed. Critics such as Frank, despite 
their alleged ultra anti-Eurocentrism, start from the same premise, as do the standard 
Eurocentric explanations, ie the incorporation of the `commercialisation model' based 
on the notion of `primitive accumulation'. That is to say, traders or merchants 
anywhere and everywhere are seen as potential, if not actual, capitalists, and the more 
active, wide-ranging, and wealthy they are, the further they are along the road of 
capitalist development. In that sense, many parts of Asia, Africa, and the Americas 
were well on their way to capitalism before European imperialism in one way or 
another blocked their path (Wood, 2001b). As a matter of fact, this approach (and 
neglect) enables Frank boldly (but mistakenly) to contend that the very idea of 
civilization is a useful (or even real) sociological category in analysing global and 
grand occurrences - which, in turn, reaffirms 
his Eurocentric anti-Eurocentrism by 
53 
assessing historical events of the past (based on multi-civilisational domains) against 
the contemporary yardstick of dominant global civilisation of the West. 
The multicultural critique 
Within the past two decades `multicultural paradigm' has become a forceful position 
in the Western socio-political context. In general, it has been perceived as a useful 
strategy in promoting racial tolerance and sensitivity toward the history and culture of 
the ethnically diverse groups comprising Western societies. Multicultural paradigm 
has been adopted in a growing number of theoretical approaches within social theory. 
The underlying assumption and the driving force behind multicultural thinking within 
social theory is the idea of inclusion with respect to the question of the other. 
The proponents of multiculturalism begin with a more systematic critique of 
the construction of social knowledge and the privileging of Eurocentrism and 
Westernness in modern episteme. The rather philistine assertion of Eurocentrism and 
Westernness on the part of conservative educators is itself a wish to run away from 
the effort of coming to terms with the fundamental historical currents that have 
shaped Western civilisation -a wish to run away from the fundamentally `plural', 
immigrant and diverse character that defines historical and current relations among 
minority and majority groups in the West (Jordan, 1985,1988). To claim a pristine, 
unambiguous Westernness as the basis of societal organisation (in its various 
dimensions), as Bloom, Hirsch, Ravitch, Will and others suggest, is to relegate to the 
dimmest parts of the unconscious a fundamental anxiety concerning the question of 
other (or what Simmel called stranger) and minority 
identities and `cultural presence' 
in what is distinctive about contemporary 
Western life. 
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The main point of multicultural theory could be what John Berger introduces 
in Ways of seeing and Toni Morrison develops and extends in her book Playing in the 
dark: that there is nothing intrinsically superior or even desirable about the list of 
cultural items and cultural figures celebrated by traditionalists like Hirsch and Bloom 
(Berger, 1978; Morrison, 1992). In other words, the notion of Westernness is a 
powerful ideological construct, one thoroughly infused with an ongoing struggle over 
meaning and values (Bernal, 1987). What is Western is therefore highly problematic, 
as June Jordan has argued (1985). In the light of multicultural criticisms, some, for 
instance, have come to argue for the historical fact that if Afro-Americans have been 
in the Americas for at least as long as whites, how is it that their history, writings and 
culture are considered non-Western? Who is demarcating the West? Where is this line 
to be drawn within the various segments of social institutions? Where does 
Westernness end and where does Englishness, Swedishness, or American-ness begin? 
Multiculturalists have tended to counter the Western civilisation movement by 
insisting on `diversity' and cultural pluralism. It should be noted, however, that there 
are at least three notions of multiculturalism that need to be challenged. The first is 
the very premise of the interchangeability of the culture of the United States and 
Europe and the notion that there is an easy fit between white America, the West and 
Europe. Secondly, there is the obvious dilemma that although multiculturalism is the 
product of one culture, nowhere in the world is there such a grandiose demand for 
multicultural `diversity' than in the affluent dynamic societies of the West. 
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In short, multiculturalists need to explain why multiculturalism itself is not 
greatly multicultural? Thirdly, and probably most problematically, is the fact that 
multiculturalism claims to tell us something true about the human world, yet it is 
founded upon the denial that objective truth is possible. In its celebration of the 
diversity of cultural perspectives - and in its denial of any objective or true point of 
view - multiculturalism becomes just another perspective. That is, on its own ground, 
multiculturalism cannot defend itself as any more (or less) true than non-multicultural 
perspectives. 
So, multiculturalism seems hardly to be a sociological theory in its sense of 
new positivity based on logical accuracy and explanatory universalism meant to 
demonstrate rational principles of the 'social'. It is probably of another order of 
demonstrable principles sine qua non of human collective canopy, ie the ethical. Its 
significance becomes imperative in the relational sense and cannot be defended or 
used to illustrate principles of `rational' or `intelligible' and `metaphysical' order (see 
below). 
On the other hand, there are many who argue for a critical approach to 
multiculturalism and it is argued that multiculturalism must insist not only on the 
cultural diversity of social knowledge but on its inherent relationality. Social 
theoretical knowledge is socially produced, deeply imbued with human interests, and 
deeply implicated in the unequal social relations within a modern global context. A 
critical multiculturalism should therefore be more reflexive with respect 
to the 
relationship between different social groups 
in the United States and Western Europe 
and the relationship of developments 
in the West to the rest of the world. This would 
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mean, for instance, that we would begin to see the issues of racial inequality, minority 
problems and subjugated voices in global and relational terms - in the context of what 
Immanuel Wallerstein calls `world-systems theory' (Wallerstein, 1990). 
A world-systems approach draws attention to the fact that the development of 
`Western' industrialised countries is deeply bound up in the underdevelopment and 
the exploitation of the Third World. C. L. R. James, for example, points out that in the 
1770s, at the time when the French government was helping to bankroll the American 
Revolution, its West Indian colony in Haiti was generating two-thirds of France's 
overseas trade (James, 1989, p ix). A world-systems approach would also emphasise 
the links that African Americans have had in terms of their intellectual and political 
engagement with the peoples of the Caribbean, Africa. For example, the civil rights 
movement in the United States has had profound multiplier effects on the expansion 
of democratic practices to excluded groups in Australia, the Caribbean, Africa and 
England, as well as in the United States itself. 
By emphasising the relationality of social knowledge, one also raises the 
question of the ideological representation of dominant and subordinate groups in 
society. For example, as Edward Said has pointed out in Orientalism, contemporary 
Western scholars arbitrarily draw a line of demarcation between `East' and `West', 
`West' and `non-West', `North' and `South', the `First World' and the `Third World' 
(Said, 1978). 
A third point of consideration in a critical multiculturalism is the status of the 
conceptualisation of the other category 
(such as race, religion, ethnicity, etc) within 
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the multicultural paradigm. Current multicultural formulations, it is argued, tend to 
define racial identities in static or essentialist terms. By this it is meant that 
proponents tend to treat, for instance, racial identities as a settled matter of physical, 
cultural and linguistic traits (Tiedt and Tiedt, 1986). 
Now let us look at the conceptual makeover of `multiculturalism' in relation to 
wider critical appraisal within human and social sciences. As a concept, 
multiculturalism is a contested conceptual tool within human sciences in general and 
much to be desired in terms of a critical project (McLennan, 2001a), as well as being 
an analytical paradigm in a position to tackle the wider social theoretical-cum- 
political problems of globalisation and postcolonialism as well as civilisational 
clashes-discourses. Originally, the term multiculturalism referred to the coexistence of 
cultural forms or groups characterised by different cultures within `modern' societies. 
However, it soon became a way of describing cultural differences in a transnational 
and global context. There are several different notions of multiculturalism and not all 
of them have an emancipatory meaning. 
The concept of multiculturalism is equally controversial and riddled with 
tensions. It indicates, either simultaneously or alternatively, both a description and a 
project (Stam, 1997). As a description, it may refer to: 
1. the existence of a multiplicity of cultures in the world; 
2. the coexistence of diverse cultures within the same nation-state; 
3. the existence of cultures that influence each other, both within and outside the 
nation-state. 
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Inasmuch as multiculturalism, as a description of cultural differences and the 
ways in which they interrelate, has superimposed itself on multiculturalism as a 
political project which celebrates or recognises these differences, it has given rise to 
criticisms and controversies, both from conservative sectors and from various 
progressive and left-wing factions (McLennan, 2001b). Conservative critiques have 
been quoted and echoed particularly in the United States of America, as a response to 
transformations in the ethnic composition of the American population; the increased 
presence of immigrants, especially the large contingent of illegal immigrants from 
Latin America; social programmes of affirmative action aimed at excluded or 
marginalised groups, such as African Americans, Muslims or Hispanics; the 
development of cultural studies and women's studies programmes within universities 
and the subsequent transformations of the curriculum of traditional fields such as 
literature, aimed at giving a presence and a voice to women and to minorities; some 
public policies supporting the cultural production of minorities; and, finally, the 
emergence, in the public space, of movements defending a politics of identity based 
on the recognition of difference. Stam (1997) summarises these critiques in the 
following four ways: 
1. Multiculturalism is anti-European, since it seeks to replace the values and 
achievements of Western civilisation with an uncritical promotion of `inferior' 
achievements. 
2. Multiculturalism promotes disunity and division, thus fragmenting society and 
threatening the cohesion and unity of national goals. 
3. Multiculturalism is a `therapy for minorities', aimed at promoting their self- 
esteem in the face of their manifest inability to perform adequately within the 
educational system and within society as a whole. 
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4. Multiculturalism represents a kind of `new Puritanism', supported by the 
policing of language and the totalitarian imposition of `politically correct' speech. 
Some progressive responses to this picture underline the anti-Eurocentric (but 
not anti-European) nature of multicultural projects, promoting the recognition and 
visibility of cultures that have been marginalised or excluded from Western 
modernity. They recognise cultural differences, historical experiences and 
intercultural dialogue in order to forge political alliances and coalitions supporting 
subaltern cultures and groups; they promote historical and cultural `counter- 
perspectives' in order to produce a relational history which includes subaltern groups; 
and they argue that examples of `political correctness' occur in all sectors of society 
and all shades of the political spectrum, but are only attacked when they are 
associated with the defence of equality or the recognition of difference. 
However, the response of the progressive sectors to multiculturalism is neither 
unanimous nor pacific. The reason for this lies in the diversity of the cultural and 
political projects that describe themselves as multicultural, and in the different 
geopolitical and spatial environments in which they operate (whether North or South, 
Islamic or Western, local, national, global, etc). The main criticisms may be grouped 
as follows: 
(1) The concept of multiculturalism is a Eurocentric concept, created to describe 
cultural diversity within the framework of the nation-states of the 
Northern 
hemisphere and to deal with situations resulting from the influx of immigrants from 
the South into a European space without internal borders, the ethnic diversity and 
affirmation of identity of minorities 
in the USA and the specific problems of countries 
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like Canada, with territorially differentiated linguistic or ethnic communities. It is a 
concept that the North has sought to impose on the countries of the South as a means 
of defining their historical condition and identity. This imposition implies the 
`exporting' or `travelling' of concepts or analytical frameworks, which remain bound 
to Eurocentric intellectual domination. In the South, the concept is associated with the 
rhetoric and political agenda of states, often with the aim or result of legitimising 
oppressive or exclusionary forms of `communalism', sometimes linked to religious 
fundamentalism. The multiplicity of adjectives employed in relation to 
multiculturalism, which has been variously described as `liberal', `authoritarian', 
`corporate', `insurgent', `boutique', `critical', `aggregate', `universalist', `essentialist'. 
`paradigmatic' and `modular', points to the fact that it is a concept that has no precise 
content and is not necessarily associated with emancipatory perspectives or projects 
(Bharucha, 2000, p 10). 
(2) For others, multiculturalism is the prime expression of the cultural logic of 
multinational or global capitalism (a capitalism `without a homeland', at last) and of a 
new form of racism: 
the ideal form of ideology of this global capitalism is multiculturalism, the attitude which, from a 
kind of empty global position, treats each local culture the way the colonizer treats colonized 
people - as "natives" whose mores are to be carefully studied and "respected". (... ) 
Multiculturalism is a racism which empties its own position of all positive content (the 
multiculturalist is not a direct racist, he doesn't oppose to the Other the particular values of his 
own culture), but nonetheless retains his position as the privileged empty point of universality from 
which one is able to appreciate (and depreciate) properly other particular cultures - the 
multiculturalist respect for the Other's specificity is the very form of asserting one's own 
superiority. (Zizek, 1997, p 44) 
(3) Multiculturalism tends to be `descriptive' and `apolitical', thus suppressing the 
problem of power relations, exploitation, inequality and exclusion (the `United 
Colours of Benetton' model). Recourse to the notion of `tolerance' does not demand 
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any active involvement with `others' and reinforces feelings of superiority among 
those who speak from a self-defined site of universality. 
(4) In cases where it does occur, the `politicisation' of multicultural projects takes 
place within the framework of the nation-state as a `special status' conferred on 
certain regions or peoples whose collective existence and collective rights are 
recognised only as subordinate to the hegemony of the constitutional order of the 
nation-state (and only while compatible with established notions of sovereignty, rights 
and, especially, property rights). 
(5) Within cultural studies, postcolonial studies and the social sciences (in other 
words social theory), the concept of multiculturalism tends to be dealt with through a 
focus on mobility and migration, with an emphasis on intellectuals, and with a silence . 
in relation to forced or subordinate mobility (refugees, migrant workers, or returned 
emigrants) or to those who have not moved but have been subjected to the effects and 
consequences of translocal cultural, economic and political dynamics. This focus is 
evident both in the postcolonial theories of hybridisation (Bhabha, 1994), and in the 
emphasis placed on the use of literature and other `expressive' cultural forms which 
can be studied by recourse to Eurocentric academic disciplines. This essentialist and 
universalist trend in relation to the `migrant condition' denies the specific histories of 
migration and, furthermore, ignores the "individuals and communities that resist 
migrancy on the basis of other loyalties and bonds to family, tradition, community, 
language, and religion that are not always translatable within the norms of liberal 
individualism" (Bharucha, 2000, p 7). 
(6) Last but not least, it is possible to question the relevance of terms such as `culture' 
or `multiculturalism' in describing and characterising specific contexts and 
experiences which involve distinct ways of viewing and dividing up the world and for 
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which the notion of `culture' or the division between the cultural, the economic, the 
social and the political is not relevant. This criticism raises the problem of the 
`strategic' use of hegemonic concepts, an issue that will be discussed further in the 
following section. 
In spite of the criticisms presented above, the term `multiculturalism' has 
become widespread as a means of designating cultural differences in a transnational 
and global context. This does not mean, however, that the internal contradictions and 
tensions identified by critics have been overcome. In fact, the expression may 
continue to be associated with emancipatory and counter-hegemonic issues and 
projects or with modes of regulating differences in the context of the exercise of 
hegemony in nation-states or on a global scale. It is significant, therefore, to specify 
the conditions under which multiculturalism as a project can assume an emancipatory 
content and direction in intercivilisational regards (see below). 
In brief, within social theory, multiculturalism has come to be considered as an 
attempt to expand the canon of recognition, difference and equality in all spheres of 
social life and praxis, while it seems the theoretical bases of `multicultural expansion' 
lacks the logic of positivity. 
4. Summary 
Modern scientific method has a demonstrable Western bias as evidenced in the 
Westernness of rationality, ie its positivist/realist meta-theoretical discourse, its 
sociological/institutional `expert' knowledge production, and its industrial/economic 
uses of that knowledge. Twentieth-century critics have argued that Western rationality 
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limits and biases the pursuit of knowledge, particularly from three perspectives. First, 
it supplants the philosophical/romantic approach to knowing with mechanics (eg 
Theodore Roszak). Second, it focuses on anthropocentrism and species reductionism 
from a socio-ecological/industrial view (eg Jeremy Rifkin, Gregory Bateson, Arne 
Naess). Finally, Western rationality's social-theoretical underpinnings inhibit 
exploring alternative ways of knowing, as articulated in three interrelated positions: 
the feminist critique of its inherent gender bias, the anti-Eurocentric critique of its 
ideology's lack of a truly global view of the world system (eg Andre Gunder Frank) 
and its naturalisation of capitalism, and the multicultural critics' attempts to expand 
the very definition of multiculturalism from privileging Eurocentrism to encapsulating 
a transnational and global reality. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The dialogue of civilisations: theoretical basis and political 
dimensions 
1. Introduction: modernity and its alternatives 
The aim of the previous chapter was to identify the need for alternatives to what has 
been perceived as `Westernness' in the context of modernity. The purpose was to 
convey to the reader the idea that modernity is synonymous with `civilisation', 
namely modern civilisation. As with any social reality, modem civilisation is not 
without its discontents and since its formation modernity has had as many critics as 
advocates. However, the overall aim of Chapter One was to give sociological 
credence to the idea of critique and, by locating the critical voices within the paradigm 
of modernity, I tried to approach the idea of critique from outside the paradigm of 
Western civilisation in order to pave the way in this chapter for the idea of dialogue 
(assuming that it is possible to think of plurality in relation to culture and civilisation 
in general, and pluralism in matters of intellectual significance in particular). In order 
to lay down the critical foundations of what I have called intercivilisational dialogue', 
' The questions of civilisation and its analysis have always preoccupied the minds of theorists within 
social theory and philosophy. Many contemporary secular analysts of civilisational questions approach 
the problem of civilisation in a general manner without breaking it down into, for instance, its various 
modes of manifestations or intellectuals who embody these manifestations. One of the reasons might be 
that they indeed represent the dominant tradition and what they analyse and see as significant 
intellectual questions are only those concerns that are deemed dire and urgent within the secular 
paradigm that has the best institutional apparatuses. My approach is to give a definition of civilisation 
and then look at intellectuals in both Muslim and Western traditions and see how they respectively 
view particular questions and how they address specific concerns. There is no imperative intellectual 
need to reduce the meaning of `civilisation' and its analysis to mega-components alone. One can define 
the meaning of civilisation as `civility', which, in itself, does not need to be equated to the current 
secular meaning of the term, namely `civic rules' only. It could refer also to the nobility of the soul and 
the refinement of character or various other modes of being. In other words, to confine the meaning of 
civilisation to the `engineering of civility' tradition 
is tantamount to failing to explore the plurality of 
meanings that exist within the matrix of human existence. 
(See, for example, the important symposium 
in International Sociology, vol 16, no 3, Sept 2001, pp 277-360. ) 
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this chapter aims to furnish the theoretical basis of such a dialogue within the 
paradigm of sociology against a topical background of existentialist concerns that are 
instrumental in a cross-cultural study. 
Until now, alternatives to modernity have tended to be partial and often self- 
defeating. One aspect of Western modernity has been criticised or challenged while 
other aspects have been accepted and even utilised in mounting the critique. This is to 
be expected. Modernity has developed its contemporary form and its impressive 
power through a long historical process and it is thus only to be expected that it 
cannot, in a short time, be replaced by something that is as effective and all- 
encompassing. On the other hand, the fact that the tradition has its shortcomings does 
not mean that it is in need of an entire overhaul. Very few of the critical viewpoints 
that have been discussed in the previous chapter reject the general aim of modernity to 
destroy the powers of absolutism (in politics), obscurantism (in social matters) and 
irrationalism (in scientific regards). Rationality itself is not the issue so much as the 
uses to which rationality are put and the institutional contexts in which it is organised. 
To draw upon and employ in a wider sense Böhme's approach to the problem 
of `alternative paradigms', where he argues that the alternative to science is 
irrationalism or obscurantism, one can discern that there had been, throughout modern 
history, sufficient alternative traditions within the modern world system to sustain 
visions of the good society (Böhme, 1979). The difficulty has been in realising the 
good while avoiding the `bad' applications and priorities. Since the French 
Revolution, the modern world system has witnessed many great revolutions (Russian 
Revolution, Chinese Revolution, Cuban Revolution, Iranian Revolution), but the 
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situation has not changed significantly. There has been a much greater move towards 
addressing civilisational issues in developing countries, and the rediscovery of non- 
Western traditions has, if anything, grown more intense. However, while the level of 
rhetoric has been raised, it is far too early to see a fully-fledged alternative to 
modernity (or even alternative modernity) emerging any time soon. 
If the search for alternatives to modernity can lead to more modest, even more 
dialogical cultural paradigms, or if it can encourage a more open dialogue with other 
traditions, then there is much to gain. At the very least, the critiques of 
Westernisation, Western modernity and Occidental rationality have raised some 
fundamental questions about the ways in which human societies make use of their 
creative resources, and out of that questioning, it is perhaps not too optimistic to think 
that the world's citizens might obtain a more varied, even pluralistic, range of 
approaches to deal with the problems that confront them. 
2. The concept of `civilisation' reconsidered 
The grand cliche of hyper-modernism used to read as follows: culture is what 
anthropologists study, and civilisation is what they return to. Although the concept 
may be obsolete now, it was once relevant - particularly when one bears in mind the 
`mega-colonialism' of early modernity, an era based on land appropriation (as 
opposed to the hyper-imperialism of late modernity) when all but a few of the world's 
countries were divided among a few super-powers. Where colonialism emerged as the 
societal organisation, social sciences as institutional sites of knowledge did, indeed, 
appear. In other words, the concept is obsolete in the context of postcolonialism rather 
than in historical fact. The aim at this juncture is not to give all-inclusive definitions, 
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but as institutional human scientists would see it, `culture' is what you get when you 
are `acculturated' - it is a set of basic rules and folk views used by societies in their 
dealings with the world - while `civilisation' is a particular type of society as a 
system - the type of society that propagates itself through texts as well as through 
direct contact. Civilisation as a term for `doing good things' is exactly the same sort 
of folk view as `the traditional ways are best because they are left to us by our 
guardian ancestor spirits'. Accepting customary ways of doing things as `right and 
normal' is institutionalisation, whether it is African villagers beating drums to scare 
away evil spirits or American commuters blowing horns to break up a traffic jam. 
A cursory look at Raymond Williams's Keywords, which usually says 
something useful about such matters, reveals that the distinction between civilisation 
and culture is one of the most complicated conceptual differentiations in English. 
There is a three-page entry on civilisation. Williams notes that it is a process at the 
end of which "civilisation still refers to a general condition or state, and is still 
contrasted with savagery or barbarism" (1988, pp 57-60). For culture, on the other 
hand, there is a six-page entry, beginning with the line: "Culture is one of the two or 
three most complicated words in the English language" (1988, pp 87-93). Williams 
notes that for some, such as Herder and Spengler, culture epitomised the mental 
aspect of the individual as well as collective aspirations, whereas for others, such as 
von Humboldt, `culture' represented material development as opposed to the spiritual 
dimension of `civilisation' until as late as the early twentieth century (1988, p 90). 
To complicate things further, Williams also notes that the same kind of 
distinction, especially that between `material' and `spiritual' development, was made 
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by German thinkers in the tradition of Romanticism, who opposed a mechanical view 
of development (1988, p 89). These complications and the tremendous perplexities 
that reigned over matters of `spirituality' and `materiality' in relation to development 
(individual as well as collective) were not entirely unrelated to the wider issue of 
Weltanschauung that followed the collapse of the metaphysical unity of Western 
Catholicism as a result of the spread and consolidation of reformative consciousness. 
The confusing discourses that arose and put their respective imprint on the subsequent 
debates on civilisation and culture were signs of the intellectual struggle to overcome 
the problem of meaning in matters of individuality and collectivity both within and 
without the `native' cultural sphere. 
However, these struggles were to be of great benefit in terms of 
intercivilisational dialogue in the paragonic statement of Herder, who repudiated the 
monological civilisational historiographies and proposed instead a `multicultural' 
approach to the question of nations by insisting on the plurality of `cultures' 
(Williams, 1988, p 89). 
Moreover, the distinction between culture and civilisation is very dependent 
on which language one is using within the Western world. There is a difference 
between the two terms in English and French, but not German. For example, Sigmund 
Freud's Das Unbehagen in der Kultur was translated in French as Malaise dans la 
civilisation (translated into English as Civilisation and its discontents)2. The 
distinction seems to be a matter of philosophical culture and tradition within three 
main Western European spheres of learning, namely German, French and English. In 
2A new translation of Freud into French is entitled Malaise dans la culture. 
a 
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German thought, `die Kultur' is in the same category as `die. Natur', and Freud, after 
Kant and Hegel, uses the terms in direct opposition to each other. French philosophy, 
on the other hand, does not consider them to be direct opposites, and for that reason 
has invented the `droit naturel' (natural right). Such a concept is problematic in the 
light of sociological critique, where `right' is understood to be a cultural concept, 
invented by civilisation and not promulgated by nature. 
English and American thought, dominated as it is by the puritanical existence 
of God in daily life, considers that culture is somehow subordinated to nature and not 
opposed to it. This may be one of the reasons why within contemporary international 
relations there is much confusion about the ideology of `human rights', which is 
sometimes used to justify imperialistic aggression against civilisation that in fact 
denies the rights of many citizens. 
The difference between Kultur and Zivilization in German thought, on the 
other hand, goes back to the nineteenth century and has been the subject of much 
discussion, partly because the distinction became blurred in many discourses 
including those of Spengler. The original idea seemingly sprang from the sense that 
civilisation is somehow one-dimensional, horizontal history, compared with the 
`culture' emerging in relation to deeper consciousness. 
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The more specific distinction of Kultur and Zivilization has an extensive 
literature3, but the ideas4, as far as I know, have not been sufficiently analysed so far. 
There are others who argue that the difference between `culture' and `civilisation' is 
in the eye of the beholder. Spengler, for instance, has the idea that culture is mostly 
creative energy and civilisation is the edifice built on it that ultimately suffocates it. 
This definition fits neatly within the Eliasian figurational sociological tradition, where 
there is an assumption that the national differences between German and French 
versus Anglo-American have had determining effects upon the use of the concepts of 
`civilisation' and `culture' (Maguire, 1999). 
In other words, it seems that the epistemological context of the `beholder' (or 
what is more commonly termed `perspective' within distinct intellectual disciplines) 
plays a vital role in depicting the contours and distinguishing between various layers 
of cultivation and civility in relation to structural aspects of historical societies. 
Let us, for the purpose of this thesis, settle for a `pragmatic definition' of the 
term in order to be able to pave the way for the introduction of modern themes in 
3 Febvre, L. (1973) `Civilisation: evolution of a word and a group of ideas', in P. Burke (ed) A new 
kind of history: from the writings of Febvre, translated by K. Folca, New York: 
Harper and Row. 
Febvre's essay on civilisation is followed by Emile Tonnelat's on Kultur. Febvre, L. 
(1930) 
`Civilisation: volution d'un mot et d'un groupe d'idees', in Centre International de Synthse 
(ed) 
Civilisation: le mot et l'idee, Paris: La Renaissance du Livre. Elias, N. (1994 [1939]) 
The civilizing 
process: sociogenetic and psychogenetic investigations, E. Dunning, 
J. Goudsblom and S. Mennell 
(eds), translated by E. Jephcott, Oxford: Blackwell. Kroeber, A. L. and Kluckhohn, C. (1963 [1952]) 
Culture: a critical review of concepts and definitions, New York: Vintage. 
4 The concept's greatest chroniclers - from Febvre, who focused on the contradiction 
between that 
notion which signified the progress of humanity and stood opposed to 
barbarism, and the term which 
represented an assemblage of the collective life of a 
human group and implied no value judgment 
(Febvre, 1973 [1930], p 220); to Elias, who portrayed the long and uneasy relationship between the 
`materialistic' Anglo-French civilisation and the `idealistic' German Kultur (1994 [1939], p 3); to 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn, who conversely pointed to cyclical variations 
in usage in all three languages 
and saw both words as contributing to the concept 
`culture' which they regard as the foundation stone 
of all the social sciences (Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn, 1963 [1952]). 
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relation to Muslim thinkers in an intercivilisational perspective by assessing how they 
respond respectively to the uncertain quest of modernity on various accounts. 
Before going any further, we need to clarify the use of the term `pragmatic' in 
our definition. Broadly speaking, within philosophy and social theory, pragmatism 
stands for: (a) the position that the content of a concept consists only in its practical 
applicability; and (b) the philosophical stance that truth consists not in 
correspondence with the facts but in successful coherence with experience (Putnam, 
1995). However, here we are not concerned with this philosophical position and its 
respective stances. On the contrary, by `pragmatism', we mean a practical approach to 
the idea of `civilisation', which would render our overall project practically feasible. 
This practical definition will allow us to bring into a dialogue the position of Muslim 
intellectual tradition with mainstream social theory based on thematic modem issues 
such as community, secular, sacred, religion and Man. So when we use the term 
`pragmatic' in the context of this project, we do not mean the philosophical approach 
that embraces the work of C. S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey or Mead. We 
mean simply a practical (feasible) approach to the problem of `civilisation', which fits 
in with the needs of an intercivilisational dialogue. 
Although it is undeniable that civilisation and civilisational patterns have been 
nurtured within the context of `city' (Mumford, 1973), nevertheless it is a mistake 
totally to equate one with the other, because one is the quality of `soul' and the 
refinement of the human spirit, which cannot necessarily be confined to the 
framework of the 'city'. To confine the emergence of `civility' (in its broadest sense) 
to the frame of citadel reference could be to run the risk of ignoring the richness and 
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depth of `civility' (understood by Clive Bell to be an acquisition of self-consciousness 
and a habit of reflection) that may exist outside of cities (both historic and 
contemporary) (Bell, 1938). One example is sufficient to demonstrate the 
unfeasibility of the essential connection between `city' and `the emergence of 
civility': the rise of `street violence' and the spread of modern city. Let me explain 
what I mean by the idea of civilisation in a dual sense. 
The term civilisation, as demonstrated above, has been used by philosophers 
of history, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, literary critics, historians, 
economists and archaeologists. My aim is not to delineate the different stages and 
shades of meaning in the history of this term; I will simply offer a definition that will 
enable us to conduct our search into an intercivilisational dialogue with a focused 
concern on existentialistic issues. 
French thinkers first introduced the idea of civilisation in the eighteenth 
century in order to distinguish between barbarism and a civilised society (Huntington, 
1996, p 40). Three main criteria were introduced to distinguish between culture (a 
primitive society) and civilisation (a civilised society): settled versus nomad; urban 
versus rural; literate versus illiterate. If this is the case, then a civilisation cannot be 
defined conclusively because the French approach seems to concentrate on how to 
distinguish the civilised from the uncivilised, whereas a culture may be perfectly 
civilised without being a civilisation. Therefore, we need a definition of civilisation, 
which is broader in its scope. 
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If one examines past civilisations, one will see that it is hard to distinguish 
them from cultures except for the fact that civilisations are much broader and include 
more than one culture; hence, a civilisation is in fact an `universalised culture'. This 
means that a civilisation is in its true sense a culture that is no longer limited to its 
local and national confines. As such it begins to include within its boundaries many 
sub-cultures, all of which are very much influenced by the foundational culture that 
has become an all-embracing culture, in other words a civilisation. It is possible to 
find such a culture in the ultimate analysis of every true civilisation. 
Our definition of civilisation enables us to distinguish the following criteria 
for civilisations: universality; multiculturalism; having an official language that 
characterises its literature, whether scientific or artistic. If a culture does not have 
these characteristics it cannot be called a 'civilisation'. It is clear that the most 
important aspect of a civilisation is its universality; and in fact all other aspects can be 
reduced to this (Acikgenc, 1998). This definition of `civilisation' allows us to think 
beyond the Gibbonistic paradigm of civilisational singularity or Huntingtonian 
clashism (Wolf-Gazo, 2000). Our definition of civilisation enables us to discern and 
recognise the possibility of an intercivilisational dialogue, which would ultimately 
render the promise of sociology5 a viable and attainable dream (Mills, 1970). 
Debates on civilisations have entered a new phase since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and the liberation of many subjugated peoples and their entry to the 
House of Nations as sovereign states. This process in itself could be viewed as a 
5 There have been many promises given by many intellectuals in the name of sociology but I do not 
intend to give an account about those broken promises here. What I 
have in mind is the `promise of 
sociology' as illustrated by C. W. 
Mills, where he says the promise of any social study is to come back 
to the problems of biography, of history, and of their 
intersections within a society (1970, p 12). 
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progressive march in a historical sense, where the ideals of Enlightenment are taken 
as the point of departure in assessing questions of historical significance. Many have 
come to understand the issues of late modernity in terms of various civilisations and 
cultures and in so doing assume that the material bases of pluralism are to be found 
there rather than in the Marxist critiques of political economic dimensions of the past. 
This approach to the problems of cultures and civilisations, to say the least, seems to 
be premature and lacking in any sense of positivity, which does include a Millsian 
approach to the problems of the social. That is to contend that any approach to the 
problems of civilisations and cultures, which are inevitably historical artefacts and 
conditioned by three fundamental Millsian questions (of societal structure, historical 
locus and individual biography), falls short of a positive sociological evaluation 
(Mills, 1970, p 13). It may seem plausible to think of various civilisational units in a 
symbolic sense (and to a certain extent in relation to linguistic indicators), but it is 
hard to fathom in any concrete sense a plurality of civilisations within a contemporary 
world system. 
This point can be illustrated by the banal example of criminal justice and its 
relation to the legal apparatus of contemporary nation-states. It is hard not to see the 
similarity between contemporary legal and prison systems within any nation-state. In 
the contemporary world, regardless of where you find yourself in a civilisational 
sense, the same cycles exist: crime, prison and punishment or sex, prostitution and 
poverty, to take two structural examples. All modern states have produced ways of 
defining crime, building prisons and issuing verdicts or ignoring poverty, rationalising 
prostitution (or punishing the victims 
by failing to address the structural bases of 
poverty) and deregulating sexuality 
(by resorting to dubious concepts of revolution 
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and liberalisation). In other words, a system of coercive surveillance seems to be 
universal and to ignore this would be nothing short of `bad faith' on the part of social 
analysts with regard to civilisational dialogues. Another example is the rapid growth 
of `intelligence services' in coercive regimes at a global level and the demand for 
dialogue with other states by the same regimes, while the least dissent at home cannot 
even be formally recognised by resorting to the `principle of intercivilisational 
dialogue'. While there is a deafening cry for alternative modernity on the one hand, 
the same countries that scream for `dialogue' with the West increasingly use more 
modern means of coercion. 
On the other hand, it seems that those intellectuals who argue for a plurality of 
civilisations think of it as a reality here and now, while the facts indicate otherwise - 
and this lack of realisation seems to play into the hands of coercive regimes. The 
simple example of `human rights' in this context illustrates the sociological 
importance of this argument. Many contemporary intellectuals who argue for 
alternative civilisational patterns seem to be blind to the coercive nature of states that 
demand alternatives to a universal human rights charter. By turning a blind eye, they 
contribute to the authoritarian nature of homegrown despotism and minimise the 
chances for any authentic democracy. On the other hand, there are examples of 
imperial powers attempting to enforce their `national agenda' on decolonised nations 
of the Third World for political purposes in the name of human rights. 
In other words, 
there seem to be two civilisations within the contemporary world system 
in both the 
material and the political economic sense. 
While it is plausible to argue that there are 
as many civilisations in a symbolic sense as 
Samuel Huntington contends, it is hard to 
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deny the fact that there are only two major civilisations in the political economic 
sense. 
In 1963, C. P. Snow (Snow, 1963) wrote an essay on the `two cultures', 
drawing attention to the differences that exist between scientists and literary 
intellectuals, deploring the lack of communication and understanding between them, 
and making a strong plea for the emergence of a more integrated culture in which the 
humanities and the sciences would contribute equally and grow through mutual 
interaction. However important the differences and lack of communication between 
Snow's `two cultures' - which may indeed have increased as a function of the 
growing impact of scientific methods and activities on all societies - they have been 
overshadowed by the even more profound and disturbing material differences 
between the rich and the poor nations of the world. Indeed, Snow made reference to 
these glaring inequalities and attributed their existence in part to the inability of the 
West, with its divided culture, to grasp their magnitude and to understand the need for 
urgent and profound structural transformations of a social, economic, political, and 
cultural character. 
It seems clear that, in keeping with the end of the twentieth century, a great 
part of the twenty-first century will be dominated by the growing gulf between the 
industrialised and the developing countries, in so far as one can talk in terms of `two 
civilisations' rather than of several worlds. The concept of the Third World emerged 
as both a third element and a buffer more or less manipulated by and manipulative of 
the two rival blocs, communism and capitalism, that confronted each other after the 
Second World War. Now that communism has disintegrated as a geopolitical force, 
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the notion of the Third World is all the more meaningless in that most of the former 
communist countries fall into a new category, that of industrialised countries that have 
become in their turn newly developing countries. Moreover, developing countries do 
not constitute a homogeneous category, and the need to distinguish various levels of 
development and even underdevelopment is more pertinent than ever. 
The world is still divided into two civilisations that interact strongly, although 
the interaction is one-sided: the second civilisation is dependent on and deeply 
affected by the first and lacks the capacity of influencing it to the same degree. The 
first civilisation is based on the growth of science as the main knowledge-generating 
activity, the rapid evolution of science-related technologies, the incorporation of these 
technologies into productive and social processes, and the emergence of new forms of 
working and living deeply influenced by the Weltanschauung of modern science and 
science-related technologies. The second civilisation is characterised by the lack of 
capacity to generate scientific knowledge on a large scale and by a passive acceptance 
of the scientific results generated in the first; by a technological base that comprises a 
substantive element of traditional technologies and a veneer of imported ones; by a 
productive system whose modern segment is dependent on the expansion of 
production in Western industrialised nations and on the absorption of imported 
technology, and whose traditional segment vegetates and is based on an often stagnant 
traditional technological infrastructure; and by the co-existence of disjointed and even 
contradictory cultures. 
The first civilisation, corresponding to the developed, or highly industrialised, 
countries, has an endogenous scientific and technological 
base. The second 
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civilisation is not swimming, but struggling to stay afloat, with the exception of a 
handful of countries that have recently succeeded in catching up with some of the best 
swimmers in the first civilisation. The great majority of the countries in the second 
civilisation are not only lagging behind but lack, above all, most of the basic 
ingredients - in terms of resources, institutions, manpower and cultural background - 
necessary for benefiting from scientific knowledge and new technological 
innovations. 
Development is an ambivalent quest in which the seekers rely heavily on 
science and technology. In short, despite what was promised by the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment and even more by the positivism of the nineteenth century, scientific 
and technical progress does not necessarily coincide with social or moral progress. 
Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, economic progress has meant socio- 
political unrest. Schumpeter seems to concede with Karl Marx at least in this regard, 
and stressed the `revolutionary character' of industrial capitalism, which leads to the 
obsolescence, destruction and renewal of economic and social structures. This is what 
is involved in innovation, and now that innovation is worshipped as the driving force 
of international competitiveness, it is important to recognise that it always has a price 
attached: technical change is accompanied by social change (Schumpeter, 1950). 
The issue of how to bridge the gap between modernity and tradition is 
constantly raised by modernity and felt by tradition, and the economic implications 
naturally have philosophical dimensions, due to the fact that the quest is, in the final 
analysis, always a human quest impregnated with existential ambiguities. There has to 
be choice at least in relation to the importance attached to tradition, to 
its structures, 
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hierarchies, codes and rites, as against rationalisation, with its constraints, order and 
disorder, its capacity to transform and destroy. As Alain Touraine (1995) has pointed 
out, scientific and technical thinking threatens to reduce human beings to purely 
instrumental rationality, while attacks on rationality from the viewpoint of particular 
faiths, traditions or communities threaten to retard or even prevent change by 
searching for compensations for the present in a mythical past. To bring together the 
economic vision and the cultural one involves the same difficulties as making a bridge 
between the particular and the universal, or between facts and values. 
The developing world has forced industrialised countries to recognise not only 
that their cultures are extremely diverse but also that that diversity is perfectly 
legitimate. Both sides have learned, too, that development cannot take place without 
dialogue between cultural heritage and instrumental rationality, even if the two cannot 
be entirely reconciled. Since the upheavals marking the end of the twentieth century, 
especially after the collapse of totalitarian ideologies and regimes, the whole world 
has been searching for new paths and alternatives leading to a better social order on a 
grand universal scale. Modernity can contribute a great deal to development, but it 
cannot do everything, and above all it does not offer a ready-made solution to the 
problem of values that is raised by the clash between tradition and modernity - and 
now due to geopolitical changes `perceived' as clashes between civilisations without 
any sense of sociological deconstruction in delineating streams of both tradition and 
modernity in all contemporary nation-states. 
Modern societies have realised that they can no longer place their trust in 
progress as people thought 
in the Enlightenment. But while nobody believes any 
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longer that growth necessarily brings with it greater democracy and happiness, 
everybody knows now that development requires growth and a certain degree of 
rationality, no longer relying on technical or administrative efficiency alone, but 
rather on an awareness and a mastery of the consequences of scientific and technical 
change if we, as a human race, are to avoid falling into the `madhouse' Tolstoy 
warned us of not so very long ago. 
3. Civilisational fault lines or civilisational dialogue? 
Huntington sees modernisation as inevitable in the long run for all societies. However, 
unlike Fukuyama, he considers societal values as more significant in shaping the 
identity of civilisations. Moreover, he sees such values as weakening in the earlier 
stages of modernisation but gaining strength as a society becomes stronger both 
economically and militarily. Thus social values assert themselves along with 
modernisation in the long run - indeed the more a society modernises, the more it 
returns to its cultural roots. He writes: 
Modernization, in short, does not necessarily mean Westernization. Non-Western societies can 
modernize and have modernized without abandoning their own cultures and adopting wholesale 
Western values, institutions and practices. The latter, indeed, may be almost impossible: whatever 
obstacles non-Western cultures pose to modernization pale before those they pose to 
Westernization.... Modernization, instead, strengthens those cultures and reduces the relative 
power of the West. In fundamental ways, the world is becoming more modern and less Western. 
(Huntington, 1996, p 78) 
Thus for Huntington our world of modernising civilisations is one which is 
ultimately tending towards a world of colliding values -a world 
in which the clash of 
civilisations would replace the demise of the clash of 
ideologies that characterised the 
twentieth century. In particular, Huntington identified the 
Confucian cultures of East 
Asia and the Islamic cultures as the major opponents of 
Western civilisation, which he 
81 
identifies with Europe and the United States. Moreover, he even projects a union of 
interests of the East Asian and Islamic societies forged through the exchange of oil for 
arms, which would bring them together in an alliance against the West. Given 
Huntington's close links with policy-makers in the US, this thesis is taken seriously 
by many in the wider world and criticised for the danger it poses as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. However, what is relevant to our concerns is that his conception of future 
trends leads Huntington to reject multicultural calls within the United States, largely 
originating in the civil rights movement in the 1960s (a movement triggered by the 
decolonising forces and processes in the rest of the world). 
Moreover, in the 1960s the United States was also rocked by a counter-culture 
movement, which turned towards cultural traditions of the Third World to define 
much of its identity. This was the time when Hindu gurus, Buddhist bhikkus, Sufi 
mystics and cultural and spiritual representatives from the many newly independent 
countries in the Third World made their way to the United States in order to project 
their views there. Their impact on American culture has been permanent. Ever since 
then, multicultural forces in the United States have been gaining momentum (albeit 
their intensity has decreased as resistance to them has waned over time). 
Nevertheless, the 1990s saw a resurgence of multicultural concerns in 
American academia -a phenomenon described even by American thinkers as the 
`culture wars'. Huntington perceives this dialogue as a serious threat to Western 
civilisation and argues that it could undermine one of the central pillars of 
American 
identity. He writes: 
A more immediate and dangerous challenge exists 
in the United States. Historically American 
national identity has been defined culturally 
by the heritage of Western civilisation and politically 
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by the principles of the American Creed on which Americans overwhelmingly agree: liberty, 
democracy, individualism, equality before the law, constitutionalism, private property. In the late 
twentieth century both components of American identity have come under concentrated and 
sustained onslaught from a small but influential number of intellectuals and publicists. In the name 
of multiculturalism they have attacked the identification of the United States with Western 
civilisation, denied the existence of a common American culture, and promoted racial, ethnic, and 
other subnational cultural identities and groupings. (Huntington, 1996, p 305) 
Having warned the public about the hazardous challenge, he continues: 
The futures of the United States and of the West depend upon Americans reaffirming their 
commitment to Western civilisation. Domestically this means rejecting the divisive siren calls of 
multiculturalism. Internationally it means rejecting the elusive and illusory calls to identify the 
United States with Asia.... Americans are culturally a part of the Western family; multiculturalists 
may damage and even destroy that relationship but they cannot replace it. When Americans look 
for their cultural roots they find them in Europe. (1996, p 307) 
His concerns about the multicultural threat, as he sees it, within his native 
country, ie the US, leads Huntington into what appears to be a fortress mentality - the 
West must unite against the Rest. He argues that in order 
to preserve Western civilisation in the face of declining Western power, it is in the interest of the 
United States and European countries... to achieve greater political, economic, and military 
integration and to coordinate their policies so as to preclude states from other civilisations 
exploiting differences among them. (1996, pp 311-12) 
He then goes on to describe a nightmare scenario of civilisational war 
(improbable but not impossible, he says) in which the United States and Europe, 
forging a strategic alliance with Russia and India, 
... 
become engaged in a global struggle with China, Japan, and most of Islam. (1996, p 315) 
Huntington is certainly right to say that there are profound differences that 
divide civilisations, but his nightmare vision of civilisational wars, prompted 
by 
concerns about the multicultural 
debates within his own country, and the solutions he 
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proposes to address his concerns can only exacerbate the problem. The greatest 
danger is, as is becoming more and more evident in post-September Il Anglo- 
American foreign policy, that the strategic initiatives he proposes would make his 
predictions self-generating. The phenomenon of globalisation will not go away by 
creating civilisational fortresses - it have to be addressed sociologically and not 
ideologically camouflaged under policy concerns along security lines and/or so-called 
`national interests'. Because sociologists6 are better equipped to address these 
concerns and these interests, they also need to be deconstructed along the lines of 
`class', `gender', `ethnicity' and `race', lest one mistakes `corporate interests' for the 
interests of the nation. 
Moreover, writing at a time when globalising networks were on rise and 
multicultural forces were making their presence felt more and more, Huntington failed 
to take into account the cross-over of cultures that would be engendered by the global 
burst of cosmopolitan consciousness (the growth of disciplinary sciences, 
international peace movements and non-governmental organisations, and events such 
as the Olympic Games are some of the factors that have been instrumental in 
consolidating such a consciousness among people from all walks of life). To say the 
least, his notion of `civilisation' is a theological one, but one that is in bad taste due to 
the fact that what constitutes the semantic field of the ontology of collective humanity 
lacks the metaphysical rigors of Christian systematic theology. 
6 By sociology I do not refer to the disciplinary notions of `sociological inquiry' but think mainly along 
the lines proposed by C. W. Mills, where the latter depicts the contours of contemporary imagination 
that enable us to grasp history and biography and the relations 
between the two within society. This he 
calls `sociological imagination', which sometimes unfortunately 
falls outside the parameters of 
disciplinary sociology. In other words, my call should not be perceived as a sectarian act of 
proselytisation (Mills, 1976, p 
12). 
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4. Clash of civilisations versus intercivilisational dialogue 
The rise of fundamentalism in American politics and the equivalently deadly 
emergence of fundamentalism among Muslim youth is significant in the vocabulary 
of international politics and indicates that something somewhere has gone badly 
wrong, which, in the words of Eisenstadt, needs a 
... closer examination of the contemporary scene [with all these continuous] ... reinterpretation 
and reconstruction ... of the multiple modernities ... by various groups and movements to 
reappropriate modernity ... 
in their own new terms. (2001, pp 335,338) 
Rather than being a sign of the times, the appearance of clash theories and 
confrontational commentators are more a sign of the lack of rigorous thinking on the 
part intellectuals on both sides of the camp: Islam and the West. What makes the 
fundamentalist discourses on both sides fascinating and popular are not their 
argumentative forces or the vastness of their visions but their blending of truth and 
falsity. One of the great contributions of clash paradigms to contemporary 
civilisational debates is the statement of the perennial facts about mega-collectivities, 
which like different personalities do constitute different patterns of existence and 
demonstrate distinguished trajectories as if various civilisations can be thought of as 
individuated mega-personalities. This is a noble finding that should not be denied just 
because those who formulated it in modern jargon are commanders of `hate' and 
because such a statement could contribute to more political clashes on a global scale. 
This politically correct approach has been one of the deadliest blows to intellectuals 
all over the contemporary world. One of the great lessons of logic is the rational 
ability to analyse `principles' of sound reasoning and valid inference by which 
conclusions may be drawn from initial premises. Now one can connect this art to the 
current debate on civilisations and distinguish between `sound reasoning' and `false 
conclusion' on the part of clash-theorists and confrontational commentators. 
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From the simple fact that different, essentially distinguished, civilisations 
exist, two conclusions could be drawn, to use the language of classical logic: first, the 
differences between two individuated mega-collectivities will inevitably lead to 
competition which will ultimately result in destruction; second, to avoid the total 
destruction that would result from a head-to-head confrontation, one civilisation 
should ultimately, for the good of all, dominate and subjugate the other. 
In other words, the vocabulary of existence has been reduced to two 
fundamental categories of Realpolitik significance: corrosive competition and 
dominance. The hardest part of this bogus debate is not to demonstrate the logical 
flaw in their respective conclusions but to examine how such nonsensical arguments 
could grow on Western as well as Islamic soil. If one reduces, for the purpose of this 
discussion, the classical as well as modern Western tradition to the recent theoretical 
as well as political discoveries (such as multiculturalism, postmodernism, reflexive 
discourses and deconstructionism, etc), then one is left with a profound sense of loss - 
how could all these happen in the light of contemporary (post-Second World War) 
vigilant reflexivity? This is a valid question, which modern intellectuals urgently need 
to address - how could such a poisonous snake rear 
its head in the matrix of post- 
reflexivity? The same applies, albeit more forcefully, to Islam and those who speak in 
the name of this religious tradition. How could there be any sounder view on 
civilisational issues than the Ummayadist jurisprudential view of `The House of Islam 
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versus The House of War'? Is the whole prophetic tradition reducible to one idiom of 
`confrontation' vis-a-vis the 'other' 7,? 
My reading of both traditions has led me to be sceptical of contemporary 
readings among fundamentalists within both the West and Islam. It seems that both 
groups have reduced unduly the entire richness of Western tradition as well as Islamic 
tradition to simple idioms of `clash', `dominance', `confrontation' and `negative 
competition'. In the light of such misconstrued readings, one is left with nothing but a 
call to the first principles and a re-reading of each tradition in the light of those first 
principles. This is what Hans Köchler in the tradition of Hans-Georg Gadamer terms 
`cultural hermeneutics' (see below). If each civilisation is construed as though it is an 
ideally individuated mega-personality, why should the next step be `dominance' or 
`confrontation'? Within Jungian psychoanalytical discourses, one thinks of the 
`individuation process' as a mode in which the unconscious and conscious are 
harmonised. This is achieved by getting in touch with the unconscious, without 
allowing the ego to be overwhelmed by it. Ego has an explicit value. Functions that 
exist below the threshold of consciousness need to be brought above that threshold, 
repressed shadow contents need to be acknowledged, and the major archetypes of the 
collective unconscious (shadow, anima/animus, self) need to be discovered and 
related to, so that their influence can be consciously mediated and their concerns 
addressed, since they are quasi-autonomous subpersonalities in their own right. Apart 
This refers to the dynasty of Ummayad, which was established in 661 by Moavieh, who succeeded 
in 
hijacking the mantle of Prophet by consolidating the temporal and religious power within a semi- 
kingship institution of so-called Caliphate through suppression and massacre of the noblemen and 
women of the House of Prophet. In concealing the tyrannical rule of 
his kingdom, he and others 
pursued an active aggressive 
foreign policy in diverting internal opinion by suppressing the voice of 
those who asked for the basis of the `legitimacy' of 
Ummayad kingship. Instead the Jurists of the 
Ummayad Dynasty concocted the idea of House of Islam versus the House of War as a political tool of 
oppression in concealing the real 
issues of legitimacy in Islam. 
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from the technical jargon employed in Jungian analytical psychology, one thing that is 
of great importance to us in relation to our current civilisational concerns is 
paradigmatic primacy. Should `dominance' or `confrontation' be our civilisational 
leitmotif or there could be other options? 
If one concedes that the process of individuation is achievable once `harmony' 
reigns over the body and soul of all individuals within society, then it is not difficult 
to understand how this state of affairs (both individually and collectively) cannot be 
achieved through violence, confrontation and clash. There is much evidence of this in 
both traditions and indeed the origins of both traditions indicate that co-existentiality 
is possible when dialogue reigns supreme. 
What does `co-existence' mean in a civilisational context? Let us look at the 
make-up of the term first, which will enable us to comprehend the concept clearly, 
before saying anything about the conceptual makeover of co-existence. The term is 
composed of two components: the prefix `co' and the noun `existence'. The prefix 
part conveys various meanings, such as `togetherness', `joint' and `mutuality', which 
indicate a sense of `partnership' or `equality', which in turn is based on the 
mathematical notion of degree in, for instance, the complement of an angle. In order 
to have a triangle, for example, one needs to have three similar lines that meet each 
other in an acute equal degree. The noun part refers to `the fact or state of being by 
continuing and maintaining life in adverse circumstances'. Now it is not hard to 
accept the fact that human beings are the only intelligible beings within the 
boundaries of the natural order (as we know it today) and that the adversity that 
confronts humanity should be projected not on one another but rather on the 
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ignorance which surrounds humanity and which cannot be overcome except by 
mutual partnership and joint effort. The interesting fact about co-existentiality is the 
very notion of `junction' that is embedded within the prefix part. A joint will function 
well as long as the connective tissues and cartilage within the human body are sound 
and not dislocated. Once they are out of joint and dislocated, then it becomes 
impossible to move the joint. The same image could be applied to human existential 
patterns, individual and communal, social and civilisational. 
It seems self-evident that the clash becomes a reality when the life of nations 
is interpreted along the lines of interests. But what is scrutinised within clash theories 
is not the existential sense of being `concerned' but rather the instrumental notion of 
interest, which is tied to the societal organisation of capitalistic order. But how can 
one determine the ontological semantics of dialogue as a liberating praxis? The 
content of dialogue, certainly, can and should vary in accordance with historical 
conditions and the level at which the participants perceive reality. Dialogue needs to 
be understood as a human phenomenon and as such an existential necessity. As one 
attempts to analyse dialogue as an existential phenomenon, one discovers something 
of the essence of dialogue itself: the word. But the word is more than just an 
instrument that makes dialogue possible; accordingly, one must seek its constituent 
elements. Within the word there are two dimensions, reflection and action, in such 
radical interaction that if one is neglected, even partially, the other immediately 
suffers. There is no true word that is not at the same time praxis. 
Thus, to speak a true word is to transform the world. Dialogue is the encounter 
between human beings within the world of power. The power is seemingly dispersed 
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in an asymmetrical pattern and it is hard to deny the patterns of oppression and 
dehumanising aggression. In speaking the word, human beings are able to transform 
the world by making the problems heard and avoiding falling into the tyranny of 
noise. If it is in expressing their word that agents transform the world, dialogue 
imposes itself as the way in which human beings achieve significance as subjects. 
Dialogue is thus an existential necessity. And since dialogue is the encounter in which 
the united reflection and action of the dialoguers are addressed to a world that is to 
become transformed and humanised, this dialogue cannot be reduced to the act of one 
person's depositing ideas in another, nor can it become a simple exchange of ideas to 
be consumed by the participants in the conversation. Nor yet is it a hostile, polemical 
argument between subjects who are committed neither to the naming of the world, nor 
to the search for truth, but rather to the imposition of their own subjectivity. 
Because dialogue is an encounter among men who name the world, it must not 
be a situation where some agents determine the agenda on behalf of others. It is an act 
of delivering; it must not serve as a crafty instrument for the domination of one by 
another. Dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of a profound clarity about 
the imposing structures of domination and a clear understanding about the subjective 
domineering attitudes that create and sustain clash mentality and clash structures. 
Thus to be able to delineate the possibilities of the emergence of dialogue over clash, 
one needs to have analytical categories at one's disposal 
in order to find out the 
historical as well as psychological reasons for the absence of 
dialogue and the 
hegemonic presence of oppressive practices in and across human societies8. 
As 
Gregor McLennan rightly argues, we need to re-emphasise the virtues of developing a 
8 For a debate on pedagogy of 
dialogue, see Freire, P. (1972) Pedagogy of the oppressed, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
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certain mature consensus across intellectual divisions about what is going on in the 
social world, rather than continue to accentuate perspectival incompatibilities. In 
particular, it is important to recover some element of critical universalism as both 
defensible and indispensable, all the more so in the context of the shared predicaments 
and perils that currently constitutes our planetary prospect (McLennan, 2001b, p 405). 
These shared predicaments and perils, which envelop our communal planetary 
existence more than ever, make the call for `co-existentiality' based on dialogical 
approach across various civilisational units desirable and even imperative. This call, 
as McLennan rightly argues, needs not obliterate differences, nor disrespect cultural 
specificity, nor leave power relations unexposed (2001b, p 405). These aspects of the 
human predicament should be taken in context, as underwritten by 1980s and 1990s 
critical thought at the expense of the commonalities that exist across Islam and the 
West (2001, p 405), while taking the best of the two civilisations to illustrate ways of 
approaching an intercivilisational dialogue in the hope of establishing co-existence 
across human societies and individuals. 
5. Theoretical basis of the dialogical approach 
Undeniably, matters of theory in regard to civilisations and to dialogue between 
civilisations are complex. Who are the agents of dialogue? The civilisations as such 
do not perform any kind of dialogical deeds but can be conceived as grand frames of 
action in a performative sense, providing structures, concepts, traditions, territorial 
locus and so on. It would otherwise be nonsensical to think of a dialogue between two 
civilisations in the same way as one thinks of 
dialogue between a son and a father. 
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In other words, the agents of dialogue are ultimately human beings but they 
perform this dialogical act in a creative sense within structures of great fluidity and 
not within completely closed systems. Otherwise the very concept of 
intercivilisational dialogue could turn into a political tool of suppression by those who 
undemocratically claim to be the custodians of civilisation x or y. For example, in the 
context of intercivilisational dialogue between West and Islam one could ask who the 
performers of the intercivilisational dialogue are - `nations', `states', `governmental 
organisations', `non-governmental organisations', or various ethnic groups, all of 
which constitute the very mosaic of each nation-state within the contemporary world 
system. 
In order to identify the main actors of dialogue, we need to know what the 
dialogue is about. In order to delineate the framework of action in the dialogue within 
the context of this thesis, we need to identify the dividing line or lines between 
Western and Islamic cultural units respectively. As mentioned earlier, the problem 
with clash theories and confrontational theories is not the premises employed in their 
analysis but the conclusions drawn from them. One of the main premises in 
Huntington's thesis on civilisational problems is the role of `religion' (Huntington, 
1993, pp 22-49) as a divisive force between Islam and the West. It would be wrong, in 
the light of postmodern critique of the `subject', to assume that the collective 
subjectivity of Muslims and the West is respective homogenous entity. But it seems to 
be correct to assert that after the anti-imperialist movements and revolutionary 
successes or failures among Muslim nations there seems to be a political will to revive 
the Islamic character of people and nations that collectively constitute the subjects of 
post-World War Two nation-states of the 
Middle East, parts of Africa, parts of the 
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Balkans, parts of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and parts of South East Asia, such as 
Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Furthermore, it seems that some of the states within this civilisational sphere 
are more prone to pursue such a policy, which would enable them both internationally 
and domestically to counter political forces deemed to be destabilising to them. For 
instance, an emphasis on the Islamic nature of politics gave the newly established 
government of postcolonial Malaysia a lever for the suppression of `communist' 
dissenters, and the flirtations of the Pahlavi regime in pre-1979 Iran with some 
Islamic groups resulted in the regime subjugating communist dissension as well as 
neutralising individual communist activists9. 
In other words, one should not be neglectful of the political dimension of 
intercivilisational dialogue between Islam and the West. There are plenty of reasons 
for both camps to be weary about the aim and purpose of such a dialogue (or lack of 
dialogue) when undertaken by those who present themselves as the sole custodians of 
`legitimate dialogue' or `sacred clash'. For instance, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria 
lament the fact that the West has launched a confrontational campaign against Islam 
and contend that it is high time to change such an approach and embark on a 
dialogical path. But the same opportunity is denied to the members of their respective 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious nations and one is left to wonder if this grandiose 
concept of `dialogue among civilisations' is nothing but another political tool used to 
regulate the balance of power in an international arena, in the same way as the `human 
9 However, the Shah regime aimed to boost discourses on `legitimacy' based on Islam and in so doing 
discredit the communists (who were perceived as the `Godless Party' in Iran) but failed to realise that 
the tool of legitimacy would also be applied to the modernist regime by Grand Ayatollahs (Ulema) and 
religious intellectuals (Roshanfekran-e 
Mazhabi). 
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rights' argument was used during the Kennedy and Nixon eras in some Third World 
nation-states (and is still used sporadically against China). 
All these problems and difficulties notwithstanding, there are many issues that 
transcend the immediate political adventurism and myopic power thirst among 
warmongers, who see and interpret the lines of difference as fault lines and not points 
of mutual attraction. In order to transcend the trivial issues (and I use trivial in the 
pristine sense of the word, ie `belonging to the public streets' but not insignificant), I 
lay the theoretical grounds for a Gadamerian Veständnishorizont ('horizon of 
understanding') that may contribute to a new discourse on civilisational encounters 
that is not `clashist' and is based on an actor's consciousness in relation to the 
instrumental employment of such conceptual tools in the postcolonial nation-state 
system of the current world system. Gadamer's concept of `horizon of understanding' 
is not employed here as a philosophical framework in understanding the dialectics of 
philosophical discourses as such. What is of interest is the possibility of using it to 
establish a framework for what Hans Köchler calls `cultural hermeneutics' that will 
help us do away with the Schmittian10 static dialectics of `us versus the others' from 
imperialist and Eurocentric times (Köchler, 1978). 
10 Prior to postmodern critique of `collective subjectivity' (Köchler, 1999, p 18) the terms of 
international relations were seemingly based on Carl Schmitt's theory of the `political' according to 
which the friend-enemy dichotomy is constitutive of the public realm. This distinction, in Schmitt's 
analysis, makes up for the differentia specifica between the private life and polity (whether on a 
national or a transnational level). Schmitt, C. Der Begriff des Politischen. Text von 1932 mit einem 
Vorwort und drei Corollarien. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1987. The differentiation and the paradigm 
of specificity do not need to be established along the lines of `foe-reign' policy 
because global forces 
have brought all the `reigns' together into one single planetary reign and the concepts of `foe' and 
`friend' and their respective interrelationships have undergone many transformations and 
have become 
more complex in the light of mass immigration - which, in turn, 
has intensified multicultural 
complexities. To put these complex issues within the narrow 
frame of civilisational-clashist is to shy 
away from addressing difficult questions of great sociological significance. 
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What is meant by the term `cultural hermeneutics', based on Köchlerian 
method, is as follows: 
A dialectics of cultural self-comprehension where the other constitutes the conditio sine qua 
non for the shaping of my own cultural and civilisational identity. (Köchler, 1999, pp 20-22) 
As discussed earlier, this approach to the social reality is a branch of post- 
positivist cultural studies as presented by multiculturalists. The Köchlerian approach 
as it stands could have been progressive in the context of `emergent nations' after the 
disintegration of colonial rule in the 60s and early 70s. This, in itself, explains why 
Köchler is still heavily indebted to Leopold Sedar Senghor in defining the relational 
identity of world cultures within civilisational dialogue (Köchler, 2002). But, in the 
contemporary global context of hyper-imperialism and state violence (in non- 
independent countries where anti-imperial forces became the oppressors once they got 
into power, for example the Mugabe in Zimbabwe), this hermeneutic dialectics short 
of positivity, in the sense employed by Gregor McLennan, would be indefensible as 
well as continuing to accentuate incompatibilities of perspective. To argue for a 
thoroughly cultural hermeneutics without reference to positivity would confront us 
with one of the deadliest critiques against multicultural theories, which so far has not 
been addressed, even within critical multicultural discourses - namely, the 
conservative critique. The conservative critique against multiculturalism can be 
summed up as follows: 
that multiculturalism claims to tell us something true about the human world, yet it is founded 
upon the denial that objective truth is possible. In its celebration of the diversity of cultural 
perspectives - and in its denial of any objective or true point of view - multiculturalism 
becomes 
just another perspective. That is, on its own ground, multiculturalism cannot defend itself as any 
more (or less) true than non-multicultural perspectives. Second is the fact that multiculturalism, 
built as it is upon a denial of universal human nature deprives us from addressing shared 
predicaments and perils that currently constitute our planetary prospect. 
(Krannawitter, 2003) 
95 
What it is needed within the current planetary context is a theoretical `hook' 
on which to hang the various aspects of the intellectual continuum that will, as 
McLennan argues, enable us to find out what is going on in the social (McLennan, 
2001b, p 405). By `positivity' I do not mean a U-turn to positivism as such 
(McLennan, 2000) but the readmission of a logical approach in social analysis and a 
strong awareness of the importance and application of analytical categories in 
discovering grand commonalities across civilisations. What we need here in this 
intercivilisational discussion is a combination of cultural hermeneutics (Köchler) and 
positivity (McLennan). How can this theoretical framework counter the clashists and 
at the same time avoid falling into naive multiculturalism, where all `social practices' 
are considered to be culturally right? 
When the shortcomings of Schmittian static paradigm are made sufficiently 
apparent and convincingly removed from the context of civilisational debates 
(Bacevich, 1997, pp 40-5), the priority then is to lay the ground for the counter- 
clashist approach based on the paradigmatic idea that: 
civilisation can only fully develop itself if it is able to relate to other civilisations. (Köchler, 
1999, p 22) 
As I mentioned earlier, the nub of multicultural critique is based on the idea of 
diversity in a relational sense. That is to say, the aim is to expand the canon of 
recognition by arguing for diversity as a noble factor within human societies but the 
emphasis on diversity should not blind us to the fact of union. In this way, the `other' 
serves as the corrective of our own understanding of the world and our system of 
values, and not as an adversary against whom we have to assert our identity 
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aggressively to ensure our very survival (Köchler, 1999, p 22). Intercivilisational 
dialogue, therefore, is based on a non-subjectivist meta-theory of the realisation of 
one's own self, in an individual and collective sense, through the encounter with 
different traditions, cultural expressions, value systems and lifestyles (Köchler, 1999, 
p 22). The hermeneutics of intercivilisationality is based on a perception of the self 
(whether individual or collective) as shaped by its encounter with that which is 
distinct from the self. As Charles Taylor holds, the dynamic process of 
intercivilisationality is similar in structure to the dialectic of subject and object as it 
characterises human consciousness, whereby, in this context, the `object' of reflection 
is another subject (Taylor, 1992, pp 25-73). 
As Hans Köchler argues (Köchler, 1999, p 23), this meta-theoretical approach 
to dialogue in a civilisational context is more progressive compared to the 
confrontationist paradigm of cultural clashes but it seems to me there is no way to 
delineate the empirical basis of distinction between various civilisational units which 
could serve as: 
an enrichment of one's own social and cultural awareness. (Köchler, 1999, p 22) 
Köchler contends that the hermeneutics of intercivilisationality is based on a 
perception of the self as shaped by its encounter with that which is distinct from the 
self (Köchler, 1999, p 22). But his is a very naive proposition due to the fact that 
sociological perception cannot be always accurate, or, to put it another way, the self- 
perception of a civilisation cannot be conceived as a homogenous project but it is, 
indeed, a discursive competition, where many traditions (and sub-traditions within 
civilisations) compete to encompass and ultimately represent a particular civilisation. 
If one takes the self-perception of a culture by its encounter with that which is distinct 
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from the self, even based on respect, it is still not clear what has been assumed 
`distinct' is actually distinct. Moreover, it seems that the analytical tools informed by 
sociological imagination that would enable us to uncover the historical and socio- 
economic reasons for assumed distinctions between x and y do not exist. 
In order to balance this naive hermeneutic of Köchler's, we need to upgrade 
the status of the empirical (Osborne, 1998) across civilisational divisions, because we 
need to analyse the sociological basis of assumed cultural, intellectual, civilisational 
and religious differences by exposing the power relations that exist across human 
societies. To gloss over these empirical issues out of fear of the Eurocentric dialectics 
of self-comprehension based on the `universalisation' of European culture (Köchler, 
1997) is to shy away from rigorous sociological analysis by taking whatever conditio 
as a sine qua non of the realisation and full perception of my own civilisation. Here 
there is a hidden process that has been argued by sociologists such as Eisenstadt 
(2001, pp 320-40) and Schaefer (2001, pp 301-19) and aptly formulated by Tiryakian, 
who argues that there: 
is a dialectical process that needs to be noted. It is that the civilisation of modernity entails 
the modernity of civilisations. (Tiryakian, 2001, p 290) 
In developing this valid emphasis in terms of `positivity' and `cultural 
hermeneutics', I wish to blend in a third element that lies at the centre of a 
constructive new process of dialogue, namely the theme of existential concerns. In 
order to clarify what it is meant by this and to establish whether such concerns are 
part and parcel of existentialism or different from continental philosophical movement 
and/or how the existential concerns of our intercivilisational dialogue overlap with 
existentialism here, I intend to present a condensed 
definition that might prove 
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constructive in bridging the diverse intellectual concerns of my selected authors under 
one overarching framework. 
6. Existential concerns in the balance of intercivilisational dialogue 
Of course, existentialism is a familiar and complex intellectual heritage, and I need to 
say something about its subthemes and variants, in three points. This is partly because 
my own interpretation, which I elaborate in Chapter Seven, involves a rather different 
set of emphases. 
1. The term existentialism is credited to Jean-Paul Sartre to describe his own 
philosophical outlook, but it was actually coined by Kierkegaard when he described 
his existential dialectic. It was not until the late 1950s that the term was applied 
broadly to several divergent schools of thought. One of the first things one may notice 
about existentialism is the confusion and disagreement that exists about what it 
actually is. Countless dissertations have been written on this vast topic, but I shall 
only give a brief overview. One could argue that existentialism is not a school of 
thought or reducible to any set of tenets (Kaufman, 1956). However, one essential 
feature shared by all existentialist thinkers is their extremely ardent individualism. 
Some of the difficulty in defining existentialism results from the characteristics of the 
philosophy itself. Most existentialists, for instance, deny that reality can be neatly 
summarised into a system, and so they reject all-inclusive views like that of Hegels 
(Barsoum, 1991). This does not mean that existentialists are unsystematic, but rather 
that they tend to accentuate the richness of human experience rather than construct a 
tidy framework. Therefore, a precise definition is impossible, although there is one 
major theme: an emphasis on individual existence and the subsequent development of 
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personal essence. Existentialists attempt to direct our attention to ourselves as 
individuals. They force us to think about ourselves, in an experientially engaging 
rather than abstract way, in relation to such topics as the existence and nature of God, 
what it is to be religious, the nature of values, the contours of virtues and vices, and 
the fact of one's own death. Existentialists encourage us to consider, in a personal 
way, the meaning of living authentically and inauthentically (Oaklander, 1992). Man 
is the only known being, according to the philosophers, that defines itself merely 
through the act of living. 
In other words, first you exist, and then the individual emerges as life 
decisions are made. Freedom of choice, through which all human beings create their 
own nature, is one of the basic themes. Because individuals are free to choose their 
own path, existentialists have argued that they must accept the risk inherent in their 
actions and take responsibility for them. Those who accept this believe they are in a 
world that does not always make sense, a world that is filled with uncertainty, where 
well-intended actions, let alone ill-intended ones, can become obscure and chaotic. In 
basic existentialist beliefs, man is the only animal that defines itself through life. 
Without life, there is no meaning. Existentialists believe in life and in fighting for that 
life (Oaklander, 1992). While fighting for life, each person must face important and 
difficult decisions with only limited knowledge and time in which to make these 
decisions. Human life is seen as a series of decisions that must be made without 
knowing what the correct choice is. Individuals must decide what standards to except 
and which ones to reject. They must make their own choices without external help. 
Humans are free and completely responsible for their choices, but this responsibility 
causes anxiety, so they try to ignore or deny it. Few decisions are without any 
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negative consequences. Some things are irrational or absurd, without explanation. If 
one makes a decision, one must follow it through (Macquarrie, 1982). However, even 
these concepts are not universal within existentialist writings, or at least the writings 
of people labelled as existentialists. Blaise Pascal, for example, spent the last years of 
his life writing in support of predetermination, the theory that is better known as fate. 
First, there is the basic existentialist standpoint that existence precedes essence. Man 
is a conscious subject, rather than a thing to be predicted or manipulated; he exists as 
a conscious being, and not in accordance with any definition, essence, generalisation, 
or system. Existentialism says `I am nothing but my own conscious existence'. 
A second existentialist theme is that of anxiety, or the sense of anguish, a 
generalised uneasiness, and a fear or dread that is not directed at any specific object. 
Anguish is the dread of the emptiness of human existence. The claim that anguish is 
the underlying, all-pervasive, universal condition of human existence is an 
existentialist theme as old as Kierkegaard. Existentialism echoes certain religious 
ideas that see human existence as a state fallen from grace, and maintain that humans 
live with suffering, guilt and anxiety. This dark and depressing view of human life 
leads existentialists to reject ideas such as happiness, the optimism of enlightenment 
and a sense of well-being, since these can only reflect a superficial understanding of 
life, or a naive and foolish way of denying the despairing, tragic aspect of human 
existence. 
A third existentialist theme is that of absurdity. An existentialist would say, `I 
am my own existence, but this existence is absurd'. To exist as a human being is 
inexplicable and absurd. Each of us is simply here, thrown into this time and place - 
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but why now? why here?, Kierkegaardians might ask. For no reason, without 
necessary connection, life is an absurd fact. A fully satisfying rational explanation of 
the universe is out of reach and the world must be seen as absurd. The fourth theme 
that pervades existentialism is that of nothingness or the void: "If no essences define 
me, and if, then, as an existentialist, I reject all of the philosophies, sciences, political 
theories, and religions which fail to reflect my existence as conscious being and 
attempt to impose a specific essentialist structure upon me and my world, then there is 
nothing that structures my world" (Lavine, 1984, p 328). In other words, `I am my 
own existence, but my existence is a nothingness'. Related to the theme of 
nothingness is the existentialist theme of death: `Nothingness, in the form of death, 
which is my final nothingness, hangs over me like a sword of Damocles at each 
moment of my life. I am filled with anxiety at times when I permit myself to be aware 
of this'. Some existentialists, such as Heidegger, may argue that death is one's most 
authentic, significant moment, one's personal potentiality, which one alone must 
encounter. It is common for people to associate a lack of faith or secular beliefs with 
existential thought. Existentialism has little to do with faith or the lack thereof. 
Religion is merely another choice you make in weaving your essence. Existentialism 
is not a singular school of thought, devoid of any and all forms of faith. One might 
think that atheism would be intrinsic to existentialist ideas. The absence of God 
implies the loss of value. However, that is not quite right, as one cannot avoid 
encountering thinkers who also happen to be religious existentialists. Thus, in a sense 
existentialism begins as a form of theism and only later appears in atheistic form. But 
again here we can see a bifurcation of existentialism's history into a religious and a 
secular tradition with their respective representatives. 
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2. Existentialism is essentially a pooling of similar thinkers who reject the same ideas. 
They reject the notion that human nature is benevolent, although many also reject the 
belief that it is innately evil. They also reject the rationalist idea that scientific or 
logical thought will eventually solve all of man's dilemmas. Many existentialist 
thinkers also reject the notion that resignation in life is acceptable, and believe that 
man has to confront his existence. The problem with defining existentialism in this 
manner is that it is not exhaustive; many philosophers who do not specifically refer to 
themselves as existential are now recognised as existentialists in modern philosophy. 
In other words, it would be wrong to assume that one can analytically and very 
precisely define who is an existentialist and who is not. This seems to belie the very 
notion of existential impulse, which is based on vital issues and is not a matter of 
analytical philosophy. Maybe the best approach would be to consider existentialism as 
a counter-tradition, which offers crucible vectors by stressing such themes as lived 
experience, intersubjectivity, contingency and meaningful quest. In this sense one can 
find traces of existential concerns all over modem disciplines and literary genres such 
as psychology, sociology, phenomenology, art, literature and so on. In other words, 
one can make a distinction between existential concerns and existentialism as such 
and then consider intellectuals, who are `existentially conscious' by demonstrating a 
keen concern over the fate and destiny of human beings within the scheme of reality 
and in relation to social living. If this distinction is viable, then one could argue that 
there are intellectuals who are not philosophically committed to existentialism 
but are 
not for that matter unconcerned about existential issues, as they are 
deeply attentive to 
the counter-traditions that view all human 
dilemmas within the frame of mainstream 
scientific disciplines. 
103 
3. Existentialism, as discussed earlier, is not a school of thought or reducible to any 
set of tenets (Kaufman, 1956; Grene, 1959). This is what I mean by existential 
concerns in relation to my four selected authors. As already mentioned, because 
individuals are free to choose their own path, existentialists have argued that they 
must accept the risk of and responsibility for their actions. So within an 
intercivilisational frame of approach we have to try to accept the existential 
responsibility for dialogue, which is instrumental in bringing about a global sense of 
co-existence. The presence or the lack of religion is not a hindrance within this 
existentially imbued intercivilisational dialogue, as it was stated earlier that if religion 
is viewed from an existential point of departure it cannot be considered a `false 
consciousness' or a `savage way' of viewing reality but a choice that can weave our 
humanity as a species being in a fundamental way. 
As demonstrated earlier, existentialists also reject the rationalist ideas that 
scientific or logical thought will eventually solve all of man's dilemmas. This is a 
very vital dimension for us in looking at the four selected authors at the core of this 
study. First, it enables me to argue that these authors operate on a level where one can 
assume that human beings are existential beings with intrinsic problems that cannot be 
considered merely as mundane issues but rather as `dilemmas' of an existential 
nature. Secondly, this reasoning is instrumental to me in that I am not arguing that my 
selected authors are existentialist thinkers as such but that they are engaged in 
existential questions that are not necessarily the same. But this dissimilarity does not 
disqualify them to be considered as intellectuals, who within their vast writings 
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display a keen understanding of human existence without being philosophically 
committed to existentialism. 
As I have already argued, it is very difficult to define what an existentialist 
thinker is and it becomes even more difficult to determine what or who constitutes the 
heart of existentialism if one steps outside a Western framework of understanding. 
This is partly because many philosophers who have not specifically defined 
themselves as existentialists are now recognized as existentialists in modern 
philosophy, while many who have engaged with existential issues outside the 
parameters of the West have not even been recognised yet. However, this is not a 
problem as far as I am concerned, as it will enable me to bring my four selected 
authors into a dialogical conversation based on existentialist concerns, which I would 
like to term `existentialicism' rather than `existentialism', which is associated with 
continental philosophy alone. This concept will enable us to re-cast existential 
concerns at a global level, where all the traditions and intellectuals that represent them 
can be reinvented along new lines of thoughts. My intercivilisational dialogue needs 
two things: themes and personas. The themes are self-community, sacred-secular, and 
religion-authenticity, and the personas that display these themes within their 
respective discourses are Goffman, Giddens, Iqbal and Shariati. But when looking at 
issues that are either divergent or convergent cross-culturally, these themes need to be 
drawn together on a topical 'hook'. The hook I have chosen for this study is what I 
term `existential concerns', which constitute the existentialist nature of these selected 
authors. But in order to not to confuse their entire discourses with existentialism, I 
have coined the term `existentialicism' to refer to the existential concerns I have 
detected in these authors but at the same time to highlight the very significant fact that 
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they are not part of the continental philosophical tradition that is called existentialism 
(although they may have been influenced by that discourse nevertheless that is not my 
main concern here). In the coming chapters, these issues will be explored one by one 
and in addition, in the final chapter, the very existential significance of our selected 
thinkers will be both explicated and critically assessed. 
106 
CHAPTER THREE 
The sociology of Goffman in the light of intercivilisational 
dialogue 
Re-reading Goffman 
In this chapter, I firstly attempt to portray Erving Goffman's social theory based on 
the contemporary literature. But in doing so I think it is possible to highlight other 
aspects of Goffman's theoretical heritage. In order to demonstrate how my own 
reading could prove cross-culturally more fruitful, I have analysed Goffman's social 
theory in terms of a conceptual device based on three pairs of concepts, ie self- 
community, secular-sacred and authenticity-religion. By assessing Goffman's thought 
within this framework, I conclude that there is a dialogical possibility in his social 
theory in relation to Muslim intellectual tradition. I argue that although in Goffman 
one can certainly discover a `lack' of religious thinking, at the same time there is a 
strong `presence' in his work of existential concerns that is of major significance in 
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relation to a cross-cultural intellectual engagements. It is my contention that in the 
dialogical interaction between these two poles, ie `lack' and `presence', there are 
significant intercivilisational possibilities that could enrich our dialogical 
understanding within any sociological frame of deliberation. The aim of this thesis is 
to create an intellectual platform for in-depth discussion around existentialistic issues 
that will be taken further as the work progresses. 
Despite coming originally from the Ukraine, the main historians of social 
theory have represented Goffman (1922-82) as either an American or a Canadian and 
colonized his legacy as one of the ombudsmen of Western sociological tradition by 
minimising (or even excluding entirely) his Russian background. Goffman was born 
into a Russian family in Manville, Alberta, Canada. Educated at the University of 
Toronto and Chicago, he taught at the University of California, Berkeley (1958-68) 
and the University of Pennsylvania (1968-82). He was known for his work on patterns 
of human communication and language, particularly his analyses of routine social 
interactions, such as the ways people walk past one another in public spaces. His 
many books include The presentation of self in everyday life (1956), Stigma (1963), 
Relations in public (1972) and Forms of talk (1981). 
Goffman is credited with enriching sociology's understanding of the details of 
interaction, but not with challenging modern theoretical understanding of social 
organisation. While his position, it is argued, is not consistent, the outline for a theory 
of an interaction order sui generis - or what Stephan Fuchs describes as the dynamics 
of interaction orders that cannot be reduced to either societal macrostructures or to the 
contingencies of particular encounters (1988, p 122) - can be found in Goffman's 
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work. Some argue that it is not theoretically adequate to consider him as an 
interactionist within the dichotomy between agency and structure, while others 
contend that he offers a way of resolving this dichotomy via the idea of interaction 
order, which is constitutive of self and at the same time places demands on social 
structure (Rawls, 1987, pp 136-9). This, his proponents argue, has substantial 
implications for sociological understanding of social organisation in general. 
Adam Barnhart (1994) argues that Goffman is a product of the Chicago 
School and writes from the perspective of symbolic interactionism by emphasising the 
importance of a qualitative analysis of the component parts of the interactive process. 
Barnhart holds that Goffman explores the details of individual identity, group 
relations, the impact of environment, and the movement and interactive meaning of 
information in the constitution of subjectivity. His perspective provides new insight 
into the nature of social interaction and the psychology of the individual, says 
Barnhart. 
A sociologist well known for his analyses of human interaction, Goffman 
relied less on formal scientific method than on observation to explain contemporary 
life. He wrote on subjects ranging from the way people behave in public to the 
different `forms' of talk, and always from the point of view that every facet of human 
behaviour is "significant in the strategy and tactics of social struggle", according to 
one Times Literary Supplement critic (Teuber, 1999). Roy Harris, in another Times 
Literary Supplement review, calls Goffman "a public private eye ... 
forever on the 
lookout for candid-camera evidence which might lead to divorce proceedings between 
ourselves and our social images" (Teuber, 
1999). And, because Goffman 
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communicated so vividly the "horror and anguish - as well as some of the absurd 
comedy - of everyday life", New York Times Book Review critic Marshall Berman 
dubs him "the Kafka of our time" (Teuber, 1999). 
Through the dramaturgical analyses of Goffman beginning in the mid-1950s, 
the metaphor of social life as theatrical performance linked social psychology with 
older traditions in literary criticism and expression. As the twentieth century moved 
towards its close, the dominant academic face of the discipline - quantitative 
sociology enchanted by the rhetoric of complex statistical analytic technique (Agger, 
2000) - was complemented by the appearance of various `late modern', postmodern 
and poststructuralist social analysts (Giddens, 1979). 
Conventional wisdom in the field holds that Goffman's most enduring legacy 
to modern sociology was his ability to make the ostensibly mundane features of 
everyday life seem anything but ordinary. He is praised for encouraging us to rethink 
the taken-for-granted aspects of social life, but is generally dismissed as a serious 
social theorist. In Burnsian discourse, however (Burns, 1992), this interpretation of 
Goffman's work is refuted; furthermore, Burns demonstrates how Goffman's work 
has a far deeper value than just novel observations about face-to-face encounters. The 
major themes of Goffmanian discourse - from the `interaction order' to `talk as 
performance' or `impression management' to `footings' and `frames - are constitutive 
of an incomplete yet promising foundation of a general theory of social (Burns, 1992). 
The other tendency to see Goffman's sociology as distinctive or perhaps unique, but 
at the same time attempting to resist Goffmanianism, is best represented by 
commentators such as Philip Manning. In my view, the main argument here is that it 
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is true that Goffman had a signature style, such that it is often possible to pick out 
even a short passage as being one of Goffman's. And of course we often use the term 
`Goffmanesque' and mean something by it. However, one should think of Goffman as 
a transitional figure in social theory, a bridge between the qualitative, comparative 
sociology of Hughes and the post-1970 theory of Giddens. 
By following this narrative, one could argue that after Giddens finished his 
synthetic, grand social theory, culminating in The constitution of society, he turned his 
attention to `self-identity' in `late modernity'. That is to say that if one follows this 
discourse without thinking about `structuration theory', there is a sense that it strongly 
connects to Goffman. Perhaps Goffman adds some of the conceptual devices to link 
the interaction order not to `structural' but rather to temporal concerns. Goffman has 
been criticised by, for example, Alaisdair Maclntyre in After virtue (1981, pp 30-31) 
for producing an `episodic' analysis that `liquidates' the self. Giddens provides part of 
the vocabulary to escape an episodic analysis. In this sense, Giddens is moving in a 
different direction from, say, conversation analysts, whom he otherwise groups with 
Goffman. Conversation analysis is micro-episodic, whereas Giddens is aiming to 
provide a sense of what is distinctive about our self-identity now rather than in 
previous times. This way of thinking links Goffman to Simmel and Weber in 
interesting ways, as Robin Williams (1988), Greg Smith (1998), Gary Jaworski 
(1997) and others have noted. 
However, it seems that some also recognise that Goffman resisted this line of 
thinking, appealing in his entire sociological discourse to the autonomy of the 
interaction order (Paul Marcus, 1999). To many commentators, such as Philip 
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Manning, this raises a key question - namely, `what are the advantages and 
disadvantages of studying the interaction order as a separate domain? ' - that has so 
far only been answered in the general terms of structure and agency. Indeed, the 
answer does not seem to hold any interest for some within the craft. This leads to one 
last thought: there is probably an important move from self-presentation to self- 
identity. 
Goffman himself saw Frame analysis as a continuation in some ways of The 
presentation of self in everyday life. The problem here is always to prevent 
dramaturgical analysis from becoming repetitive or mere conceptual box filling. If 
Goffman were to be seen as a transitional figure, it would be inevitable for 
sociologists to ask what he is progressing from and to. Part of the answer is from 
Hughes and before him Simmel and Weber, to Giddens and others interested in 
qualitative, comparative sociology. Of course, for these comments about Giddens to 
be feasible, one has to assume that his work on self-identity can be detached from 
structuration theory, an assumption that Giddens and many Giddensians probably 
would not accept. Andrew Travers (1997), for instance, has rightly discerned that 
Philip Manning's account (1992) misses an important aspect of Goffman's social 
theoretical concern, namely his concern with self. This is extremely important in the 
context of intercivilisational dialogue when the existential concerns of human 
individuals - such as `disintegration of the public self, `fragmentation of the private 
self, `disempowerment of the authentic self, `dissociation of the public-private self 
from the spiritual self, `dissolution of the moral self and the `crisis of meaning for 
the (individual, social, and cosmological) self - are under investigation (Sherrard, 
1992). 
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It seems that there are many sociological writers who attempt to counterpose 
Goffman and Parsons, for instance, in order to determine Goffman's overall 
theoretical position within modern social theory. But this approach may be to simplify 
the complex issues that are unique to each individual thinker in the context of the 
discipline of social sciences in general and sociology in particular. Clearly one can 
find major similarities, for instance, between Goffman and Parsons, for example in 
their mutual debts to Durkheim, which has created important common elements in 
their work, and it is no exaggeration to state that some sociologists do see Goffman as 
much more of a structuralist than a social constructionist (Dingwall, 1980, pp 151-73; 
1990, pp 141-168; 1991). 
Goffman, some critics argue, consistently emphasises the extent to which 
actors are making choices, decisions, etc in contexts that are not wholly of their own 
making. Frames are to some extent a reality sui generis, supra-individual phenomena 
that are only enacted through their use but which cannot be used in just any way. The 
over-imaginative user falls foul of Felicity's Condition and risks the questioning of 
his/her sanity. As to whether Goffman is a functionalist, the evidence seems to be 
more mixed (Trevino and Lemert, 2003). 
However, many have always been impressed by his respectful discussion of 
the sick role in `Insanity of Place', (Goffman, 1969, pp 357-87) where it seems that he 
comes very close to an endorsement of the Parsonian line on the functional virtues of 
the development of this role for the maintenance of order. But, all in all, his 
contribution as an existentialist thinker, which could play a significant role in an 
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intercivilisational dialogue, has not been greatly explored within the literature (Hall, 
2000). This is an aspect that will be discussed later on (see Chapter Seven) in relation 
to existential questions that could be employed within an intercivilisational analysis. 
We now look at Goffman in terms of conceptual social theoretically significant 
themes that will hopefully bring out the diverse dimensions of Goffmanian theory that 
are better suited for our cross-cultural purposes. 
2. Self and community 
For Goffman, "any individual who possesses certain social characteristics has a moral 
right to expect that others will value and treat him in an appropriate way" (Goffman, 
1959, p 13), and, quoting Durkheim: "The human personality is a sacred thing; one 
does not violate it nor infringe its bounds, while at the same time the greatest good is 
in communion with others" (Goffman, 1959, p 69). 
There is a notion of a `rational individual' in Goffmanian discourse, an 
individual capable of distinguishing between `ideality' and `reality' (of a social 
nature), which the individual feels others will be able to find, at least temporarily, 
acceptable (Goffman, 1959, p 20). The individual is further perceived as a multi- 
conscious being, ie his consciousness is constituted of multifarious levels of 
interactional complexity, which means s/he can feel the shame caused by her/his own 
behaviours and at the same time grasp the depth of shamefulness perceived by 
`immediate others', while looking to find an escape by turning the situation into a 
neutral one by any means available to her/his mind (Goffman, 1959, p 23). 
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Society is not only the sum of economic forces but also a definitional work in 
progress. By 'definitional', Goffman does not intend to imply only an idealistic view 
of communal life. On the contrary, the term is meant to convey rather a strong 
message, namely the importance of individual consciousness in defining what `is' and 
what 'ought to be' or `ought not to be'. In other words, what defines a situation is the 
sum of encounters and interactions and society is not something outside of this 
`mental sociableness' (1959, p 24). However, Goffman is not neglecting the 
Durkheimian meta-sociological concern in relation to the overall nature of social life, 
namely the moral question and what the essential feature of social life is, ie morality. 
The presentation of self would be meaningless for Goffman if there were no 
sociological concern in regard to the moral character of interactional order (1959, p 
24). Society is a morally principled organism, which endows values and norms upon 
individuals and they, in turn, by embodying these norms and values, ultimately 
express morality at various levels of interactions. In other words, what a self performs 
is moral through and through and what society is, in essence, composed of is moral 
deeds (1959, p 24). However, Goffman does not provide us with any guidelines about 
the source of morality, although he does refer to society as a source of morality and 
the individual as a carrier of moral sense. 
The individual is capable of belief and is a repository of power. As such, 
Goffman says, the individual can engender a sense of realness in others, which can 
have a huge effect in extraordinary situations (eg revolutions, civil unrest, war) where 
a charismatic leader can accomplish what a generation of politicians have failed even 
to formulate) (1959, p 28). 
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Goffinan's sense of the world is deeply rooted in the soil of society, which 
means there is no epistemological space for `transcendental communion' as a relevant 
sociological category. So, when he argues that "the world, in truth, is a wedding" 
(Goffman, 1959, p 45), one should interpret `world' as meaning the interactional 
world order. In the same way that a wedding is a ritual act based on ceremonial 
complexities, the whole world of society is a ceremonial expression of ritual 
performances. It is common sociological wisdom that the term `society' is primarily 
understood to mean `values' rather than `structures', `functions' or `production 
forces', but nevertheless this is a concept that is not always adhered to. For Goffman, 
the idea of society or communal self is not devoid of morality and values. On the 
contrary, he argues that society is a moral reality with common official values with a 
sacred centre based on common values (1959, p 45). 
There are many indications within Goffmanian social theory that the self is not 
wholly a social product that emerges within the interactional canopy but due to 
Goffman's naturalistic inclinations (that is evident in his anthropology) it is hard to 
see what a non-social self is or could be. For instance, he suggests that an individual 
tends to conceal or underplay those activities, facts and motives that are incompatible 
with an idealised version of himself (1959, p 56). So it seems that Goffman views the 
self in a complex manner, namely as something capable of having a core, which 
distinguishes between `acts', `acts to be enacted', `actual self and `idealised self. An 
idealised self without a notion of `ideals', `ideal values' and a sense of `self- 
development', or what Maslow terms `self-actualisation', is hard, if not impossible, to 
imagine. 
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Another aspect of Goffman's social theory which, in itself, is related to the 
second theme of this chapter, ie sacred and secular, is that of the desecration of 
communal life and modernity, and the distinction between desecration and 
demoralisation by sociology in general and Goffman in particular. Of course, the 
distinction between morality and religion within modern paradigm and the 
preservation of morality as a sine qua non conditio of social life without being 
conditioned by the question of sacrality as formulated in religious traditions is itself 
not completely unrelated to the themes tackled later in this chapter and I do not want 
to jump ahead of the argument here. Suffice it to say that the distinction between 
morality and religion and the necessity of social life based on morality (without being 
epistemologically concerned with the intellectual and existential nature of religion) is 
one of the most novel contributions to modern social thinking that cannot be found in 
any traditional system of reflection, including the Islamic tradition (as it appears in the 
Iqbalian and Shariatian discourses) under investigation in this thesis. But this is not 
the same for Goffman. 
As a matter of fact, for him desecration of communal life is an essential part of 
modem society and constitutive parcel of modern consciousness and self. In other 
words, the secularisation of values and minds are necessarily part and parcel of 
modern urban social organisation, both in the mind of society as well as the individual 
self. Goffman even goes on to argue that urban life would become unbearably sticky 
if `communion' were the base of social relations (1959, p 57). In other words, 
secularisation is not only a political choice but also an imposed reality because of its 
inherent inevitability. 
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So far, we have ascribed to Goffman views about self and the anthropology of 
the human personality without defining what is meant ontologically by the terms 
`self and `human nature' in his sociology. Let us now look briefly at Goffman's view 
of the complexities of the nature of human being within a Goffmanian frame of 
reference. 
As Wrong (1961) has already demonstrated, there is a tendency within social 
and human sciences to emphasise the socious-aspect of human nature and promote 
what he terms the `oversocialised conception' of human nature. Within sociological 
debate Goffman has been seen as an intellectual who does not grant any ontological 
significance to the non-social aspect of human self, despite his own inclination to do 
so (Branaman et al, 1997, p xlvi). For Goffman, we have what he terms an `all-too- 
human' versus a `socialised' self. This means, if you like, that we have a dual nature 
that is composed of a natural self (with an instinctive side and many other aspects 
universally attributed to a human being) and a social self (where the attributes of the 
cultural settings one is born into are seen as a symbolic canopy that ultimately 
constitutes the nature of human character) (Goffman, 1959, pp 63-5). 
The analytical distinction between these two aspects of the same reality is a 
complex issue. The reality of being a human self is that there is always this 
interwoven streak of nature and culture, or natural and social, and existentially it is 
not an easy task to balance these two significant sources of energy. As a matter of 
fact, as 
... 
human beings we are presumably creatures of variable impulse with moods and energies that 
change from one moment to the next. 
As characters put on for an audience, however, we must not 
be subject to ups and downs. 
(Goffman, 1959, pp 63-4) 
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Although this might have the effect of the human self stifling his/her own true 
self, nevertheless Goffman argues (after Durkheim) that a certain level of socialisation 
of the spirit is inevitable if the communal canopy is going to function at all. But there 
is no indication in Goffmanian discourse of the identity of the true self and of the 
indices of authentic culture and society, except for the tacit reference to what he terms 
the `bureaucratisation of the spirit' - which could perhaps be interpreted along the 
lines of Weberian sociology of modernity as an the unstoppable march of the 
secularisation of spirit, mind and body (Goffman, 1959, p 64). 
On the other hand, the very term `society' is indeed a hermeneutical work in 
progress and in no way an innocent sociological explanation of the complex empirical 
realities of modernity or otherwise. In Chapter One I demonstrated that there are a 
great many critiques levelled at modern rationality as a Eurocentric approach to the 
problems of reality in general and the `social' in particular. Multiculturalism has been 
used to tackle questions of an epistemological as well as empirical nature in relation 
to the `social' by either reducing or modifying the monological assumptions of 
modern episteme. But the question is how this relates to the Goffmanian notions of 
`society', `collectivity', `communal life' and `community' in the general scheme of 
intercivilisational dialogue. 
Despite the fact that Goffman was not American (or Canadian or from any 
other Western European background), he used the term `society' to refer to a cultural 
unity known as `Anglo-American culture'. There are many 
instances where one 
cannot but notice that the entire ontology and sociology of 
Goffman is built upon the 
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symbolic landscape of what he terms `our Anglo-American culture' as the framework 
of reference for problems of the `social' (Goffman, 1959, p 76). The `social' is never 
separated from `reality' as a meta-sociological and philosophical category of 
intellectual significance. In other words, what unites the concerns of Goffmanian 
social theory in relation to the three pair of concepts under investigation in this 
chapter - self-community, secular-sacred and authenticity-religion - could be the very 
notion of reality and how it is perceived and sociologised by Goffman. 
Reality is not a flat or one-dimensional phenomenon, but a complex and 
multifarious stream within Goffmanian discourse (1959, p 79). While the ontology of 
the self is as complex as its various social levels of engagement, the same applies to 
reality and the view the individual has of that reality. Goffman divides this into an 
inward and outward view of reality. The distinction has a profound bearing upon 
notions of self-community, secular-sacred and authenticity-religion. He argues that 
`reality' is a negotiable task and its real-ness does not stem from an essential source of 
being but is a complex matter conditioned by the soil of society. It is related to one's 
sense of integrity, and being unable to depart from one's inward view of reality may 
endanger one's existentiality during the process of social negotiation (1959, p 77). 
The idea of self as a presentational project is related to what could be 
considered, if not existentialist, then an existential view of the human social self 
within Goffmanian social anthropology. To `be' a given kind of person: 
... then, 
is not merely to possess the required attributes, but also to sustain the standards of conduct 
and appearance that one's social grouping attaches thereto. 
(Goffman, 1959, p 81) 
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The similarities and dissimilarities between existentialism (as a continental 
philosophical tradition) and existentialist social theoretical inclinations within the 
general scheme of cultural studies are not, in principle, pertinent to the current 
discussion on Goffman. But it can be briefly stated, for the purpose of this study, that 
what unites them is the very idea that Man has no essence prior to his existence, and 
this is where Goffman and existentialist philosophers share a common ground. This 
common ground is instrumental in enabling us to discern the existential concerns in a 
social theoretical context (as it appears in Goffman, and even Giddens) without 
associating the authors with any particular aspect of the continental existentialist 
tradition. It is in this sense that one could infer that Goffman does have an existential 
view of self, which is fraught with the dilemmas and paradoxes of `being', without 
being ontologically committed to existentialism as a philosophical tradition. This 
becomes clear if one takes into consideration his view on personality, which is not 
based solely on `being' but on `sustainability of being' within the parameters of the 
'social'. What differs here, which could be considered as Goffmanian Eurocentrism, 
is the conditioning of `sustainability of being' within the soil of society, which in 
Goffman's case explicitly refers to Anglo-American civilisation (1959, p 109). 
The relation between self and society is not based on a mechanistic 
construction but on perception, which itself is a form of contact and communion 
(Goffman, 1959, p 74). What makes the being of a self into a functional personality 
through socialisation within society (status, position, role, etc) is a mechanism not of 
imitation but of realisation. Goffman's view of self, though a-religious, is 
intercivilisationally productive because for him self is a `realisational being' 
Regardless of Goffman's conditioning of self in a social context rather than in the 
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context of transcendental reality, this is potentially dialogical and constructive in an 
intercivilisational intellectual engagement, where traditions are bound to interact 
through individuals (1959, p 81). To be able to determine the nature of the 
realisational poesy of individual being at the heart of communal life as envisaged by 
Goffman, one needs to look at the anthropology of the individual self in Goffmanian 
discourse in a performative sense. That is to say, one needs to ask what Goffman sees 
the self as having in its armoury. 
An individual person is equipped with character and a sense of personality, 
which means they have `depth', `recesses', an `inside' and an `outside' (Goffman, 
1959, pp 86-7). Besides, the self is an entity, as argued earlier, capable of realisation 
or alienation, depending on the circumstances (1959, p 87). But self-distantiation 
would be an epistemologically as well as existentially inadequate notion if there were 
no concept of universal human nature. If one argues that realisation and alienation can 
be determined by social group, then why do we have notions of `crime' and prisons 
for `criminals'? It is because criminals do not consider themselves as such and 
because the criminalisation of an act (or activity or profession) reinforces its 
existence. If it is argued that all these categories is due to the power and the 
hegemony of powerful discourses, then why do we cherish the notion of victim and 
feel justice has been done or needs to be done? In other words, you can only distance 
yourself from something that is fixed. If humanity's values have no fixed centre, then 
how can one measure one's distance from it and assess one's degree of estrangement? 
Goffman is not clear about the nature of values in society or the line that separates the 
natural from the social and how these two issues are respectively related to the 
religious traditions. 
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It is one of the novel contributions of sociological imagination that have 
religion (as a transcendental value-system) is not concomitant with morality or moral 
communal life. As a matter of fact the wisdom of Enlightenment philosophy (and all 
other disciplinary intellectual traditions) lies in its endorsement of a categorical 
distinction between religion and morality and the necessity of society being reliant 
upon the latter rather than the former as the only way of consolidating communal life 
and individual wellbeing. Goffman writes from within this tradition when he argues 
that society is based on morality, but the morale of social morality is not a matter of 
transcendental vision of any kind but a historical product of a social nature (1959, p 
87). However, he does not discuss what it is that sustains the nature of socialness nor 
how the morality of social nature affects the processes of self-realisation and self- 
alienation, and how these can be distinguished (in the absence of universal ideals and 
divine revelation). 
But this lack of engagement does not minimise the importance of his view of 
self as a presentational phenomenon of great significance in an intercivilisational 
project such as this with it emphasis on dialogue (Goffman, 1959, p 244). What do we 
mean by the self as a presentational reality? We mean the individual self -a symbol- 
using creature in Goffmanian discourse (Cuzzort, 1976, p 238) - as a 
dialectical being 
engaged in a dialogical communion through symbols. In a presentation there 
is always 
a task to be done, an audience to be dealt with and an agent to enact all 
these 
(components of presentation) by being conscious of all levels of the complexity of 
social reality in a presentable and comprehensible 
fashion. 
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3. Sacred and secular 
Goffman does not display any coherent or detailed discussions on sacred and profane. 
But from what he `gives off, to use one of his own conceptual schemes (1959, p 33), 
it seems there is no notion of `transcendentalism' in his social theoretical analysis. 
The question of sacralisation and secularisation and how to distinguish them is 
one of the most perplexing problems of modern episteme. Modern social theory has 
had its own fair share of this complex debate by placing the sacred and profane in a 
cultural realm rather than any religious or transcendental sphere of being such as 
revelation or transcendental unity of being. The wisdom of modem social theory lies 
in the fact that if the distinction between sacred and secular could be established as a 
matter of `observation' (eg the lessening of church attendance or the minimisation of 
educational role of priest in society at large), then it would not be very hard to argue 
that what is considered `sacred' is not transcendental in nature (or embedded within 
human nature) but of a contractual kind and prone to social regulation. This is not to 
minimise the importance of moral authority, which modern social theory claims for 
society in general and within Durkheimian tradition in particular (Manning, 1992, pp 
59-60). Nevertheless what is at stake is the meta-theoretical tool to distinguish the 
metaphysical precedence of one over the other and the problem of how to 
determine 
the politics of definition in a broad cultural and civilisational sense. 
In fact this is the very battleground of modern consciousness versus traditional 
mindset. If one can create a sphere of independence that can 
be regulated on its own 
terms, then what results is not only a `secular space' 
but secularism, which is harder 
to resist. In other words, what 
is needed is an ontology of cosmogonal calibre, which 
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will pave the way for the socialisation of mental categories set by secular terms and 
conditions. In Elementary forms of the religious life (1965), Durkheim provides such 
an ontology of sociological nature by constructing two (nominally invented) ideal 
types (priest and magician), who are respectively instrumental in bringing about the 
sacralisation and profanisation of the world (Manning, 1992, p 59). The trick in this 
sociological scenario is to separate the issues of the `world' (in a cosmological sense) 
from the problems of the `community' (in a sociological sense) by making `Man' the 
centre of being. This, in itself, is not a novel idea, established as it was by humanist 
thinkers in Italy during the Renaissance. But what is noticeable in this context is the 
sociologisation of the philosophical and metaphysical inclinations and choices made 
by various individual thinkers in modern Europe into a disciplinary and seemingly 
scientific fashion. 
In other words, the world is not a sacred aspect of divinity and the holy is 
nothing but the `clan' in its total imaginary (but not illusory) personification 
(Manning, 1992, p 60). So, what is born is not a secular domain but a notion of 
`sacred' that receives its sacredness from the soil of society and is regulated by the 
constantly mobile and relative terms of progressive society. This may not be ontology 
in its classic sense, but it is surely a modern metaphysics of the nature of beings based 
on and conditioned by the `social'. This ontology is uniquely modern and is absent in 
the Islamic intellectual tradition, whether classic or contemporary, as I will explore in 
my discussions on Shariati and Iqbal. On the other hand, what Goffman explicates 
and modulates is not fundamentally different from modern social concerns, which are 
essentially different from the Islamic assumptions. This is something I will analyse 
later on in this thesis. 
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Goffman's ontology of sacred-profane is a modern one, which means that the 
sacrality of the `holy' and the profanity of the `secular' are determined by social 
indices. This observation can be endorsed by noting that in Goffman's social 
theoretical mindset there are occasions (both in time and space) where one finds 
oneself both in sacral and secular situations (1959, p 62). The mental ability to 
distinguish between spaces and times as sacred or secular cannot be divorced from 
existential modalities either and these are all achievable epistemologically once the 
idea of transcendence is removed from the universe of intellectual activity, as is the 
case with Goffman. The distinction between secular and sacred can be applied (as is 
indeed applied by Goffman) to the self and its actions in relation to social reality and 
the world at large: 
we tend to blind ourselves to the fact that everyday secular performances in our own Anglo- 
American society .... 
(Goffman, 1959, p 63) 
How can we determine Goffman's views on sacred and profane ontologically 
within his sociology? 
For Goffman, if the centre of affairs is the being of man (in its generic sense), 
then the nature of reality is purely a matter of intellectual categorisation within the 
parameters of the `social'. But if (in contrast to Goffmanian social theory but in 
accordance with religious thinking) the centre of affairs is the supreme being (or the 
transcendental vision of reality), then the nature of reality (its assumed sacredness or 
secularity) is not defined by the integration of the social ensuing 
from the totem that 
`symbiotically fuses the religious and the societal' (Manning, 1992, p 60). On the 
contrary, it is a totally distinct category 
(intellectually as well as existentially) of 
ethoscal dimension, which characterises 
the significant aspect of religion in general 
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and the sacred in particular, namely `salvation' through communal life and not outside 
it. 
In The presentation of self in everyday life, Goffman argues that, for example: 
... while 
it is felt to be an inexcusable crime against communication to impersonate someone of 
sacred status, such as a doctor or a priest, we are often less concerned when someone 
impersonates a member of a dis-esteemed, non-crucial, profane status such as that of a hobo or 
unskilled worker. (1959, p 67) 
By deconstructing this seemingly irrelevant episode in Goffman, it is possible 
to determine the sources of Sacrum and profanity within his sociological universe. 
The intelligence of his reflections lies in the fact that the ontology of sacredness and 
secularity is not determined in any comprehensible way as a matter of spirituality or 
divinity. On the contrary, it is an issue related to the soil of society and Goffman 
demonstrates this cogently by relating both sacred and profane to both the 
sociological and the empirically assessable conceptual category of `status'. In other 
words, the questions of sacred and secular are all relational in nature and these 
relations are all reducible to the categories of social character as rooted in the loam of 
society. 
This is perhaps due to the fact that Goffman's sense of human dignity and 
oppression/repression is apparently grounded in a secular humanist sense of 
enlightened moral rights and intellectual freedom, or at least that seems to be the case 
in the absence of any more explicit theological themes in his writing. And if, indeed, 
like Mead he sees personality as being constructed by the processes of interaction in 
`everyday life', the idea of a more essential `ground of being' does not really fit into 
that scenario. And as has been 
indicated by Robert Harsh, this interactionist 
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perspective seems to exclude any deeper psychological or religious self grounded in 
gnosis, revelation or archetypical myths apart from otherwise secular experience. 
Thus ethical actions for Goffman (like Mead) can be understood without religious 
consciousness as `creative intelligence' in social interactions, based on Anglo- 
American secular civilisation and its institutional frameworks. 
Sacred and profane are not exclusive terms for Goffman. `Sacred' is imbued 
with a sense of morality, which is an end in itself and presumably refers to the rules of 
civic nature (1959, p 110). It would seem reasonable to assume that Goffman does not 
attribute any authenticity (and epistemologically informative, i. e. saying something 
about the nature of reality or the complex reality of the nature) to the notion of 
`sacred' as an awe-generating force within the universe -in the same way as Muslim 
thinkers do when they employ the term `Vahy' (which is, for them, knowledge- 
generating as well as an actual "message' about the `Divine Reality'). Instead, he 
takes it as a socially arranged phenomenon. This can be demonstrated in Goffmanian 
discourse in the many examples he provides of presenting the question of sacredness 
in the overriding secular context of everyday life. The relation between sacredness 
and personality is hence described as a backstage arrangement in the following terms: 
Persons may become so sacred that the only fitting appearance they can make is in the center of 
a retinue and ceremony; it may be thought improper for them to appear before others in any 
other context, as such informal appearances may be thought to discredit the magical attributes 
imputed to them .... 
(Goffman, 1959, p 122) 
This episode illustrates the very nub of the Goffmanian concept of sacred as a 
category ontologically based on magic and sheer ignorance without any real 
connection to the phenomenal structures of the world, which is alone the source of 
knowledge. As Cuzzort notes (1976, p 238), Goffman states elsewhere that: 
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human beings are symbol-using creatures. If we recognize at the same time that symbols are 
false because they are never the same as the reality they represent ... 
then it is not too far-fetched to suggest that God (and with it all that God stands for, ie 
a source of sacralisation) is a created symbol and hence a falsity, which envelops the 
entire matrix of life (Cuzzort, 1976, p 238). 
Last but not least, it would not be wrong to assume that the entire sociology of 
Goffman is an attempt to grasp the vast landscape of secular life in all its social 
entirety at all possible comprehensible levels. In other words, sociology is the 
intellectual means through which one can define the boundaries of a secular 
worldview, or as he himself puts it in unmistakably arresting fashion: 
Durkheimian notions ... and concepts 
help us to grasp ... aspects of urban secular 
living 
... 
and this secular world .... (Goffman, cited in Branaman and Lemert, 1997, p 32) 
4. Authenticity and religion 
It has been well established that the notion of authenticity within the human sciences 
has suffered from lack of conceptual clarity (Handler and Saxton, 1988; Bruner, 1994; 
Wang, 1999) and one of the main epistemological reasons for this is perhaps the 
disconnection of authenticity from the religious notion of autonomy, which is not 
conditioned by social indices but transcendental values. Authenticity is possible 
wherever there is autonomy based on personal integrity beyond the grasp of the 
dictates of institutions. Goffman, however, seems to suggest that the frameworks 
provided by "our ... urban secular 
living" (1997, p 32) and reinforced by sub- 
institutional forms of modern organisations (institutions such as prisons, mental 
hospitals, manufacturing industries, universities, etc) might inhibit the growth of 
selfhood and personal autonomy. 
But the human being is not a malleable, passive 
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reality, but a recalcitrant phenomenon capable of asserting its selfhood and autonomy 
beyond the influence of organisations. This, following the Goffmanian logic, can be 
demonstrated even in total institutions through various activities aimed to demonstrate 
"the spirit of someone taking a stand against authority" (1997, p 86). Dostoevsky 
demonstrates this recalcitrant spirit of the self very lucidly (Dostoevsky, 1956, p 17), 
and this serves Goffman in his argument that the confined self is capable of 
'deconfining' all restricting circumstances reinforced by external power relations (of 
whatever nature or character), not so much in relation to total institutions as to social 
movements and clandestine political activities (or even criminal activities), where 
people `deconfine' beyond the boundaries of the ruling party or regime of restrictions. 
The sense of authenticity in Goffman can probably be discerned in the notion 
of `career' in the peculiar sense in which he employs and situates the term: 
One side is linked to internal matters held dearly and closely, such as image of self and felt 
identity; the other side concerns official position, ... and style of 
life, and is part of a publicly 
accessible institutional complex. The concept of career, then, [is about] the personal and the 
public, between the self and ... society .... 
(Goffman, 1961, p 119) 
That is to say that the source of any sense of being, prior even to any sense of 
autonomy, comes from a dual foundation; the psycho-biological aspect on the one 
hand (Goffman, 1959, p 246) - which in its turn is also conditioned 
by social 
contingencies (1959, p 246) - and the products of the `social' on the other. 
In other 
words, there is no space for `transcendental dimension of self 
in Goffmanian 
discourse. To grasp this frame of analysis in Goffman, one needs to look at another 
concept, which is of dear significance to 
him, namely the notion of `moral' (Goffman, 
1961, p 119). 
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The notion of `moral', which is not solely a matter of formal ethics or social 
etiquette, also helps us to comprehend where Goffman lays the source of authenticity 
and how religion is not an issue within the framework of his sociological analysis. 
Besides, the frame of analysis could perhaps be conditioned by the parameters of the 
very `frame' and how the `data' for this frame is conceptualised or what is to be 
considered as `data' and where the `data' is to be found. Goffman's meta- 
methodological inclinations, which in terms of `background assumptions' reflect the 
logic of the secular worldview minus religious tradition, may also be discerned in this 
frame of analysis (Goffman, 1961, p 119). 
What does Goffman mean by the `moral'? The very notion of moral within 
Goffmanian discourse provides us with an ambivalent, and at the same time dialectic, 
tool for considering life in an existential sense because the semantics of the moral 
concerns `any social strand of any person's course through life' rather than a single 
episode in one's biography (Goffman, 1961, p 119). And this is what a moral career 
means to Goffman; it is existentially rich and intercivilisationally dialogical in spite of 
the materialistic overtones that exclude religious dimensions as its ontological basis. 
But there are also problems with Goffman's notion of self. If there is no self 
(as a universal human nature to be realised), then how is possible to consider, let 
alone to experience, `authenticity'? 
The very notion of authenticity arises from the depths of the human soul prior 
to any social or external influences at a micro-level that may prove instrumental or 
inhibiting in the final analysis. But authenticity means creating (in the secular 
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authentic school) or incorporating (in the religious authentic school) our own 
comprehensive life meanings - our `authentic projects of being'. If there is no `soul', 
then what is self? 
For Goffman, the self is not but it occurs as an event within the confines of 
social context, and to think of `salvation' in the context of transcendental discourses is 
an oxymoron to say the least, because the self: 
can be seen as something that resides in the arrangements prevailing in a social system for 
its members. The self ... 
dwells 
... in the pattern of social control .... 
(Goffman, 1961, p 154) 
The self "is not a fortress, but rather a small open city" (Goffman, 1961, pp 151-2). 
It should be emphasised, however, that Goffman does not seem to advocate 
over-socialisation of the self and surely is not in favour of inauthentic actions. As a 
matter of fact, on reading Asylums one could argue that Goffman is depicting the 
harmful social and personal consequences of confinement in what he calls `total 
institutions' (prisons, mental hospitals, boarding schools). Through what he terms 
`secondary adjustments', individuals in these institutions both adjust to and subvert 
the social controls of the institutions, trying to regain the individuality and dignity 
they lose by being confined. In this sense, their institutional selves are indeed 
`inauthentic' by design, and perhaps this process also reflects broader social 
movements against tyranny and repression in nation-states. 
Having said that, it seems that despite his firm stance against inauthenticity 
there is a discrepancy between the definition of an inauthentic frame of action and 
state of being on the one hand, and authenticity or how it can be realised on the other. 
There could be many reasons for such a discrepancy in Goffman's social theory but 
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the one that interests me and relates to what might be called the `materialistic 
anthropology' and/or `Eurocentric vision of the social' within a Goffmanian frame of 
analysis is his notion of 'religion'. 
The idea of religion as a transcendental category of both intellectual and 
existential significance, which could prove instrumental in the process of 
individuation as well as collective life (such as Umma in Islam or Sangha in 
Buddhism), seems to be absent in Goffmanian discourse. Philip Manning relates this 
to Goffman's Durkheimian influence, where the latter formulates a socialised version 
of `religion' as a universal category by comparing the Aboriginal culture to "... our 
own ... " (1992, p 60) and inferring that the sacredness as a notion evolves within the 
soil of society. This sociology of religion-logic becomes more significant when one is 
reminded that within Durkheimian sociology of religion what distinguishes religion as 
a category of social significance is the idea of 'sacred'. Once it has been proved that 
the significant part of religion (sacrality) is endowed upon religion by society, then 
"... society is given a moral authority" (Durkheim, 1965, p 237), which demolishes 
any notion of transcendentality within religious thinking. 
This line of argument goes right against another tradition within modern 
thought, which is best represented by Carl Gustav Jung, who argued that all religions 
confirm the existence of `something whole', independent of the individual ego and 
whose nature transcends consciousness (Hyde and McGuinness, 1994, p 112). But the 
`question of independency' is what exactly is at stake within the `Eurocentric vision 
of the social' or `materialistic philosophy' that has imbued the sociology of religion in 
Goffman as represented in Durkheimian tradition. There is nothing independent from 
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the logic of the social within Goffmanian sociology of religion and the supreme moral 
authority is due to the `society'. This is not to argue that the secular world is an 
irreligious world order (Goffman quoted in Branaman and Lemert, 1997, p 32). 
Goffman argues that: 
... in one sense this secular world is not so irreligious as we might think. Many gods have been 
done away with .... 
(1997, p 32) 
So, there is a religious element within our secular world that has still not been 
done away with. This could perhaps be explained in terms of the paradigmatic role 
Goffman has assigned to modernity as a secular frame of reference in terms of 
`background assumptions'. That is to say that the paradigm of modernity is based on a 
secular worldview (and far from monotheistic worldview of Islam or 
transcendentalism of Buddhism), which has religion as one of its constitutive 
elements and not as the fountain of all constitution. But the question is what kind of 
religion does Goffman envisage and what is the nature of religion as a category of 
intellectual importance within his meta-theory? 
Within philosophy of religion, the best way to study a religion is to define the 
attributes of the God or supreme being and the relations between the deity and its 
created beings. In Goffman's view of religion, the concept of a `Deity' is aptly 
described in the following terms: 
... gods 
have been done away with, but the individual himself stubbornly remains a deity of 
considerable importance. He walks with some dignity and is the recipient of many little 
offerings. He is jealous of the worship due to him ... the 
individual is so viable a god because he 
can actually understand the ceremonial significance .... 
In contacts between such deities there is 
no need for middlemen; each of these gods is able to serve as his own priest. 
(1997, p 32) 
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It seems clear that Goffman is describing Protestantism upside down and the 
result of this `inversive transformation' is the reconnection to the overarching idea of 
humanism in its ideological sense, whereby Man is the only supreme deity. This is not 
to discredit the idea, as it is an effort to situate the Goffmanian notion of religion 
within the secular context of analysis and avoid adopting it as a general scheme of 
analysing religion or religious tradition(s) through a Goffmanian frame of analysis. 
But there is a positive dimension within Goffmanian discourse that could prove 
intellectually instrumental and intercivilisationally constructive, and that is the very 
idea of the `human person' as a `sacred object' (1953, p 103) in our clash-riddled 
contemporary world. 
If religion is defined in terms of secularism and individualism as an 
overarching ideological frame of comprehension on the one hand and presented in 
sociological idioms on the other hand, then what is considered as `personal autonomy' 
or the source of authenticity will surely differ from a context that takes religion as the 
alpha and omega of being, individual as well as communal. In an intercivilisational 
dialogical context, the differences should be drawn out as well as the possibilities for 
authentic and co-existentially encouraging debate, which is the most distinguishing 
aspect of the hermeneutics of intercivilisationalism based on human commonalities. 
Reading Goffman makes one feel that his approach is one of secular 
intellectual tradition based on Enlightenment philosophy and a non-religious 
worldview. To me it seems that his view of religion is not essentially different from 
sociology of religion logic, where religion is an aspect of cultural life rather than 
cultural life itself and/or its sustainer or guarantor. If this observation is correct, then 
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the terms sacred and secular are not substantially dissimilar to the Enlightenment 
tradition, and what Goffman depicts as sacrality or profanity will inexorably fall 
within the secular-humanistic frame of deliberation. This is not to say that Goffman 
conceives of the self in terms of `socius' and `psychos', but he is unsystematic about 
the latter facet of the self and about the dialectics between the two. In addition, he 
does not address the self and gnosis. As argued earlier, the self is not divided solely 
between the social and psychological but has a third feature, which can be termed 
`gnosis' and the dialectics between these three parts are sociologically as significant 
as the `socius'. Furthermore, any perceived lack of the gnosis in our daily life 
(intellectually as well as socio-politically) is due not to its inherent unimportance in 
human existence (individual as well as communal), but to the hegemonic prevalence 
of secular institutions (both in public as well as private) in our civilisation. But 
Goffman does not appear to address these concerns, which leads me to conclude that 
he is a secular social thinker who is humanist in heart and follows a method in his 
intellectual pursuit called `methodological atheism' (Berger, 1970, p 100). 
Finally, it could be argued that Goffman's sense of human dignity is 
apparently grounded in a secular humanist sense of enlightened moral rights, or at 
least that seems to be a reasonable deduction in the absence of any more explicit 
theological or transcendental themes in his writing. And if, indeed, he sees (like 
Mead) personality assembled in the interaction processes of `everyday life', the idea 
of some more vital `ground of being' (a la Paul Tillich) does not really fit into that 
scenario. And as I indicated above, this interactionist angle also seems to exclude any 
profounder psychological or religious self, grounded 
in gnosis, revelation, or 
archetypical myths (a la Jung) apart 
from otherwise secular experience. Thus ethical 
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actions can be understood without religious consciousness as `creative intelligence' in 
collective interactions. From here one is left with two choices; either to conclude that 
the lack of religious consciousness within Goffman would leave us with no option but 
to forget a dialogical approach between Muslim intellectual tradition and Western 
sociological tradition as the former is imbued with axioms and presuppositions that 
are transcendentally grounded; or to choose a simple alternative that invests more in 
the oppositional modalities of civilisational issues addressed by distinct intellectual 
traditions and different authors from various cultural backgrounds. Neither approach 
would be constructive in terms of intercivilisational dialogue as both deny the 
possibility of converging horizons between different cultural units. However, this is 
not the conclusion I am attempting to put forward. On the contrary, after examining 
the work of the other core authors in this study in the coming chapters, I will finally 
demonstrate (a) why the current view within the literature is not completely 
satisfactory, (b) how a dialogical approach can be established, and (c) where this 
approach could take us in terms of the existential concerns that profoundly impress 
themselves upon our humanity in a universal sense. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The sociology of Giddens in the light of intercivilisational 
dialogue 
1. Re-reading Giddens 
In this chapter, the conceptual tools of `self and community', `sacred and secular', and 
`religion and authenticity' are used to maintain that there is a `lack' within Anthony 
Giddens' sociological discourse in relation to `religious consciousness'. By displaying 
the lack of this feature within Giddensian discourse, I try to lay bare an intellectual 
space in relation to my overarching theoretical framework, ie intercivilisational 
dialogue, through a more focused approach to existentialist concerns. On the other 
hand, I make a virtue of this approach by highlighting the `presence' of existential 
concerns within his sociology that are of profound significance to the overall concern 
of the thesis. That is to say that although I argue that there is a lack of `religious 
consciousness' in Giddens, Giddens himself, by distinguishing between `religious 
concerns' and `existential concerns', has undoubtedly provided points of commonality 
that can be utilised in the context of intercivilisational engagement. This `lack' allows 
me to bring Muslim intellectuals into the debate and the `presence' enables me to 
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establish the dialogue. In Giddens (as with Goffman), I detect a lack of 
`transcendental concern' - which is in fact the point of departure in Muslim 
intellectual tradition - but this not mean that I dismiss either Giddens or Goffman or 
in any way consider the alternative to be superior or more relevant. On the contrary, 
for me, this `lack' highlights the presence of a significant dimension within secular 
tradition that is of some intercivilisational import, and that is the distinction between 
religious and extistential domains, which concerns the existentialistic aspects of 
human existence. 
Anthony Giddens (1938- ) is by general agreement the most extensively cited 
existing secular social theorist in the world. He is the author or editor of more than 
thirty books that have been translated into some thirty-five different languages. His 
first work, Capitalism and modern social theory, has been in print for more than three 
decades. Giddens' writings stretch well beyond the discipline of sociology itself. He 
has written on social theory, the history of social thought, class structure, elites and 
power, nations and nationalism, personal and social identity, the family, 
cosmopolitanism and intercivilisational conflicts, relationships and sexuality. Among 
his most celebrated books are New rules of sociological method (1976), The 
constitution of society (1984), The consequences of modernity (1990), The 
transformation of intimacy (1992) and The Third Way (1998). He was one of the first 
authors to take up the idea of globalisation, in the mid-1980s, and has continued to 
work on the theme since then. His influence on politics has been extremely 
significant. He popularised the notion of the Third Way, `globalisation' and `reflexive 
modernity' in political and cultural thinking, and his ideas have influenced secular 
politics immensely. His advice has been sought 
by political leaders all over the world 
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and has had a major impact upon the progress of New Labour in the UK. He was a 
prominent and successful director of the London School of Economics from 1997 to 
2003. 
For Giddens, the main philosophical trends in modernity centre on subject- 
object dualism, just as social philosophy concerns the structure-agent dichotomy. He 
views the key movements in contemporary philosophy as converging, however, since 
post-positivist philosophy of science and postwar hermeneutic philosophy have both 
acknowledged the complexity of their opponents' points of departure and essentially 
accommodated a number of noteworthy critiques. Science is no longer understood 
entirely as a modus operandi of explanation, but a complex interaction between 
explanation and interpretation. Hermeneutic thinking considers interpretation to be set 
within the `horizon' of an interpretive tradition, and proposes that adjustments to this 
horizon come about as the outcome of the clash of interpretations, but it recognises 
that concrete social reality may sometimes break or transform all interpretive 
horizons. 
As a result, in both cases the ontological problem of the spirit of the existence 
of entities (rationalistic realism versus social constructivism; philosophies of 
difference versus philosophies of the subject) becomes principally contrasted with the 
way in which knowledge is acquired. What exists is more vital than how we know 
about it - in truth, in the lens of the ontological turn, the 
former in principal has the 
answer to the latter, since any theory composes its object and determines what is 
perceptible and what is imperceptible. Giddens' point of departure is to try to find a 
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combination of the critical scientific realism of Roy Bhaskar and the hermeneutic 
philosophy of Hans Georg Gadamer(Giddens, 1982, pp 1-17). 
Bhaskar's critical realism attempts to construct a `common-sense ontology' 
founded upon the realist and materialist principle that the objects of science exist 
separately from the pursuits of science and shape up the boundaries of scientific 
assumptions. This implies that realism is chiefly an ontology prior to being an 
epistemology. Scientific accounts do not appeal to universal laws; rather, science 
renders the causal machineries underneath the phenomenal forms recorded in 
experience or experimentation. As a result, Bhaskar is not committed to a `unified 
field theory', or to the unity of scientific rationality -just to the concept of inference 
to the best explanation and to the realist belief that the causal mechanisms revealed by 
science exist (Collier, 1994). 
In spite of that, and while being in favour of Bhaskar's programme for a 
science of society, Giddens withdraws from it (1979, p 63). For Giddens, the 
dissimilarity between nature and culture connotes that social theory is primarily 
hermeneutic and not scientific. Despite the fact that Giddens puts forward the idea that 
social ontologies are pragmatically oriented towards the solution of specific questions, 
in particular regional circumstances, in truth the theory of structuration offers a broad 
social ontology and political hermeneutics. It is this ontological point of reference to 
the self-understanding of agents that informs Giddens' denunciation of functionalism. 
Functionalism suggests that societal systems have `needs' that have to be 
catered for by social institutions so that the social structure can 
be perpetuated. 
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Communities are accordingly quasi-natural life forms with institutional `organs' 
directed at preserving natural functionality and social reproduction. For Giddens, this 
is obtuse. Social systems have no `needs' - purely human agents have necessities. The 
postulation made by functionalism that the `social' is in functional symmetry is a sign 
that the dynamics of social conflict and change are disregarded or hypothetically 
disqualified (Giddens, 1996). 
Giddens also disapproves of the inclination of functional social theory that 
considers human agents as `cultural dopes' - he calls Althusser's agents (bearers of 
social structures socialised by ideological state apparatuses) "cultural dopes of an 
astonishing mediocrity" (Boucher, 2001). Social institutions are not `needed' by 
society but rather are contingent historical products of the actions of human agents 
under determinate settings. That is why Giddens repudiates, for example, Marxism's 
account of the reserve army of labour (Boucher, 2001). 
There are two main strands to Giddens' constructive social theory when 
viewed from within disciplinary paradigm. One of them involves an attempt to rethink 
theoretical problems that modern thought in general and social theory in particular 
have been wrestling with since the Enlightenment (Thompson, 1989, p 2). The second 
strand of Giddens' social theory involves an attempt to analyse the features of 
modernity (such as self, identity, love, passion and romance) both globally and in a 
micro-sociological dimension. It is no secret that Bernstein, Bauman, Thompson, 
Gregory, Saunders and Gregson have criticised him on both accounts. The basic thrust 
of Giddens' social theory is an argument to balance the undoubted energy of 
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capitalism with the need to foster social solidarity and civic values. Giddens, in 
elaborating the political dimension of his social theoretical reflections, states that: 
The Third Way suggests that it is possible to combine social solidarity with a dynamic 
economy, and this is a goal contemporary social democrats should strive for. (2000a, p 5) 
Giddens points out that social forms of governing (such as national 
governments) are limited by historical developments in how far they can manage 
economic life and provide social benefits. His ideas are taken seriously by politicians, 
while others, mainly social theorists such as Jeff Faix, Stuart Hall and Pat Harrington, 
remain distinctly unimpressed. The nub of their critique is that Giddensian social 
theory in its political sense offers no strategy to achieve a more equitable distribution 
of wealth and makes no reference to power relations on one hand while on the other 
hand it 
... expresses the world-view of 
the multinational corporate sector - that the global marketplace 
only works effectively if government plays a minimal role. (Faux, 1999, p 75) 
But critiques levelled against Giddens are not all of one intellectual kind or 
even at the same level of abstraction. Apart from those already mentioned, which 
could be considered to be socio-political as well as ideological critiques, other 
critiques are either methodological or metatheoretical in nature. 
The issue of the relationship between the individual and society, or between 
action and social structure, lies at the heart of social theory and the philosophy of 
social sciences. In the writings of most major theorists 
... this problem 
is raised and allegedly resolved in one way or another ... the problem 
is not so 
much resolved as dissolved, that 
is, disposed of beneath a philosophical and methodological 
platform that is already located 
in one of the camps. (Thompson, 1989, p 56) 
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Giddens' meta-theoretical/theoretical/methodological approach is claiming a 
unique niche for itself, staking out a position somewhere in between many of the 
polar issues that characterise the boundaries of thinking in the social sciences while 
redefining these as differences, rather than polarities (Dervin, 1993). For example, it 
claims to stand between theory and practice, between order and chaos, between the 
individual and society, and between structure and action. The approach has thus 
assumed a privileged position and underlies the various calls to move the study of 
human society to new ground somewhere beyond these `axes of polarities' or 
differences. Giddensian metatheoretical approach seems to suggest that it is balanced 
between action and structure, because this polarity or difference has been singled out 
by many as being crucial in social sciences (Giddens, 1984; Fielding, 1988; Knorr- 
Cetina, 1988; Thompson, 1989; Baber, 1991). In sociology and cognate disciplines, 
the debate over this difference has been both divisive and long-standing, leading to 
streams of theorising and research that have been and remain fundamentally opposed 
to each other. Broadly dichotomised as `macro' and `micro', these streams 
... are 
by themselves incomplete and indeterminate in complementary ways: macro explanations 
require `micro-translations', and `micro-foundations' require stable and enduring social 
contexts.... Both micro- and macro-level explanations must therefore be extended in the 
direction of the other, if they are to be explanations at all. (Bohman, 1991, p 156) 
Metatheoretical approach by Giddens offers an intriguing strategy for dealing 
with the relationship between action and structure as well as a way forward that 
avoids residual essentialism, as Pickering and others argue -a way that 
does not rely 
on either dissolving or disposing of the problem and that moves 
beyond the `orthodox 
consensus' (Giddens, 1989, p 55). 
From its assumptions of ontological and 
epistemological incompleteness, to 
its theory of the subject, to its focus on process, 
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Giddens' approach seems to be attempting to stand between macro- and micro-level 
explanations, extending the explanatory power of each in the direction of the other by 
examining critically the meanings and uses of the concepts of action and structure 
and, more abstractly, chaos and order, in focusing on the ways in which they allow the 
circling of the moment wherein both the individual and the society are 
maintained, reified, changed, and created by individual acts of communicating. (Dervin, 
1989, p 67) 
Working out from a conception of the individual as `an individual moment of 
communicating' and from the central role of `communication as procedure', Giddens 
seems to question whether a systematic view of the constitution of the individual and 
society and of action and structure can be developed that provides 
the energizing linkage between the macro and the micro as well as the micro and the macro. 
(Dervin and Clark, 1993, pp 110-111) 
Giddens' significant point is that "modernity is multidimensional on the level 
of institutions" (1990, p 12). That is to argue that against evolutionist thinking (even 
Marxism, which notes discontinuity), Giddens' is a project that - while similar to 
Lyotard's deconstruction of the grand narrative - retains a confidence in discerning 
episodes of historical transition that are significant in terms of self-development and 
social progress. Thus the emergence of sociology in the form of Marx, stripped as a 
theorist of alienation/exploitation/power, Durkheim and Weber, optimistic and 
pessimistic theorists of industrial society, war and totalitarianism, all operating within 
the institutional parameters of modernity. 
In New rules of sociological method (1976), Giddens make a distinction 
between two characteristics of social structures - one is that of power and the other is 
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the division of interests. He claims that while power is a feature of every form of 
human interaction, division of interest is not (Giddens, 1976, p 112). Giddens and 
Bhaskar have made themselves fairly distinct. Whereas Giddens seems to revel in 
Durkheim's empiricism, Bhaskar (1979) attacks Durkheim in The possibility of 
naturalism as a positivist and empiricist, and upholds Marx as the champion of social 
sciences. Giddens has taken great pains to certify that he is not a Marxist, by releasing 
a second edition of A contemporary critique of historical materialism (1985) and 
maintaining that most of Marx's science has to be thrown out. In my opinion, though, 
their actual differences are not that great. Giddens' appropriate, heavy-handed attack 
on functionalism in A contemporary critique of historical materialism meshes well 
with Bhaskar's `Third Way', transformational model of social action. Looking at 
Giddens' New rules, it seems that a division between `management' and `control' 
based on Giddensian rules is impossible. In addition to the need, stated by Bhaskar, 
for neologisms in cases like this, to make a distinction between two forms of 
oppression, one legitimate and the other not, is nothing more than an apology on 
behalf of one class of oppressors over another. 
Does Giddens imply, in New rules, that every form of human interaction 
constitutes a social structure, or that all human interaction falls under the rubric of 
some social structure? The debate is far from settled in this regard and it should also 
be mentioned that Giddens himself has not made the whole problematique any clearer 
despite what many critics hoped. As for Giddens' idea on power, it has merit in 
general but it clashes badly, I think, with Bhaskar's notion of freedom as negation; 
that is, with the removal of harmful social structures as liberating. Yes, oppressed 
people must gain power, but it is what they 
do with that power, which holds the 
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possibility of their liberation individually and communally, privately and publicly. If 
they attempt to bulwark the prison walls of the old society, they will free themselves 
but imprison others; but if they destroy the prison gates and the old social forms, only 
then will they set everyone free. To yearn for a society in which there is no `artificial 
division of interest' seems doubly wrong, since firstly, no society will ever be fully 
unified in the interests of its members, and secondly, to work for such anyway is 
merely a polite description of the rebuilding of the bourgeoisie's demolished prison 
walls. 
Giddens has been attacked from both the Left and the Right for what Keith 
Sutherland calls his `shotgun marriage of the market and social justice' (2002, p 84) 
There are some who look at meta-theoretical aspects of Giddens and are critical about 
his approach. The later Wittgenstein has had an abiding influence on the theory of the 
social science, particularly in England, where philosophers and sociologists such as 
Peter Winch, David Bloor and Anthony Giddens have developed social theories 
drawing explicitly and extensively from Wittgenstein's Philosophical investigations. 
Unfortunately, although I am fully in favour of this sort of project, these attempts to 
abstract social theoretic principles from Wittgenstein's palimpsestic texts have not 
always proved successful. Theodore R. Schatzki, for instance, criticises Giddens' 
influential transfiguration (in the latter's The constitution of society) of Wittgenstein's 
discussion of rules and rule following into a general theory of social rules. The central 
problem with Giddens' view is that in Wittgenstein's name he posits ubiquitous 
`implicit rules', so to speak, that govern human social life, whereas Schatzki, by 
drawing on Wittgenstein's discussions of linguistics definition, criticises Giddensian 
147 
conceptions for ascribing content to the practical understanding (which Giddens 
seems to imply governs action). 
In other words, Schatzki argues vehemently that there is no Wittgensteinian 
basis for recognising such rules. The arguments offered suggest that the very idea that 
social life is necessarily `rule-governed' may need to be reconsidered. In fact, argues 
Schatzki, Wittgenstein's considerations problematise any account of social life that 
identifies rules as the chief determinant of action (1997, p 300). 
Finally, it could be said that Giddens' theoretical stance is distinguished by his 
insistence on the need to transcend the dichotomy of subject and object (philosophy), 
or agent and structure (social theory), through a turn to questions of social existence 
(ontology) rather than concentration on problems of knowledge (epistemology). It 
should be acknowledged, however, that this `turn' is of great significance for us in 
terms of intercivilisational dialogue across different cultures and intellectual 
traditions, because it will allow us to look at the ontological dimensions of self in a 
more non-disciplinary fashion, which would have proved harder with more 
epistemologically oriented discourses or those of a more disciplinary nature. 
Nevertheless, his turn within Giddensian paradigm has proved catastrophic in the eyes 
of many of Giddens' critics, who view such a loose semi-philosophical ontologisation 
of social theoretical problems as diversion from the real sociological questions that 
classical sociology has bequeathed us. Notwithstanding the `intra-sociological' 
importance of these kinds of critiques, it should be admitted that Giddens' approach is 
of great value in terms of dialogue between traditions across cultural boundaries as 
the focus of ontology is, in essence, of a universal kind rather than of particular 
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significance. This latter aspect is what one finds less in current literature and it will be 
explicated later on in relation to existentialistic concerns across different intellectual 
traditions and in particular in connection to our selected core authors (see Chapter 
Seven). 
2. Self and community 
For Giddens, being a human being is tantamount to knowing; in other words, the 
identity of the human self is conditional on `rational capability' (Giddens, 1991, p 35). 
The notion of the self within Giddensian theory would be incomprehensible without 
an affirmative appreciation of historicity as the wider framework of intellectual 
orientation. That framework, which constitutes the very elemental parts of his 
sociological vision in the sense of Weltanschauung, is modernity (Giddens, 1991, p 
181). The semantics of the self within the societal formation of modernity comprised 
two dimensions, namely an innerness and a core (Giddens, 1991, p 100). 
Historicisation may be considered to be a given issue in a modern intellectual 
context, but this is not so much the case when the unit of analysis is intercivilisational 
in nature. For Giddens, the `social' is tantamount to historicising society. When the 
social canopy is historicised (ie divided into stages, periods, phases or junctures such 
as modernity, medieval, feudal or traditional), there is no doubt that Giddens is 
reflecting over one very specific form of social relations - modernity (Giddens, 1991, 
p 1). Modernity is a `social order' and the very structures of its orderliness change 




The idea of the self harbouring complex dimensions such as core and 
innerness is based on a dynamic of dialectical nature that does not fit with 
decentralised notions of the postmodern self. The self, on the contrary, is an agent 
capable of moulding the situations that are considered external to its `inner core' 
(Giddens, 1991, p 2). Of course, it is another story entirely if the modern agent has the 
structural means to keep at bay the disintegrating forces that can cause tremendous 
sequestration of experiences with profound effects (such as fragmentation, 
powerlessness, uncertainty, commodification or meaninglessness) upon both the self 
and the society (Giddens, 1991, pp 144- 200). 
If modernity is a kind of social order that differs from its previous types of 
`social life', then this could raise an issue connected to the transcendental view of life 
in general and social life in particular. Let us explore this point further to see how it 
might affect the question of self and society within secular social theory. Giddens 
argues that modernity (ie modern social life) is not only a set of new modes of 
production or technological advancement, but also a profoundly different way of 
conceiving time and space, order and tradition, cognition and meaning 
(Giddens, 
1991, p 2). In other words, the structuration theory of modernity endorsed 
by Giddens 
is a theoretical worldview cast in sociological terms (Kilminster, 
1997, pp 100-38). 
But how is this connected to religion and a transcendental view of history? 
This is a 
theoretical problem that will be pursued in greater detail 
in the section on religion and 
authenticity below. But it is relevant to mention that the question of 
Weltbild in 
Giddens does substantially affect the approach he takes to the question of self and 
community. He argues that: 
Self and community should be reflexively made. 
(1991, p 3) 
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But the question is against which background? This is where the question of 
structuration theory takes a different twist, and Giddens tunes the general problems of 
humanity into the jargon of social theory and attempts to make sociology as 
instrumental as possible in providing coherent and synthetically cogent solutions to 
the colossal problems of modernity - not in the sense of a sociological problem 
among others, but of the problem of sociology on a Weltbild scale. 
In order to address the question of `background', it is important to recall that 
one does not tear a wall down without having some idea of how it will be rebuilt. If 
both community and self should be reflexively made, as Giddens puts it, then the 
parameters for remaking that self and community reflexibly should be clear. In 
Giddens' view, the person of the self is an ontological phenomenon in need of 
security. But the parameters of both `On' (being) and `Secürüs' (wellbeing) in the 
Giddensian view of self are based on the soil of society, which itself is a historicised 
set of institutions and mutable without any transcendental sense of `perennial 
parameters' (1991, p 3). 
Rather than being inhibited in providing a comprehensive perspective on the 
role and place of self in relation to the social universe (as well as the universe of the 
social), Giddens is able to demonstrate the capability of his reflexivity project in 
contrast to regressive forms of life politics (1991, pp 209-231). He forcefully argues 
that the reflexive project of the self involves 
the sustaining of coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives.... (Giddens, 
1991, p 5) 
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Instead of lamenting the loss of metaphysical unity, which was provided by 
the religious ideology of Christianity (in one form or another), he makes a virtue of it 
by arguing that the biography of the self in particular, and that of modern social life in 
general, take place in the context of multiple choices, where: 
... tradition loses its hold, and the more daily life is reconstituted in terms of the dialectical 
interplay of the local and the global ... 
[in] the post-traditional order of modernity ... self- 
identity becomes a reflexively organized endeavour. (Giddens, 1991, p 5) 
In other words, the lack of transcendental connection does not disregard self or 
the very community that shelters the narrative of the human self, but it changes the 
very dynamism and the meaning of self. While sustaining a coherent biography of the 
self, it reinforces a continuous mechanism of revision based on the mutable values of 
the `social' without any regard to the transcendental values that traditional religions 
claim to have over the self and community in terms of ideal regulation or divine codes 
of conduct, both individual and collective, such as Shariati in Islam or Dharma in 
Buddhism. 
Giddens eloquently argues that we live in a single world, which means that we 
have a unitary framework of experience, and then contends that we are in a post- 
traditional order of being. It should be borne in mind that to be in a post-traditional 
order does not only refer to the technological dimension (or even instrumental aspects 
such as economy or finance) but also includes the Leben-dimension of both the 
individual self and the collective symbols of social life (Giddens, 1991, p 5). Taken 
with Giddens' view on religion (which will be explored later on), it is not 
hard to 
understand why he considers religious thinking, religious thinkers and religious order 
to be `threats' when he engages in the politics of reflexivity in late-modernity at a 
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cosmopolitan level of theoretisation (1994, p 13). This is not only problematic where 
religion (or religious intellectual tradition) is concerned; it also has a great impact on 
how we view society and self. Giddens addresses this eloquently in the following 
passage: 
In a world of high reflexivity, an individual must achieve a certain degree of autonomy of action 
as a condition of being able to survive and forge a life.... (Giddens, 1994, p 13) 
What does autonomy of action mean in the context of Enlightenment 
tradition? Giddens' notion of autonomy could convey many complex meanings, but 
one of them is surely the Kantian notion of freedom from tutelage. This freedom 
could imply a freedom from religious dogma too, which would consequentially lead 
to deregulation of religious orthodoxy in the realms of action and ethos. The 
personality born out of this tradition would certainly differ from an individual self that 
lives by and within religious universe. When related to the Giddensian claim of `post- 
traditional unitary experiential framework', this would create some profound tensions 
concerning the very symbolics of self and how the parameters of the `social' are 
constructed in an intercivilisational context, where, if it could be contested that our 
framework of experience is not unitary as Giddens depicts, then the project of self 
would not be the revised or even the coherent narrative of the self edited along the 
lines of post-traditional secular humanism. This is because the grammar of 
emancipatory politics is not of the realm of `actuals' but of `ideals', and the set of 
ideals within the politics of emancipation may genuinely differ within different 
civilisational contexts of contemporary human societies. 
According to Giddens, modernity as a novel form of social order creates its 
own notions of self and individual 
life. Although not based on any transcendental 
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view of community-self, it would be a mistake to consider Giddens' social theoretical 
reflections as being devoid of existential concerns. As a matter of fact he admits that 
there are genuine existential questions and dilemmas that haunt the human self and 
pose a great many challenges before the `social' (at the level of culture), but modem 
social life tends to become separated from the quest for meaning in accordance with 
secular paradigm (Giddens, 1991, p 8). In his view, self is in dire need of `meaning' in 
order to sustain the project of reflexivity concerning the biography of the self. The 
search for meaning is imperative in an individual's life but the modern social order 
does repress any coherent moral question and in principle deny answers. In other 
words, the self in Giddens' historical approach is in a constant state of self-alienation 
and self-denial, which are reflections of the kind of society that modernity entails in a 
profound existential sense (Giddens, 1991, p 9). 
However, there are unresolved issues within Giddens in relation to morality, 
both as ethics and ethos. If the core of morality like many other dimensions of human 
life is mutable and influenced by the logic of secularity, then it would be, if not 
incomprehensible, hard to understand why Giddens laments that: 
... 
for many people, direct contact with events and situations which link the individual lifespan 
to broad issues of morality and finitude are rare and fleeting. (Giddens, 1991, p 8) 
Having said that, it should be emphatically stated that Giddens' view on self in 
relation to society is a very complex and existentially loaded set of problernatiques, 
which are, in principle, dialectical and, in essence, dialogical. That 
is to say, he 
discerns that the problems of agency are not only epi-phenomenal aspects of structural 
motions but complex products of a 
dialectical (institutions and structures are 
dialectical) as well as dialogical (human beings due to communicative capacity are 
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dialogical) interaction. In Giddens' view, the self needs `moral resources' in order to 
overcome existential isolation. In addition, he thinks that the individual is capable of 
envisioning a full life that is existentially satisfying and actualising it as a reflexive 
project. But he further detects that there are institutional quandaries within modern 
society that inhibit the birth of a coherent vision of existentially defragmented self 
(Giddens, 1991, p 9). 
As has been argued earlier, Giddens' social theory is not concerned with 
`perennial questions' versus `contingental questions' but it is rather a historical 
approach, which historicises even the perennial questions by recasting them in terms 
of `conditional dilemmas'. This explains why the tribulations of the self and the 
dilemmas of social life are presented entirely within the framework of modernity and 
globalisation as two sides of the same conundrum that affects the whole of humanity. 
Against this background then, one can see that the very riddle of `society' is recasted 
in terms of the dilemmas of a historical phenomenon, the `nation-state system' as the 
locus classicus of sociological analysis. It should also be noted that the notion of self 
in its universal sense is not of great concern to Giddens. In other words, what comes 
across within his frame of analysis is the self in terms of `citizenry' within the 
stratified context of nation-state with all its sociological paraphernalia (1991, p 15). 
The self, as elaborated earlier, has a `core' but this individual core is hinged 
upon psychic dimensions, which are, in nature, embedded within the soil of society 
which in Giddens' view is historical in nature (1991, pp 32-3). The self in Giddens is 
a secular project (1991, p 34); the individual does not aspire to the realisation of 
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religious ideals (as commanded and required by orthodoxy) and divine communion, 
but is an agent who attempts to balance 
opportunity and potential catastrophe in equal measure. (Giddens, 1991, p 34) 
It would be a mistake to assume that the Giddensian concept of the social self 
is based on a purely utilitarian premise. It could be argued, however, that Giddens' 
self could clash with an understanding of the self based on a religious dimension that 
regulates the grammars of the self and society in a transcendental frame of reference 
(such as Sharia law or Torah). Nevertheless, there are major complexities that envelop 
the symbolism of the self within a Giddensian social theory embedded in and 
surrounded by modernity as its overall frame of reflexivity. The human self is a 
psychological riddle that is able to transcend itself by displaying an objective side, a 
subjective side and an objective-subjective side. This can be seen in the self's ability 
both to feel fear (and hence to provide a reaction to it) and sense anxiety or dread (and 
gradually cope with it) (Giddens, 1991, pp 42-3). That is to say, human beings are 
rational animals that also have an existential side to them. 
For Giddens, the individual self is capable of developing a `framework of 
ontological security' (1991, p 44) but the parameters of onto within his sociology, as 
mentioned above, are based on secular terms through the reduction of `security' to 
social integration parameters. This, in other words, is to construct a 
kind of 
anthropology of the human self or communal being based on a secular philosophy or 
worldview, which is surely distinguished 
from the transcendentally oriented 
anthropology that takes the notion of narration 
beyond the realms of `bio-graphy' and 
`psycho-graphy'. 
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What is significant in Giddens in terms of intercivilisational dialogue is his 
emphasis on the human person as an existentially self-reflexive project, who lives in 
circumstances (community, society, world) fraught with `existential contradictions' 
(1991, p 49). Besides, Giddens' self is not the decentralised agent of postmodernism 
but an active ego that engages with the world in composing his/her own biography 
within sociographical parameters. In other words, the self is not a fictional 
phenomenon through and through but an ongoing 
story about ... who we are ... 
how we have become, and where we are going [which is a 
reflection of ] ... the capacity to 
keep a particular narrative [about the self] ... going. 
(Giddens, 
1991, p 54) 
As the self is a riddle of existential nature, the `society' within Giddensian 
social theory is not devoid of moral dimensions. It is a moral fact, but in his view the 
`social' in late-modernity has lost its morality. On the other hand the remoralisation of 
social life without falling prey to ideologies of clashism when we return more to 
existential issues is a hard task when there are no transhistorical ethical principles 
within that politics of secular humanism that can help humanity to cope with clashes 
of ideology (Giddens, 1991, p 231). 
3. Sacred and secular 
Ideas have consequences and nowhere more so than in this distinction between the 
secular and sacred. It would be a mistake to assume that in Giddens there is no notion 
of sacredness and that his social theory based entirely on the profanisation of human 
existence. To view the distinction between sacred and secular along these 
lines is to 
miss the very sociological point that Giddens' scheme 
hinges upon in the first place. 
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If one were to ask Giddens if it were possible to live in a world where with no 
notion of sacrality, the answer would surely be no. He argues that we cannot live in a 
world where nothing is sacred (Giddens, 2000b, p 68). But the notion of the 
sacrosanct within his social theory belongs to a very specific and well-researched 
tradition within modern philosophy, where the essence of sacredness is not based 
upon any revealed religion or transcendental notion of the holy. 
Looking at the history of ideas within Western tradition since the early 
seventeenth century, there are three distinct phases in the debate on religion and the 
question of sacred versus secular. In the first phase, which includes the work of 
thinkers such as Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Feurbach, Comte and Marx, there is a direct 
engagement with religion and an attempt to renounce religious control in the name of 
secular philosophy. The debate is conducted in the manner of a war between secular 
philosophy and sacred philosophy and the term `religion' is used in the sense of the 
orthodox traditions of Christianity vis-a-vis the emerging tradition of Enlightenment. 
The argument is in dualistic terms and makes explicit reference to Enlightenment and 
religion by arguing in polemical terms that religion is a regressive force, the whole 
ontology of life is based on secular ideals, and there is no need for sacredness in a 
modern scientific context. The second phase, which produced intellectuals such as 
Durkheim and Weber, is more reserved in terms of distinguishing the fields and 
assigning each to its respective sacred or secular domain. But there is a very subtle 
settlement of previous intellectual wars and polemics by reducing the realm of sacred 
to one of the modules of the `social' without setting the 
latter in opposition to 
religion'. Durkheim develops this 
idea significantly, distinguishing between sacred 
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and secular and making the very essence of sacredness conditional upon the 
elementary forms of socialness. 
In other words, the sacred falls within the realm of the secular and beyond it 
there is nothing but superfluous fantasies or beliefs that fall outside intellectual 
engagement. In the third phase, where social theory has been established by thinkers 
such as Goffman and Giddens, we have neither the war of the first stage nor the 
reformulative attempts of the second. On the contrary, we witness in Giddens a 
conscious attempt to formulate the problems of human existence in the `absence' of 
religious consciousness or transcendental values by clearly defining the features of 
social life within modernity in accordance with the logic of secularism or what he 
terms `emancipatory politics' (Giddens, 1991, p 210). 
However, the absence of debate on sacred and secular within Giddensian 
social theory should not be interpreted as a sign of obliviousness on his part. On the 
contrary, this is a feature of the very tradition he upholds and from within such a 
tradition he uses an intellectual platform to address contemporary issues of human 
existence. For Giddens, the Third Way is a project in the great rationalist tradition of 
post-Renaissance politics. The parameters of this political endeavour are based on a 
notion of reality that claims to be independent of any transcendental sphere save the 
inherent process of materialism. Within this framework there is no place for sacrality 
as the enveloping principle of reality because what bestows meaning upon sacrosanct 
within a sociological frame of reference is the logic of the `social'. That is to argue 
that the semantics of the holy is dependent upon the incessant dynamic transformation 
of society and there is no need for society to comply with the demands of the religious 
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dogma' 1 as the rules and regulations of the sacred should modernise themselves in 
accordance to the `social'. This postulation is possible within Giddensian social 
theory because it has been already established within the second phase of 
Enlightenment that religion has its origins in the practical demands of life in society 
(Giddens, 1978, p 80). 
For instance, if the demands of the `social' are that the patterns of the `family' 
should be reconstructed along new `pioneering' forms of late-modernity (Giddens, 
1994, p 14), then the sacred (and institutions that represent it such as the Church) 
should comply accordingly. Otherwise one is on the brink of violating human rights 
as conceived within modernist international discourses on law and legality. This, in 
the language of classical philosophy, is to give `primariness of being' to the `social' 
over `religion' or secularism over transcendentalism. In this sense, one could easily 
assume that Giddens' social theory is a refined expression of secular worldview, 
where crucial terms such as `religion', `sacred', `values', `existence', `ideals', 
`emancipation' and `secular' have fundamentally different connotations and 
essentially dissimilar consequences for both society and the self if synthesised within 
a religious worldview. 
In Giddens, the term modernity signifies secular society where the whole 
community is a profane canopy (Giddens, 1978, p 88). If one concedes that totemism 
is the simplest form of religious ideology, in contrast to more developed forms of 
religion where "most members of the religious community are profane 
beings, with 
only a specialized group of religious leaders ... who participate more 
directly in the 
11 That itself was based on a claim that religious 
dogma is an expression of the truth in its most 
primordial sense. 
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sphere of the sacred" (Giddens, 1978, p 88), then, it is reasonable to claim that 
modern society is a thoroughly profane universe due to the fact that modernity is more 
developed than both totemic and religious society. But this is not to imply the total 
disappearance of the `sacred' within profane modernity. On the contrary, one of the 
sub-divisions of secular society is `sacred' and its `sacrality' is not transcendental but 
an expression of socialised arrangements (without the sacred having any inherently 
transcendental principality of essence or even basis of being). 
In other words, the expression of sacredness within a simple society such as 
the Australian totemic community (as an ideal type) is congruent with the form of 
societal organisation that prevails in such a society, and within modernity, where 
scientific rationality reigns supreme, the whole universe should be an expression of 
profanity. As long as one is writing the history of ideas within the context of 
Occidental reason in accordance to the dominant liberal view of civilisations, then this 
view could have some significance as an intellectual standpoint worthy of attention. 
But if it is taken to be the framework for any comprehensible intercivilisational 
dialogue, then it fails to stand up to close examination. In fact, this is the reason why 
many secular sociologists, including Giddens, feel uneasy when they encounter the 
question of religion and civilisation outside of a European context (Giddens, 1994, p 
124); the logic of their respective discourses does not follow the secular narrative of 
historiography that Giddens relies upon in making general assertions in terms of 
`progress', `regress', `emancipation', `collective meaning' and the existential 
concerns of the individual. These issues all pertain to the realm of `background 
assumptions' and intellectual mayhem may ensue if the parties engaged 
in the debate 
do not share the same `point of departure'. 
If a fundamentalist (as Giddens employs 
161 
the term) and a secularist approach these questions from their own respective points 
of departure based on the assumption that their `own' position is the most reasonable 
one and indeed represents the global reality, then it is not difficult to imagine the 
result. But despite his Western generalisations, there are certain elements of Giddens' 
social theory that would qualify him as a suitable nominee in an intercivilisational 
context. 
Like Goffman, Giddens assumes without any rigorous explanation in terms of 
`subjectivity' and `the context of culturality' that we live in a profane culture. Without 
any further exploration it seems that the modern subjectivity of secularism is taken to 
be the yardstick of assessment in relation to the `social' based exclusively on the 
singular notion of civility. In Modernity and self-identity, Giddens argues that "living 
in a secular risk culture is inherently unsettling" (1991, p 181). But in terms of 
intercivilisational dialogue, which would enable intellectuals from various 
civilisational backgrounds to find `common grounds', Giddens' social theory offers a 
great opportunity in terms of unearthing common grounds for dialogue. Because 
regardless of his secularly imbued worldview, which would certainly affect the 
process of finding `common answers' after the common grounds have been founded, 
there can be no doubt that modernity - East or West, North or South - has proved to 
be unsettling at a societal level and the cause of feelings of anxiety on a personal level 
(1991, pp 181-2). 
It is worth noting that Giddens is writing to make sense of the lives of his 
audience as well as the worldview, which envelops the societal semantics of the 
culture of modernity, ie secular life. In other words, the 
life under scrutiny is not a 
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universal category but a sub-unit of secular culture in the Occidental context of social 
development (1991, p 181). 
In other words, Giddens' approach is totally secular and falls easily within the 
third phase of Enlightenment tradition, where the issues are no longer concerned with 
the significance of religion vis-a-vis materialism but with how much of religion is 
`useful' for the reconstruction of the 'social'. The dominant view within modem 
social thought in relation to sacred, religion and transcendence is not the truth claim 
pertaining to the internal system of thought that produces them. On the contrary, the 
overarching theoretical frame of reference is that of `religion as social contract' 
(Thrower, 1999), which enables Giddens to conceptualise about `religion' along with 
other categories of the `social', such as class, family, nation, and race. This approach 
to the sacred is possible when secularisation is the context of discovery and 
secularism is no longer an ideological device but an ethos of being in a very 
existential sense. This possibility is discernible in Giddens when the language of 
social theory is diverted to issues of a symbolic nature and to collective ideals that 
form the very general meaning of existence, finitude, identity and substantive moral 
issues (Giddens, 1991, p 227). 
Giddens seldom, if ever, mentions God. Religion is subsumed in tradition and 
custom, then written off because of its irrelevance in the modern secular world 
depicted and endorsed by Giddens. The peculiarities between right and wrong, good 
and evil, this world and the next are superfluous. The idea that particular institutions 
and practices should be labelled sacred and venerated is irrelevant to this Weltbild. 
The meaning traditionally given by the sacred to birth and death, marriage and the 
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sexes, work and stewardship, war and peace, culture and ethics is not present within 
the entire fabric of his social theory, save the secular notion of sacredness that is 
constructed upon the parameters of the 'social'. The moral order has no absolutes save 
for tolerance. But this minimum, in the light of intercivilisational dialogue, is of 
maximum importance because human existence without the canopy of moral 
orderliness is inconceivable. If it could be established that a notion of `reaching-out' 
does exist within secular social theory based on a sacral notion, regardless of its 
ontological nature, then a very crucible step has been taken towards dialogue that 
certainly requires a morally imperative attitude of tolerance. 
In Runaway world, Giddens argues that although globalisation is restructuring 
the narrative of both our individual and social biography, nevertheless it would be a 
mistake to assume that human existence could be sustained without the `presence of 
sacred'. The reason for such an impossibility, which itself is conducive in terms of 
intercivilisational dialogue, is that even the very notion of `tolerance' cannot be 
sustained when based on local or particular mores, without the presence of the sacred 
in the life of the `social' in its primordial sense of existence. On the contrary, as 
it is 
impossible to live in a world where there is no sense of sacred, at the same time it is 
inconceivable to yearn for the ideals of tolerance and dialogue if there is no notion of 
the sacred (not necessarily in its religious sense) in the world. 
As Giddens himself 
puts it: 
tolerance and dialogue can themselves be guided by values of a universal 
kind. (Giddens, 
2000b, p 68) 
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4. Authenticity and religion 
The context of debate in Giddens' social theory is best understood as post-Christianity 
(in an intercivilisational perspective). That is to say that the terms and ideas relating to 
religion are peculiarly Christian in origin, where the essence of religion is faith, ie 
fides. In so fathoming the problem, the religion's claim for truth inevitably disappears, 
as there are no intellectual grounds for its truth claim. Then what remains is not 
religion that gives birth to faith but faith as the distinguishing mark of religion. This 
approach gives Giddens an opportunity to retain something of religion, which is of 
great import in relation to the tribulations of the self. But this `something' is 
transcendental in nature but a secular construct of the `social' (1991, p 207). Within 
modernity there are many conflicting processes that generate many diverse worries 
within the self (and society in general). Giddens argues that these can cause many 
different kinds of anxiety, which may be diminished by adhering to a clear-cut faith 
(1991, p 81). 
The problem with Giddens' notion of religion is that it is based entirely upon 
faith (as a matter of subjectivity) without any relevance at the level of cognition. Of 
course, this is a very popular view among distinguished secular sociologists who, like 
Durkheim, do not consider religion as an illusion (as did Freud). In this fashion, 
Giddens retain a notion of the sacred within the parameters of secularisation 
but it 
should be noted that in doing so the transcendence of religion and 
its traditional 
metaphysics have vanished, while a post-traditional compartmentalised version of 
religiosity has been retained. 
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Religion as a transcendental frame of reference does not occupy any 
epistemological place within Giddensian intellectual universe, but he values faith that 
"offers a comprehensive life-style [that] 
... may diminish ... [existential] ... 
anxieties" (Giddens, 1991, p 181). 
There is no doubt that anyone, who thinks s/he does so from a point of 
departure that is rooted in a tradition with all the complexity that this word stands for. 
By that I mean a tradition embedded in a historical frame of reference and adorned by 
symbols of a particular universe that unify the very structures of ideas and ideals. 
Giddens is no exception in this regard. Many of Giddens' commentators are secular 
Western sociologists (or those who adopt the position of secular sociological vision 
and all that it stands for), who take for granted the fact that in his theorising about the 
`World', Giddens nevertheless addresses the problems of Occidental history. This can 
be demonstrated by a deconstruction of the elements that inform his historiography of 
religion: 
for reasons that are to do precisely with the connections between modernity and doubt, 
religion not only refuses to disappear but undergoes a resurgence. (Giddens, 1991, p 195) 
This is an updated version of the secularisation versus sacralisation thesis, 
which could have some justification within Occidental history of Christianity. But to 
extend the same logic to a non-Christian context, Giddens is at the edge of 
Eurocentrism, which is, in principle, detrimental to sociological vision in its 
intercivilisational sense. It should be clear that Giddens' views on religion are of 
profound significance for an intercivilisational 
dialogue as long as they are related to 
existential aspects of the human self and 
its tribulations. However, when they are 
employed in an explanatory sense 
in relation to the historiography of religion in a 
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global perspective based on sociological categories, they lose their significance 
because Giddens attempts to project his own `emancipatory politics' at a global level 
by neglecting the imperial and colonial legacy of Europe and the relationship between 
them. 
If the `social' is a historicised phenomenon and the significance this new 
historical notion has brought about (ie modern society) differs from all Preceding 
forms of social order (Giddens, 1991, p 1), then how can `religion', which in secular 
tradition is considered as a historically conditioned phenomenon12, be relevant to the 
late-modem global world? 
Giddens' reply could be two-fold. On the one hand, he would probably argue 
that the society of modernity as the self in modernity is of a compartmentalised nature 
and prone to the `logic of sphericalisation'. In other words, in a private sphere, 
religion of some sort is (or could be) useful in the fabric of society but it does not 
necessarily need to be an orthodox kind of religiosity, which might prove divisive for 
social integration in late-modernity (Giddens, 1991, p 207). That is to say that while 
`religion' as an existential leap (in a private realm) has a place within Giddens, there 
is no place for religion as an organising unit idea within what he considers the `post- 
traditional world'. Giddens puts `religion' in the former sense in the same category as 
belief in `fate' as a residual component derived from pre-modern eras (Giddens, 1991, 
p 28). On the other hand, he could cling to his secular sociological view of Western 
history, which is based on the fundamental assumption that `modern society' is a 
result of a significant historical break, by arguing that religion is a residual aspect of 
12 It is obvious that major world religions did appear 
in the very distant historical past. 
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pre-modernity. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that religion has "failed to disappear" 
(Giddens, 1991, p 207). 
Gidddens would not argue that the modern vision of humanity is based upon 
profoundly ideological grounds that are lacking deep understanding of the human 
psyche, but he would ascribe this failure to `religion' (1991, p 207). But one should 
not be too hasty to dismiss Giddens' view on religion as uninteresting because he does 
not rule out `religiosity' as a sociological category altogether. He does not favor 
fundamentalism but favorably analyses 
the creation of new forms of religious sensibility and spiritual endeavour ... [which] ... 





issues of the moral meaning of 
existence which modern institutions so thoroughly tend to dissolve. (Giddens, 1991, p 207) 
This is exactly the point that both Goffman and Giddens earnestly attempt to 
engage with and that comes across very clearly when we look at the problems of 
existentialicism in an intercivilisational perspective. That is to enunciate the concern - 
one should think of social universe in Goffman and Giddens and of cosmological 
universe in Iqbal and Shariati - to find genuine and authentic ways to stave off the 
corrosive process of emptying the universe of existential moral meaning. 
Authenticity is of genuine concern to Giddens but unrelated in its symbolic 
sense to the category of religion in the transcendental sense. In fact it is an important 
aspect of quest for `moral meaning' in relation to the self. Giddens believes that there 
is a core within the human self that is in dire need of actualisation if the self is not 
existentially `isolated' - that is, where the core of inner self is separated from the 
moral resources that bestow meaning upon moral quest (Giddens, 1991, p 
9). 
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However, Giddens is aware of the institutional barriers that stunt the quest for 
authenticity (1991, p 9). He is deeply concerned with existential issues of self in 
relation to the consequences of modernity as tribulations of the self and paradoxes for 
society. As with many existentialist thinkers, the question of authenticity is of 
supreme importance for his post-traditional anthropology. In his view, the self is 
capable of actualisation, despite many alien forces within modernity, and one of the 
main endorsing factors in self-actualisation is individual concern with authentic 
action, which is a precondition of the emergence of emancipatory politics or the 
principle of autonomy (Giddens, 1991, p 213). 
In Giddens, who is writing from within a post-Kantian tradition in terms of 
religion and morality, the sense of `authenticity' is not related in any transcendentally 
existential-ontological sense to `religion', as, for instance, is the case within Islam or 
Buddhism. On the contrary, the sense of authenticity could be achieved in any kind of 
relationship (eg pure relationships), regardless of their `social form', which could 
have been considered as an obstacle to the very emergence of `authenticity' within a 
transcendentally oriented frame of reference (Giddens, 1991, p 187). Although 
Giddens is not concerned with the religious and transcendental aspects of authenticity, 
he nevertheless provides a comprehensive analysis of the existential consequences 
that lurk behind the quest of authenticity "so far as a relationship lacks external 
referents" (Giddens, 1991, p 186). 
There is no doubt that the question of authenticity in the absence of a religious 
frame of reference is not free of normative dimensions. This is profoundly evident 
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within the social theory that falls within Giddens' emancipatory political philosophy 
when he looks at the 
... core perspective of modernity [and] ... the project of the self ... [that is] ... guided only by a 
morality of `authenticity'... as it [concerns] ... the most intimate human sensibilities [that] ... 
centre upon rights of personhood and individuality, which connect back to the existential 
dimensions of self-identity .... (Giddens, 1991, pp 225-6) 
It is true that modernity has an unsettling impact upon both society and the 
individual self. It is also true that religion in its traditional sense does not have any 
relevance within the post-traditional context of a globalising risk society of modernity 
that brings about many instances of ontological insecurity and anxiety. Nevertheless, 
to consider the modern social universe that encompasses the very narrative of the self 
as a meaningless sign of semiotic interaction is to lose the very distinction that 
Giddens makes between the forces that threaten the personal symbolics of a coherence 
narrative and the politics of emancipation, which should be aimed at staving off 
the looming threat of personal meaninglessness. (Giddens, 1991, p 201) 
Although the narrative of self-identity lacks transcendental points of departure, 
nevertheless overall it does not lack concern for regulation and compliance in relation 
to the wider domain of existence. That is to say that the 
narrative of self-identity has to be shaped, altered and reflexively sustained in relation to 
rapidly changing circumstances of social life, on a local and global scale. (Giddens, 1991, p 
215) 
But this project cannot be sustained if there is no core of existential nature 
within the parameters of the human self that could develop a coherent sense of project 
over long periods of time and changing spaces. Giddens does not condition this very 
core within any religious frame of reference of transcendental nature, but situates it 
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within the soil of society in a normative political agenda. The problem that faces 
Giddens is to balance the relativism of ideals and values with the fundamentalism of 
political convictions, which are of significant import within the project of modernity 
at this stage of globalisation. Giddens should defend the position of traditional 
thinkers that there are no `transcendental values' that could be the basis of the politics 
of personality, while contesting the views of philosophers who reduce the role of 
individual person to a meaningless sign of structures - which would, in turn, 
jeopardise the very project of politics of emancipation. This can only be achieved if 
there is a developed notion of `inner authenticity' within the narrative of modern 
individualism (Giddens, 1991, p 215). 
Giddens vehemently argues that even in the absence of `traditional religion' 
there is an existential need for the human self to have a notion of unity of identity that 
can keep the most basic idea of modernity ('control') alive and functional. Otherwise, 
if the person is not able to develop an inner authenticity -a framework of basic trust 
by which means life can be understood as a unity against the backdrop of shifting 
social events - then modernity is not attainable (Giddens, 1991, p 215). This is 
because the dilemma of powerlessness versus appropriation and the pathologies 
resulting from these tribulations in the major domains of modern society that engulf 
the autonomy of action will in the long run undermine the very composition of ideals 
that gave birth to the very of idea of modernity in the first place. 
In other words, by making a distinction between issues of existential 
significance and problems of modernity as sociological issues, Giddens opens up an 
intellectual space that can be utilised in an intercivilisational dialogue. How is this 
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possible? Because, if as Giddens argues, authenticity is not a matter of taste or desire 
but a reasonable approach to the great many issues of human existence, there can be 
no doubt that one commonalities can be found and displayed as such to others 
(Giddens, 1991, p 170). He argues that: 
what makes an action good is that it is authentic to the individual's desires, and can be 
displayed to others as such. (1991, p 170) 
In other words, authenticity, even in the absence of religious reflection (which 
could be the metaphysical ground for authenticity), is, in principle, dialogical and 
based on sound reason, which brings the `other' into its orbit of engagement. This is a 
very important point if one extends this idea to an intercivilisational level in relation 
to, for instance, the International Monetary Fund or other international institutions or 
even multinational companies. Corporate companies, for instance, do disregard the 
welfare of third-world countries (or even the working classes in first-world countries) 
through various forms of exploitation. These forms of colonialism do not bear any 
relation to authenticity and the reasons for such policies (which often have negative 
ecological consequences) cannot be shown to be authentic. The fact that international 
political space is dead is partly due to the fact that modern secular authorities claim 
`legitimacy' based on reason (the ability to prove the goodness of action as desirable 
and to display it as such to others). In addition, the pervasiveness of one aspect of 
`authenticity' is often at the expense of a second dimension of authentic action. 
As Giddens argues, an authentic action is composed of two dimensions; one is 
that the goodness of the action should meet the desirability criteria set by the 
individual but, a very significant exception, its desirability should be displayable to 
the others as such (Giddens, 1991, p 170). 
If one of the indices is excluded, then the 
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action, whatever its degree of goodness, is not an authentic action; it does not qualify 
as a symbol of culture of modernity and loses its emancipatory political dimension. 
Although religion as a liberate force that can lead both the self and the community 
towards an authentic state of existence is absent from Giddens' social theory, 
nevertheless the existentialistic concerns for authenticity and meaning are not 
altogether absent in his sociology. In fact the distinction between religious meaning 
and existential meaning is one of the noblest achievements of modernity that Giddens 
utilises in great detail in depicting both the conditions of ontological security and the 
hazards of existential anxiety in relation to `authentic life' (Giddens, 1991, p 50). 
This distinction is a very powerful tool in opening up the intellectual venues at 
an intercivilisational level that could provide a platform from which existential 
concerns could be approached by finding commonalities that could enhance the 
meaningfulness of the `finitude of life' that is accepted by all traditions and 
civilisations. As Giddens himself admits, anxieties about finitude are universal 
(Giddens, 1991, p 50) and this minimum of universalism could do wonders if the 
parameters of an intercivilisational dialogue could be laid down in order to find ways 
to make encounters between people more dialogical than conflictual. This is the first 




The social thought of Iqbal in the light of intercivilisational 
dialogue 
) 
1. Re-presenting Iqbal 
& 
Having examined at length two key, and familiar, figures in the Western secular 
tradition, I turn to two seminal thinkers from the Muslim world, thinkers who are not 
customarily read and re-read in the manner of Goffman and Giddens. However, it is a 
central part of my project to argue that such non-Western thinkers need to be 
increasingly brought into the canon of social theory, not least because their presence 
there will help reconstitute that very domain. 
In this chapter, I present and analyse Muhammad Igbal's social thought in 
relation to modern concepts such as self, community and authenticity, which have 
social significance as well as cross-cultural import. The main purpose is to 
demonstrate the aspects of his social thought that may prove instrumental for an 
intercivilisational investigation built on existentialistic themes, concerns, and issues 
such as alienation, meaning and 'throwness'. The chapter takes an 
interpretational 
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approach to Iqbalian discourse which gives us a rounded picture of a thinker with a 
transcendental frame of reference, but who despite his religious inclinations is also 
fully engaged with social issues. In spite of this religious grounding, then, there are 
issues here that have both cross-cultural import and existentialist significance for our 
conception of intercivilisational dialogue. In the next chapter, I make a parallel case 
for the significance of the (very different) thought of Ali Shariati. 
Muhammad Igbal was born in the Punjab on 22 February 1873. He received 
his early education in Sialkot and joined Intermediary College after passing the 
entrance examination. Mir Hassan, a renowned oriental scholar at the college, had a 
special aptitude for imparting his own literary taste to his students and under his 
influence, Iqbal was drawn to Islamic studies. He moved on to the Government 
College of Lahore, where he studied Islamic culture and Arabic literature with the 
distinguished English Orientalist, Sir Thomas Arnold, and graduated in English 
Literature, Philosophy and Arabic. He went on to complete an MA in Philosophy and 
was appointed a Lecturer in History, Philosophy and Political Science at Oriental 
College, Lahore. He then returned to the Government College to teach Philosophy and 
English Literature. 
In 1905 Iqbal travelled to Europe to further his studies and remained for three 
years. He completed an Honours Degree in Philosophy and taught Arabic at 
Cambridge University. He then completed a doctorate in Philosophy in Munich. His 
time in Cambridge brought him into contact with the neo-Hegelianism of J. M. E. 
McTaggart, and in Heidelberg and Munich in Germany he got acquainted with 
continental philosophy in general and German philosophy and social thought in 
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particular through his exposure to Henri-Louis Bergson and Nietzsche. Much changed 
by these experiences, Iqbal returned to India in 1908 with a new and vibrant message 
based on a profound sense of `self-consciousness', which became the cornerstone of 
his message, ie the idea of 'self. Esposito has argued that Muhammad Iqbal 
represented a new phase in modern Islam after Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Jamaluddin 
al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh (Esposito, 1988). Iqbal was plagued with constant 
illness towards the end of his life. He died on 21 April 1938 (Vahid, 1944). 
Igbal has been perceived variously as an opponent of women's freedom, a 
fundamentalist, a rationalist and a true revolutionary who was in favour of the Ummah 
discarding all that was old, traditional and hackneyed. Some consider him as a 
creative mind who wanted Muslims to reject the rigid structures of thought and return 
to the ceaseless quest of the new on the path of self-discovery based on the premise 
that man alone can participate in God's creativity as a partner; others, however, see in 
his message a crude feudalistic call to conformism. 
On the other hand, as Khawaja Masud contends (Masud, 2003), conformism to 
Iqbal was akin to apostasy, because he wanted Muslims to question everything 
including the dogma. How to remain relevant in a kaleidoscopically changing world is 
the essence of Igbal's thinking (Masud, 2004). Khudi refers here to self-realisation, 
which according to prophetic tradition is the same as knowing God. Creativity to 
Iqbal's way of thinking was the essence of faith. Conformism was the sure path to 
degeneration. The world had to be built anew by breaking the structures raised by 
imperialists and their lackeys, the mirs (feudal sources of power), the pirs 
(traditional 
sources of religious power) and the mullahs 
(traditionalistic religious leaders), whom 
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Iqbal held to be the enemies of progress of the self as well as of the community. These 
provocative assertions about Iqbal's revolutionary and iconoclastic stance are 
questioned by Ashfaq Salim Mirza, who believes Igbal's concept of the `religious 
community' is muddled and his philosophical positions in the context of prescribed 
beliefs untenable (Javed, 2003). Inayatullah goes several steps further and says that 
Iqbal could easily be seen as a fundamentalist in the light of much of his poetry; he is 
against women's rights and their liberation in society and is not the revolutionary 
Khawaja Sahib is trying to make him out to be (Inayatullah, cited in Anwar, 2002). 
Another important account of Iqbal within contemporary literature is Nazir 
Qaiser's comparative study, where issues of metatheory, philosophy and social 
thought are critically assessed. Qaiser attempts to dispel what he sees as the 
misconceptions in Iqbal's philosophy by understanding him in his true perspective -a 
perspective that, he says, carries with it the possibility of turning Muslims into a 
spiritually democratic nation. It is therefore vitally important for Qaiser to remove all 
the wrong ideas about Iqbal's thought and give him his due place as an original 
thinker. 
Qaiser's latest book Iqbal and the Western philosophers: a comparative study 
(2001) aims to prove beyond any doubt that Igbal's primary source and frame of 
reference is the Quran, Islamic tenants, the genuine concepts of Muslim thinkers and 
the thoughts of Sufis, especially Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi, whom he regards as his 
Murshid (or Spiritual Guide) and his Mathnavi as `The Quran in Persian'. Qaiser does 
not agree with those scholars and critics who hold the view that Iqbal borrowed some 
of his basic concepts and ideas from the Western intellectual tradition. Kant, Fichte, 
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Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, William James and Bergson are the Western philosophers 
who are usually said to have greatly influenced Iqbal. Some 50 years ago, B. A. Dar, a 
notable scholar of Iqbal, wrote his famous book Iqbal and post-Kantian voluntarism 
(1956) and tried to determine the extent of the influence these philosophers had 
exerted upon Iqbal. Adopting a middle-of-the-road approach, Dar advocated the thesis 
that though Iqbal did allow himself to be influenced by a number of Western and non- 
Western thinkers, ultimately he absorbed this influence into a system of his own. 
Most of the ideas taken from others were transformed and, therefore, assumed new 
meanings. 
Then we have Tara Charan Rastogi, an Indian scholar who wrote numerous 
articles and at a book entitled Western influence in Iqbal (1987) to demonstrate that 
all of Igbal's basic ideas were in fact borrowed from the Western men of philosophy 
and letters. For many students and followers of Iqbal, it was an outrageous claim that 
was bound to create some sort of reaction. Qaiser's discourse, on the other hand, 
seems to have been penned in conscious, or perhaps unconscious, reaction to 
Rastogi's approach. The Indian scholar claimed that Iqbal borrowed all his ideas from 
the West; Nazir Qaiser assures us that there is absolutely no trace of Western thought 
in Igbal's system. Both are clearly immoderate positions. 
In the introduction to his book (2001, pp 1-3), Qaiser says that his work is 
neither an apology nor a defence but is "simply an attempt to analyse western sources 
of Iqbal's philosophy in order to place the works of Iqbal 
in their true perspective". In 
his view, Iqbal was a unique and original thinker 
in the sense that he was well versed 
in Muslim intellectual tradition as well as modern science and philosophy. He derived 
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his originality of thought from Islam and presented a critique of modern thought. The 
basic frame of reference of Iqbal, Qaiser observers, is Islamic, which 
... 
helps him to bring out the strong and weak points of the thinkers he is dealing with. There is 
no denying the fact that one can discern some affinity on certain points in his thought and other 
philosophers but this affinity is more or less ephemeral and it cannot speak of their identity of 
thought. The difference in their approaches is so great that it is against the spirit of true 
scholarship to consider Iqbal as a camp follower of any of those western philosophers. Iqbal 
uses the modern terminology in English but he keeps the Arabic, Persian and Urdu terminology 
in tact, which is spread out in his various works in different languages. Whenever he uses this 
philosophical terminology in English, he is conscious of enshrining its real, true and full 
meaning impregnated in the Islamic concepts. (2001, p 8) 
At this point we can legitimately ask Nazir Qaiser why, if Iqbal was never 
influenced by Western philosophers, a number of scholars think otherwise? He has 
attempted to answer this question. There are, he writes, two main reasons for this 
view: one is that the scholars themselves lack sufficient knowledge of the Quran, 
Muslim thought and sufi concepts; the other is that Igbal's own discussion and 
appreciation of certain views of some of these Western philosophers "have not been 
understood in their true context" by these scholars. Iqbal has discussed and 
appreciated their views "only to show that they have also caught some glimpses of the 
ancient truth as imbibed in the Islamic tradition. It does not mean that he abandoned 
his original frame of reference and started imitating the westerners" (2001, p 3). But 
the main problem of Qaiser's approach is his anti-intercivilisational perspective, 
which renders a dialogical approach to intellectual tradition impossible wherever 
traces exist of the exchangeability of ideas that might lead to constructive discourses 
on co-existence. In addition, Qaiser seems to read Iqbal from a post-1947 perspective, 
when the `ideology of Pakistan' turned into a reality at the geo-political level. If he 
had heeded to Iqbal's spirit of `reconstructive approach', surely he would have 
thought differently about Iqbal's intercivilisational inclinations in intellectual terms. A 
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very brief passage from a lecture is sufficient to demonstrate how ]gbal viewed 
intellectual sojourn: 
With the reawakening of Islam, therefore, it is necessary to examine, in an independent spirit, 
what Europe has thought and how far the conclusions reached by her can help us in the revision 
and if necessary, reconstruction, of theological thought in Islam. (Iqbal, 1986, p 6) 
Before he visited Europe, his poetry affirmed Indian nationalism (as in Naya 
shawala or The new altar), but time away from India caused him to shift his 
perspective. He came to criticise nationalism for two reasons: in Europe it had led to 
destructive racism and imperialism, and in India it was not founded on an adequate 
degree of common purpose. In a speech delivered at Aligarh in 1910, called `Islam as 
a social and political ideal', he indicated the new Pan-Islamic direction of his hopes. 
Some critics may argue that the recurrent themes of Igbal's poetry are a memory of 
the vanished glories of Islam, a complaint about its present decadence, and a call to 
unity and reform without any substantive direction either in politics or policy. Reform 
can be achieved by strengthening the individual through three successive stages: 
obedience to the law of Islam, self-control, and acceptance of the idea that everyone is 
potentially a vicegerent of God (na'ib, or mu'min) (Helal, 1995, pp 98-109) 
This individualistic notion of reform could be critiqued as being anti-social as 
well as idealistic, which in neither case would yield to the kind of reformation that 
people such as Shariati, Eshkevari, Javid Iqbal and Sorosh claimed Iqbalian paradigm 
would lead to. Notoriety came in 1915 with the publication of his long Persian poem 
Asrar-e khudi (Secrets of the self). In this work, Nadwi (2002) claims that Iqbal 
presents a theory of the self that is a strong condemnation of the self-negating 
quietism of classical Islamic mysticism (ie the belief that perfection and spiritual 
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peace are attained by passive absorption in contemplation of God and divine things); 
his criticism shocked many and excited controversy (Helal, 1995, p 96). 
Iqbal and his admirers steadily maintained that creative self-affirmation is a 
fundamental Muslim virtue; his critics said he imposed themes from the German 
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche on Islam (Nasr, 1993, p 121). His philosophical 
position was articulated in The reconstruction of religious thought in Islam (1930), a 
volume based on six lectures delivered at Madras, Hyderabad and Aligarh in 1928-29. 
He argued that a rightly focused man should unceasingly generate vitality through 
interaction with the purposes of the living God (Mir, 2001). 
Iqbal tended to be progressive in adumbrating general principles of change but 
conservative in initiating actual change. But the advocates of Iqbalian paradigm base 
their arguments mainly on the assumption that Iqbal was a critical thinker who 
revolutionised the philosophical framework of Classical Islam as well as 
demonstrated the theoretical fallacies of modernist philosophies of Europe. This is, at 
least, the general view proposed by writers on the `ideology of Pakistan' as well as 
authors such as Muzaffar Hussain and Shariati, and Shariatians today. However, there 
are others, such as Mirza, who view things in a different light. 
Ashfaq Salim Mirza's view is that philosophy denotes the intellectual inquiry 
through which we try to understand relationships between objective reality and 
subjective reality. Philosophy, he claims, begins when primacy of matter over mind is 
acknowledged. Therefore, only those thinkers are entitled to be called philosophers 
who first accept the primary position of matter and then look for universal, social and 
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economic realities. There are other thinkers who accord primary position to mind. 
They look at the world through a preconceived metaphysical system. Ashfaq Salim 
Mirza refuses to call them critical thinkers. They are, he insists, theologians. You may 
take Iqbal as a religious thinker, moralist and scholar, but it would be an outright 
misnomer to call him a critical thinker (Mirza, cited in Javed, 2003). Although these 
engagements with Iqbal are constructive, nevertheless there is still room for more a 
globally oriented reconstruction of Igbalian's thought in relation to other intellectual 
traditions in general, and Western social theory in particular. This latter aspect will be 
more fully explored in the final chapter. 
2. Self and community 
Igbal's conception of self and community is based on a three-dimensional model. 
Iqbal first conceived the idea of selfhood or ego as a sociological and revolutionary 
notion. In due course, after having witnessed the signs of degeneration and loss of 
self-identity of the Eastern nations, especially the Muslims, and after examining its 
causes, this idea became permanent and deeply rooted in his frame of thought. 
Afterwards he sought to provide a philosophical and subjective ground to it, and 
based this notion on a general conception of the self, something similar to the 
conception of existence as evolved by philosophers - an essence which 
is shared by 
all beings but needs to be interpreted philosophically. The notion of unity 
in plurality 
and plurality in unity has been recurrently used in his Asrar-e 
khudi (Secrets of the 
self), and what Iqbal meant to refer to by this notion 
had profoundly individual and 
collective connotations (Iqbal, 1978). 
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Ego, in Iqbal's thought, needs to be strengthened in an individual. But this 
very egohood of the ego of an individual and the strengthening of the personality of 
the ego has social implications in the covenantal framework. Unless the personality of 
the (individual) ego is strengthened, a strong and stable society in its real sense (in 
Igbal the real is equivalent to divine as real in Koranic language stands for the divine 
or Haq) cannot come into existence. The meaning of the ego is different from that of 
the existence. At the first instance he speaks in the manner of mystics about the 
generality and the extent of the concept of self. The world of being is actualised 
through the manifestations of the ego (Helal, 1995, pp 75-92). Each one of the 
phenomena of the universe is a manifestation of a particular aspect of the self. The 
ideas, themselves produced by the self-consciousness, are the manifestations of the 
ego in every being. The affirmation of one's ego is also an affirmation of others. 
When the presence of the ego in a human being is posited, it automatically posits the 
presence of egos other than one's own. Therefore there is the self as well as the non- 
self, that is, the existence of other is also posited. Hence it may be inferred that the 
whole universe is contained as a possibility in the self. 
The ego is also the source of hostility. There are various selves that are at war 
with one another. This struggle, this perpetual conflict, brings the world into 
existence. It is the ego that is responsible for the selection of the fittest and its survival 
as well. The concept of ego is a graded one and its grades vary in intensity and 
weakness. The degree of intensity and weakness of the ego in each being is the factor 
that determines their strength and firmness. In this context, Igbal cites in his poems 
examples such as drop, wine, goblet, cup-bearer, mountain, 
desert, wave, sea, light, 
eye, verdure, candle, silence, candle-bearer, gem, earth, moon, star, sun, tree, etc. 
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Each entity is measured by the intensity of its ego; for instance, a drop has one 
strength of ego, while a stream has another. Similarly, a gem on which an image can 
be engraved possesses an ego-strength different from that of a stone on which no 
image can be engraved. Finite ego is never absolute. It always refers to a graded 
essence that is present in things and human individuals, as well as in cosmic elements 
in diverse measures. He concludes this theme with the following verse: 
When ego embraces Elan Vital, 
The stream of life is transformed into an ocean. (Iqbal, 1915, Ghazal, 40) 
In Asrar-e khudi (Secrets of the self j he tries to awaken the sense of selfhood, 
that is, the sense of human identity in the individual as well as the society. One could 
mention a separate section in Secrets of the self that deals with the idea that entreating 
weakens the selfhood. When an individual or a nation stretches out its hands in need, 
this act of dependency is a sign of loss of faith that weakens the individuality of the 
person or the nation, leading to subsequent deterioration. As Iqbal puts it: 
Nations come to birth by Faith 
let Faith expire, and nations die. (Iqbal, 1987, p 32) 
Following on from the problem of ego, Iqbal elucidates the problem of 
selflessness. While discussing the problem of the self, the notion of strengthening an 
individual's identity should not be interpreted in the sense of imprisoning one's being 
within the walls constructed around the self and living in isolation, cut off from other 
human beings as independent egos or as Leibnizian monads (Leibniz, 1902). Neither 
does it that one should lose one's identity among other selves in society. Rather an 
individual should live in close relationship with society. This is the real meaning of 
selflessness. The book Rumuz-e bikhudi (Secrets of selflessness or mysteries of 
selflessness) is illustrative of Igbal's ideas about covenantal collectivity (Iqbal, 1953). 
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Igbal's ideas about establishing an order based on the ideals of covenant are 
expounded more in Rumuz-e bikhudi than in any other of his works. Overall, the 
problems elucidated in Rumuz-e bikhudi are issues relevant to social theory and the 
establishment of a religious community (Igbal, 1953 and 1934, p 92). 
Iqbal's vision of the human self in society is not based on philosophical 
secularism or biological evolutionism. In Igbal's thought, the human self takes a 
lonely journey through the world before finally coming face to face with Allah or the 
ultimate reality by becoming aware of the innate powers of the self (Nadwi, 2002, p 
76). 
Throughout his work it appears that Igbai is attempting to remind human 
beings of their true nature, a nature that consists of a temporal as well as a heavenly 
element (Nadwi, 2002, p 77). Through his poetry he attempted to rekindle in human 
beings the `divine spark', which is an integral part of their makeup. Indeed, the Quran 
notes that when Allah created the first human being, "He breathed His own spirit into 
this new creation" (Al-Hijr 15: 29 and A1-Sajdah 32: 9). Consequently, human nature is 
not `human', it is a `humanness' that has an element of the divine in it. But after 
having been created "in the best conformation" (Al-Teen 95: 4), the human being was 
reduced "to the lowest of the low" (Al-Teen 95: 5). The question now arises as to 
whether the human individual and human collectivism can again rise to the primordial 
noble heights of ideal society, or Umma in Islam (Helal, 1995, p 281; Maitre, 1962, 
pp 19-20). In the twentieth century, no Muslim thinker has delved into this issue more 
perceptively than Iqbal (Abdul Vahid, 1944, p 3). Iqbal formulated his philosophy of 
khudi in order to express his ideas on this subject. The following quatrain illustrates 
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the motive underlying his spiritual and intellectual endeavours as well as the essential 
core of his philosophy: 
Why should I ask the sages about my beginning? It is my ultimate destiny that I am 
really concerned about. 
Elevate your khudi to such heights that before every decree, God Himself asks you: 
"Tell me, what is your wish? " (Iqbal, 1973, Ghazal, 33) 
Iqbal's philosophy essentially revolves around the issue of the progression of 
the human being, or the rise of the `self or `ego' (the Iqbalian khudi) in the direction 
of attaining exalted heights (ie the heights at which Allah Himself begins to take the 
wishes, hopes and aspirations of the human being into account before formulating His 
decree (Iqbal, 1987, p 50). 
Iqbal argues that khudi is the root of all existence, an entity that may appear to 
be perishable, but which can attain immortality (Rahman, 1944, p 223). The human 
ego or `I' has the potential of achieving permanence as an element in the constitution 
of the universe provided that it adopts a certain mode of life. The ego can evolve, 
progress and succeed as well as degenerate, atrophy and fail. These two possibilities 
can be viewed in the language of Koran as follows: "The one who causes this (self) to 
grow in purity has indeed attained success; and the one who is negligent of this (self) 
has indeed utterly failed" (Al-Shams 91: 9,10). The human ego has the ability to grow 
by absorbing the elements of the universe, of which it appears to be an insignificant 
part, as well as the ability to incorporate the attributes of divine being. Muslim Sufis 
have advised: "Create in yourself the attributes of Allah". If the human ego were able 
to do this, it would become worthy of being the vicegerent of God on earth (Nadwi, 
2002, p 66). Iqbal argues that the human ego has a central place in the universe, while 
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it is, at the same time, intimately linked with the ultimate ego, or God Himself. Igbal 
notes: 
... throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of egohood until it 
reaches perfection in man. That is why the Quran declares the Ultimate Ego to be nearer to 
man than his own neck-vein. (Iqbal, 1922, p 238) 
In order to reach these noble heights of perfection, the ego has to pass through 
three stages, which Igbal describes in Asrar-e-Khudi. These three stages can be seen 
as the different spiritual phases through which the ego and the collective ego have to 
pass in their journey of spiritual ascension: Itaat, or obedience to the divine law; 
Dabt-e-Nafs, or self-control, which is the highest form of self-consciousness or 
egohood; and Niyabat-e-Ilahi, or the vicegerency of God. 
These three stages in the spiritual progression of the human ego resemble 
Nietzsche's three stages of the metamorphosis of the spirit, except for the covenantal 
nature of Igbal's thought. In fact, Iqbal himself deemed it necessary to warn readers of 
Asrar-e-Khudi that Nietzsche does not at all believe in the spiritual, which he 
described as khudi (Javid Igbal, 1960). 
The fact that Nietzsche does not even accept the reality of the human ego is, in 
Igbal's view, itself the most pressing evidence that the three stages in the development 
of the khudi are not identical with the three stages in the development of the 
Nietzschean spirit. Nietzsche argues that the human `I' is a fiction and Iqbal accepts 
the argument that this is indeed the case if the issue is viewed from a purely 
intellectual standpoint (Dar, 1956). This position of Nietzsche echoes the Kantian 
argument in The Critique of pure reason (1986) that the notions of God, 
immortality 
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and freedom cannot be proven on intellectual grounds, however useful such notions 
may be for practical purposes. But Iqbal goes on to note that the existence of the `I' 
cannot be rejected just because it cannot be proven on intellectual grounds because 
the human ego is not a purely intellectual entity - its existence is also rooted in inner 
experiences. This is something that has also been noted in `voluntaristic philosophy' 
(which had some impact on Iqbal): when one moves beyond the constraints of purely 
intellectual thought, and views the issue from the perspective of `inner experience', 
the `I' is no longer a fiction but an indubitable fact (Helal, 1995, p 80). 
Iqbal notes that Leibniz, in asserting that the `I' is an ultimate fact, was closer 
to the truth than either Kant or Nietzsche. But Leibniz, in Igbal's view, regarded the 
human ego as something closed or windowless. To Iqbal, khudi is the essence of life 
and its existence. The entire system of the universe originates in the self or khudi, and 
so the continuation of the life of all individuals depends on strengthening the self. In 
Asrar-e-Khudi (Secrets of the self), Igbal says: 
The form of existence is an effect of the Self, Whatsoever you see is a secret of the Self. When the 
Self awoke to consciousness, It revealed the universe of Thought. A hundred worlds are hidden in 
its essence, Self-assertion brings Not-self to light. The Human Ego can survive the shock of death 
provided it enlivens the interior landscape of Ego by the gnostic love in attaining proximity to 
Ultimate Ego, which is not but the essence of Love. (Iqbal, 1915, pp 11-20) 
Iqbal, however, notes that this assertion is contradicted by our experience in 
which the `I' can grow and evolve through the process of education. In light of this, 
the most pressing question for Iqbal is not whether the human ego is a reality or not - 
it most certainly is a reality - but whether this weak, created and dependent ego or `I' 
can survive the shock of death and thus become a permanent element 
in the 
constitution of the universe (Nicholson, 1920, p xviii). As Iqbal argues 
in Asrar-e- 
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Khudi, the human self can attain immortality if he/she adopts a certain way of life 
(individually and communally) through which he/she can come into contact with the 
ultimate source of existence, the ultimate ego (Iqbal, 1986, p 122). 
Since attaining permanence depends upon perfecting the self and bringing it 
into accord with divine will, Iqbal appropriately exhorts that one should `know' his or 
her inner self. `Know thyself is an exhortation that has been made numerous times 
before by many others; the problem is not in the exhortation itself but in its approach. 
According to Iqbal, all distinctly existential problems have ultimate solutions in the 
self, but, unfortunately, it is this very self that is still ignored. The reason underlying 
the ignorance of the self is the fact that the self is thought of as being a material entity. 
But the human being is not only a material being; he/she also possesses a non-material 
component. Iqbal says that: 
... the unity called man 
is body when you look at it as acting in regard to what we call the 
external world; it is mind or soul when you look at it as acting in regard to the ultimate aim and 
ideal to such setting. (Helal, 1995, p 78) 
In other words, there is an element in the composition of the human being that 
manifests itself and experiences reality quite differently from the bodily element of 
human composition. This non-corporeal element is what Iqbal considers to be the 
human soul and Helal holds that it constitutes the focal point in Iqbal's thought 
in 
relation to the self s existential and cosmological problems (Iqbal, 
1986, p 84). 
Together, the body and soul exist as a unit. Thus, the Igbalian `self is an entity in 
which the body and the soul have to work together. Both 
have to grow together and 
work harmoniously if the personality of an 
individual is to be strengthened. The body 
and the soul are indispensable 
for the needs of each other, as Iqbal notes: 
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... the 
body is not a thing situated in an absolute void; it is a system of events or acts. The system 
of experiences we call soul or ego is also a system of acts. This does not obliterate the 
distinction of soul and body; it only brings them closer to each other. The characteristic of the 
ego is spontaneity; the acts composing the body repeat themselves. The body is accumulated 
action or habit of the soul; and as such undetachable from it. (Iqbal, 1986, pp 28-9) 
He expresses the same point in a couplet: 
To name body and soul separately is the requirement of speech. 
But to see (or know) body and soul as separate entities is heresy. (M. Irfan Iqbal, 1998) 
According to Iqbal, the soul is that element in the constitution of the human 
being that can be explained only in the sense of being a divine spark that bestows 
meaning upon the very unity of humanity as a foundation for peaceful co-existence 
(Iqbal, cited in Helal, 1995, p 123). 
Modern secular thought, in Igbal's view, has lost all cognisance of this divine 
spark. The ignorance of this spiritual reality has led to the degeneration of the human 
being to sub-human levels of existence, notwithstanding scientific, technological, and 
economic accomplishments (Iqbal, 1986, Lecture IV). 
Iqbal's thought on self and society leads him to a point where he cannot help 
but renounce `materialism' in modernity by distinguishing the latter from the former 
and urging Muslims to embrace the fruits of modernity without being influenced by 
the fountain of modernity, ie secularism or atheism. His stance against atheism and 
the disintegration of societal fabric in a religious sense (which should ultimately link 
the individual being to the ultimate ego) was demonstrated during of his visits to 
England in December 1931, when he was invited to address students at Cambridge. 
He stated: 
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I would like to offer a few pieces of advice to the young men who are at present studying at 
Cambridge 
... 
I advise you to guard against atheism and materialism. The biggest blunder made by 
Europe was the separation of Church and State. This deprived their culture of moral soul and 
diverted it to the atheistic materialism. I had twenty-five years ago seen through the drawbacks of 
this civilization and therefore .... 
13 
It should be noted that Igbal's denouncement of atheism was not a simple 
denominational condemnation of all things `un-Islamic'. His sophisticated approach 
to `atheism' is put into context when one takes into consideration his estimation of 
Karl Marx as the prophet and founder of scientific socialism. He considers Das 
Capital a kind of religious book in which are contained the principles of a new and 
just social order. He considered its author to be a `prophet without an angel' and in his 
book Javid Nameh spoke of Marx as follows: 
The author of `Capital' comes of the tribe of Abraham 
He is a prophet, without Gabriel. 
For, in his error there is a hidden truth, 
With the heart he is a fidel, with the brain a heretic. 
The people of the West have lost the heaven, 
They seek the pure spirit in the stomach (economic arena). 
The pure spirit does not receive color and fragrance from the body, 
But socialism has no concern other than with the body. 
The religion of this prophet who does not know the Truth 
Is founded on the equality of stomachs. (Iqbal, 1932, p 69) 
His positive attitude towards the social teaching of Marxism and Leninism led 
him to adopt working-class life as a poetic theme (Padmanabhan, 1998) by 
composing many verses in praise of Lenin and Russian Revolutionaries. 
On the other 
hand, he condemned their atheism and the lack of spiritual consciousness 
in their 
respective positions (Smith, 1946, pp 131-2). 
13 See: http: //www. pakistanvoice. org/al lama_mohammad_igbal. htm 
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In Igbal's thought, secular modernism has rendered the human being incapable 
of moral self-assessment. In addition, it has become the greatest contemporary hurdle 
to human spiritual progress, because it makes the human being unconscious of the 
true nature of human reality as well as the true nature of the reality of the universe 
(Waheed, 1958). The fatal flaw, the greatest misfortune of modern secular science, 
philosophy and art is that they have become totally lopsided - totally focused on the 
material dimension of reality and oblivious to its spiritual dimension. For Iqbal, what 
unites human beings against all corrosively divisive forces of nature and egoistic 
colonisation are the secrets of Tawhid, without which the moral fabric of the 
individual and the ethical texture of society would lose sight of `spiritual worth' and 
`universal humanism' (Iqbal, 1986, Lecture VI). 
Consequently, it comes as no surprise that not only has the human being failed 
to progress spiritually during the modern period, but, more tragically, its moral and 
spiritual faculties have become numb and practically dysfunctional. Although his 
entire social and philosophical reflections are based (or are an attempt to be based) on 
the principles of Tawhid, nevertheless Iqbal did not think of his message as entirely 
confined within denominational boundaries. In a letter to R. A. Nicholson, he wrote: 
The object of my Persian `Masnavis' (Secrets of the self and Mysteries of selflessness) is not to 
attempt an advocacy of Islam. My real purpose is to seek a better social order and to present to 
the world a universally acceptable ideal (of life and action), but it is impossible for me, in the 
effort to define this ideal, to ignore the social system and values of Islam whose most important 
objective is to demolish all artificial and pernicious distinctions of caste, creed, color and 
economic status. Islam is violently opposed to the idea of racial superiority ... 
[which] is the 
greatest enemy of mankind and it is the duty of all well-wishers of human race to eradicate it. I 
am intensely devoted to Islam, but I have chosen the Islamic community as my starting point not 
because of any national or religious prejudice.... (Maitre, 1962, pp 19-20) 
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In other words, Igbal is trying to make clear that his overarching concern is 
with the communal aspects of human life and even when he directs his attention to 
philosophical, theological and gnostical dimensions of the Muslim community, the 
axis of investigation is still of a `social nature'. In other words, his discourse is not 
intra-theological in nature. 
However, even though Iqbal believes that spiritual faculties have become 
dormant in modernity, that is not to say they are dead altogether. Rather, they are 
waiting for the time when human beings will recognise the importance of these inner 
capacities and decide to reappropriate them so that they can play their rightful role in 
the reconstruction of humanity (Iqbal, 1986, pp 33-4). For the time being though, 
modern thought has come to rely exclusively on science (or a philosophy that is the 
handmaiden of science) in its search for `objective' knowledge. But, as a matter of 
fact, neither science nor philosophy is by itself capable of reaching the truly 
`objective' knowledge of the actual nature of reality and the actual reality of the 
human being either in its individual or collective sense. Speaking about the limitations 
of science in the human quest for knowledge, Iqbal notes14: 
Natural Science deals with matter, with life, and with mind; but the moment you ask the 
question how matter, life, and mind are mutually related, you begin to see the sectional 
character of the various sciences that deal with them and the inability of these sciences, taken 
singly, to furnish a complete answer to your question. In fact, the various natural sciences are 
like so many vultures falling on the dead body of Nature, and each running away with a piece of 
14 Igbal's remark on science bears great resemblance to another religious thinker of the early twentieth 
century from Russia, namely Leo Tolstoy, who advocated the 
integral unification of the true (science) 
and the good (ethics) as the basis of intelligent pursuit. 
In his critique of modern episteme, Tolstoy 
argues that: "All who turn to the science of our 
day not for the purpose of satisfying idle curiosity, nor 
in order to play a role in science, nor to make a 
living at science, but simply in order to answer direct, 
simple, vital questions find that science answers 
for them thousands of complex and learned questions 
- but not that one question 
to which every intelligent person seeks an answer: `What am I, and how am 
Ito live? "' (Sorokin, P. A. (1912) `L. N. Tolstoy as a philosopher', 
Vestnik Psikhologii, Criminalnoi 
Antropologii I Gipnotizma (Journal of Psychology, 
Criminal Anthropology and Hypnotism), vol 4, no 
5,80-97). 
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its flesh.... Natural Science is by nature sectional; it cannot, if it is true to its own nature and 
function, set up its theory as a complete view of Reality. (ibid, p 49) 
While the limitation of science is that it is by nature `sectional', the limitation 
of philosophy is of a similar nature: 
Philosophy is an intellectual view of things; and, as such, does not care to go beyond a concept, 
which can reduce all the rich variety of experience to a system. It sees Reality from a distance as 
it were. (ibid, p 49) 
Because of the obvious limitations of science and philosophy, it is equally 
obvious that the human being cannot truly realise his/her humanity if the individual is 
left to depend upon his/her physical and mental capabilities alone. In other words, the 
human ego, the Iqbalian khudi, cannot fulfil its true potential if the individual avails 
him/herself only of the resources of science and philosophy. For Iqbal it is only Deen 
that can provide us with the intimate and holistic knowledge of reality - the type of 
knowledge that is an essential prerequisite for the realisation of our humanity. Iqbal 
argues: 
[Philosophy] is theory... [Religion] is living experience, association, intimacy. In order to 
achieve this intimacy thought must rise higher than itself, and find its fulfilment in an attitude of 
mind which religion describes as prayer - one of the last words on the lips of the Prophet of 
Islam. (Ibid, p 49) 
This attitude of mind, though only in its most developed and highest form, is 
the theistic counterpart of Nietzsche's atheistic `will to power'. Of course, the `will' is 
essential if one is to overcome the temptations of an immoral life, as demanded by 
religion. However, in Iqbalian social philosophy, the `will' without the support of 
`belief in something higher and more sublime cannot withstand the pull towards 
carnality and corruption (Ali Yusuf, 1940, pp 90-4). 
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Khudi requires the coupling of `will to power' and 'belief, eventually 
realising itself in the form of yaqeen or a deep inner conviction. In fact, it is 
undaunted conviction that serves as the pivotal point for the `ego' to act and react to 
the sensual temptations of life. However, this conviction will not actualise itself 
unless the individual understands that his/her life has a purpose, and that this purpose 
has an individual as well as a collective dimension (Iqbal, 19??, pp 13-34). 
The ascension of the ego is not merely a detached, personal, and individual 
event; this spiritual development has a collective dimension too that cannot be 
ignored. Iqbal's conceptual repository is full of concepts and images that are mainly 
absent from secular social theory or devoid of their pristine (or archaic) connotations, 
which Iqbal employs in his discourses. One of these concepts is `soul' (Ruh) and the 
image is `spiritual' (Ma'navi) in both Secrets of the self and Mysteries of self essness. 
These concepts are used unproblematically just as one uses terms such as `nation', 
`ethnos' and `social' within the conceptual framework of modernity due to the 
abundant historical, philosophical and sociological arguments that lie behind the 
project of modernity. Iqbal does rely on the Muslim intellectual tradition, which 
ultimately relies on the worldview of the Koran, which has a strong transcendental 
frame of reference. 
In other words, what Iqbal calls `the ascension of the ego' does not have any 
correlative within modem social theory and cannot be understood if one does not 
mention the story of `Me'raj' in Islamic psychology - that, in turn, is a derivation of 
the `prophetic nocturnal ascent' and profoundly interrelated with the gnostic discourse 
on `celestial' versus `terrestrial' self within 
Sufism. If these interrelated discourses on 
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the self in the Koran and human existence in Sufism are not taken into account, then 
Igbal's argument for the ascension of the ego would be nonsense in terms of modern 
social theory on the concept of self or identity. This is because the modern persona 
does not ascend to any celestial sphere and the concept of ascension in modernity 
means recent astrophysical developments in relation to the Moon. This is a totally 
different story. 
Moreover, Igbal notes that a great deal of sacrifice and benevolence is 
required in order to bring the individual, self-preserving ego into harmony with the 
collective ego. Consequently, the guiding principle in life cannot be one of conflict 
between the `self and other `selves' if the dynamic process of the development of 
khudi is to take place. This process can only unfold if there is a conscious realisation 
of the tension between the individual and collective dimensions, a consciousness that 
in turn enables the individual to balance this tension. Iqbal defines `personality' as 
this very state of tension, which, if not maintained, will cause indolence to set in, 
short-circuiting khudi's process of development (Iqbal, 1978, p 44). 
The process of self realisation requires the presence of tension, as tension is 
the Fons Vitae of dynamism, or as Igbal himself puts it: 
In action, lies the secret of life, 
Longing for creation is the law of life. (1978, p 44) 
The human being's complete freedom from the limitations of the material 
world - and from materialism 
itself - is contingent upon the maintenance of this 
tension. In essence, the human being's aspiration to achieve perfection necessarily 
196 
requires the achievement of a balance between the individual ego and the collective 
ego. In Igbal's words: 
The life of the ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment and the 
environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside this arena of mutual invasion. It 
is present in it as a directive energy and is formed and disciplined by its own experiences. 
(Idbal, 1986, p 82) 
This constant interaction between the individual ego and the environment 
provides the ideal opportunity for self-evaluation. As the individual interacts with 
her/his environment, he/she must be constantly assessing his/her own 'self, not only 
on an individual basis, but also in relation to other `selves', or what in modem 
sociology one calls the `social', in the environment. But one should not lose sight of 
the fact that the initial emphasis is on the individual ego. Only that individual ego 
which has attained a degree of self-realisation and self-understanding will be able 
genuinely to understand and constructively engage with other individual egos. It is 
significant to note that by understanding Iqbal does not comprehend an intellectual 
competence but rather a consciousness of God that lies at the heart of any authentic 
self-realisation. This is what Igbal means by genuine self-understanding (Iqbal, 1986, 
Lecture IV). 
This is another way of saying that only that ego which has learned self-respect, 
self-love and self affirmation will be able to extend respect and love to other selves, 
and also affirm their dignity and autonomy. Iqbal's philosophy of khudi posits that a 
mature and developed understanding of respect, love, and affirmation on the part of 
individual ego requires respect, love, and affirmation for every other `self because 
only that individual ego which is genuinely 
integrated with its environment and 
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constructively engaged with other egos is really a conscious self. Or as Iqbal himself 
puts it: 
What is Self? The inmost secret of life. What is Self? The awakening of creation. 
Eternity behind it, eternity before it, No limit behind it, no limit before it. 
Flowing along with the tide of the time, Enduring the suffering of its waves. 
From eternity, it is involved in ceaseless struggle, It assumed shape in the form of Man. (Iqbal, 
1935, pp 166-7) 
In the context of Igbal's social theoretical reflection, then, the progress of the 
individual human being depends on his/her relationship to the self, to the family, to 
the society, and ultimately to God, which envelops and directs them all as a 
meaningful whole. The gradual realisation of this intricate and delicate web of 
relations will lead the individual to realise his/her fullest potential and significance. 
Ultimately, with the rise of ego-hood on Iqbalian terms, the individual can become the 
architect of human destiny (Rahman, 1939). 
3. Secular and sacred 
There is great debate within modern social theory and philosophy on the relationship 
between the emergence of modern society and the decline of traditional religion and 
their respective impact on modern Lebensphilosophie, which, in turn, determines the 
general outlook of the `modern self in a phenomenological sense with regard to the 
constitution of self and community (Shiner, 1967, pp 207-20). That is to say, modern 
theoreticians of the `social' argue that there appears to be a virtually universal process 
in the modern world in which the social influence of religion is diminishing -a 
process known to social theorists and modern philosophers as secularisation. The way 
this `social influence' is conceived by modern theorists is significant, ie if the human 
being is a social animal and the self is a social construction, and if religion does not 
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have any influence on the delicate process of `socialisation', then religion is an epi- 
phenomena, devoid of any of the cognitive, existential or ontological aspects that 
collectively make up the fabric of public life. This is the other implicit side of the 
argument within modern social theory, which works as an overall theoretical umbrella 
for theories on religion and society within European intellectual tradition. However, 
any discussion on secularisation would be futile without reference to Larry Shiner's 
discourse on the topic. I do not attempt here to explore all of the aspects of his theory 
and the critiques levelled at it, but I seek to summarise the main points in order to 
shed some light on Igbal's position in relation to sacred (and sacralisation) and secular 
(and secularisation) as a position within the Muslim intellectual tradition. 
Shiner explores six different meanings of the term secularisation and hence 
provides a valuable framework for any substantial discussion on the topic. In his 
view, the Latin root saeculum, from which the term `secular' derives, is ambiguous in 
itself. It could signify a great length of time or could be employed as a religiously 
negative term signifying `this world' under the domination of Lucifer. At any rate, as 
the influence of the church grew in `this world', the term became more neutral, so that 
by the Middle Ages, for instance, `secular clergy' referred to those priests serving 
ordinary parishes rather than those in religious orders within 
Catholic Europe. 
Concomitant to the emergence of the nation-state in Europe, the term `secularisation' 
was used to signify land transfer from ecclesiastical to civil control, 
but by the 
eighteenth century, when the battle between church and state 
became more political in 
nature, the seemingly neutral connotation of the term was 
doomed to disappear from 
the socio-political landscape of Europe 
for some time. In the nineteenth century, when 
the discourse of the `social' was falling into 
disuse as well, the term `secularism' was 
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applied to denote militant atheistic associations, and perhaps because of this 
theologians became concerned about its ontological-existential consequences and 
hence attacked it (Shiner, 1967, pp 207-20). 
This is an historical overview of the term more or less advocated by Shiner; 
however, it has been disputed by many (Hill, 1973, pp 228-50) and, more importantly, 
some sociologists, such as David Martin, have argued that the concept fundamentally 
should be disregarded as a scientific tool (1969, p 9). 
The dispute between Martin and Shiner or the arguments between scientific 
and historical sociologists are beyond the scope of this discussion and I am not going 
to attempt to pass any verdict on the topic, even though it is of great significance for 
the paradigmatic relation between scientific studies on Christian theology and modern 
social theory (Martin et al, 1980). However, I would like to outline the six general 
definitions of secularisation provided by Shiner and explore how the rationale for the 
whole distinction between sacred and secular in Shiner's classification 
(dis)corresponds to Iqbal's view on secular and sacred, both as an ontological ethos 
and a sociological process. Shiner's six definitions are as follows: the decline of 
religion, which would lead to a society devoid of religiousness; the shift from `other- 
worldly' to `this-worldly' orientations, which is the essence of Weberian concern but 
with formal rational criteria replacing the substantively rational considerations in the 
area of economic activity; the disengagement of society from religion where the 
differentiation of religious ideas and institutions from other parts of societal structures 
would lead to an intensification of privatisation (and hence limitation) of religion; the 
transposition of beliefs and activities that were once thought to have a divine point of 
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reference to an existential understanding to a situation where they are considered to 
have an entirely `secular content'; the idea that the world is gradually deprived of its 
sacral character so that the human being, in Heidegger's word, ultimately feels as if 
they have been `thrown' into the world; the transition from a `sacred' to a `secular' 
society, which is related to value structures and where virtues are understood by 
members of society in relation to historical changes and societal transformations 
(Shiner, 1967, pp 207-20). 
The main point in Shiner's framework is that, regardless of what an individual 
self feels, experiences, thinks, acts or existentialises in the societal world, there are 
processes above, beyond and below individual control that could be disregarded in the 
construction of any theoretical perspective on the `social'. Besides, the complexity of 
the social world brought about by science and technology does not allow any for any 
substantial role of `enchantment' in modern society. Iqbal's answer to this might be 
that religion is not about `enchantment' and magic is not the essential component of 
religious cognition and ethos; and that the ego is the only reality that sets the rules and 
if the ego is lost and its influence minimised or diminished, then what we have is not 
society or Menschlichleben but conglomeration falsely conceived as human society 
and human life (Iqbal, 1986, p 168). 
There are philosophical as well as religious reasons for Igbal's position. There 
is a categorical distinction between `vital facts' and `intellectual facts' in relation to 
the existence of the khudi (self) in the Hasti (Welt), where: the human being, in 
her/his unregenerate state is but dust; there is yet in her/him the potential to discover 
the highest destiny in the universe; the unfolding of that potential is through khudi; 
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that self or personality needs to develop constantly through love; the channel for that 
development is the principle of Tawhid, the mystic personality of Muhammad the 
Prophet; intellect and modern knowledge, common virtues like humbleness or 
contentment, or anything else that is shackled in the senses is a mere blind and leads 
away from perfection; the inner light in the self is creative; the pith of life is action 
and strength. In this context, there is no space (either factual or intellectual), time 
(serial or real) or `orbit of existence' capable of serving as the ontological container of 
the modern distinction between sacred and profane in Igbal's philosophy (Ali Yusuf, 
1940, pp 97-98). 
The seen and unseen, empirical and intellectual, sensible and intelligible, past 
and present, private and public, being and becoming, subject and object, thinking and 
action, religion and science, sacral and secular, mind and matter and whatever holds 
up the philosophical (political-societal-economic) backbone of this dichotomous 
outlook is denied by Iqbal in his understanding of the khudi as the key to the vital 
comprehension of all existence, which is a preparation of the vicegerency of God in 
the hands of Mardi-Kamel ('the Perfect Man'). Igbal's `Perfect Man' is Mard-i- 
Momin, a religious self who possesses immense power and strength, and can 
transform the destiny of the people by establishing the Kingdom of God on earth: 
Who can imagine the strength of his arm (Mard-i-Momin) 
Destinies are changed at the mere glance of a Perfect Man. (Iqbal, 1924, p 308) 
Iqbal's position will be incomprehensible if approached from a modern 
sociological view of religion. Iqbal, as Helal discerns, attached great importance to 
religion in the private as well as social 
life of an individual being (1995, p 260). 
Elsewhere, Iqbal, argued that in Islam: "God and the universe, spirit and matter, 
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church and state, are organic to each other ... Europe uncritically accepted the duality 
of spirit and matter, probably from Manichean thought" (Vahid, 1967, p 163). When 
one considers that Iqbal's frame of thought is determined by religious philosophy or 
imbued with transcendentalism that the philosophy he attempts to `reconstruct' 
(Igbal's own term) is Islam, then one is not far from the concept of Deen in Islamic 
tradition. This is what lies at the heart of Igbal's social philosophy, and it surely 
differs from what, in post-Enlightenment tradition (and commonly employed by 
secular social theorists), is considered to be religion (Iqbal, 1986, pp 195-6). 
To Igbai, who attached great importance to religion in the development of 
individual ego as well as communal ego, secularism (ie the separation of religion and 
politics, or church and state) and secular (ie the separation of spirit and matter, or 
sacred and profane) did not appear convincing, despite his Nitzeschean-Bergsonian 
inclinations. Although he did sympathise profoundly with both of these philosophers, 
he was deeply critical of Nietzsche's view of God (ie the lack of divine dimension in 
ego's perfection in Nietzschean philosophy) and its fatal impact on the conception of 
ego. For Iqbal, Nietzsche's view is: 
nothing more than a Fatalism ... 
Such a doctrine, far from keying up the human organism for 
the fight of life, tends to destroy its action-tendencies and relaxes the tension of the ego [which is 
the ultimate venue in achieving to the height of the Ultimate Ego]. (Iqbal, 1986, p 92) 
If it is assumed that categories such as `universe', `matter' and `state' in 
modem discourse represent the here-dimension and `God', `spirit' and `church' 
represent the hereafter-dimension, so to speak, then there is no space for `profanity' in 
Iqbalian discourse for the simple but compelling reason that `Deep' is neither a 
private nor an otherworldly concern. 
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The distinction between `here' and `hereafter' does not exist as such within 
Islamic discourse, and its absence, in turn, devalidates the ontological distinction 
between sacred and profane and, more importantly, discredits any claim for the 
historical absence of a divine dimension within the process of human terrestrial life in 
all its aspects. The lack of such distinction has tremendous political consequences, 
which have been evident in the history of Muslim politics from colonialism to neo- 
colonialism. 
In order to comprehend where Iqbal stands in relation to the sociological 
concepts of profane and sacred, one needs to consider two fundamental concepts of 
Akhirat (the reality related to intellectual, intelligible and divine dimension) and 
Dunya, or the world of empirical nature (the reality that is comprehensible to our 
senses), in relation to Deen in the Muslim intellectual tradition, which is what 
constitutes the backbone of Iqbal's Weltbild. The concept of religion or Deen, in 
Igbal's view (which enables him to deny the significance of sacred-profane 
distinction), is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling nor mere action; rather it is an 
expression of the whole man that aims at the perfection of the human ego beyond the 
temporal span of life (Iqbal, 1986, p 178). 
Al-been, or religion, is not a matter of worldliness or an individual's concern 
for otherworldliness in Igbal's scheme of thought. On the contrary, al-Deen is the 
only valid `connective chain' between sensible reality and spiritual reality. If this is 
the case, then how could Iqbal concede to the modern distinction between sacred and 
profane advocated by James, Durkheim, or even Otto? One could pause to ask 
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whether the presence of such a religious outlook or transcendental philosophy within 
his social thought put any fundamental constraint upon Iqbal in relation to existential 
concerns of humanity in contemporary era. Or to put it otherwise, is there any 
existential concern within Iqbalian discourse that could prove to be 
intercivilisationally dialogical? 
As was argued in Chapters Three and Four, the lack of religious consciousness 
within Goffman and Giddens did not automatically disqualify them in relation to 
existentialist questions (as this could be the argument of religious thinkers against 
secular intellectuals who disregard the essential significance of `transcendental 
consciousness'within their anthropology). On the other hand, could the presence of 
sacred consciousness be a theoretically inhibiting problem within the frame of 
intercivilisational dialogue (as this could be the argument of secular thinkers against 
religious intellectuals who condition the very notion of anthropology to a thorough 
appropriation of transcendental vision)? Igbal's conception of ego is not divorced 
from Koranic concept of `vicegerency', ie man/woman is not the master of the 
universe but the vicegerent of God on Earth as long as man/woman keeps his/her 
covenantal oath and carries the Mithaq (the responsibility of being in God's image). 
In other words, if the state of the `social' is conceived in contrast to divine 
origin and man/woman grows out of tutelage when he/she 
becomes less God- 
conscious (or liberated from God-consciousness), ie atheist or secular, then 
how can a 
man/woman of Islam (religiously authentic and 
individually communal) be a secular 
man woman? If, Igbal argues, there are strong signs of secularism within 
the Muslim 
mind as well as the Muslim civilisation, this 
is due to the total confusion that reigns in 
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the Muslim world and is the real secret of selflessness or Bikhudi (alienation, 
assimilation and estrangement) in contemporary Muslim culture. Elsewhere Iqbal 
argues that the coherence of the Muslim community and the subjective consistency of 
Islamic culture depends on a "kind of purely subjective agreement in a certain view of 
the world" and that view, which distinguishes Muslim subjectivity from other kinds of 
subjectivity, in a purely sociological sense, is the idea of Tawhid (Iqbal, cited in Lee, 
1997, p 62) 
If this principle is forgotten in the mind of the individual ego by neglecting 
Tawhid in the communal consciousness of Muslim Umma as Iqbal tried to depict in 
relation to gender and education of women in Muslim community, then chaos would 
reign among Muslims. The reason for such a socio-psychological discordance is that 
no-'body' can function with an ailing spirit and lack of authentic subjectivity (Iqbal, 
19??, pp 16-19,30-4) 
4. Religion and authenticity 
Iqbal took up defence of religion as a form of experience as early as 1929 when he 
delivered his famous lectures at Madras and Hyderabad (India), particularly in his 
first lecture "Knowledge and Religious Experience", and then in his paper "Is 
Religion Possible? ", which he presented to the fifth session of the Aristotelian Society 
in London in 1932. In this lecture in particular he tried to refute Kant's famous 
rejection of the possibility of metaphysics because, as he believes, his argument 
applies with equal force to the realities in which religion is especially 
interested 
(Iqbal, 1986, Lecture VII). By expounding the significance of metaphysics for 
religion, Iqbal argues that science may 
ignore a rational metaphysics but religion 
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cannot, in so far as it aims to reconcile opposing experiences and justify the 
environment in which humanity finds itself (Iqbal, 1986, Lecture VII). Kant's 
position, and that of those who followed him in this rejection of metaphysics from an 
Iqbalian point of departure, can be based on the following presuppositions: all 
experience other than the normal level of experience is impossible; there is only one 
space-order and time-order, which Kant calls the `forms of sensibility', that organise 
data into knowledge of objects and `precepts'; the term `fact' has been limited to 
`empirical facts' only, which in Iqbalian discourse is called `the optically present 
source of sensation'; and discursive thought is the only kind of thought amenable to 
Man (Iqbal, 1986, Lecture VII). 
Kant position on metaphysics is based on the bifurcation between 
phenomenon (the `thing as it appears') and the noumenon (the `thing in itself); the 
latter falls beyond the pale of the manifold of senses and hence is unknowable (Iqbal, 
1986, Lecture VII). For Kant, "The thing in itself is only a limiting idea. Its function 
is merely regulative". Again, Kant made a distinction between what he called the 
`sensible intuition' and `intellectual intuition', and denied that Man possessed the 
latter. This also contributes to his contention of the impossibility of metaphysics. Here 
Iqbal urges that: "Kant's verdict can be accepted if we start with the assumption that 
all experience other than the normal level of experience is impossible" (Iqbal, 1986, 
Lecture VII). Iqbal refers to the evidence of religious experts in an intercivilisational 
perspective both historical and contemporary by arguing that there are potential types 
of consciousness lying close to our normal consciousness. If these types of 
consciousness open up possibilities of life-giving and knowledge-yielding experience, 
the question of the possibility of religion as a form of higher experience is a perfectly 
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legitimate one (Iqbal, 1986, Lecture VII). He goes on to add that these experiences are 
perfectly natural, like our normal experiences. The evidence is that they possess a 
cognitive value for the recipient (Iqbal, 1986, Lecture VII). 
Iqbal discusses the position of modern naturalists who allude to the 
determinants of these experiences and decry them as "neurotic or mystical"; but he 
agrees with William James that the questions concerning the nature, origin and 
historical development of a thing are of quite a different order from the questions 
regarding their importance, meaning and values. Psychologically speaking, Iqbal 
seems to suggest, all states, whether religious or non-religious, are organically 
determined. The scientific form of mind is as much organically determined as the 
religious (Igbal, 1986, Lecture VII). He concludes: 
The truth is that the organic causation of our mental states has nothing to do with the criteria by 
which we judge them to be superior or inferior in point of value. (Iqbal, 1986, Lecture VII) 
However, the question of how to distinguish between what is really 
transcendental and what is counterfeit has always arisen in the mind of the religious 
people themselves. In such a situation, Iqbal, agreeing with James, recommends the 
use of the pragmatic test. But the nature of the `test' within Iqbalian discourse is not 
naturalistic and the extent of its pragmatism compares unfavourably to the 
experimental notion of the test within modern discourses. In other words, the 
testability of religious truth is demonstrated in an existential scene related to the 
sphere of `life-world', to use a Habermasian concept. Religion for Iqbal is an essential 
mode of actual living (existential dimension) as well as the only serious way of 
handling reality (cognitive-intellectual dimension) (Iqbal, 1986, Lecture VII). About 
two centuries after Kant, the logical positivists made an attack on metaphysics and 
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religion on the self-same grounds, though they approached the problem from a 
different angle: they were not so much interested in the genuineness of an experience 
as in the `meaningfulness' of statements in which an experience expresses itself; thus 
their main question was whether a given `statement' is verifiable (in Poperian version 
falsifiable) or not. As Iqbal believed in the cognitive aspect of `religious experience', 
he would agree that it could be expressed in the form of verifiable `statements'. He 
says: "Religious experience is essentially a state of feeling with a cognitive aspect, the 
content of which cannot be communicated to others, except in the form of a 
judgment" (Iqbal, 1986, Lecture VII). 
He adds that any judgment begs the question, `Are we in possession of a test 
that will reveal its validity? ' This question can legitimately and justifiably be asked 
about `statements' expressing religious content. To those critics who regard religion 
as a personal and subjective experience only, Iqbal replies: "If personal experience 
had been the only ground for acceptance of a judgement of this kind, religion would 
have been the possession of a few individuals only" (Iqbal, 1986, Lecture VII). He is 
of the view that religious `statements' are perfectly verifiable; that we are in 
possession of tests "which do not differ from those applicable to other forms of 
knowledge". These he calls the intellectual and pragmatic tests. 
But it should be noted that his notion of `pragmatism' is very close to the 
pristine meaning of the term in Greek language, i. e. pragma, meaning action or deed. 
This can be proved by reference to Igbal's insistence on the very substantial character 
of the Koran, which, in his view, is a book that emphasises `deed' rather than 'idea'. 
In addition, Iqbal insisted time and again on the categorical distinction 
between 
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`intellectual fact' and `vital fact' and the imperative importance of the latter in 
assessing the relevance of any intellectual tradition or philosophical position for the 
human ego and the spirit of Muslim culture (Iqbal, 1986, Preface). 
In his second lecture, `The philosophical test of the revelations of religious 
experience', Iqbal applies the intellectual test with a view to proving religious or 
spiritual realities of the universe. As already noted, by distinguishing between 
`intellectual facts' and `vital facts', he contends that religion deals with the latter kind. 
By `intellectual facts' he appears to mean facts concerned with cognition that add to 
our knowledge when interpreted, whereas `vital facts' are concerned with conation 
and become part of our faith when understood - not blind faith, of course, but faith 
well grounded in knowledge. This is what Iqbal calls the stage of 'discovery'. Being 
influenced by Comtian philosophy of history in relation to the societal progress of 
mentality, Igbal divides the metaphysical growth of religious life into three periods: 
the period of faith, the period of thought, and the period of discovery. By the period of 
discovery, Iqbal does not mean the modern sociological logic of the secularisation of 
consciousness but argues instead for something qualitatively different from 
naturalistically oriented social theorists, namely a totally individual sacralisation of 
life and life processes. Iqbal argues that in this third period metaphysics is displaced 
by psychology, and religious life develops the ambition to come into direct contact 
with the ultimate reality. It is here that religion becomes a matter of personal 
assimilation of life and power; and the individual achieves a free personality, not by 
releasing himself from the fetters of the law, but by discovering the ultimate source of 
the law within the depths of his own consciousness (Iqbal, 1986, Lecture 
VII). 
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The distinction between vitality and intellectuality is of other significance, as 
Igbal's overall transcendentally oriented metatheory is primarily concerned with 
`deed' (of universal nature that has religious point of departure) rather than `idea' 
(which has a conceptual point of departure and hence has a social - particular - 
origin) (Igbal, 1986, Lecture VII). Focusing on `discovery', Iqbal says that "the 
experience which leads to this discovery is not a conceptually manageable fact"; it is a 
vital fact, which "can embody itself only in a world-making or world-shaking act; and 
in this form alone the content of this timeless experience can make itself effectively 
visible to the eye of history"(Iqbal, 1986, Lecture VII). 
This demonstrates why this experience is more amenable to the pragmatic, 
rather than the intellectual, test. Moreover, religious statements, in Igbal's view, are 
more like the statements of history, which have a cognitive as well as an evaluative 
aspect. In Iqbalian discourse there is no such thing as isolated fact, as facts are 
systematic wholes, the elements of which must be understood by mutual reference. 
This means that religious facts are, like other facts, systematic wholes with affective, 
cognitive and conative aspects. Thus, for Iqbal, religious truths are of supreme value. 
They are of paramount importance for the constitution of self and society for the 
simple reason that truths in the religious domain are of vital importance for the 
emergence of ego, its pivotal role in creation and salvation. By making a comparison 
between science and religion, which for Iqbal are both part of the pursuit of the true 
nature of reality, Iqbal argues that in so far as the ultimate nature of reality is 
concerned, nothing is at stake in the venture of science. 
211 
On the contrary, he argues, in the religious venture the whole career of the ego 
as an assimilative personal centre of life and experience is at stake. Conduct, which 
involves a decision of the ultimate fate of the agent, cannot be based on illusions. A 
wrong concept leads to misunderstanding; a wrong deed degrades the whole 
man/woman, and may eventually demolish the human ego. The concept alone has a 
partial effect on life, while the deed is dynamically related to reality and stems from a 
generally constant attitude of the whole man woman towards reality. 
In other words, the truths of religion should stand the ordeal of the critical 
mind and the man/woman of religion should be vigilant in the pursuit of accurate 
knowledge because her/his entire `fate' hinges upon a truthful account of reality, 
which itself leads the ego to ultimate reality. Wherever one turns in Igbalian thought, 
one ultimately returns to the theme of ego and its enhancement in terms of becoming 
more real and truthful; this is because Haq (meaning `real' and `truth') is one of 
God's attributes and, in Iqbal's view, one should absorb all divine attributes, which 
ultimately leads to the birth of the perfect ego (Lectures IV and VII). 
To put it another way, to have an authentic and `accurate' knowledge is one of 
the most significant issues in establishing `authenticity' both at the individual as well 
as the communal level. That is why Iqbal goes on to establish the epistemological 
accuracy of religious thought by dismissing its pure subjectivity in the sense that it is 
merely an arbitrary affair. The idea of `authenticity' as a distinct category does not 
appear in Iqbalian discourse but his reflections on `deeds' as vital for humanity, either 
in an individual person or in a communal body, is an expression of authentic thought 
in its most primordial sense. The concept of khudi is the key to understanding 
his 
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discourse in relation to religiosity as the most significant expression of authenticity. 
Nevertheless, the main question is what does Iqbal mean by khudi or how does he 
understand 'authenticity'? 
The term authentic in everyday English means genuine, reliable or 
trustworthy. Although Iqbal does not disregard these connotations, what he has in 
mind when he uses the term is more primordial and archaic than the modern 
understanding. His notion of authenticity or isalat cannot be conceived without 
ontological reference to the principle of aslie-insan, ie the divine origin of being. He 
takes the idea of isalat as auto + hentes = one who acts independently. If Quran is 
the book of `deeds', as he argues it is, and the man/woman of Quran is a man/woman 
of action, then a genuine, true, authentic self emerges when man/woman `acts'. At 
any rate, any human action is in need of a `frame of action' in order to make sense of 
separate, individual and sporadic chains of acts. Otherwise the very ideas of integrity 
of human self and genuine personality (which lie at the heart of Iqbal's argument for 
religious being as a vital component of life) shatter and disappear. For Iqbal that 
frame of action is provided by the principle of Tawhid. The principle of `oneness of 
God' is another name for `normative conception of religion' and in addition is the 
most distinguishable framework for acting authentic or being genuine. God, in 
Koranic parlance, is absolutely unique and the ego of each individual should be 
vigilantly unique and hence authentic in Iqbalain discourse if he/she is up to the 
challenge of having a `human destiny' instead of falling in the hands of Madre 
Fortuna (Lecture IV). 
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Here, the ideas of authentic self and religious self are not diametrically 
opposite categories as they are in modern social philosophy. This could pose 
substantial problems in terms of Iqbal's idea of `religious collectivism' or society 
based on spiritualism and transcendental values (Helal, 1995, p 267), for, in Iqbalian 
discourse, (which is influenced by Rumian philosophy of life) `society' (the collection 
of socius or comrades) is truly possible when `spirituality' as a highly desired stage of 
personality is developed within each communal self (Seljuq, 2000). This is the final 
aim of Igbal's philosophy, ie the creation of a society of highly developed and 
emancipated individuals whose corporate presence forms the unity of such a society. 
Otherwise we will have an `organised society' that is a super-(im)personal entity 
whose strength and integrity are far more important than the rights and freedoms of 
the individuals (Helal, 1995, p 227). 
The category `human self is not a given reality but a desired state of being for 
Iqbal. To him, the ego in its inner life has two aspects, corresponding to its physical 
and spiritual existence -the efficient ego and the appreciative ego. The 
former is 
related to physical existence and the latter corresponds to the spiritual dimension. The 
same applies to societal reality, which, when deprived of the spiritual dimension, 
turns into a cage rather than a `communal reality'. It is noteworthy that the concept of 
reality in Iqbal's view does not apply to whatever that is `out there'. In his view, 
reality is librerative as well as capable of generating authenticity and what constitute 
its realness is not social convention or ad hoc contingencies but the 
divine khudi, 
which is the highest form of ego or realness in existence 
(Helal, 1995, p 142). What 
nourishes the sense of realness and nurtures 
its authentic continuance in self and 
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community is `religious experience', which activates the sense of originality in 
individuals as well as community (Schimmel, 1963, p 73). 
For Iqbal, being authentic is becoming more `experienced' in religious life but 
this does not mean becoming more expert in the factual study of religious texts or 
jurisprudence. On the contrary, to be religiously experienced is of a vital as well as an 
intellectual nature. To be authentic is to strengthen the sense of khudi, which is the 
essence of life and existence and ultimately based on `God-consciousness' and not 
'dead-of-God-consciousness'. And what makes an individual's self or character more 
authentic is not, in terms of Fons Vitae, any different from what makes the 
community less authentic, ie the lack of khudi. But it seems that in their respective 
discourses both transcendentally oriented thinkers (who follow methodological 
theism) and naturalistically oriented intellectuals (who adhere to methodological 
atheism), despite many differences in terms of point of departures, have come to be 
engaged in existential issues that could prove immensely constructive in terms of 
intercivilisational dialogue. 
By that I mean that within modem discourse the question of religion has been 
framed within the parameters of natural philosophy (secular social theory) and dealt 
with along other social indicators such as class, ethnicity, race, employment and 
nationality, as religion within modern social theory has been considered as a matter of 
faith and devoid of any intellectual significance (or its intellectual significance has 
been confined to its historical import). Within this approach, regardless of its 
scholarly significance or academic popularity, it has been assumed that the death of 
God has left us literally and culturally indefensible before the immense power of 
`secularisation' (Turner, 1983, p 246). This has come to be perceived as `we' having 
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the epistemological right to consider religion as a social category along other 
indicators of social origins as there is no `reliable cognitive proof for religion as a 
`revealed' and as well as transcendentally valid point of departure. 
All these modern assumptions and sociological points of departure have 
established the academic idea that naturalistic understanding of the world (and all that 
stands for) is the only `academically' (intellectually, sociologically, social 
theoretically) valid point of engagement in the global village. But the 
intercivilisational dialogue does not recognise a priori supremacy of any position (eg 
from the perspective of secular sociology, religions must be regarded as social 
constructs, which leaves the issue of their truth or falsity unresolved; or from the 
perspective of religious traditions, the notion of life based on secular ideology leaves 
the existential yearning of human self unanswered) and could be concluded in terms 
set by Thrower (1999, pp 194-8), who rightly argues that we have two broad ways - 
naturalistic and religious - of understanding the world (and the way we experience it 
and interpret the experience), and that the dialogue at intercivilisational level has not 
had a very long history. In fact, this dialogue, where both positions (and the 
intellectuals that represent the respective traditions) keep their ontological, 
epistemological, and existential integrity "has only just begun" (Thrower, 1999, p 
198). 
In sum, the brunt of my presentation and analysis of Igbal's work is that he 
can usefully be regarded as a thinker with subtle, considerable, and existentialicist 
leanings despite a transcendental frame of reference representing a new phase in 
modern Islam. Though highly controversial, Iqbal's belief in creative self- 
realisation/affirmation is crucial both to Muslims and to intercivilisational dialogue. 
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In the context of the dialogue's three themes, Igbal's strong transcendental grounding 
and notion of unity in plurality and plurality in unity have profound implications not 
only for embracing the fruits of modernity, but for cross-cultural conversations as 
well. Specifically, in terms of self-community, self-consciousness by definition 
affirms others and is intimately linked with God Himself, creating covenantal 
collectivity. In terms of sacred-secular, for Igbal modernity's distinction between the 
two is invalid: sacred consciousness is central to Islam and thus has great importance 
in individuals' private and social lives; a religiously authentic and individually 
communal Muslim simply cannot be secular. For the final theme, religion- 
authenticity, religion is an essential mode of actual living (existential dimension) as 
well as the only serious way of handling reality (cognitive-intellectual dimension); the 
two terms are not diametrically opposed as in modern social philosophy, as religious 




Igbal: The Architect of Reconstruction 
Only one unity is dependable and that unity is the brotherhood of man, which 
is above race, nationality, color or language. So long as this so-called democracy, 
this accursed nationalism and this degraded imperialism are not shattered, so long as 
men do not demonstrate by their action that they believe that the whole world is the 
family of God, so long as distinctions of race, color and geographical nationalities 
are not wiped out completely, they will never be able to lead a happy and contented 
life and the beautiful ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity will never materialize. 
Introduction 
In this chapter we aim to look at Igbal in relation to Sociology. Despite the 
fact that he published his sociological works in English and in one of the most 
distinguished sociological journals in the world there are little works within 
sociological discourses on Iqbal as a social thinker. Of course there are great many 
works in English, German, and Italian where one can find scholarly works on Iqbal as 
a literary man, who was engaged in timeless cross-cultural poetical debates with 
giants such as Goethe and Uhland but there are scant scholarly works on Igba1 as a 
sociologist or even social thinker worthy of mentioning in the history of comparative 
social theory and sociology. Maybe one of important reasons for neglecting to take 
him seriously as a sociologist is the manner Iqbal approached social problems. For 
him, sociology was not an academic pursuit per se but an outlook to be employed in 
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awakening people in general and his Muslim Community in particular. He really 
believed that the East, and particularly the Muslim East, needs to open its eyes and 
wake up from its long holiday from history. The Eastern people should, in Iqbal's 
view, realize that life cannot effect a revolution in its environment before it has had, 
in the first instance, a revolution in the inner depths of its own being, nor can a new 
world assume external form until its existence takes shape in the hearts of men. That 
immutable law of the Universe which the Koran has enunciated in the simple but 
comprehensive verse: 
"God does not change the destiny of people unless they change themselves. " [xiii. 11 ] 
holds good for the individual as well as the collective aspects of life. This religious 
approach to social issues could not be understood by secular social historiographers, 
who were deeply committed to a positivistic philosophy of history, where religion 
was not an issue and could not be an intellectual and world-shaking fact anymore. The 
idea of religion, as mentioned earlier, is not synonymous to what sociologists have 
come to understand within Iqbalian frame of thought and to rectify this lack of 
understanding I tried in the previous chapter to provide some aspects of his general 
social theory and here, before entering upon his particular concern with modernity in 
relation to Muslim society, I would like to discuss his status as a sociologist as one 
understands this term within Western academia. To accomplish this task I have 
approached three aspects, namely Iqbal as a sociologist, Iqbal and social sciences, and 
thirdly Iqbal and sociological study. The final part of this chapter is, as mentioned 
above, on the questions of Modernity and Tradition within Iqbalian reconstructive 
approach. Iqbal, as Shariati, notes is neither a thinker who 
is concerned with 
scholastic issues of traditional Islam nor 
is he a Gharbzadeh (modernist) disconnected 
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from his heritage. On the contrary, he is a concerned thinker, who aims to bring 
change about in his society and believes that such a change is not possible as long as 
the men and women of this Umma are awakened to the truth of Khudi. (Shariati, CW, 
5.22) 
1. Iqbal and Sociology 
In earlier chapter we presented the thoughts of Iqbal in relation to six major 
concepts, which are of significance within social theory without elaborating the most 
basic question, i. e. if Iqbal could be considered as a sociologist in the sense this term 
is used within Western academic context. We can start approach this aspect by posing 
very elementary questions such as `Is Igbal a sociologist? ' If the answer is affirmative 
then the second question could be about his sociological works, i. e. if he did produce 
any works concerned with social sciences or to put it differently did Iqbal choose the 
term `sociology' in any of his published works? There are certainly specific criteria 
for labelling an intellectual as a sociologist within disciplinary framework but one of 
the most obvious ones is, what I rather call the `Physical' dimension of sociology that 
could range from the employment (within sociology departments around the globe) or 
journals (of sociology that people get their works published in). In other words, we 
could ask, in order to discover if he was a sociologist in the very academic sense of 
the term, whether he has any publications in any sociological journals in the world? 
Or to be more specific, we could investigate whether he published any work in 
Western sociological journals? 
The answer to all the above questions is affirmative and one could be 
surprisingly certain that Iqbal does qualify, apart from a broad conceptualization of 
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what sociology is, as a sociologist in its very strict academic sense of the term too. In 
other words, we can approach Iqbal's sociological status in two different manners; in 
the first instance we can approach him from a Sorokinian constructed model, whereby 
the idea of sociology is not confined to presentist conceptualizations of the 
sociological enterprise and rather based on a historicist approach to the question of 
sociology. And in the second instance, we can look at the physical evidence in regard 
to Iqbal's status as a sociologist. Of course it should be mentioned that if we consider 
sociology as part of the larger social scientific enterprise then, again, we have no 
choice but admit that Iqbal is a social scientist too. For on this account then we have 
physical evidence, which clearly demonstrates Iqbal as a social thinker, who looked at 
different aspects of society such as economy and economical dimensions of social 
progress. 
2. Was Iqbal a Sociologist? 
If by sociology one takes the current academic definitions of the subject then I 
doubt he would be able to qualify as one. But if by `sociology' one understands the 
ardent pursuit of `knowledge of comradeship' (in all its aspects and dimensions) - or 
Bensozia15- and its true sustenance then the answer is affirmative and one may 
consider him a sociologist as one does not doubt to count 
Ibn Khaldun, Plato, 
Shankara, Aristotles and Hegel among world sociologists as did Pitrim A. Sorokin. 
Sorokin, for instance, proposed that the scope of sociology and how to define the 
boundaries of sociological imagination have to do with our conception of 
foundation 
of knowledge. He argued that our contemporary conceptualization of 
foundation of 
knowledge based on either rationalism or empiricism or empirical-rationalism 
15 "Bensozia" is a 16th-century Italian dialect word that means `the good society'. 
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resulted in that science produced limited and highly circumscribed truths. Instead 
Sorokin suggested a comprehensive approach to knowledge where empirical, rational, 
and supersensory (transcendental) aspects of knowing are integrated into an 
epistemological framework in order to grasp total reality. Regardless of its viability or 
reliability in terms of epistemological consideration one fact is undeniable and that is 
related to how to imagine and conceive the `scope of sociology' and how to delineate 
the `boundaries of sociology' in history. 
Sorokin's integralism allowed him to stretch the history of sociology to 
include traditions and personalities as far as Taoism, the Upanishads and Bhagavad- 
Gita to Plotinus, Porphyry and down to the modern time. In 1963, Sorokin provided a 
general statement of Integralism and referred to it as ontology and system of 
cognition: 
`My ontology represents a mere variation of the ancient, powerful and perennial stream of 
philosophical thought represented by Taoism, the Upanishads ..., 
brilliantly analyzed by the Hindu and 
Mahayana Buddhist logicians 
..., shared 
by all branches of Buddhism ... and reiterated by the great 
Muslim thinkers and poets ... . 
In the Greco-Roman world this philosophy was developed by 
Heraclitus and Plato ... 
it was supported by Aristotle, and ... the thinkers of the Neo-Platonic, the 
Hermetic, the Orphic, ... . 
In Christianity it was expressed by many ... 
like Clement of Alexandria, 
Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, Origen, St. Augustine, ... 
St. Thomas Aquinas, ... .' 
(Sorokin, 
1963, pp 373-4) 
Based on this approach one should not be in any doubt that Iqbalian religious 
position could be a sociologically valid position within modern academic discipline. 
In other words, Iqbal surely could play a role in this Sorokinian conception of history 
of sociology based on the truths of mind, the senses, and the spirit, which constitute 
the foundation of Integralism vis-a-vis rationalism, empiricism, which in Sorokin's 
view did produce one-dimensional and instrumental knowledge. He argued that the 
human existence is based on a trinity and knowledge of its collective being could not 
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afford to neglect the interrelationship between mind, senses, and spirit. (1965, pp 833- 
844) 
Why is this relevant to Iqbal? It is not hard, in the light of the previous chapter 
to realize that Iqbal ardently pursued to find out what makes life worth living and how 
this struggling battle called `life' could be authentically sustained in collectivity of 
genuine Khudis (personalities of high characters). In this sense, Iqbal could be 
considered as a sociologist, who was not interested in human existence and communal 
life based on empiricism but an integral approach to the social life, which in 
Sorokinian historiography of social sciences does qualify as a sociological position, 
apart from its ontological relevance that takes an integral approach to human 
problems, without reducing them to empirical or rational realms. 
3. Iqbal and Social Sciences 
If one takes a broader approach to social theory, then it should be mentioned 
that Iqbal wrote a book on the principles and problems of economics and society in 
1903 (one year earlier than Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
first was published in German) which was entitled: Ilmul Iqtisad or The Science of 
Economy. 16 This book was written in Urdu and published in Lahore. Many scholars 
who work as Orientalists such as Albert Hourani were aware of this work but no, 
apart from Iranian and Indo-Pakistani authors, historians of social sciences mentioned 
this work of Igbal in the context of social sciences. The significance of this work is 
not only of historical nature but one could find the genesis of `Islamic Economy' 
paradigms that developed later on among Muslim intellectuals, on the one hand, and, 
16 To my knowledge Igbal's book on `Economy' has not been so far translated in English. 
The original work is written in Urdu and was published in 1903 in Lahore. Allama Muhammad Iqbal, 
Ilmul lgtisad, Lahore, 1903. The impact of early 20`x'-century socialist philosophy is evident in Igbal's 
thought and retrospectively one can even discern the `nationalist trends' in terms of establishing a 
modern nation state based on a modern 
infrastructure unprecedented within Islamic Classical Thought. 
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for the purpose of this debate, on the other hand, one could discover that as early as 
1903 the question of the `Social' was an integral part of Muslim intellectual tradition. 
Finally another good reason to believe that from the very emergence of social 
sciences Muslim thinkers were not oblivious to modern debates even it is fair to argue 
that they had not the institutional back-up of universities and colleges as their western 
counterparts did. But this did not stop Iqbal, for instance, engaging in issues related to 
modernity in its social scientific parlance, as this book is a physical evidence of that 
scholarly attempt, even earlier than some of classical works in social sciences. 
Let's have a brief look at the content of his thoughts on economic problems. 
Alleviation of poverty and welfare of people are the major themes of Allama Iqbal's 
economic thought. The main practical themes of his economic theory could be 
summarized as a forceful endorsement of the cause of the poor, landless tenants and 
workers and he strongly opposed concentration of wealth in a few hands. He was 
against capitalists as he thought that they were selfish and exploited the poor. 
For economic progress, Iqbal laid down three basic principles: acquisition of 
knowledge and necessary skills, family planning and elimination of the element of 
selfishness which he believed was the main cause of economic imbalance in the 
society. That imbalance could be removed if there was spirit of sacrifice of personal 
interests for public welfare. Iqbal's concept of a strong relationship between economic 
progress and social development which he presented less than a century ago is worth 
to reconsider in relation to Socialism and a distributive system of justice in a global 
context where the monetary system is the sole criterion of conditions of life, including 
life-world, and moreover the balance between the poor and rich becomes 
insurmountable and insufferable. 
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Iqbal's `science of economy' was based on the distinction between external 
and internal aspects of society's economic structure. The internal aspect was the soul 
of the structure which in the absence of necessary measures for poverty alleviation 
and well-being of the people, caused disease, restlessness and frustration. The 
emphasis of Iqbal on the internal structure of economy was supposed to create a 
balanced development of society and prevent the rich from becoming richer and the 
poor from becoming poorer. 
Igbal also desired reconstruction of Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqah) as he 
believed that enforcement of Islamic law could ensure economic rights of the people 
and provide for their basic needs. This he had mentioned in his letters to Muhammad 
Ali Jinah (or Quaid-i-Azam as he is known in Pakistan), which he wrote one year 
before his death. For this purpose he emphasized the need for Ijtehad (Jurisprudential 
Modernization or what Muslim Ulema term as Independent Reasoning within the 
Canonical Framework of Islam) to enable the Islamic Shariat to meet the changing 
requirements of the Ummat. 
For alleviation of poverty, Iqbal suggested that the youth should be imparted 
vocational training to make them stand on their own feet, women be educated, 
industrialization be pursued on the Japanese pattern and drugs and social evils be 
eliminated. 
For Iqbal, the main reason for backwardness of the people of the then British 
India was ignorance, western control on trade and industry, population growth and 
low value of Indian currency. Iqbal's thought on economic aspects of society could 
best be captured by the concept of `Moral Economy' in the context of Islam. His line 
of thoughts gradually developed to a modern discourse, where the major discussants 
in the context of `Moral', `Economy', and `Islam' have attempted to define the role of 
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economy in an Islamic context such as `Islamic Banking', `Public Finance in Islam', 
and `Islamic Socialism' and so on and so forth. '? 
4. Iqbal and Sociological Study 
In 1910 Iqbal delivered a Lecture in Strychi Hall of Muslim University of 
Aligrah (almost about the same time when Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft was 
written) entitled The Muslim Community: A Sociological Study. In this lecture Iqbal 
talked about Comte, Giddings, Renan, and demonstrated a highly complex knowledge 
of sociology, in particular, and social theory, in general, by discussing concepts such 
as `society', economic forces', `political forces', `social determinants', `social 
change', `gender and emancipation' and theoretical problems such as `Moral 
Evolution' (in the tradition of L. T. Hobhouse) and so on and so forth. In the subtitle 
of this lecture, Iqbal explicitly used the adjective `sociological' in describing his 
approach to the problem of community among Muslim Nations. This work, apart from 
its nominal usage of the adjective `sociological', is one of the most obvious (read 
physical evidence) instances, where Iqbal puts its sociological approach into practice. 
The core of this lecture was the idea of `Community' and the context of application 
was the `Islamic' society. 
The Muslim community in Iqbalian sociological approach was unlike any 
other on account of its 'peculiar conception of nationality' which had nothing to do 
with the unity of language or country or of economic interest. Derived from 'a purely 
abstract idea' it was 'objectified in a potentially expansive group of concrete 
personalities' who identified with the sunnah or historical tradition associated with the 
Prophet of Islam. The subjective feeling of belonging to the community of the Prophet 
" See for instance Fahim Khan, M. Essays in Islamic economic, Leicester, England: Islamic 
Foundation, c1995. Series title: Islamic economic series; 
19. 
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Muhammad gave Muslims a sense of nationality or asabiyyat (Party-spirit: a concept 
derived from Ibn Khaldun and later on elaborated by Shariati too). While creating a 
strong feeling for their own nationality, asabiyyat did not necessarily imply any 
feeling of hatred against other nationalities'. The Muslim community was structured 
by the religious ideal, though not by its 'theological centralization' which would 
'unnecessarily limit the liberty of the individual'. (Iqbal, 1983, pp 16-17) To put it in 
the context of India prior to 1947 it is not hard retrospectively discern that Iqbal was 
struggling to find a way between Islamic universalism and Nationalism in Indian 
context. In his presidential address to the All-India Muslim League in December 
1930, he posed the rhetorical question of whether it was possible `to retain Islam as an 
ethical idea and.. . reject 
it as a polity' in order to embrace the idea of `national politics' 
in which religion played no part. (1970, pp 156-7) 
As is evident in the poem `Mazhab' first published in 1924 in an anthology 
entitled Bang-i-Dara, or the sound of the moving caravan, 
Don't compare your nation with the nations of the West 
Distinctive is the nation of the Prophet of Islam 
Their solidarity depends on territorial nationality 
Your solidarity rests on the strength of your religion 
When faith slips away, where is the solidarity of the community? 
And when the community is no more, neither is the nation. (1924, p 202) 
Iqbal thought it a contradiction in terms for Indian Muslims to subscribe to a 
national polity by abandoning the principles of Islamic solidarity. He 
lamented that 
the religious leaders of Muslim India deemed the 
Indian National Congress's ideal of 
territorial nationalism to be consistent with Islam: `strange indeed are the vicissitudes 
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of time. Formerly, the half-Westernized educated Muslims were under the spell of 
Europe; now the curse has descended upon religious leaders. It was not that the 
Islamic worldview rejected love of one's homeland or watan. But modern nationalism 
was not merely about territorial attachments; it was `a principle of human society', `a 
political concept' based on the separation of religion and the state. It was this which 
clashed with Islam which `for the first time, gave the message to mankind that 
religion was neither national nor racial, nor individual and private, but purely human 
and that its purpose was to unite and organize mankind despite all its natural 
distinctions'. (Iqbal, 1970, pp 252-5) 
I could elaborate even further on the notions of religion, race, ethnicity, nationality 
and nationalism as developed by Iqbal but these are not the main concerns of my 
discussion in this section. The main point is that Iqbal did work on questions pertinent 
to social sciences and his findings are most often novel and different than secular 
approaches. Above all, Iqbal was a reformer at heart. The lawyer in him put a very 
basic question in the most theoretical manner: What is the basic factor that causes a 
society suddenly to change and develop, or suddenly to decay and degenerate? His 
answer to this question explains the whole religious meta-theory of intellectual 
enterprise in a nutshell. According to him, if one wants to grow an orchard, first he 
has to know the principles of gardening. Then, he has to apply these principles so that 
the trees in the orchard can give him the best fruit. Likewise, according to Iqbal, if 
one wants to develop an ideal society, one has to know the principles of ideal human 
self (Khudi) -or the ideal human relationships- and then 
has to apply these principles 
in order to bring about appropriate situations. The two determining factors in Iqbalian 
social theory are laws and human self. In the spirit of Muslim Culture we can 
find the 
ordering principles (Sunnah and Koran) but what we are 
in dire need today is the man 
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(Marde Mo'min) who is committed to apply these principles in order to move Umma 
in the right direction. This was the guiding idea of the sociology of Shariati too, who 
argued that Islamic sociology is based on two key factors, i. e. laws and man. The first 
one is discernible in the Sunnah Nabavi (Koran and Prophetic Tradition) and the 
second one needs to be born in the form of people who have `Darde Deen' (Those 
who are ready to carry the painful Trust of Religious Life). 
Finally, I would like briefly to address the last question, namely was any of 
Igbal's work published in European Journal of Sociology? The answer is again an 
affirmative one. Iqbal wrote an article entitled Political Thought in Islam in 1908 and 
that was published by the journal of `Sociological Review' in England. The 
importance of this publication, apart from its substantive contribution to comparative 
sociology, is its symbolic significance for my purpose in presenting the Iqbalian 
discourse within the tradition of modern disciplinary sociology, where unfortunately 
the theorists and philosophers of the `Social' other than the western ones have hard 
time to be recognized as colleagues and peers. It does not take a genius to note that 
almost the majority of text-books on the history of sociology written in European 
languages since the establishment of sociology as a discipline at modern universities, 
East or West, do not mention any contemporary Muslim intellectuals as part of the 
`community of sociologists'. Apart from few sporadic instances such as H. E. Barnes' 
and H. Becker's ' Social thought from lore to science' (1938) the main trend among 
historians of sociology is to neglect the main social theoretical or sociological trends 
of non-Western tradition. 
The appearance of Iqbal's article on `Political Thought in Islam' based on two 
sociological concepts of `Religion' and 
`Leadership' in the context of Islam is of great 
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significance to qualify him as a sociologist too. The axis of this article is around two 
concepts, which in Muslim context reads as `Kalifat' (Leadership) and `Islam' 
(Religion). The concept of `Leadership' is a well-established sociological term, which 
means the abilities, qualities and behaviour associated with the role of group leader. 
This role, sociologically speaking, may be conferred on individuals on the basis of 
personal characteristics (Weber's notion of Charisma) and experience, or through 
tradition and/or position occupied. Igbal's notion of `Khalifat' in the context of 
politics of Islam does indeed qualify as a sociological interpretation. The concept of 
`Religion' is another sociological concept, which Iqbal employs and gives it a nativist 
twist by bringing it closer to the context of Islam. Iqbal's conception of religion is not 
one of a demarcator of difference. Rather it was a notion of religion as faith with the 
potential to erase national and racial differences in order to attain a universal human 
consciousness based on the multiplicity of existence in the unity of Divine creation. 
The distinction between religion as difference and religion as faith is an important 
one, not least on account of the legitimization acquired by violent acts attributed to 
religious passions in late colonial and post-colonial era. It was nationalism, according 
to Iqbal, which gave rise to the `relativity of religions', the notion that religions were 
territorially specific and unsuited to the temperament of other nations. It was 
nationalism, therefore, and not religion which by compartmentalizing people into 
different nations was the source of modern conflicts. The `peculiar greatness' of the 
Prophet of Islam lay in destroying the `invented distinctions and superiority 
complexes of the nations of the world', such as land, race or genealogy, without 
denying the fact of cultural differences or the manifold multiplicities of tribe, colour 
and languages which co-existed in the unity of the one and only God. (Iqbal, 1970, p 
262). 
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A claim of Islam's distinctiveness and universality of purpose might seem 
contradictory, accustomed as we are to perceiving the world in terms of the binary 
opposition between religion and `secular' politics. Yet the nub of Iqbal's critique of 
Western Enlightenment philosophy was the denial that `all human life is 
spiritual'. The nature of any act, even if `secular in its import' was `determined by the 
attitude of mind with which the agent does it'. Whether an action was inspired by 
religion or irreligious political motives depended on positionally specific observations 
since the secular in itself was `sacred in the roots of its being'. An act was temporal 
or profane if it was done in a `spirit of detachment from the infinite complexity of 
life' and `spiritual if it is inspired by that complexity' (Iqbal, 1930, pp 122-4). 
The great significance of this article, which appeared in a British sociological 
journal around the same time that Durkheim and Weber were active in Europe, is that 
it was not only a scholarly piece of work. On the contrary, its significance could dawn 
on us if we put it in its socio-political context of India, where the idea of Nationalism 
and Indian identity were real questions with grave geopolitical consequences, which 
are still unfolding. In other words, Iqbal's philosophical reconstruction of Islam 
underscore the tensions between a view of Indian nationalism based on keeping 
religion out of politics and the normative Muslim conception of treating the spiritual 
and temporal domains in non-oppositional terms. It was precisely because religion as 
a demarcator of difference was insufficient to sustain Islam as an ethical ideal that 
Iqbal rejected the possibility of Muslims agreeing to privatize their religiously 
informed cultural identities in the interest of being considered politically as part of the 
Indian nation. In the last year of his life, for instance, he severely castigated Maulana 
Husain Ahmed Madni - the pro-Congress leader of the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind - for 
suggesting that Indian Muslims should embrace the vision of an inclusionary Indian 
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nationalism in which they would have complete freedom with regard to their personal 
law and religious practices. Madni had maintained that the millat was something 
higher than the nation, likening the relationship to the cosmic one between heaven and 
earth. Yet in Iqbal's opinion, the Maulana had `left no place for millat by preaching 
to the eight crore Muslims to lose their identity in the country, and therefore in the 
majority, and to make nation a heaven ... 
ignor[ing] the fact that Islam will thereby be 
reduced to the status of the earth' (Iqbal, 1977, p 256). 
Moreover, in this sociological article, Iqbal analyzes the idea of 'State' and 
`Society' within modern European tradition (as expressed in Rousseau) and compares 
that with Abolhassan Al-Mawardy's (d. 1085) theory of the origin of the state within 
Muslim intellectual tradition and argues that the 
`... origin of the State, according to Al-Mawardy, is not force, but free consent of individuals who 
unite to form a brotherhood, based upon legal equality, ... . 
Government, with [Al-Mawardy], is an 
artificial arrangement, and is divine only in the sense that the law of Islam-believed to have been 
revealed- demands peace and security' (1908, p 256). 
The most significant point about the publication of this article in the British 
Journal of the `Sociological Review' is the importance of its editor in 1908, namely 
the doyen of British sociology L. T. Hobhouse (1864-1929), who is celebrated for his 
contributions to comparative sociology and sociology of development today. Iqbal's 
article appeared before Hobhouse article on `The Law of the Three Stages and after 
William Trotter's discussion on `Herd Instinct and its Bearing on the Psychology of 
Civilized Man'. Totter's book `Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War', published by 
Macmillan in1918 is to this very day considered as Essentials of social psychology 
within the field. All these discussions are not meant to prove a pedantic point about 
Igbal's role but to assert that even by the academic, disciplinary, secular, and modern 
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standards of institutional sociology Iqbal could be qualified as a sociologist. Needless 
to argue, as abovementioned, that the institute ion of sociology is not confined to the 
material aspects of departments and faculties of social sciences in the shape of 
buildings and complexes, but includes books, journals, conferences, and so on and so 
forth. Now that I have demonstrated the significance of Iqbal as a sociologist in its 
modern and disciplinary sense, I would like to conclude this part by his own word 
about the spirit of his entire endeavours: 
I have never considered myself a poet. Therefore, I am not a rival of anyone, and I do not 
consider anybody my rival. I have no interest in poetic artistry. But, yes, I have a special goal in mind 
for whose expression I use the medium of poetry considering the condition and the customs of this 
country. ' 8 
5. Modernity and Tradition: A Critical Appraisal 
The tension between modernity and tradition in Iqbal and his attempt to 
overcome, in his view, the shortcomings of both are very characteristic of major 
debates within the Islamic literature of late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
Here I attempt to set the Iqbalian discourse within the context of Modernity and Islam 
and appraise it in relation to the questions of Umma (Muslim Community) and Moral 
Decline. 
18 See Igbal @ http: //jaihoon. com/iqbal/iqbpoems. htm 
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A. Moral Decline and Reconstruction during the Colonial Rule 
Iqbal's obsessive reflection over `self and `self-in-community' or Umma did 
not have a metaphysical incentive alone. He was born in India where the right of self- 
determination of Indians from all walks of life was denied by colonial power and the 
loss of self-estimation and sense of inferiority was so pervasive that an Indian, for 
instance, used to address an Englishman `Sahib'. It is an Arabic word by origin, 
which via Persian entered the Indian sub-continent and could be translated as 
`Master', and 'Owner'. Iqbal's idea of an exalted and eagle-like self, if not a total 
fiction, is more of an exaggeration of a, to use Fanon's word, wretched soul before a 
colonial system. Let's look at the historical situation in and around (Muslim) India 
when Iqbal was born and set gradually foot in the socio-political and intellectual stage 
of Muslim Umma. 
The Muslim land in nineteenth-century was under a heavy process of military 
operation and far to the northeast (up to Caucasus) and far to the northwest (up to 
Berber region in present Algeria) of Muslim land was the battle-ground between 
French, English, and Russian troops. But the heavy military battles were waged at the 
outskirts between Russians and Caucasians and French and Algerians. Two names 
were of great significance who symbolized the armed struggle against colonial rule 
either of Franco-English or Russian power. In 1871 Sheikh Shamyl, one of the most 
ardent Sufi-leader who fought against Russian invasion in Caucasus, after being 
captured by Beriatinsky's army in 1859 and deported, died in Mecca and thus ended 
the time of armed struggle in the farthest point of contact between Islam and Europe 
in Euro-Asia. The armed struggle on the western side of Muslim land also came to an 
end around the same time when Amir Abd al-Qadir, one the most persistent Sufi- 
leader who fought against French troops in Maqrib (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria) 
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passed away in exile. The deaths of these two men are not only important in the 
history of anti-colonial movement but they, in fact, reveal the end of an era in Muslim 
history when Muslims, after being engulfed by colonial armies, realized that the 
decline of Muslim culture goes deeper than one primarily thought. This reflection 
becomes even more evident when one is reminded of the failure of political Islam 
around the same time by Seyyed Jamal al-Din. In 1897 Seyyed Jamal al-Din, who 
used religion to achieve political aims and believed in `reform from top' rather than 
`democracy from below', was poisoned to death in Istanbul and his political 
proposition of Pan-Islamism under one Caliph failed to realize due to modern 
sentiments of nationalism among Ottoman Caliph's subjects and deep-rooted 
corruption in Istanbul. 
The deaths of these three aforementioned men in one way or another captures 
the spirit of Muslim culture at the turn of the twentieth-century in a symbolic manner 
and is related to the project of Reconstruction of Iqbal in early years of twentieth 
century. The political failure and military defeats among Muslim intellectuals 
triggered a long and arduous period of soul-searching and the spirit of this soul- 
searching period could be summarized in the following three questions: 
1) Why are Muslims declining in power? 
2) How could Muslim Umma re-gain its glorious past (Asr-I Saadet as represented 
by Namik Kemal and Ahmet Midhat in Ottoman Emipre)? 
3) What means are required in order to overcome the current `backwardness' 
(Takhallof as represented by Arab intellectuals) and `degenerated' state of society 
and self? 
These were three supreme questions that Muslim intelligentsia asked 
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themselves. Although the answers are far more complex and variegated than I can do 
justice within the scope of this work and indeed requires a separate study in its own 
right. Nevertheless, for the record, it should be mentioned that all did not favor Islam 
or Religious traditional established form of `Polity'. Some such as Mirza Fatali 
Akhundov (1812-1878) went as far as to encourage Oriental people of Persia (and 
Caucasus) and Ottoman Empire to break with their past and embrace the ways of 
`Melale Raqiyet' (Civilized Europe) and he himself changed his traditional dress and 
went to study Russian and was greatly overjoyed in being associated with Russian 
literary circle in occupied territory of Persia in Tiblis. In present Azerbayjan he is 
known as the Father of modern alphabet due to his tireless efforts in changing Kufi- 
alphabet into Latin with a few Cyrillic characters. (F. Alakbarov, 2000) There were, 
however, others such as Mirza Malcolm Khan (the leading Constitutionalist in Persia 
during Qajar Dynasty) who opted for, to use a modem historiographical concept, a 
modernist polity in Persia. All in all, when Iqbal set foot on the scene in Punjab both 
to his East and West one fact was undeniable, namely the dominance of colonial 
power over, what he later on came to call in his lectures, the spirit of Muslim 
Culture. (Iqbal, 1930) Although he shared the zeal and the zest of Sheykh Shamyl 
and Sheykh abdul Qadir (in Sufism), nevertheless his answers were different in kind 
from them in finding solutions for the aforementioned questions. 
At the heart of all these three questions was, what one might tentatively call, 
the question of `Moral Decline'. Although it is needless to argue that everybody 
concerned with the problem of `Muslim Regress' in nineteenth-century did not 
understand this question in the same manner and more importantly the way out of this 
`Decline' was not conceived in similar vein. Nevertheless nobody doubted that there 
is a decline and it seems the correlation between civilizational decline and morality 
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took an important position in the contemporary discourse of nineteenth century Islam. 
Mirza Abdul-Rahim Talbof (1834-1910) -born in Tabriz- in Caucasus, for instance, 
proposed a Rousseauian educational philosophy to the social problems of the Muslim 
community based on `Modernist Rationality' in an Islamic parlance in his `Kitab 
Ahmed' (The Book of Ahmed) -which was designed in the same manner as 
Rousseau's Emile. Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924), for example, introduced a sociological 
notion of `nationhood' based on the Durkheimian conception of society and envisaged 
a middle road by supporting `partial modernism', which meant a material adoption of 
civilization of Europe and rejection of its non-material aspects. (Niyazi Berkes, 1959, 
p 21) Yet, contrary to, for instance, Namik Kemal (another Muslim intellectual of 
Tanzimat period in Ottoman Empire), Ziya Gokalp did not think that the individual 
and his reason could be a criteria for `social reconstruction'. He rather signified a shift 
from Tanzimat rationalism inspired by the French Enlightenment to the German 
Romantic thought by accepting the transcendental reality of society identified with the 
nation instead of individual reason. Berkes sums up Ziya Gokalp's social philosophy 
in the following manner: 
`As the ultimate reality of contemporary society is the nation, and as national ideals are 
ultimate forces orienting the behaviour of the individuals, so the most urgent task for the Turks 
consisted of awakening as a nation in order to adapt themselves to the conditions of contemporary 
civilization'. (1959, p 22) 
Others such as Seyyed Ali Bab (1819-1850), and Bahaullah (1817-1892) in 
Persia took a millenarian approach and established a new religion of humanity where, 
in the words of Bahaullah `The earth is but one country and mankind its citizen'. A 
similar approach of this kind was that of Mirza Ghulam Qadiyani (1839-1908) in 
India, who claimed to be the promised Messiah and hence opted to re-interpret, and 
some would even suggest surpass, the religious canon of Islam (and 
later on of major 
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religions of India). (Syed Abdul Hasan Ali Nadwi, 1967, p 22) In other words, the 
reconstruction of Muslim Community and that of Islamic Reason was not conceived 
in a very straightforward fashion but the historical facts do seemingly point that the 
very project of `reconstructing the Islamic Morality' put the very adjective of 
`Islamic' into jeopardy. The dangers were so real and tangible that the ideology of 
Khalifat in Ottoman Empire was dismantled by Kemal Ataturk and the Young Turks 
opted for a militant secular state-ideology and religious establishment in Turkey as 
well as Reza Khan's Persia went from a position of power to a defensive one and 
quietism for time to come. The disintegration of Ottoman Khalifat, apart from 
political consequences, took Muslims in India by surprise and the idea of 
reconstruction from a theoretical level came gradually to be associated with a political 
pursuit. The application of re-constructive project in India, in the demise of Khalifat, 
did gradually give birth to the Idea of Pakistan when the tensions between Hindu and 
Muslim populations in sub-continent, despite of many reconciliatory efforts, rose high 
and finally came to a dead-lock and `Nazaria-e-Pakistan' (The Ideology of Pakistan) 
was born by Iqbal. (J. Iqbal, 1971) 
B. Iqbal and the Project of Reconstruction Revisited 
In order to address the question of `Moral Decline', which was so dominant a 
theme within nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century Muslim literature, Iqbal 
proposed his heuristic project of `The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam'. 
However, I haste to add that Iqbal's preoccupation with `Reconstruction' was not his 
own sole invention. He entered a domain, which within nineteenth century Muslim 
context there were many others who attempted to tackle the problem of moral 
decline 
from various angles and the panaceas varied and differed accordingly. `lhya' 
(some 
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like Shahid Muttahari may say Revivification) or `Reconstruction' was one among 
many solutions offered by intellectuals and dignitaries to rectify the causes of moral 
decline. Other competing discourses, which were around and part and parcel of socio- 
political struggles of the time could be briefly mentioned as `islah' (Re-form), `tahzib' 
(Re-cultivation), `tanzih' (Re-moval), `tanbih' (Re-awakening), `taj adod' (Re-newal 
and Modernity), `ijtihad' (Re-interpretation and Reasoning), `renesans' (Re-birth), 
and `salafiyya' (Re-turn) and so on and so forth. In other words, Igbal's discourse, in 
a very essential sense, was part of a larger anti-colonial struggle and heavily 
dependent on the question of political self-determination of Muslim nation, in 
particular, and colonized nations, in general. 
Within European tradition the idea of religion underwent an ontological as 
well as a semantic metamorphosis and earlier in my introduction I mentioned that my 
research led me to realize that what in modern context is called `Social', which stands 
for an all-embracing and all-inclusive phenomenon, is what within Muslim tradition is 
termed as `Deen'. Although I admit that the ontological foundations of the `Social' 
and `been' do certainly differ nevertheless I think they both share one common 
feature and that is their `all-inclusiveness', `all-embracing' and `all-enveloping' as a 
paradigmatic concept. Having said that, I would like to return to Iqbal's notion of 
`reconstruction' of religious thought, which has been the object of great many 
controversy since its inception and more importantly since its appropriation by 
Shariati and Shariatians such as Sorosh, Agajeri, Ganji and many others in Iran and 
newly independent Republic of Azerbijan (which was invaded by Russia and 
separated from Iran for more than 100 years). Although he used English as his 
medium of conceptualizing the tradition of Islam nevertheless the meta-theoretical 
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background of his thought on religion was not what, for instance, contemporary 
Positivism did denote when the term `religion' (or its derivations such as religious, 
religiosity, religionism, and religieux) was employed. 
In general, what Iqbal meant by religion could be termed as a view that took 
society as a part of transcendent religion, i. e. society as a religious phenomenon and 
did not imply the positivistic conception where religion was viewed as a part of 
society and culture, i. e. religion as a social phenomenon. 
This methodological disclaimer should serve as a conceptual tool in realizing 
that Iqbal was not discussing the religion, as one understands within European 
tradition of nineteenth and twentieth century of positivism. On the contrary, he was 
discussing `been' and his reconstruction project was, to use sociological concept, a 
cultural project in its modern sense. He, under the influence of German Romanticism, 
as Ziya Gokalp (Kadioglu, 1996) was looking at the foundation of society but unlike 
Gokalp did not endorse wholesale reliance on modem rationality and hence a constant 
tension in Iqbalian discourse between Modernity and Tradition. 
In `The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam', Iqbal discerns three 
essential components of a dynamic culture: God, Man, and Spirit (The Collective 
sense of Solidarity). The spirit of Muslim culture, he claims, is `Revelation' but the 
reconstruction of the spirit of Muslim culture is not aimed at `Revelation' itself (as 
happened by Bahais and Qadiyanis) or its redundancy in modem time (as it occurred 
in modernist discourse among secular thinkers such as Akhundof in Caucasus (when 
it was part of Iran) or Taqi Arani in Tabriz and later on in Tehran) but its 
understanding. This hermeneutic approach was meant to counter the problem of 
`Moral Decline' and rectify the primary causes of the lack of movement in the 
structure of Islam. But reading Iqbal leaves one with a very cumbersome question, 
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which is left un-addressed, un-conceptualized and grossly misinterpreted, namely the 
question of 'Spirit' as he employed it in the German tradition of Geist. Was lqbal 
thinking of spirit of Muslim culture in the sense of 'Folk-Geist' in the dawn of birth of 
Islam in Arabia or the spirit of Muslim culture was denoted to express the 
transcendental basis of Islamic civilization? 
To put it differently; lqbal does not explain when he talks about the spirit of 
Muslim culture does he think of a traditional Muslim mind that obediently follows the 
tenets of Islam? Or does he think of a critical mind that earnestly searches the 
principles of reality in all its aspects? Because, if he thinks in the first sense, then this 
is what the proponents of Salafflya Movement, in general, and contemporary 
conservative clerics in Iran, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, and many 
post-Glasnost Republics in Caucasus and Central Asia in particular, demand and is, in 
their respective view, in contrast to reconstruction of Islam. The argument is that the 
basis of modem rationality and Islamic rationale are not compatible and those who 
endorse such a project are, to say the least, 'secular' or, to imagine the worse, heretic 
and Muhammad Arkoun is the prime example of such a case. But if Iqbal does 
support the second understanding then the question could be reformulated as follows: 
If the spirit of Islamic culture is as sublime as lqbal claims it is, then why the 
culture of Islam is in need of 'modern spirit' to be reconstructed by 1qbal in the 
tradition of Thomas Arnold, Nietzsche, William James and Whitehead? 
It is true that human civilizations do borrow from each other but if, as lqbal 
and many other Muslim thinkers do claim, the modem rationality belongs to the 
immaterial aspect of Europe and this is a sufficient reason to reject it, then why the 
spirit of Islam is in dire need of modem rationality? The inconsistent approach in 
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lqbal is profoundly related to his dual conception of modernity and tradition and his 
solution is to criticize tradition by modern rationality and expurgate modernity by 
Islamic rationality. This approach on the surface seems perfectly compatible in 
lqbalian discourse but what he calls 'Islamic Rationality' is, if not a dubious, but 
conceptually contested category. Because he approaches the spirit of Islam based on 
modem historical methodology and critical philosophy and this is evident in his 
doctoral thesis on 'The Development of Metaphysics in Persia' (1907). 19 When he 
finally in 'The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam' (1934) attempts to 
reassemble the spirit of Islam and launch his critique of modernity he has not 
demonstrated the basis of 'Critique' in an Islamic tradition. The modemist critique of 
Islam, so to speak, is formidable and inexorable; the Iqbalian response to modernism 
is, by contrast, a paltry affair. There is no serious and sustained intellectual 
confrontation such as one might dignify with the term 'critique'. 
Instead lqbal takes his own modem conception of Islamic Tradition for 
'Islamic Rationality' or 'Aql Islami' without realizing the ontological differences 
between the two and wherever he finds in the history of Islam those who do not 
adhere to his modernist understanding he accuses them of being under the grip of 
Classical Greek thought. In other words, his critique of modernity is a modem 
reflexive critique that bears resemblance to Jacques Maritain, Jacques Ellul and many 
modem religious critics and far from a perspective in the tradition of Islam. lqbal left 
a very simple but significant question unsaid and that was why should the spirit of 
Muslim culture, which claims to be divine and a Traditio (handed down as a 
Revelation to Mankind) be in metaphysical need of relying on Nietasche, Goethe, 
William James, and Modem Rationality (as expressed in Orientalism and Social 
19 See in particular the introduction and the rationale of his textual analysis of metaphysics of 
Islamic Sufism. 
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Sciences) in order to be in tune with contemporary and epochal life of Muslims? The 
distinction between modernity (as a philosophical position) and contemporariness (as 
an epoch where both traditional and modern do occupy synchronously) did not- as it 
is evident in the works of al-Attas, Nasr, Fritijof Schuon (Sheikh Isa), Martin Lings 
(Sheikh Seraj al-Din), Titus Buckhardt (Sheikh Ibrahim)- occur in lqbalian discourse 
either. In addition, lqbal did not note that he could,, theoretically speaking, distinguish 
between the 'epochal understanding' of Islam and 'Islam' as an Ideal in the mind of 
God (Umul Kitab). This is a position which has been presented forcefully by another 
contemporary Muslim thinker in post-1979 Iran, i. e. Abdul Karim Sorosh (b. 1945) 
and even with greater force countered by two traditionally-inspired Sadraian 
philosophers Ayatullah Javadi Amoli and Ayatullah Mesbah Yazdi in Qom. 
Another major tension in lqbal's thought is his insistence to graft the 
positivistic conception of religion with the traditional understanding of 'Revelation'. 
Apart from ontological and epistemological incompatibility between the two 
conceptions the main problem is that lqbal, unwittingly and despite of his own 
poetical disposition, reduces the trans-rational dimension of religion to the discursive 
realm of rationality. By so doing he, like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) who 
based his conception of religion on Rationalism, did gloss over the question and place 
of 'Islamic Reason' and the reasons for its decline or it may be argued, as many critics 
of Islam did, that the decline of the Oriental Civilization was exactly a result of 
'Islamic Reason' and not its neglect. These were very significant questions and 
provocative issues, which many Muslim thinkers, except few such as the Iranian 
intellectual Seyyed Ahmad Kasravi (1890-1946) that took issue with the 'Islamic 
Reasoning' and for that was assassinated, preferred to be quite about and resorted 
instead to a poetical language and sophistry arguments. Iqbal, as many other Muslim 
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modernists, kept silent about this problematique and wittingly overlooked the relation 
between 'Islamic Reason' and 'Modern Reason', 'Islamic Polity' and 'Modern 
Polity'. More importantly, a problem such as the foundations of Islamic Reason from 
within the paradigm as has been understood by Muslim Intellectuals prior to lqbal 
was glossed over or mis- caricatured. Instead of looking at the history of Islam 
through the lens of modern methodology and whenever finding a seemingly modem 
discourse in the past and uphold it as 'True Islam', one could, as Iqbal did not, first 
and foremost, make clear what the Tradition of Islam stands for. This is a path, which 
was travelled more rigorously by Allama Seyyed Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani from Iran and 
Syed Naghib al-Attas from Malaysia. What are the results of these undertakings for 
Muslim intellectuals or even the debates on East and West and the future shape of 
intercivilizational dialogue are beyond the scope of our research here as the next two 
chapters are on Shariati and his social theoretical significance within the parameters 
of intercivilizational dialogue. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The social thinking of Shariati in the light of intercivilisational 
dialogue 
1. Re-presenting Shariati 
Following the pattern of assessment in the three previous discussions, my approach in 
this chapter is to discuss Ali Shariati's main ideas in relation to my own conceptual 
framework by demonstrating his existential concerns and the relevance of such 
concerns in an intercivilisational dialogue. It is argued that Shariati's point of 
departure is a religiously grounded one, but this, unlike the main argument of modem 
thinkersý does not prevent him from being engaged with the social self, which is 
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grounded in an understanding of the dynamics of the historical process. This chapter 
is an illustration of how a Muslim intellectual can come to terms with modernity. 
Religious ulema (scholars) in Iran considered Shariati to be a Marxist, who 
blended Islam with Marx's notion of a socialist society and attempted to reformulate 
the Iranian idea of nationhood based on Sartrean notion of 'authentic self by dressing 
it up in Shia terminology. His supporters venerated him as Muslims' Luther and hence 
a true and long-overdue reformer. Here I do not attempt to solve these historical 
disputes or address Shariati's relevance in terms of 'traditionalist theology' or 
'modernist theology' and their importance to the question of state in contemporary 
Iran. This is not to say that one should disregard entirely relevant questions of 'class' 
and 'Power' raised by these opposing parties, who three decades ago gathered their 
respective ideological troops around the positions formulated by Shariati (such as the 
role of ideology and religion in modemity; tradition and modernity in relation to the 
state; and so on); indeed, Shariati's memory lives on in today's post-Khomenian Iran 
and these political positions seem to be of profound importance to the modem clergy 
and their lay religious counterparts. These are significant issues but they have already 
been discussed in other works, as have the many other relevant aspects of these 
discourses that fall outside the parameters of this particular study, which takes as its 
focus the questions of social theory in an intercivilisational perspective by 
emphasising the convergence of social theoretical reflections in Western and Islamic 
traditions in existential terms. I would like to begin with a brief account of Shariati's 
biographical background before tackling his ideas and thoughts in relation to social 
theoretical concepts of modernity. 
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Ali Shariati was born on 3 December 1933 into a religious and learned family 
in Mazinan, a suburb of Mashhad, Iran. His father, Mohammad-Taqi Shariati, was a 
religious scholar with a strong social activist philosophy based on anti-Marxism. He 
hoped that by establishing an Islamic centre at the border of the former Soviet Union 
he would be able to educate Muslim youth about the erroneous beliefs of the Tudeh 
party, which represented Marxist-Stalinism in Iran. The young Shariati's first teacher 
was his father, who taught him about Islam and its social teaching versus Marxism. 
All Shariati completed his elementary and high school education in Mashhad. At 
teacher training college, he came into contact with young people from the lower 
economic strata of society and became more aware of poverty and hardship. At the 
age of eighteen, he started his career as a teacher in the north-eastern province of Iran. 
After graduating from college in 1960 he won a scholarship to pursue graduate studies 
in France. He received his doctorate in hagiology in 1963 from the University of Paris 
by submitting a partially annotated translation of a medieval Persian manuscript 
entitled Fazael-e Balkh ('The meritoriousness of Balkh') as his dissertation. In France 
he got acquainted with five different discourses of modemity: Marxism, Orientalism, 
academic sociology, existentialist philosophy, and the postcolonial ideologies of 
Fanon and the Algerian Freedom Movement. 
When he returned to Iran he was arrested at the border and imprisoned on the 
pretext of having participated in political activities while studying in France. Released 
in 1965, he began teaching again at Mashhad University. As a Muslim sociologist, he 
sought to explain Muslim society in the light of Islamic principles, explaining and 
discussing the issues with his students. He soon gained in popularity with students 
and with people from different social classes in Iran. As a result, the regime 
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discontinued his courses at the university and Shariati was transferred to Teheran. 
There he continued his active and brilliant career. His lectures at Houssein-e-Ershad 
Religious Institute attracted not only thousands of students who were registered for 
his summer classes, but also thousands of people from different backgrounds who 
were fascinated by his teachings. 
His first book sold more than sixty thousand copies in its first print run, 
despite the obstructive interference by the authorities in Iran. The Iranian regime was 
so threatened by the popularity of Shariati's courses that the police surrounded 
Houssein-e-Ershad Institute, arrested many of his followers and put an end to his 
activities. He was imprisoned again for eighteen months in extremely harsh 
conditions. Popular pressure and international protests finally obliged the Iranian 
regime to release Shariati on 20 March 1975, but he remained under close 
surveillance by security agents. This was real freedom, since he could neither publish 
his thoughts nor contact his students, and he finally escaped to England. Three weeks 
later,, on 19 June 1977, he died in suspicious circumstances in London. However, his 
memory lives on in post-revolutionary Iran, where debates on modernity versus 
tradition, democracy versus theocracy and modernist Islam versus Islamic modernity 
reign supreme in a chaotic manner both in the streets and universities. 
In situating the significance of Shariati, many critics have argued that what he 
advocated was 'radical Islam', as opposed to the 'militant Islam' expounded by 
Ayatollah Khomeini. Shariati, in this depiction, made bold innovations in the 
interpretation of Shi'ite doctrine, particularly in the way it applied to the relationship 
between religion, religious reformation, politics and community. It is also argued that 
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he advocated the use of violence to transform society into an Islamic utopia. Shariati's 
version of utopia was an Islamic state ruled by enlightened thinkers, with no room for 
the ulema, while Khomeini's, for instance, was an Islamic state ruled by the ulama as 
representatives of the hidden Imam. Shariati's ideology is understood as a blueprint 
for the radical transformation of the social order. The agenda for Shariati was social 
revolution, whereas Khomeini had political revolution in mind, aimed at the 
establishment of a theocracy. Shariati's ideas appealed almost exclusively to the 
young intelligentsia, many of whom found their organisational base in Mojahedin-e 
Khalq (Banuazizi, 1999). 
Challenging the widespread assumption of modernist though that "only the 
West has produced political theory" Robert Lee, another exponent of Shariati, poses 
fundamental questions about the nature and degree of common political and 
philosophical quandaries across civilisations. He does so by tracing the contours of 
the modern Islamic search for authenticity against the backdrop of analogous pursuits 
by Westem political theorists from Rousseau to Charles Taylor. His discourse serves 
as a timely reminder that those who dismiss the pursuit of authenticity as the 
machinations of wild-eyed Islamists fail to recognise the way in which 'authenticity' 
is a familiar trope in modem and contemporary Western social thought, and that we 
need to attend to the nuances and complexity of Islamic attempts to theorise about 
authenticity. At times, one may argue, the analysis founders in its attempt to turn 
similarities between radically different critics of modernity into a transcivilisational 
search for authenticity defined not only by common dilemmas but also by unswerving 
themes and analogous solutions. 
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The discourse on Shariati begins by identifying four crucial themes in the 
pursuit of authenticity as articulated by modern Western theorists: a concern for 
individual and cultural particularity; a radicalism defined by a struggle against both 
tradition and modernity; an emphasis on human autonomy in the creation of identity 
and history; and the 'unicity' of human experience. 
Some may regard decision to analyse Shariati in terms of themes derived from 
Western debate as problematic and biased. But Lee, for example, insists that 
advocates of Islamic authenticity must be understood, at least in part, in terms of their 
profound engagement with Western debates. He sidesteps the all-too-common 
temptations to essentialise what is often called 'the Islamic impulse' or to assume an 
undifferentiated, homogeneous West. He provides admirably clear and nuanced 
exegeses of Shariati's significance, while associating with 'the West' a mixture of 
arguments and anxieties that nevertheless reveal common preoccupations with the 
darker side of modernity. Lee, despite his complex theoretical approach, seems to be 
unconcerned about finding the right balance between striving to understand what he 
calls 'authentic thought' on its own terms and practising intercivilisational dialogue. 
There are other thinkers who have criticised Shariati from a liberal perspective based 
on what they believe to be his anti-progressive sociology. In analysing the problem of 
development in terms of transition from tradition to modemity, Ghaninejad (2003) 
argues that if we want a brief definition of the term development, we could say that it 
is an economic, social and political process, which leads the members of a given 
society to better economic and socio-political conditions. Through such a process, the 
standard of prosperity, wellbeing, per capita income and education of citizens 
improves and they achieve modern and prosperous living conditions as a result. 
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This may lead one to question what this process is. It is in fact a transition 
from a traditional to a modem economy and the achievements gained from it are the 
products of this process. The question for Ghaninejad is why this process is so slow in 
Iran. The reason is that our knowledge and understanding here have been lacking. 
Who is responsible for the country's backward condition? Ghaninejad blames modem 
Iran's intellectuals and scholars. He argues that those who have taken up this problem 
of underdevelopment have never presented a comprehensive, systematic and 
acceptable theory about the causes of poverty and lack of progress in Muslim 
countries in general and Iran in particular. When studying the works of these 
intellectuals, time and again we come across a number of simplified reasons for Iran's 
lack of progress and development, such as foreign elements, foreign exploitation and 
imperialism. Ghaninejad argues that while it is unwise to deny the important role 
played by other nations in Iran's underdevelopment, to attribute it to foreign influence 
alone is a sign of intellectual naivety and deprivation, and it is the latter that is a more 
problematic aspect of modem time. Ghaninejad argues that such intellectual poverty 
has prevented Iranian thinkers from impartially analysing and judging the reasons for 
this underdevelopment and caused them to point the finger of blame at others and 
avoid responsibility. Ghaninejad believes that if we cannot appreciate the realities of a 
situation, we cannot find a remedy for our problems. According to him, the main 
problem with Iranian intellectuals is that they have not had a sound understanding of 
realities and therefore have not been able to put forward reasonable theories. 
Ghaninejad contends that Shariati, instead of outlining concrete and well- 
founded explanations for these problems of modernism and development, presented a 
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series of fictions and illusions aimed at provoking people. He did not present an 
accurate evaluation of modern society, but mimicked the arguments of leftist critics - 
without taking any initiative of his own - and repackaged them as Islamic socialism. 
In attempting to explain why intellectuals such as Shariati had difficulty 
understanding the concept of development, Ghaninejad argues, that rather than 
becoming familiar with the essence of Western thought based on liberty and 
rationalism, Iranian intellectuals have been influenced by a leftist form of postmodern 
socialist theory. He argues that this outlook is more compatible with the values of 
Iran's traditional society and, by putting aside the original modernism, these 
intellectuals have been unable to understand Western society adequately. 
In order to tackle the contradictions between tradition and modernism, 
Ghaninejad suggests that Muslim nations should know that tradition is an 
amalgamation of beliefs and values that are often contradictory in nature. It is possible 
to extract many elements of tradition that are compatible with modernism, but in order 
to do this, Ghaninejad suggests getting rid of models that are in principle leftist and 
clad in Islamic jargon by people such as Shariati whom he views as being responsible 
for keeping Iran in its current intermingled and eidetic situation. 
Ghaninejad goes even further and dismisses the very notion of religion held by 
Shariati, arguing that the Islam that Shariati introduces cannot be the real Islam 
because he censored himself and never tried to understand this reality. According to 
Ghaninejad, Shariati had the wrong idea about modem society; he believed that 
socialism was the ultimate aim of advanced society and since Islam is just, therefore 
so is socialism. 
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In other words, Shariati is criticised by intellectuals such as Ghaninejad 
because of a perceived anti-Liberalism and lack of traditional understanding of Islam 
(which is in fact capitalist-friendly in its attitude towards private property) 
(Ghaninejad, 2003). On the other hand, among leftists such as Ali Mirfetros (1357), 
Liberal Democrats and progressive secularists, there is a deep-rooted hatred of 
Shariati. They tend to view him as the prophet of retrogression, who (along with Jalal 
Al-e-Ahmad, another Iranian intellectual) attacked democracy and modernism and in 
doing so did a great disservice to Iran and Iranians. The main thread of this 
historiography is that it was a mistake for Iranian intellectuals to fall for Shariati's 
version of Islamism in 1970s and attack secular liberalism and democracy through 
anti-Western slogans, because it achieved nothing but reactionary backwardness for 
Iran (Ghandchi, 2002). There are also those who Place Shariati's work in the wider 
context of Islam and modernity and argue that he belonged to a particular school of 
Islam that goes back to Seyyed Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97), who was 
extremely critical of traditional ulema (religious scholars) because, in his view, they 
discouraged any new creative thought among Muslims. Shariati, as a member of the 
Afghani school, believed that medieval mentality was primarily responsible for the 
decline of Muslim power and influence in the contemporary world. The proponents of 
this position argue that for Shariati, Islam is the religion of action and must be 
energetic too. They argue that Shariati supported an action-oriented view of religion 
by quoting ftom the Quran that "God changes not what is in a people until they 
change what is in thernselves". In following the Afghani school of thought, 
Shariati 
believed that Europeans embraced change, and Muslims must achieve this in their 
own way by revolutionising their cultural 
life (Hopwood, 2000, pp 1-2). 
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Lily Zakiyah Munir (2003) suggests that Shariati attempted to reform Islamic 
thought within Muslim communities through reason and revelation by advocating the 
convergence of Islamic and universal ethics. In other words (like the Afghani Abduh 
(1849-1905), Mahmud Muhammad Taha of Sudan and Muhammad Abed AI-Jabri 
and Abdurrahman Wahid of Indonesia), he was a modernist who did not fear or 
dislike the ways of the West. On the contrary, he welcomed non-Islamic ideas and 
practices that he considered beneficial to the progress and prosperity of Muslim 
societies. Munir holds that Shariati imaginatively synthesised Islamic and Western 
ideas to produce a valid and relevant interpretation of Islamic reasoning with an 
enlightened cosmopolitan, liberal and realistic perspective (Munir, 2003). 
Within this perspective, Shariati is interpreted as a modernist, who believes in 
tolerance for diversity and is willing to adjust rapidly to a changing environment that 
may contribute to the emancipation of the individual Muslim and to the progress of 
Muslim societies (Husain, 1995, pI 10). 
As well as these liberal and leftist critics, Shariati had his enemies within the 
camp of what could be called religious intellectuals, for example, Sorosh. In Sorosh's 
view, Shariati belongs to the category of intellectuals who favour extracting their 
political doctrines from religion, in contrast to mystics, who argue that the world is an 
impermanent domain to be abandoned in favour of an inner journey. Religion for 
mystics is the methodology of this inner journey. In Sorosh's view, mystics, unlike 
intellectuals such as Shariati, consider the affairs of the world and those of religion as 
mutually exclusive. But for Shariati, argues Sorosh, the Muslim abandonment of the 
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worldly aspects of religion and the abdication of the political and social struggle are 
inimical to religiosity and religious order. Thus, what Shariati proposes is a new 
understanding of religiosity that embraces these neglected aspects. 
But by doing this, argues Sorosh, Shariati presents an ideology of religion that 
is the opposite of pluralism, and by doing so binds it to a single interpretation and 
generates a class of official interpreters -a result, which, in Sorosh's view, is not 
what Shariati had in mind. But this result is inevitable, according to Sorosh, because 
Shariati "wanted to make religion plumper" (Sadri, 1999). In other words, many 
claims have been made in the name of religion and many burdens are put on its 
shoulders, and this is a direct consequence of presenting such an ideology of religion. 
According to Sorosh, this is the view of religion that intellectuals such as Bazargan 
(1907-95), Jalal Al-e-Ahmad (1923-69) and Shariati have been instrumental in 
disseminating among Muslims, and is one of the great dangers in post-Revolution Iran 
(Sadri, 1999). 
Although these discourses on Shariati are of great significance, nevertheless it 
should be noted that none of these critics has looked at his discourse in terms of cross- 
cultural issues that contain themes of common interest across different intellectual 
traditions based on 'existential concerns'. But before exploring this aspect and 
addressing how my own understanding differs from the current view of Shariati in the 
literature (see Chapter Seven), let us look at Shariati's thought in terms of an 
overarching frame of analysis based upon the concepts of self-community, sacred- 
secular and religion-authenticity. 
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2. Self and community 
There can be no more splendid a question than what 'Man' is in Shariati's entire work 
(based on Kaviriyat or gnostic reflections, Islamiyyat or Islamic reflections, and 
Ijtima'iyat or social reflections) and in his religious-cum-political activist life. The 
very distinction between the different dimensions of his collective work betrays 
Shariati's view of the perfect man and ideal society: the fact that he viewed the self as 
a three-dimensional being, with a social aspect, a divine nature and an inner world 
that together constitute the unique nature of the human ego. 
Human is a being-in-be coming who is in dire need of introspection, objective 
investigation and projection (of his/her own ideals and dreams in the world). That is 
to say that man/woman needs to know the nature of his/her own dualistic self through 
an inward journey (the path of gnosticism or Sufism), to realise the historical 
dimension of divinity in one's own social setting (the path to becoming acquainted 
with the religious mode of society and hence Shariati's appropriation of Islam) and 
the application of one's introvert and extrovert struggles in the realm of society and 
history. Shariati's view of society includes the three dimensions he would probably 
prefer to call the 'Holy Trinity', ie a spiritual preoccupation among individuals in 
human society; a concern about the meaning of 'revealed religion' in the heart of the 
historical process, which would and should re-channel the spiritual force of humanity 
into life-giving and self-enhancing resources rather than unawareness-inducing and 
self-alienating ideologies (which would become opium for the people); and constant 
application and dutiful engagement with society and a belief that the results of 
individual gnosis and revealed truth of monotheistic religion should be tested in the 
laboratory of community. This is Shariati's view on self and society in a nutshell. I 
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shall now turn to the underlying assumptions in Shariati's discourse on society and 
self and its implications for his ideological construction in terms of wider socio- 
political issues of relevance for social theorisation in an intercivilisational perspective. 
There is a longstanding tradition in modem social theory of arguing that 
empirical findings should not disobey the logic of discovery, which means that 
research should be conducted on descriptive terms and rendered analytically, without 
normative biases, be they positive or negative. In Shariati's discourse, the boundaries 
between 'real' and 'ideal', 'fact' and 'fiction, 'myth' and 'history' are not separable 
realms but poles of being or be-coming and surmountable by the will of 'committed 
man' (insan mote'ahed) such as Abu Zarl. In his view, human being is a Mojod 
(being) in the geography of Vujud (existence). The very phenomenon of Vujud is a 
spark of divine love (Eshq) and human being is the only 'spark' able to enhance the 
scope of her/his existence and aspire to the highest form of being, which is 
distinguished by the degree of Agahi (consciousness). In order to understand 
Shariati's view of human being, one should remember that he is a man of ideology - 
and I use this in a very peculiar sense of the term, which is uncommon in modem 
sociological parlance - ie a knowledge of the very setting of ideas as a carrier of 
meaningful message. The idea of self in his discourse can be extracted from his view 
on the nature of Haq or reality. Shariati provides a key to understanding and unveiling 
his 'idea-logy'. He makes a distinction between false and imProper realities or belying 
occurrences on the one hand and truthful unrealities on the other. In his view, only a 
naYve person believes that all that is real is truthful and all that is unreal and has not 
' Abu Zar is Shariati's first symbolic creation, his first 'meaning sign' in challenging both the traditional 
understanding of religion and modernist intellectuals who relegate religion to a feudal era in the past. Abu Zar 
is 
the signal, code or allegory for the committed, defiant, revolutionary Muslim who preaches equality, fraternity, 
justice and liberation. The same construction of meaning signs happens whenever Shariati feels the need to address 
other pressing issues or senses the need to alter the 
dominant understanding within Muslim world. 
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actually happened is a lie. For Shariati, contrary to popular opinion, there are many 
truths that are lies since they never happened, and many lies that are real. "There are 
so many truths, absolute, proper and becoming truths that have not attained body, 
weight, colour and presence" (Rahnema, 1998, p 161). 
What is essential to Shariati is not the actual occurrence of an event or the 
authentic existence of a character, but the necessity of conceiving, developing and 
depicting a significant occurrence, individual, art form or message. The ideal 
individual, the exemplary poetic verse, the perfect gnostic love story portraying the 
depths of metaphysical attraction and divine beauty is what is true in Shariati's eyes 
(Rahnema, 1989, p 161). This methodology gives him a powerful tool in approaching 
social issues in a tripartite sense, ie the ideal, the actual and the revolutionary. The 
ideal is a desirable mode of being yet not actualised; the actual is the degrading or 
realised form of the ideal depending on its content; and the revolutionary act is, the 
distinguishing feature of self as a bridge-builder between angelic forces and 
Luciferious ones. To understand the ideals, one should rely on the symbolic universe 
of the holy tradition; to learn about the actual context of human life one should learn 
sociology and history; to bring desirable changes into the society of people and within 
the selves of society one should practise Khodsazi-e-Enqelabi or realise one's 
spiritual abilities and live accordingly (Shariati, Collected Works 2, p 13 1). 
There is continual reference to this trinity of ideal- actual-revolution in 
Shariati's anthropology. What the self should be is based on Koranic discourse but 
what self is is based on his modernist reflections (here one can find traces of Hegel, 
Marx, Bergson, Nietzsche, Fanon, liberation theology, existentialism, Hinduism, 
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Buddhism, and so on). In addition, how the actual self can attain the state of the ideal 
being is based on Shariati's unique approach to the riddle of life. This tripartite 
methodology reflects the way he came to view his own life-long intellectual, political 
and religious struggle - Kaviri at, Islamiyyat, Ijtima'iyat. These three elements y 
collectively express his worldview (tawhid) and, in turn, inform its modalities and 
practicality in a changing world. 
Human being is a creature capable of elevating his/her lowly, animal-like 
existence to the level of God, the absolute manifestation. Man/woman, in Shariati's 
view, is a maker of ideals who possesses superior virtues and desires. The basis of 
Shariati's ideology is tawhid, a mystical-philosophical worldview that sees the 
universe as one living organism, imbued with self-consciousness and will, evolving in 
a pre-determined direction toward a utopian goal. Tawhid allows no dichotomies - it 
is a 'unity in trinity' of the three hypostases, God, nature and Man. No matter how the 
observer perceives reality, tawhid states that the universe is a harmonious whole. 
One's responsibility is to recognise and accept this model of reality and move with its 
flow (Shariati, Collected Works 16, pp 308-9). 
The apparent discord in the world is not an inherent tawhidic trait, but stems 
from an opposing worldview - that of shirk - imposed on the universe by those who 
reject the tawhidic model. The worldview of shirk is idolatry that sees creation full of 
many equal but opposed forces. Shariati thus views history as an eternal dialectical 
struggle between tawhid and shirk. Tawhid is the 'natural', God-given order of things, 
while shirk is the enemy who has to be fought and eliminated. In Shariati's discourse 
there are major concepts that reflect his religious anthropology, such as the path 
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(tariqa), the pilgrimage (haj) and the journey (suluk) to God. Human being is on an 
inward pilgrimage, returning from the exile of sin to God who is his original home 
and friend, and the haj to Mecca is its symbol. Man is "the way, the wayfarer, and 
wayfaring. Engaged in constant migration from his clay self to his divine self' 
(Ahmadi, 1365, p 73). This religious anthropology comes to fore more vividly when 
Shariati reflects on the dynamism of the human self within society and history. Man, 
he claims, is a dialectic reality created of clay and spirit, a contradiction causing 
inward struggles and constant movement. 
In the creation myth of Islam, clay symbolises stagnation while spirit 
symbolises movement toward perfection. Man's natural condition (fitra) lies between 
two opposite poles, a combination that creates an evolutionary movement of Man 
toward perfection. The real battle of Satan against God is not waged in nature but 
within Man's heart as his clay nature strives to overcome his spirit (Shariati, Collected 
Works 16, pp 42-7). 
Shariati thinks he has discovered in the Quran a humanistic philosophy of 
Man's great dignity, God-like essence and spiritual nature. Adam symbolises the 
human species created as God's viceregent (khalifa) and superior to the angels. Man 
is the bearer of God's trust - free will -a trust that no other part of creation was 
willing to accept. God gave Man the knowledge of names, signifying scientific truths 
that even angels are unaware of, and a mission to perform God's will and create a 
paradise in this place of exile. Man is not merely God's trustee on Earth; he is also 
God's relative, partner and friend. Insan (human being) is not a fixed biological 
reality but an existential choice. Insan is the sum of struggle and effort, and the result 
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of Shenakht (knowledge). Insan is an 'eternal be-coming' - an 'infinite emigration'. 
In short, Insan is a dialectical being (Shariati, Collected Works 16, p 44). 
What makes Man superior to other creatures, in Shariati's view, is his sense of 
ýchoice% as he can rebel and chose between good and evil. God's spirit within draws 
him up to perfection, while the opposing clay principle drags him down to stagnation. 
In the process of overcoming his lower nature, Man evolves and draws nearer to God. 
But God is not a theological substance as advocated by ulema. On the contrary, the 
Shariati's God is a vital reality that lives in history and is different from the 
Aristotelian prime mover of metaphysical nature (Shariati, Collected Works 28, pp 
304-5). 
It could be said that Shariati has a vision of the evolution of the 'ideal man', in 
whom spirit has overcome clay, freeing him from doubt and contradiction and 
enabling him to enjoy both nature and spirit. He is wise and artistic, not moulded by 
his environment, but forming it, creating a paradise on Earth. Shariati's ideal self is a 
philosopher and a politician, soldier and Sufi. Shariati was aware of the critical 
writings of modem intellectuals such as Herbert Marcuse, Heidegger and Horkheimer 
(there are many occasions where he mentions them by name), who decried the one- 
dimensionality enveloping 'modern man'. To impede this global process among 
Muslims, Shariati urged his audience to aspire to become multi-dimensional beings 
and build a multi-dimensional society based on irfan (gnosticism), azadi (freedom), 
and barabari Oustice) (Shariati, Collected Works 5, p 36). These three dimensions are 
for Shariati 'innate needs' that have been historically separated from one another. 
Taken in isolation, or if one of the dimensions is missing altogether, these dimensions 
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become fallacious, the building blocks of an iron cage (Shariati, Collected Works 1, p 
78). Freedom, justice and gnosticism, he argued, constitute the inseparable triad 
assuring human happiness as well as communal welfare (Shariati, Collected Works 1, 
p 78). 
For Shariati, the notion of 'heroic Sufism' was an individualising force rooted 
in the notion of spiritual chivalry or futuwwat (Javanmardi in Persian). Members of 
this Sufi order were calledfatiyan, a word derived from the Quranic termfata, which 
the ninth-century Sufi Master Qusheri defined as "he who breaks the idols". Shariati's 
Suf1sm, therefore, taught the individual how to win freedom from the chains of 
religion, as the prophet Abraham, the model fata had done. Moreover, Shariati was 
convinced that such a religious ideology was indispensable for developing the ideal 
Islamic individual, who through a fusion of reason and gnosis would "liberate God 
and His love from the monopoly of religion, freedom from the monopoly of 
capitalism, and egalitarianism from the monopoly of Marxism" (Shariati, Collected 
Works 2, pp 48-9). Precisely for these reasons, the Marxists detested Shariati, because 
in their view he was 'Islamising their ideas'; although in his own view he was 
reclaiming lost religious territories intellectually. Religious fundamentalists, 
meanwhile, despised him for "liberalising, democratising and socialising religion" 
(Rahnema, 1998, p 226). 
Man is an extremely important subject in Shariati's social theory because his 
worldview is based on the axiomatic principle that perceives the mental rather than 
the natural universe of Man as the battleground of God and Satan, clay and spirit, 
polytheism and monotheism. This is another way for Shariati to unveil his normative 
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view about society and the ideal form of communal system. In Islam, as Shariati 
understands it, Man is not subjugated by God, since he is the Lord's associate, friend, 
trustee and kinsman on Earth. God taught Man and all the angels prostrated 
themselves before him. Such a two-dimensional being needs a religion that will 
protect him from the extremes of asceticism and worldliness, and keep him at a 
constant equilibrium. Only a two-dimensional religion is able to give reality to Man's 
great responsibility (Shariati, Collected Works 5, p 48). 
What distinguishes Man from other animals is Man's ability to bestow 
meaning upon his own death by dedicating his life to a cause. To demonstrate this 
aspect of his anthropology, Shariati focuses on the notion of Shahid (martyr) to depict 
the role of 'cause' in shaping of human self. The 'cause' in his view is always 
intertwined with a sense of 'pain' due to the very fact that Man is a Mojod and the 
story of 'being' is sad and mysterious. This idea of cause is extended to the communal 
dimension of humanity, where he argues that "a nation is the sum total of all human 
beings who feel a common pain" (Shariati, Collected Works 35, vol 1, p 317). This 
understanding of nation and human self opens up many paths in an intercivilisational 
dialogue, where issues of an existential nature can bring intellectuals of various 
traditions into a global debate where points of departure are not the only determinants 
in the process of dialogue. 
In order to understand the notion of community in Shariatian discourse, one 
needs first to define the human self and how he or she comes into being. The 
'beingness' (Mujodiyat) of Insan (human being) is not an accidental phenomenon 
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based on a purposeless whim of unknown forces. Insan is in its truest sense an act of 
choice'. This choice (Entekhab) is covenantal and demands committed allegiance, 
setting before Insan a constant challenge (called life). This challenge requires 
profound endurance or sabr. To realise this is to be conscious of the very 'painful' 
fact of life in exile, ie Insan's separation from God. The story of being is the painful 
reminder that Insan is 'separated' from his/her Love and exists in Kavir (the vast 
desert of being). The notion of pain is at the heart of Shariati's religious anthropology 
and this is carried into his reflection on the sociological dimension of being as an 
individual self as well as a communal being (Shariati, Collected Works 13, pp 73-4). 
The notion of community, however, is not a descriptive concept in Shariati's 
thought. That is not to say that he is unaware of descriptive sociological concepts such 
as 4 society', 'nation-state' or 'world system'. On the contrary, one should credit him 
as one of the few third world Muslim intellectuals in the '60s and '70s who was aware 
of both Western schools of thought and Eastern religious philosophies. At the heart of 
Shariati's normative notion of community is the idea of 'cause', which gives birth to a 
community or nation (Rahnema, 1999, p 120). To help understand this idea, it may be 
useful to introduce two concepts rooted in the religious tradition of Islam that were 
dear to Shariati's social philosophy: Shahadat and Hajj. 
One could hastily translate these terms as 'martyrdom' and 'pilgrimage', 
respectively, but to do so would be unfair to the 'semantic revolution' of the Shia 
tradition that Shariati brought about by fusing the ethos of existentialism the and piety 
of Shi'ism in the spirit of revolutionary socialism. By Shahadat Shariati meant a way 
of being and by Hajj he meant a way of becoming. A martyr or Shahid is not someone 
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who wages a holy war and dies a mortal death. On the contrary, Shahid is someone 
who lives for a 'cause' and Hajj is living one's life faithful to this cause. Hajj is not 
the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, which involves circling the House of Ka'aba and 
observing various religious rituals and rites. It is the act of becoming a traveller 
through the desert of life, a witness of the primordial covenant. Shahid is a man or 
woman who is like a 'sign' (Ayat), displaying the path to those who are not yet 
initiated in the theophany of existence. Shahid is a person who intends (Ahange Hajj 
Kardan) to walk on the path of the divine (Haq) and bear witness to the primordial 
covenant (Mithaqe Azah). To do this is tantamount to carrying a weight unbearable to 
all those in the entire universe of being except Insan. Insan sets forth and accepts this 
responsibility unknowingly, but once the realisation dawns he or she feels pain (dard), 
anxiety, worry and qamm (a sense of spiritual pain that results in consciousness or 
frustration) (Shariati, Xhad and Shahadat; Hajj). 
This pain is not tantamount to poena (punishment), however. The dard 
Shariati is referring to here - and in fact prescribing for the Rushanfekr (the ideal 
modem man who understands his time and society, a true intellectual whose 
existential being has been lit up by the spark of God's love of his people) - is neither 
trivial nor a poenaical kind of pain (a kind of penalty). Rather, he is envisaging an 
uplifting spiritual pursuit in the midst of communal life, which tackles the obstacles of 
societal life in a divine sense and turns them into an arsenal of self-construction or 
self-realisation; this can be achieved by finding an outlet for the social ills one 
encounters, thus avoiding 'indifference' (Mohammadi, 1374, p 60). This is the kind of 
dard Shariat, calls Dard-e-Deen, which needs to be incorporated in the psyche of the 
Rushanfekr-e-Deeni (or religious intellectual). 
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To undertake the burden of this pain is not a punishment but a higher form of 
6consciousness' (similar to the one Jesus demonstrated before his enemies and those 
who crucified him), which displays a profound 'insight' into the nature of reality that 
is beyond mere 'bookish understanding' or discursive rationality. This kind of pain is 
a gift and the beginning of true self-realisation amid seemingly secular socialisation 
because the real is Haq and Haq is another name for God in Shariati's religious 
parlance (Shariati, Collected Works 23, p 129). 
It is impossible to form a community of selves in the school of pain without 
recognition of the categorical significance of 'cause' and the intention of bringing this 
ideal into the body of communal life. For Shariati, a 'human thing' (Bashar) is not 
automatically a 'human being' (Insan) endowed with the extra dimension of 'self- 
consciousness', which can only be realised by experiencing 'felt pain'. He then moves 
on to define a community or nation (Umma) as the sum of all human beings who feel 
a common pain (Shariati, cited in Rahnema, 1998, p 120). If that pain is felt across 
contemporary borders of current nation-states and throughout history, then Socrates 
could be described as a closer disciple to Buddha than his contemporary Rajas and 
Gandhi a closer guru to Shariati than the mullahs in Iran. Similarly, a community of 
oppressed people in the colonial countries of Latin America could be said to be closer 
to Shariati than the affluent Muslim aristocracy who happened to inhabit the same 
geographical space as him. 
The idea of pain in Shariati's view of the self is expressed within his discourse 
on society too. The concepts of Shahid and Hajj also apply to the community and 
266 
Umma should be a witness with the intention (Ahange Hajj Nemodan) of sustaining 
the heavy weight of 'cause' (Shariati, Hajj). Such a nation can be bom regardless of 
national, ethnic, racial, religious (in the traditional sense), political, ideological and 
geographical boundaries. The pain felt by Shariati in his time was caused by 
Este'mar, Estekbar,, Estehmar or Zar, Zur and Tazvir (colonialism, capitalism and 
religious stupefaction or mammon, coercion, and hypocrisy). He saw great souls such 
as Fanon, Che, Mao, Lumumba, Sartre and Massignion fight against these forces 
around the world; he identified profoundly with their pain and felt an affinity towards 
each of them. 
It seems Shariati is suggesting that a nation can be born if a common pain 
generates a sense of commitment and the kind of dynamism that can produce Agahi 
(awareness) in those who vow to renounce all polytheistic allegiances and adopt a 
tawhidic worldview. This cannot be accomplished without the necessary 'ideological 
apparatus'. 
The mere existence of a group of people is not enough to generate the type of 
dynamic nationalism that produced Protestant Europe, for example. In Shariati's 
view, a 'human being' cannot fully emerge if he or she has no consciousness of self. 
A human organism does not automatically qualify as a human self unless he or she is 
acculturated or socialised and it seems as if Shariati applies the same reasoning to 
human community or what he calls Umma (Shariati, Collected Works 26, pp 494-5). 
Before Europe became largely Protestant, there were different tribes and groups of 
people who were unconscious of their own 'nationality' and 'language'. The colonial 
mentality of Catholic imperialism deprived them of using their own vernacular 
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dialects in their self-education. What led to the birth of Protestant Europe was the felt 
common pain, which brought people such as the English together and liberated them 
from the yoke of Catholic Church (Shariati, Collected Works 27, pp 86,122). 
In other words, a group of people can become a nation or community when 
they realise they share the same destiny and arriving at their chosen destination will 
cause pain and require more than a verbal commitment to the cause. The cause 
demands total commitment, which is tantamount to a complete renouncement of life 
in death, not in the sense of the glorification of death but of upholding life without 
oppression. By shedding "his own blood, the shahid ... condemns the oppressor 
[which is one of the forces that distorts the historical destiny of the community of God 
which intends to realise the tawhidi system on earth] and provides commitment for 
the oppressed. He exposes aggression and revives what has hitherto been negated. He 
reminds the people of what has already been forgotten ... the [upholding of the 
covenantal cause or shahadat] blood of the shahid is a candle light which gives vision 
and serves as the radiant light of guidance for the misguided who wander amidst the 
homeless caravan, on mountains, in deserts, along by-ways, and in ditches" (Shariati, 
Jihad and Shahadat) 
In Shariati's view, Insan (the human being) is a 'sign' in the theophany of 
existence and to live up to such an ideal demands Hajj -a sense of purpose, and the 
intention to embark on a purposeful life - which elevates the man of clay to the 
heights of performer of a purposeful life, ie Hajji through Arafat (knowledge), 
Mashar (consciousness and understanding) and Mina (love and faith). As a man of 
covenant cannot be bom without a sense of purpose and the will to live life for the 
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cause, a community of covenantal people will differ from contractual society where 
the communal cause is a secular convention devoid of divine purpose. Umma is 
another name for a covenantal community where men and women intend to embark 
on the path of becoming signs of God or performers of Hajj (Shariati, Collected 
Works 7, pp 31,77,43). The symbolic stage of pilgrimage is traditionally set in 
Mecca and it seems Shariati is suggesting that it would be a grave mistake to limit the 
revolutionary performance of authentic existence to few days of the year and to a 
small place in Arabia (Shariati, Collected Works 22, pp 156-7). 
Hajj (or living life as witness to God by achieving the heights of divinity) is 
performed on the stage of life itself and its borders are as wide as the world. Shariati 
implies that Umma no geographical boundaries. For him, community is not bound to a 
place in the way that the concept of 'nation' in modem social theory is. On the 
contrary, he is envisaging a group of men and women embarking on a journey that 
does not recognise geopolitical boundaries but takes humanity as its audience and the 
world as its home (Shariati, Collected Works 7, p 43). 
As man in the true sense of the word must gain knowledge, consciousness, 
faith and love (the stages of becoming a Hajji or performer of the divine covenant), so 
must the community. When Shariati turns his attention from abstract issues to 
concrete problems such as colonialism and underdevelopment, he has different 
explanations from those provided modern intellectuals in third world countries. He 
argues that colonised societies will remain stagnant if they do not aspire to pass 
through the stages of Hajj and Shahadat, which are universally incumbent upon men, 
women and the community. Without this consciousness, the men and women 
in these 
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societies are nothing but consumers imprisoned by machinery or Assimik (Shariati, 
Collected Works 12, pp 72-3). Such consciousness can only be achieved through 
Madhab (religion), which itself in his parlance is another name for 'self- 
consciousness' or Khod-Agahi. It should be noted that Shariati does not take a 
scholastic view of religion, nor does he accept the traditional religious dictums 
prescribed by Shia clergy. He seems to argue that although we need a methodology to 
study religion, the methods need not necessarily be extracted from the religious 
tradition itself (Mohammadi, 1374, pp 61-2). 
3. Sacred and secular 
Shariati's entire work could be deciphered through an understanding of his view of 
Insan (human being) and her/his nature in the scheme of reality. This is one of the 
most salient entries to his universe of theorising and social philosophical-cum- 
ideological reflection. In his view, Man has a primary 'essential' character and a 
secondary 'shaping' character. With respect to the former, every person is the same. 
Anyone who wears clothes exists. But, Shariati argues, what makes a person's true 
character and makes him distinct from other beings is his spiritual qualities - the 
things that cause a person to sense his particular being (T). He becomes conscious of 
his 'self , and says 
'Sum' ('I am') (Shariati, Mad and Shahadat). 
This distinction in Shariati's anthropological methodology serves 
fundamentally as a touchstone in assessing both modernity (European civilisation) 
and traditionalism (contemporary Iran, and by extension the 
Islamic World) and 
exposing what he saw as the social vices and malpractices of 
both. He is of the view 
that there are societies, philosophies, ideologies, religions, intellectual positions and 
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economic systems that are based mainly on furthering and nourishing the 'primary 
ýessential' needs of Man while neglecting or even distorting his fundamental role and 
diminishing the substantial importance of the 'secondary shaping character' in Insan 
(human being). Shariati's dualistic definition of Man's being gives him a toot to 
argue that is possible to identify two movements in history. On the one hand, there is 
Man's orientation based on an ideology where the ultimate goal is the fulfilment of 
'essential needs' and the extension and proliferation of those needs in a consumerist 
society. On the other hand, there is a society where essential needs are considered but 
spiritual concerns are the leitmotif of social rationality and where the rationale of 
historical change is not the result merely of blind fate but of authentic choices made 
by Ummatan Wasatan or 'a community justly balanced' (the ideal society) (Shariati, 
Collected Works 7, pp 40-2). 
History, society and the entire cosmos of human being could be seen as 
warring forces on a battlefield, vying over the soul of 'direction' and the means of 
controlling the 'end'. In a society structured mainly on 'primary essential needs' 
where material welfare takes precedence over existential wellbeing (the latter, in 
Shariati's view, requiring a deep sense of religious anxiety), the significance of 
secondary shaping needs' gradually disappears and diminishes. The lack or presence 
of these secondary character- inducing needs respectively produces different models of 
existence: monotheistic Man (society, religion, worldview and history) and 
polytheistic Man (society, religion, worldview and history) (Shariati, Collected Works 
16, pp 147-8). 
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The notion of secular (in its meta-theoretical sense) in modern social theory 
can be seen as a belief in the independence of the social universe as a unit unto itself, 
governed by own set of rules and non-reliant on any transcendental guidelines, which 
in Islamic parlance is called Vahy or revealed tradition. Shariati, unlike traditional 
Muslim thinkers, does not approach modernity from the naYve viewpoint that the West 
is a materialist civilisation and the East is a spiritual culture and never the twain shall 
meet. His approach is subtler. 
First, he de-legitimates the traditional point of departure in Muslim intellectual 
tradition by arguing that the conventional distinction between 'here' and 'hereafter', 
or Dunya and Akhirat, is merely figurative and at best has an 'existential relationship' 
to the vital process of Hayat or life. Dunya and Akhirat are not geographical realms, 
separated spatially and temporally. On the contrary, they are qualities (sefat) that 
become meaningful in relation to the acts committed by human subjects (Shariati, 
Collected Works 32, pp 101). 
To understand the worldview of Islam in such a dualistic sense is to miss the 
point about the very fact of life, the very act of creation, and the importance of Man in 
the theophanical cosmos. By introducing his particular kind of gnostic monism (which 
is different from both Spinotzian. monism and Russellian neutral monism), Shariati 
attempts to shatter the traditional distinction between here and hereafter and argue for 
religious activism in the matter of society, which is linked to the birth of the 
'existential character' of Man. Once he has demolished the concepts of traditional of 
Islam, he begins to question the very ontological basis of modernity, relegating 
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matters of spiritual concern to the private sphere and contrarily establishing a sui 
genet-is realm called 'secular) 
If the true expression of secular rationale is to found in economics, civil 
society and political life, where there is no place for religious intrusion and spiritual 
anxiety, it is clear that Shariati also has a different opinion of capitalism and class - 
which are not issues that figure in late modernity, although they had serious social 
consequences at the early stage of modernity in European countries such as France. 
The refutation of the traditional worldview of life and after-life does not lead Shariati 
to materialism in philosophy, capitalism in economy or secularism in politics 
(Eshkevari, 1379, p 232). 
The sacred-secular distinction is based on a particular 'vision' of reality (in its 
metaphysical sense), which can be extended to various aspects of reality (such as 
epistemology, ontology, politics, ideology, society and so on) and condition the 
perception of one's praxis. One of the most salient features of this distinction is the 
peripheral role assigned to 'religion' and 'religious concern' in the political scene and 
the rationale of polity in the modern context. In fact, as stated earlier, the emergence 
of 'secularism' within the political arena in Europe was profoundly related to the role 
of religion, which at the time was deemed destructive for the health of civil society 
and nascent nation-states. But it seems Shariati has a different understanding of 
religion and the role assigned to religious thinking and 'religious sensibility' in the 
affairs of society and in the construction of the human self. 
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In Shariati's view, the categorical 'distinction' between the secular and the 
sacred, which allows for the systematic regulation of the affairs of life to various 
dimensions, is only possible for an ideology based on shirk - that is, polytheistic in 
nature rather than monotheistic. Let us now explore these two concepts in detail and 
find out what impact they have had on the notions of sacred and secular in Shariati's 
social theory. 
The secular is a domain where the affairs of civil society are of central 
importance and the 'managing rationality' is devoid of any 'religious' or 'divine' 
concerns. The notion of 'accountability' is mundane and unrelated to extra-societal 
concerns, which (the same concept), in religious worldview, is contingent upon a 
system conceptualised as 'creation'. The domain of being is the created domain and 
the creatures of this universe are all part of a divine melody. There is only one being 
capable of disobeying the theophanical rhythms of this melody and that is Human 
Being. The very act of disobedience brings a peculiar kind of mentality, that can serve 
as the basis of the historical process and for Shariati is illustrated in the story of 
Adam, in its metaphorical sense, and Abel and Cain, in its sociological sense. 
Man is the battleground of the 'spirit of God' (which represents creativity, 
consciousness, knowledge, love and forgiveness) and the 'stinking mud' from which 
human beings were made (in the anthropology of Koran) represents stagnation and 
inertia. Abel and Cain represent these respective forces and the subsequent socio- 
economic systems resulting from them in turn mirror the 'spirit of God' or the 
C stinking mud'. The Cainian system is a 'property system' and subsequent class 
systemý and represents the secular with its distinction between 'matters of life' and 
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(affairs of after-life'. Shariati goes on to argue that the property system gives rises to a 
tripartite hegemony where capital, ideology and power constitute a whole that could 
be seen as a worldview in itself What is called religion (organised religion and a 
clerical class) and anti-religion (society without religion and non-religious classes) 
today is misguided and the very basis of secularism or the distinction between the 
matters of polity and the affairs of religiosity are unauthentic. For Shariati, the whole 
raison d'etre of Islam was to demolish the distinction between 'spiritual, ethical and 
metaphysical' on one hand and 'social and political' on the other hand. The greatest 
and most revolutionary contribution of Islam to human history, he held, was that it 
channelled the 
... power of religious love and the miraculous force of gnostic feelings, which had always 
existed within individuals, guided them towards revolution, sacrifice, the welcoming of death 
and martyrdom and towards the attainment of power to create a human society based on justice 
and dedicated to material and spiritual progress in this world. (Shariati, Collected Works 5, 
p 48) 
Within modernity the 'social' emerges in its most progressive sense when the 
political notion of religion is relegated to a pre-modem communal system but in 
Islam, it seems Shariati is suggesting that the best form of humanity can be achieved 
in 'communal form' and only in Umma, which is a divinely guided community. 
Shariati's notion of tawhid prevents him from conceiving of a sphere where the affairs 
of the 'social' can be conducted, the rationality of capitalism acceded, and 'reform' 
chosen as an option to rectify the drawbacks of the system. He is essentially a Mosol 
Parast (Utopian), an ideologue rather than a modem academic sociologue. 
For Shariati, the whole of creation is an expression of sacred or Tajalli-e-Haq, 
but it is only within Insan (human being) that this divine expression can be realised. 
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Within human society that expression or the lack of it is apparent on a global scale, 
and this affects the 'cause' of creation. If Man is a dual reality, then the two 
dimensions of profane and sacred are not external forces but aspects of Man himself 
vying for supremity. When the allegiance to 'stinking mud' overtakes the 'spirit of 
God', or when within society the principles of polytheism overshadow the reality of 
Tawhid, then, in Shariati's non-native analysis, the consequences show themselves in 
all spheres of life (Shariati, Collected Works 14, pp 318-20). 
Shariati goes on to argue that this world and the hereafter, natural and 
supernatural, spirit and body, matter and meaning are all integrated, and each is a 
dimension of a single 'existing truth'. This existentially imperative life principle 
cannot be laid at the doorsteps of one of the noblest dimensions of man's activity, ie 
the affairs of the City or Medina. The search for this life-generating principle and 
world-shaking energy requires a special kind of vision, which is beyond the grasp of 
reason or philosophy. Shariati calls this vision hikmat or theosophy (Rahnema, 1998, 
p151). 
Shariati seems to suggest that the methodological distinction between secular 
and sacred is a by-product of a historical and sociological process in a European 
context that has come to occupy a semi-philosophical position in terms of the 
fundamental issues of 'epistemology', 'ontology', 'the nature of world' and 'the 
character of history I in general. If, Shariati argues, the problems of modernity in terms 
of worldview are context-bound, then Muslim intellectuals do not need to adopt 
secular positions in encountering the challenges of modernity or describing Islam 
in 
terms set by secular ideologies (Shariati, Collected Works 10, p 4). Shariati, apart 
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from his categorical refutation of imitation of Western hi stori co- soc io -political 
destiny both in form and content, refuses to acknowledge this distinction and instead 
argues that the world is a purposeful and continuous entity with an 'ideal and an 
objective' (Rahnema, 1998, p 289). The principle of Tawhid is not a concept limited 
only to the belief in one God. Shariati construed monotheism not only as a world 
outlook, but also as a philosophy of history, a sociological outlook, an ethical doctrine 
and finally a social mission (Shariati, Collected Works 16, p 232). On the basis of his 
Tawhidi worldview, Shariati rejects the traditional dichotomies between soul and the 
body, material and spiritual, sacred and profane, physical and metaphysical world, 
here and hereafter, without realising that his refutation is the result of an ideological 
commitment that lacks explanation. 
Shariati's understanding of monotheism was not a logical construction aimed 
at re-emphasising the 'existence of God', but had specific social, political, economic 
and ethical implications. It was more of a re-establishment of human self in the 
scheme of modemity, as well as an attempt to rescue the human being from the 
stifling grasp of traditionalism by refuting the inevitability of materialism and 
idealism on the one hand and the opium-inducing character of traditional religion on 
the other (Rahnerna, 1998, pp 287-8). 
Shariati's principle of 'unity of being' or wahdat al-vujud gave him a tool to 
view the whole phenomenon of life as a single organism connected in all its diverse 
dimensions by the very principle of 'being' or vujud. This principle conditioned his 
view by imposing unity upon objective diversity within all dimensions of 
life. 
Wherever unity was absent (such as in Iran's economic system during Pahlavi), 
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Shariati wished to impose it without any regard to the internal logic of the system (be 
it social, economic, or political) (Shariati, Collected Works 5, p 25). There is no 
single 'sphere' that could claim 'independent logic' (and hence unconditional 
allegiance, as was demanded by the Shah-regime during the pre-Revolutionary 
modernisation of Iran) from Tawhidi principle. This is why Shariati declared that Man 
was only accountable to one judge, which can be interpreted as the denial of any 
ý special claim' or prior concession to secular logic and the refusal to concede that 'the 
sacred logic' is irrelevant or of limited relevance. Shariati tried, albeit polemically, to 
de-legitimise the claim for any special kind of secular logic and extended his notion of 
monotheism to envelope all areas of communal life and international struggle. But 
how could he accomplish this? The notions of ikhlas and deen are the key to 
deciphering this conundrum. 
4. Authenticity and religion 
What is ikhlas? The direct translation is 'sincerity', 'loyalty' or 'devotion'. In the 
religious discourse of Islam, it is said that leading a religious life requires sincerity 
and loyalty as well as devotion. In rejecting loyalty to religious establishments, 
Shariati declares that the search for attaining an authentic sense of being and leading 
an integral life requires a process of personal soul-searching based on absolute 
sincerity in one's intentions and actions both in solitude and among the multitude 
(Shariati, Collected Works 35, p 338). He distinguishes between faith and religion by 
explaining that faith has an external (zaheri) and an internal (bateni) dimension. For 
him, the essence of faith is gnosticism (Irfan) reached via the path of Tariqa (Shariati, 
Collected Works 35, p 339). To express this mode of being, Shariati uses the 
symbolic ritual of pilgrimage, Hajj, and transforms its entire semantic universe in 
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order to demonstrate his sense of authenticity and the way he conceives deen or 
religion both in solitude and multitude (Rahnema, 1998, p 15 1). 
The ritual of Hajj begins with a conscious act of niyyat or 'intention'. Before 
setting off on the path, the pilgrim should make some 'preparations' in order to be 
eligible to arrive at miqqat, the 'trysting-place'. The symbol of Hajj is used to 
formulate the notion of an 'existentially responsible' lifestyle, which Shariati deems is 
correct and conforms to the Koranic notion of Mithaq or covenantal trust. The 
substantial dimension of a life in pilgrimage, as in the ritual of Hajj, is the very notion 
of 'consciousness', which is a self-conscious seeking of 'authentic existence' by 
renouncing all kinds of allegiance, whether psychological or socio -political, that claim 
a God-like sense of submission without having any divine credibility (Shariati, 
Collected Works 22, pp 116,156-7). 
Shariati seems to overturn the semantic universe of the term 'pilgrimage', 
bestowing a new identity on the 'pilgrim' by exhorting his audience to abandon the 
traditional sense of understanding - which confines religious mode to a ritualistic 
machinery without individual spirit - as well as the modern one - which deprives 
Man of the spirit of religion in the name of modernity (Shariati, Collected Works 12, 
p 238). 
The lexical translation of ikhlas, however, is not to make sense of what 
Shariati means by this concept (ikhlas) in relation to authentic action and religious 
thinking. it is tempting to compare his notion of ikhlas to 'integrity', which 
constitutes the spirit of ikhlas even if it belies the lexical meaning of the term. 
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Shariati's religious integralism implies that the human person is both material and 
spiritual, and can become more than a merely self-interested individual by acquiring 
and practising the habits necessary for actualising his humanity. Indeed, Man may rise 
to the heights of reason and purpose latent within his nature most efficaciously 
through prayerful communion with other persons under divine guidance. Shariati goes 
so far as to suggest that man has a substantial dimension that can be termed 'gnostic 
substance', which can be activated through sensible education that acts as an antidote 
to fallacious ethics symbolised by Marxist materialism and Western bourgeois 
capitalism (Shariati, Collected Works 2, pp 51-3). 
Shariati shares an essential notion with many other modem Muslim thinkers 
who have a quest for authenticity (Safi, 1994). This is the notion of 'individual 
authenticity' based on sacred morality, summed up by the belief that 'I as a person 
(and by extension a culture) should be who I am and not anybody else'. An authentic 
person should not follow external recipes for ethical behaviour and moral vision (such 
as institutional mullahism, a sign of tradition, or statism, a sign of modemity) but 
should be guided by Arafat (knowledge), Mash'ar (consciousness), and Mina (love 
and faith) (Shariati, Collected Works 20, pp 374-7). The argument put forward by 
Shariati is not only about personal salvation; he also attempts to formulate a recipe for 
social salvation from the hazards of modernity (be they the capitalism of the West, the 
Marxist-Leninism of the former USSR, or traditionalist Islam and Iranian 
nationalism) (Shariati, Collected Works 4, p 31-3). 
How successful he was in this attempt is a matter of great controversy among 
scholars of both East and West. One issue is undisputed, however: the 'essential' link 
280 
between 'individual authenticity' and 'societal authenticity' based on sacred morality. 
Shariati, like Jacques Maritain (1946,1973) in his religious and neo-Thomistic 
anthropology, preferred to describe this as darde deen (religious concerns) for the 
right ordering of public life, which without individual life or life itself would go awry. 
As Jacques Maritain argued that the best political order would encourage the view 
that religion and metaphysics are an essential part of human culture, primary and 
indispensable incentives in the very life of society, so Shariati maintained that the 
religious dimension' is truly the only essential human dimension. Without this, 
society would be destroyed, Man would be at loss, and history would become a 
dungeon. Shariati alludes to this in his Philosophy of Supplication in a very poetical 
manner: 
My Lord, inspire our 'open minded' ones who consider economics essential that economy is not 
the goal, and inspire our clergy and religious ones that economy is also essential.... An empty 
stomach lacks everything. A society, which has economic problems also, lacks spiritual wealth. 
Whatever is called ethics in a poor country is nothing but deviant customs and habits, not 
spirituality. 
What does Shariati mean by the term 'religion' and how does this relate to the 
idea of authenticity (Bazgasht be-Khishtan)? Since Kant, Religionkritik has signified 
the abandonment of 'religious consciousness' (as a factor to be reckoned with in the 
matters of social engineering). For David Strauss, Ludwig Feuerbach and Marx, this 
was tantamount to 'false consciousness, devoid of any cognitive dimension (or an 
irrelevant truth-claim in Durkheim's sociological investigation on religion as a 
societal cohesive element). In a similar vein, Dewey followed Feuerbach and Strauss 
in admitting that the ultimate reality of 'religious yearning' is not a being or a living 
reality but the unity of all ideal objectives arousing us to desire and action, best 
described as human subjectivity. This modern discourse takes natural sciences or 
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I scientific rationality' as its point of departure, stripping religion of any a priori claim 
to 'objective understanding' and 'truthful consciousness'. 
If Man is a social animal whose interests are best served in a political order as 
a citizen, what he needs most is accurate and truthful consciousness to enable him to 
realise his most humane potential and achieve his social needs. The way to achieve 
the heights of social consciousness and political maturity is through science and 
philosophical rationality (or modern mode of consciousness). Within this framework 
(based on Religionkritik), there is no place for 'religious consciousness'. Religion is a 
figment of imagination and a product of social 'unawareness' or at best a tool for 
moulding communal nation-states into a cohesive form rather than a 'force' to be 
reckoned with in the progression of humanity in a historical sense. 
Scientific rationality needs to be applied to the social fabric and individuals 
need to reacquaint themselves with modem consciousness through science. But 
Shariati, as much he revered science and modern philosophy, did not appreciate 
modem Religionkritik. On the contrary, he accused modernists of being nalve in not 
getting to heart of 'historical truths' in relation to religion and 'religious 
consciousness'. Such truths could awaken Man to a nobler form of being unattainable 
to science and philosophy and necessary for a cohesive public life in particular, and 
for humanity in general (Shariati, Collected Works 20, pp 81-4; Collected Works 22, 
pp 46-7). 
Further strengthening his position, Shariati uses historical characters such as 
Abu Zar, Salman and Avecinna as ideal types to demonstrate that what brings 
dynamism into history is not 'philosophical consciousness' or 'scientific 
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consciousness'. If political order is impossible without the integrity of individuals in 
possession of the 'self-consciousness' evident among religious men such as Abu Zar 
or Salman as symbols of authentic personalities of the highest order without the 
slightest sense of social responsibility (rather than the consciousness found among 
scientists and philosophers such as Avecinna), then the path to authenticity is not 
through science or modern rationality (which disregard the essentials of religious 
thought and mode). 
To understand Shariati's argument in relation to modern Religionkritik, it is 
necessary to find out what he means by religion and how it is different from the 
modem view conceived within the sociology of religion. His understanding of 
religion is imbued by the complex notion of dialectic (half Hegelian-Marxist and half 
gnostic) that informs his anthropology and cannot be considered independently. As 
mentioned earlier, Shariati's view of Man is as a dual reality, the battlefield of God 
and Satan in dialectic mode, but the dialectic he espouses is not so much a Marxian 
method of analysis as a religious and Islamic one (Rahnema, 1998, p 291). Using the 
dialectical method, he refers to human beings as the union of Lucifer and Allah. The 
spirit of Allah' - representing creativity, consciousness, knowledge, love and 
forgiveness - is the thesis, while the 'stinking mud' from which human beings are 
made represents the antithesis, stagnation and inertia. The struggle between the two in 
the nature of human beings and their history has created an ascending deterministic 
and dialectical movement. In Shariati's scheme of thought, as Rahnema rightly notes, 
the path leading from the 'stinking mud' to 'God' is called 'religion' or deen (the 
primordial nature) (Shariati, Collected Works, 16, p 47). 
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However, the main point is that the demonstration of the Tuciferious 
religiosity or religious conception based on false consciousness' does not remain in 
the individual realm but manifests itself at various social and historical stages in 
increasingly complex ways. Shariati sets out to describe the most vicious forms of 
Luciferious mentality that creep into the framework of 'true religious ideology' by 
domesticating people and depriving them of an original 'personality' and an ideal 
'society', attainable only when the transition from mud to God produces a God-like 
creature able to use her or his free will and ingenuity to successfully construct a 
human paradise on earth (Rahnema, 1998, p 292). 
Shariati fights on two fronts (traditional and modem) to make the distinction 
between monotheistic and polytheistic religion. While arguing that philosophy and 
science are forms of 'consciousness', he contends that if the war of 'religion against 
religion' is not properly understood in a historical context, two significant facts, 
which would mean nothing without humanity, end up being neglected. 
The first of these is that while science and philosophy are important in the 
history of humanity, they only lead to a 'consciousness' devoid of political and social 
significance. This can only be achieved when an individual of historical nature attains 
a form of 'self-consciousness', demands his rights and pays his dues. Shariati equates 
this form of self-consciousness with religion and considers it to be the true source of 
'authenticity' (Borojerdi, 1996, p 115). The self-consciousness of an Abu Zar or a 
Salman is related to their God-consciousness and it can only be realised through the 
negation of the self in God and subsequent living with people within society 
(Rahnema, 1998, pp 159,247). 
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The second fact concerns polytheistic religion - the opium of the people - 
viewed as the primordial nature of man advocated by Islam. Shariati claims that 
religious wars have raged continually throughout history. Each war represents a total 
ideological system (comprising economy, worldview, religion, society, philosophy, 
anthropology, politics and ideals), symbolically termed Abelian or Cainian. Shariati 
accuses the intellectuals of the Enlightenment (or Rushanfekran in Iran or the Third 
World) of disregarding this significant fact (ie the distinction between religion and 
anti-religion that is socially represented as religion) and hence depriving the masses 
from a powerful venue of 'self-consciousness' that could be instrumental in bringing 
about an authentic socio-political revolution in Iran or the colonised world. He 
attempts to de-legitimise the accuracy of Marxism in a Muslim context in general and 
an Iranian context in particular and uses Shi'ism as a native cultural framework in 
order to galvanise revolutionary fervour in Iran. By so doing, he hopes to demonstrate 
that the 'opium of the people' is not a monotheistic religion but a polytheistic one. He 
also attempts to convince third-world intellectuals that social progress achieved at the 
expense of the abandonment of religion in Europe should not be imitated at any cost. 
Instead, one should reconsider Occidental religious experience and the importance of 
the nature of 'European rejection' (Shariati, Collected Works 14, pp 45-6). 
Shariati argues that a distinction should be made between monotheistic and 
polytheistic religions, the true cause of wars in human history, without clarifying 
whether this distinction is based on an intra-religious approach or on his sociological 
methodology. Monotheistic religion is championed by the prophets of the Abrahamic 
religions. Polytheisism, meanwhile, has always challenged and 
fought against 
monotheisism the name of religious custody. Sharaiti 
distinguished between false 
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polytheistic and true monotheistic religions on the basis of their position in relation to 
socially significant issues. Polytheism was characterised as a creed that propagated 
acquiescence and inauthenticity, while monotheism was defined as a revolutionary 
creed based on defiance and a source of authentic being. 
The term religion is a normative one saved for 'true monotheism' and in this 
true sense it has a spiritual aspect based on belief in one God, and a material and 
worldly aspect representing human unity or oneness. But Shariati seems to argue that 
there is no distinction between Dunya and Akhirat if both aim to reach the same 
destination, where man is delivered from 'stinking mud' and turned into Khalifat-e- 
Allah on Earth. Since human beings are creatures of a single ultimate reality, Shariati 
argues, they must be of the same kind and of equal value. From a sociological point of 
departure, therefore, monotheism represents the belief in the unity of humanity, 
irrespective of race, ethnicity, nationality and class. Monotheism's invitation to 
obedience towards God is also an invitation to rebel against any authority that 
deprives people of being true and authentic unto themselves; the only relevant 
authority is Ruh-e-Khoda, or the spirit of God. 
Monotheism is thus a 'revolutionary religion', which urges its adherents to 
change and destroy whatever they find to be false and unacceptable to the rule of God. 
Polytheisism is as old as the monotheisism but not in the sense used by Hume. The 
long history of polytheism is evidence of oppression and suppression of the masses by 
zar (an economic system based on expropriation), zur 
(a political system based on 
oppression), and tazvir (an ideological system 
based on false consciousness). 
Polytheistic religions, Shariati claims, distort all religious principles and deprive the 
286 
Muslim community of any truthful means to regain their authenticity by adhering to 
the principles of religion. In Shariati's view, Muslims adhere to distorted ideas and 
misconstrued ideals in the name of religion, ideas that induce nothing but 
acquiescence to widespread social injustice, inequity and inequality in the name of 
Qaza and Qadar (pre-determined fate) (Shariati, Collected Works 19, p 274). Shariati, 
concurring with modem intellectuals who called religion 'the opium of the masses', 
berates Muslims for not distinguishing between the religion of Tawhid and anti- 
religion of Shirk, which is founded on ignorance, fear, discrimination and property 
laws characteristic of the feudal era (Rahnema, 1998, p 249). 
The institutionalisation of polytheistic traits and their application as social 
norms deprives Man from the sense of authenticity that is a prerequisite of any ideal 
city. For Shariati, polytheistic religions that distinguish between Islam-e Aqideh and 
Islam-e Farhang (a belief that comes from within and is a constitutive factor of one's 
personality versus a cultural feature that one is bom into without any personal 
realisation, or put simply, ideological Islam versus traditional Islam) are enemies of 
progress, freedom and civilisation, and propagators of divisive politics, oppressive 
systems and alienating social conditions (Shariati, Collected Works 29, pp 144-8). 
If the path from 'stinking mud' to 'spirit of God' is called religion and leads 
Man to the highest form of consciousness, which is an expression of authentic being, 
then Shariati reminds us that this pilgrimage cannot be accomplished while the social 
condition is in tatters. In the story of Hussain (a historical personality in Islam), who 
leaves his ritual pilgrimage in order to encounter Yazid (a ruler in the early days of 
Islam), Shariati introduces his concept of 'religious consciousness' and its 
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significance in social revolution and the birth of Hurrs (a historical figure who in 
Shariati's hands became an ideal for authentic being and action - an 'authentic 
personality'). 
Authenticity or Bazgasht be Khishtan (Esalat) cannot be achieved without a 
profound sense of khudi or 'self. The Process of realising one's own self as a 
purposeful reality situated at the heart of history and ingrained with a divine purpose 
is impossible without a sense of 'self-consciousness' or Khod Agahi tantamount to 
T', I- Knoda Agahi or 'God-consciousness'. Awareness of this dimension of Man's being 
cannot be brought about by either science or philosophy; Shariati equates the 
emergence of self-consciousness in the heart of Man with religion, but not any kind of 
religion. His is a normative religion, which has Tawhid as its sole principle. The 
product of this religion is a Muvahhed or an authentic man, who is freed from the four 
prisons of 'nature', 'history', 'society' and 'self and capable of recreating himself in 
the form that Allah originally created him - not as a social animal who adapts to the 
environment, but one that can make his environment adapt to the needs of the 
authentic man of Tawhid (The Philosophy of Supplication). 
This is a man with ikhlas who practises isar (or self-consciously practises 
selflessness for the cause of the oppressed), in whom the 'spirit of God' has prevailed 
over Man's basic mud-like element. This ideal man, who represents the noblest form 
of authenticity, permanently revolts against the Cainian status quo in order to 
establish the Abelian society (Rahnerna, 1989, p 294). What are the principles of the 
Abelian society? Who are the symbolic examples of this ideal society and how can 
one know about the ideology of monotheism? 
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Islamshenasi or knowledge of Islam (its history, society, principles, book, 
significant personalities, culture, and so on) is the key to a successful revolution and 
the creation of the promised human paradise on earth. Here again, Shariati takes the 
opposite view of the traditional clerical concept of religion, which bases its ideology 
for lay people on the 'principle of imitation'. He also disagrees with modern 
intellectuals who argue against 'religious thinking' in toto. His own position is that of 
Shenakht - understanding the epistemological bases of Islam as a religion in the 
history of mankind and its place within the history of civilisation. Shenakht enables 
the authentic man of religion (as personified by Abu Zar, Hossein, Fatima, Ali, 
Muhammad, Hurr, Zeynab, Salaman and Meqdad in history and in concrete social 
situations, where the real essence of human self can show itself) to realise that Man is 
not a plant that grows because of a coincidence of nature, history and society (or what 
Shariati takes for the materialist position within modem discourse) and at the same 
time enlightens him to the fact that 'the only' path towards God (and authentic self- 
consciousness) passes through the Earth, i. e. living within history and being 
concerned about the historical realities. That is to say, Shariati holds, that traditional 
religious people have forgotten that Man is made of dust, which is an indication that 
material phenomena imply God's existence as much as inexplicable unseen ones. 
In other words, the road to authentic life, as demonstrated by Abraham in 
Shariati's view (Shariati, Collected Works 29), both in its individual and communal 
sense, follows the principles of material reality, which is an expression of the ultimate 
reality. Shariati yearns for an existential kind of life - not something that will make 
him resentful of its worthlessness or mourn for its uselessness on his deathbed, but 
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something endowed with the 'gift' of choice, which is the only salient feature of 
mankind. But the choice Shariati endorses is not of the Sartrean kind, devoid of divine 
concerns or dard-e deen; on the contrary, his is a choice different from traditionalists' 
notion of Ekhtiyar (free will) or Jabr (determinism), and also unlike the Fanonian 
concept of 'personal choice'. 
In The Philosophy of supplication, Shariati expresses this notion very 
eloquently by saying to God, as the ultimate ultra ego or the absolute other: 
My Lord, grant me ... a life ... [and] let me choose ... but in the way that pleases you the most 
You teach me how to live... I shall learn how to die. 
Although the road to authenticity is through 'knowledge', the kind of 
knowledge Shariati deems significant for a true religious life, either individual or 
communal (as expressed in the symbolic form by the image of a pilgrim) is not a 
modem objective secular kind of episteme. On the contrary, he depicts a kind of 
knowledge that is 'useful' to the communal being of mankind. This 'usefulness' in 
Shariati's view is not individual "elated feelings of the heights of lofty understanding 
[represented by fine arts, which would disable one] to see the depth of hunger in the 
eyes of the hungry or the black bruises of an abused human". 
The kind of knowledge advocated by Shariati is Ma'rifa. This is essential for 
an authentic life and is the fruit of religious thinking, which is distinguished from 
discursive thinking but not independent from it, and the philosophy or the spirit of 
supplication (The Philosophy of Supplication). Religion in Shariati's view is an 
existential yearning, which turns into a lifestyle of praxis through Man's actions 
in the 
world. The vocation of Man on Earth is to work and fulfil God's message. The 
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fulfilment of the message (religion) is another name for authenticity. Religion is a 
direct call for action, and action is a manifestation of faith. Action involves men and 
women alike, hence Shariati's attention to Ali and Fatima as ideals of the Muslim 
community and their ways of dealing with vital issues of life as the norms of authentic 
action. Action is the only legitimising device for sovereignty on Earth. The revolution 
of transcendence appears in society for the implementation of social justice and the 
foundation of an egalitarian society. Transcendence means universal equality between 
all individuals in the same society. Prophets did not only preach the revolutions but 
they also led them. They enter into the political struggle and take the side of the poor, 
the oppressed and the wretched of the Earth. 
To conclude this exploration and evaluation of Shariati, the key point to 
underline is that this theorist has presented a distinctive modernist normative agenda 
for Muslim/Iranian social (as opposed to political) revolution through fusing 
existentialism and the piety of Shi'ism. In the context of the three themes of 
intercivilisational dialogue, as with Iqbal, controversy abounds about Shariati's 
(notably different) theoretical groundings. But despite - or perhaps because of - his 
transcendental worldview that sees the universe as one living organism, his essentially 
existentialicist approach provides substantial commonalities for cross-cultural 
discussion. Specifically, in terms of self-community, humans are uniquely three- 
dimensional, dialectics of clay and spirit, who through self-conscious monist gnosis 
and a common cause/destiny achieve communal consciousness. In terms of sacred- 
secular, despite constant internal human conflict between fulfilling 
essential/consumerist needs and fulfilling spiritual concerns, the holy and profane are 
not distinguishable in an ideology based on divinely guided monotheism. For the final 
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theme, religion-authenticity, in an 'existentially responsible' lifestyle, self- 
consciousness through religious knowledge is by definition seeking both individual 
and societal authenticity based on sacred - normative - morality. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Ali Shariati: The Architect of Revolution 
In the first part of this presentation major concepts of Shariati, which mainly 
fall within the genre of his 'Islamiyat' (intra-Islamic discussions) -in contrast to 
'Ijtlmaiyat (sociological discussions) and 'Kaviriyat' (Gnostic discussions)- will be 
discussed. The second part of this chapter is on particular aspects of Shariati's 
sociological views and the last part is on his debates on modernity, tradition, 
civilization and how he re-construed the position of religious thinking vis-a-vis 
secular tradition of Western modernity. 
1. Theological Dimensions in Shariati's Thinking 
As I have argued earlier Shariati is working within the parameters of religious 
thinking but takes modernity very seriously. Time and again in his discourse one can 
witness a redefinition of classical Islamic concepts in the spirit of Iqbalian 
reconstructive approach that discerns a spirit in religion that 
is entangled in an ill 
body. For instance the concept of 'Intizar' within Shia-tradition of Islam was related 
to Imam Mahdi and the event was considered in a semi-co smo logical sense but 
Shariati gives it a modern twist by re-reading the whole story of Intizar 
in the light of 
dialectics. 
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Shariati believes in determinism as a law of the universe decreeing that 
evolution and revolution are inexorable. All roads lead to the inevitable climax when 
equality and unity are realized worldwide - this will be utopia, the end of history, the 
return of the Mahdi,, the culmination of the dialectical struggle. Intizar is the Shi'a 
belief in the return of the Imam, an active waiting for, and accelerating of, his coming 
-a progressive movement toward the goal of revolution. Contrary to the elite, the 
masses have fervently clung to this belief, proving that man is basically a creature of 
hope. Realising that the present is not what it ought to be, dialectical intizar negates 
the present oppression: "Belief in Intizar is belief in God's promise to the Muslims, in 
the final realization of the wretched masses' ideal and hope; in the final triumphant 
emergence of the classless society, a society freed from tyranny, injustice and 
deceit ...... (Shariati, Collected Works 7, p 14). 
Shariati sees man, after having spent millennia on his difficult path of 
evolution, finally arriving at the end of history, to the formation of a new world and a 
new man. Shariati, too, like lqbal is a socially conscious intellectual and concerned 
with the destiny of Muslim Umma in the world and for this reason he is in the pursuit 
of nation building by creating role models. 
Shariati, like any social thinker, has a latent anthropology that guides his 
ideological pursuits in the context of socio-political activism. In his view, as 
mentioned earlier, Human Being has a 'Gnostic Substance' (Johar 'Irfani) that is 
universal and does not recognize boundaries of geography or history. In this sense, 
Shariati is far from cultural relativism of disciplinary secular sociology, which does 
not recognize the universality of human nature loudly. Although there are great many 
western social thinkers such as Fromm, Maslow, Angyal and Jung, who do believe in 
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the universal human nature nevertheless it would not be unfair to assert that the 
contemporary sociology in its disciplinary academic form is not inclined in this 
direction. The importance of this 'Gnostic Substance' for Shariati is not a matter of 
personal taste but a significant revolutionary tool in his ideological struggle against 
Estebdad (Despotism), Estekbar (Imperialism) and Estehmar (Obscurantism). For 
him, any ideology that aims to prevail needs two components, i. e. committed people 
and clear vision. It is not exaggeration to call Shariati an ardent Iqbalian in his 
understanding of human person as the idea of 'Khudi' lies within Shariati's social 
thought. But in terms of his thoughts on ideology Shariati is a great synthesizer and to 
some extend one could argue that he has surpassed his spiritual mentor. 
In his view, each religion, school of thought, movement or revolution is made 
up of two elements: wisdom and love. One is light and the other is motion. One gives 
common sense and understanding, the other, strength, enthusiasm and movement. In 
the words of Alexis Carrel, 'Wisdom is like the lights of a car which show the way. 
Love is like the motor which makes it move. ' Each is nothing without the other. A 
motor, without lights, is blind love, dangerous, tragic and potentially fatal. (Shariati, 
Collected Works, 20, p 15) 
In a society, in a movement of thought or in a revolutionary school of 
thought, men of letters (who are clear thinkers, who are aware and responsible) show, 
through their works, that there is a way to come to know a school of thought or a 
religion. They show that there is a way to give awareness to people. 
The responsibility 
of the people, on the other hand, is to give their spirits and their strength to a 
movement. They are responsible for giving the starting push. 
(Shariati, Collected 
Works, 14, p5 1) 
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A movement is like a living body. It thinks with the brain of scholars and loves 
through the hearts of its people. If faith, sincerity, love and sacrifice seldom found in a 
society, people are responsible. But where correct understanding of a school of 
thought is at a low level (where vision, awareness, logical consciousness and deep 
familiarity with the goals of a school of thought are lacking, where the meaning, 
purpose and truths of a school of thought are missing) the scholars are responsible. 
Religion, in particular, needs both aspects and would be incomplete one without the 
other. In religion, knowledge and feelings are not treated as separate entities. They are 
transformed into understanding and faith by means of common sense and knowledge. 
(Shariati, Collected Works, 16, p 216) 
This is Islam. More than any other religion, it is a religion of the recitation of 
the book, a religion of struggle in God's Way Oihad), a religion of thought and love. 
In the Koran, one cannot find the boundaries between love and faith. The Koran 
considers martyrdom to be eternal life. It blinds one to the pen and writing. If 
Muslims are unaware of this, who, then, is responsible? (Fatima is Fatima, Ch. 1) 
The idea of responsibility (vazifeh) has always been part of religious canon in 
Islam as it is evident in 'Fiqh' (Islamic Jurisprudential Discourse) texts and literature. 
But this concept came to be understood in a very narrow sense, which seemed almost 
unrelated to the social reality that Islam was practiced in. But Sharaiti takes the 
concept of 'responsibility' and 'religion' (Deen) in a wider sense and asks if religion 
requires our total dedication then why is this total dedication not applied to the 
context of dedication, namely society? Why should the application of responsibility 
be confined to individual realm and even the collective realms understood in a non- 
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organic sense? (Shariati, Collected Works, 5, p 34) For instance, it is required by 
Muslims to perform collective prayers but why is this spirit not applied to economy or 
political life? Why should Muslims be equal when they stand to say prayers before 
God in a mosque but in the realm of politics there are no ideas of egalitarianism or 
equality before Sharia-law? (Shariati, Collected Works, 22, p 29) 
One may inquire about the reason behind such a state of Estehmar 
(Obscurantism) among Muslim Umma. Within traditional culture of Islam Ulema- 
scholars have established the institution of 'Taqlid' (reliance on religious scholars in 
matters of religion), which takes the grand loads of personal responsibility in learning 
about what matters in life in accordance to Islam. Although it is argued that one 
cannot follow any religious scholar in matters of principle such as 'knowledge of 
unity of God' (tawhid), 'knowledge of the necessity of prophethood' (nabuwat), 
'knowledge of divine leadership' (imamate) and so on and so forth nevertheless it is 
fair to assert that the majority of Muslims don't undertake scholarly approach to these 
questions. Shariati, on the other hand, conditions the very understanding of religion 
(Deen) on 'Shenakht' i. e. Knowledge. In other words, there is no religion, which 
could result in the birth of Husseini Character 20 (which was elaborated by Iqbal) if 
you don't have knowledge about what matters in life, which essentially are exactly 
similar to what are the principal matters of religion in Islam. (Shariati, Collected 
Works, 5, p 109) He argues time and again that our society (Iran) for centuries have 
harbored the love of Ahl al-Bait (The Prophet and his family) but if you ask people 
about why do you love, for instance, Ali or how could Hussein be lived in your 
life, 
society today you would surely not find any answers. (Shariati, 
Collected Works, 15, 
20 Hussein is the third infallible leader of Shia-Muslims but his character stands above all 
secterainism by representing an ideal personality to a point 
that even Mahatma Gandhi proclaimed that 
he was inspired by Hussein in his struggle 
for justice and truth. 
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p 239) What lqbal cautioned as the dangers of Materialism for Shariati was a tangible 
problem as Communist Russia and its Tudeh-allies in Iran were working on the youth, 
who did not have the piety of their parents but at the same time did not have the 
protective cocoon of traditional culture, as their parents had. Tudeh-party, for 
instance, targeted the illiterate masses and the young university students, whose 
understanding of religion was based on Taqlid or unreflective religiosity, which could 
be shattered in an instance when confronted with philosophical doubts based on 
materialist dialectics of Marxism or Leninism. One of the main reasons that another 
religious thinker (Ayatullah Mutaharri) devoted most of his time and energy to debate 
Marxism was the widespread currency of Tudeh-ideology in Iran prior to 1979 
Revolution. Although the debate on Marxism versus Islam was not confined to 
Shariati or Mutaharri but involved great many other Ulema-scholars such as Makarem 
Shirazi, Dr. Ayatullah Beheshti, Dr. Mofateh Ayatullah Mesbah Yazdi and so on and 
so forth, nevertheless there was a qualitative difference between Shariati and these 
traditionally trained scholars and that was his understanding of religion. For him, 
religion was not any difference than other pursuits of life which is always conditioned 
by 'knowledge'. 
In other words, when I want to learn about a car I need to study mechanics; 
when I want to be a gardener I need to learn about the arts of gardening and so on. 
This process of learning and using all your creative faculties in the service of 
knowledge is indispensable to human being that lives on this planet. There are no 
short-cuts and we cannot assume that somebody else could carry the burden of 
existential search for us in life. To him, it seemed that the idea of Taqlid was such a 
short-cut and consequently refuted and dismissed. Of course this caused antagonism 
in a traditional culture where Ulema-scholars had the ultimate ruling in matters of 
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ý, meaning' but at the same time brought a force into the middle of streets which later 
on came to be called political Islam that had not its seats of power either in seminaries 
or palaces but streets of Tehran, Tabriz and elsewhere in the globe. 
In order to counter the traditional understanding of Islam, he proposed 
'Shenakht'. (Shariati, Collected Works, 30) What is it? The word simply means 
knowledge but it has deeper consequences in the context of Islamic thought. 
Mutaharri, for instance, talked about 'Shenakht der Islam' (the foundations of 
epistemology in Islam) and prior to him great many other philosophers such as Hajj 
Mulla Hadi Sabzevari, Ayatullah Ashtiyani, Allarna Tabatabi, Mir Fendereski, Mulla 
Sadra and many others had various epistemological views on matter of knowledge 
and reality. But this was not Shariati's concern and he did not have the same 
understanding as his contemporaries in matters of religion. At heart he was a 
sociologist, who took even the idea of religion in relation to society rather than 
transcendence, i. e. religion is a product of Vahy but the content of Vahy is not about 
otherworld but for the betterment of our human existence in its most wonderful sense 
that pleases God. To obtain such an ideal or Jam'eh Mahdavi (Ideal City) a Muslim 
needs to have knowledge of Islam. Islam Shenasi or Islamology is not a luxury for 
Muslim academics but it is an urgent need for all Muslims, who are qua Muslims 
responsible for the change of their Umma as the God of Islam is not an object of 
contemplation in the forests but in the middle of community. (Shariati, Collected 
Works, 16, p 216) The ideal man of Islam is not Avecinna but Ali, who is able to 
defend the society by his sword in the daytime but protracted in the middle of night in 
prayers before Almighty. There is a Hadith in Islam where Prophet Muhammad says: 
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there is no monastic life in Islam but Jihad in the service of God within society. 
Shariati builds upon this Hadith by arguing that the moral decline that we witness 
today among Muslim Umma is not the result of Islam as many modernists contend but 
on the contrary it is the lack of Islam. What does he mean? As we know this argument 
is not very novel and had been put forward prior to him by Seyyed Jamal al-Din 
Assadabadi, Abdu and Rashid Rida and many others. That is true but he considers 
himself as part of this revivalist school and what he intends to achieve is a 
communitarian understanding of Islam that repudiates individual ethics of Sufism in 
matters of society and dismisses modernity in matters of individual human self. A 
good society is possible where there are people whose heads are in the heaven but 
firmly grounded on the earth and such personalities are found among chosen 
companions of Prophet Muhammad such as Ali, Abu Zar, Salman Farsi, Yaser, and so 
on and so forth. But the whole question is how to achieve such a society based on a 
traditional understanding of Islam, where, for instance, even the most revolutionary of 
ideas i. e. Kerbela Movement has become a source for pacifism and public mouming? 
This movement was a clear assault on despotism of Yazid ibn Muawiye (the second 
ruler in Ummayad Dynasty) under the mantle of religion by Hussein ibn Ali, which 
was supposed to serve as an ever-alarming source of inspiration for all those who 
yearn for freedom and social justice but again here we are faced, in Shariati's view, 
by distortion of truth and grave misleading. (Shariati, Collected Works, 3) Marxism 
argued that religion is the opium of the masses and Shariati agreed with this 
leftist 
analysis because he contended that the religion is not a homogenous phenomenon. It 
could become a source of oppression of the worse kind when there is no 'shenakht'. 
The followers of religion should know about their religion and to embark on a path 
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without knowledge is the road to Estehmar (stupidification) and that is the state that 
Muslim Umma is within now. (Shariati, Collected Works, 22, p3 1) 
The knowledge he is thinking of is not confined to scholarly research that 
could only be achieved in the universities or seminaries. This knowledge is bookish 
understanding of life and religion, which is part of life too and certainly does not lead 
to Hikma. The Hikma comes to the heart of a man, when he is engaged in the welfare 
of Umma and not indifferent to the ills of his fellow Muslims. If there is poverty in 
the society and he is indifferent to the poor but at the end of the year pays his alms he 
is not a Muslim and does not have Hikma even if according to the traditional 
understanding of Islam he has paid his dues or Zikkat. To take the religion seriously 
does not go hand in hand with formalism produced by traditional understanding of 
Islam. So he talks about two kinds of Islam, one is the Islam of Abu Zar that is all 
responsibility until death comes upon and the other is the Islam of Muawiye (the first 
ruler of Ummayad Dynasty), which is all about formalities and rituals without any 
sensible connection to the reality that we live in. In this second understanding of 
Islam Hussein is slaughtered but the religious Mufti is not asking for what crimes he 
has been killed and by who but, on the contrary, he asks why did Hussein leave his 
pilgrimage unfinished and broke the Sunna (Prophetic Tradition, which decrees the 
pilgrimage should start on a specific date and end in the season of Hajj )? 21 
21 In year 61 of HJjra Imam Hussein left his pilgrimage unfinished and marched towards Kufa. 
This aroused many controversies among Ulema-scholars, who accused Hussein of breaking the rules of 
Prophetic-tradition. But Shariati makes a virtue of this move by Imam Hussein by arguing that Hussein 
did so as he wanted to proclaim to the world that if there is no organic justice or Tawhid in society 
there is no religion. In other words, the rituals of Islam should mirror the Oneness of God in all aspects 
of Muslim Umma. If not then there is no difference between Islam and Polyteism when the centre is 
corrupted, i. e. the leadership is based on ignorance (Jahiliyye). 
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The Islam of Muawiye does not ask about the sources of power and the plight 
of Umma under despotic rulers who have no relation whatsoever to prophetic tradition 
in its noble and integral sense but nominal adherence to the tenets of Islam without 
any organic relationship. The big picture of Islam is lost in this understanding of 
Islam and masses are indeed drugged by mental opium. To bring back the Islam of 
Muhammad into our life one needs to know his products. What are his products? The 
products of a prophet are his book, his sayings, his deeds, and his followers. Who 
were his followers? Shariati chooses many characters such as Ali, Fatima, Abu Zar, 
Salman, Balal Habashi and many others and in doing so attempts to compare the 
contemporary state of Muslim Umma (and the people who purportedly are called 
Muslims) with this distinguished personalities. The difference does not lie in that they 
left religion behind and that is why they could achieve such a grandiose state in the 
world of humankind as modernists may argue. On the contrary, the reason these 
people arrived at such heights of humanity lies in the fact that they learned about 
Islam and took it very seriously and carried the responsibility of Deen to its end. This 
is the nutshell of Shariati's famous thesis on religion versus religion and the backbone 
of his revolutionary ideology. (Shariati, Collected Works, 22) 
Religion vs Religion consists of two lectures Ali Shariati gave at the 
Husayniyah Center in Tehran on August 12 and 13,1970. In them he puts forth a 
most remarkable thesis, that throughout history, religion has fought against religion 
and not a non-religion as we have come to believe. That is, monotheism, the religion 
of the belief that God is One, that religion brought by Prophet Abraham which is 
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called din al-hanif, 'the rightful religion, ' has continuously, throughout history, had to 
struggle against the religion of denying that there is One God or believing that there is 
no God (kufr, disbelief, infidelity, atheism) or against the religion of believing that 
there are multiple gods (shirk, polytheism, multitheism), the latter of which has 
branched into idolatry. 
And again we cannot find the true meaning of religion and consequently we 
cannot act religiously (truthfully, beautifully and good) if we don't have shenakht and 
if we lack shenakht we are unable to do the right things and we will never have hikma, 
which is the gift of God to people who strive to find the ways of God. This unleashed 
a revolutionary understanding of Islam, which brought Koran from the cemeteries, 
where people used to recite it for the deceased into the middle of public square. In 
other words, religion went public in the middle of modernization of Shah Regime that 
was working to minimize the role of religion and its scholars to a private sphere. 
For centuries people got used to cry for Imam Hussein who was killed in 
Kerbela and they were told that this would bring them closer to the Paradise. The 
Ulema of lower ranks used to recite and read nostalgic poems and bring the public 
into mourning by reminding them of the great pain and sufferings that were inflicted 
upon Hussein and his family and followers in the field of Kerbela. Shariati was 
outraged by this narrative and saw nothing of social and political value in such an 
approach to the character of Hussein, who was of great spiritual and political stature 
in his view. In order to distinguish between the real Kerbela and fictive Kerbela he 
attempted to purge the story in the lines of Islamology. (Shariati, Collected Works, 
16) What were the lines of Islamology? One of the main points in his approach was 
based on sociology of concepts. He, for instance, took the term 'Fazil' 
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(accomplished), which referred to a traditional scholar in Iran and contrasted it with 
the vocabulary of, what he considered to be the pristine Islam, where someone who 
knows about Islam is called 'Alim' (aware). By such contrast he is not only interested 
in the verbal distortion but social implications of such misunderstanding of religion 
and the functions of religion in society and those who are claiming to defend religion 
against Tahrif or distortion. In the traditional understanding one need to learn about 
texts and forget the context but in the pristine form of Islam one needs to know the 
text in the middle of the context of life. Let me explore this further in Shariatian 
sense. 
Avecinna, for instance, was a great philosopher and accomplished man but he 
did not pay any attention to the society of his own time. For him it did not matter if he 
worked at the palace of a despot king, while the people were suffering of oppression 
and lack of social justice as long as he could do his research in Samanid Library in 
Bukhara. This, for Shariati,, represented the archetype of anti-social Islam that lacked 
the spirit of Abu Zar or Ali, who cried when he heard that in his realm somebody 
violated the right of a Jewish woman by taking her belongings and said: whoever dies 
hearing of such an injustice has verily not died a vain death. Because a Muslim should 
be active and responsive to his/her society and one cannot be a Muslim while the 
Muslim society as a whole is under the rule of Colonial Powers of Russia (in 
Caucasus and beyond) France (in Algeria and beyond) and England (India and 
beyond). (Shariati, Collected Works, 5, p 96) 
In Shia-tradition of Islam Ulema-scholars do write a book at the end of their 
long scholastic studies of Islam which is called 'Tozih al-Masa'el' (Treatise on 
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Islamic issues). In this genre a scholar does discuss various issues of Islam from 
sexual intercourse, prayers to rituals and conditions of economy and so on and so 
forth. Shariati was outraged by such people, who cared to write about intercourse 
between humans and animals but went completely silent on the most urgent matters of 
all and that, in his time, colonialism and despotism all-evident in Muslim society. 
Such a quietist approach to matters of socio-politics, in his view, could not go hand in 
hand with Islam. In his work on religion (Shenakht Adyan) he argued that such an a- 
political approach to religion may be in tune with Buddhism but far away from 
Abraham's religion. (Shariati, Collected Works, 11, p 44) The God of Islam is a God, 
who cares about the empty stomach of hungry people and reproaches those who call 
themselves Muslims, while people go hungry and as a matter of fact the Koran denies 
the value of your religiosity when you are not anxious in filling the stomach of poor 
people or alleviating the hunger in community of humankind, as Imam Ali told to his 
companion Malik al-Ashtar on his road to Egypt as the governor of al-Misir (Egypt): 
Oh Malik! People are your brothers and sisters either in Religion (al-Deen) or in 
Humanity (al-Insaniyet); Treat them very well. Shariati's religious understanding 
could not be indifferent to such injunctions of Imams, who took religion seriously 
both in its form and spirit. How could such a God and such a religion be indifferent to 
matters of society and politics? Either these traditional scholars are lying about the 
God of Islam or religion is a deceit of great magnitude. Again here there is no way out 
but shenakht. One should embark on the path of striving and existential search until 
the truth becomes evident to one. This is where he, in the context of Shia-Islam, 
proposes his thesis on Safavid Shia versus Alavid Shia. The latter is the true 
expression of Islam, which could be seen in the light of Imam Ali, who demonstrated 
in his life by being a responsible man in life and in his own society. He did not seek 
305 
power for the sake of power. He did not deceive anybody for the sake of his own 
benefits but he put himself on the line always for the sake of God and his wisdom did 
not arrive in a miraculous way as traditional scholars argued but due to his tireless 
struggle to be true to the ideals of Islam. But Safavid Shia is a total reversion of all 
ideals of Islam and a distorted version of Mahayana Gnosticism under the mantle of 
Sufism. In this understanding of Shia ideology Imam becomes a sacral personality, 
who does not choose anything but reads from a heavenly manual. The very genius of 
human being in Shariatian sense is to his/her ability to choose but the Imam 
represented in Safavid Shia (and endorsed by traditional ulema) does not choose 
anything but everything is predetermined for him. But Shariati is not only happy in 
proving traditional ulema wrong and certainly he is not concerned with academic 
disputes per se. 
On the contrary what he is mainly concerned with is the fate of Muslim 
society in his own time when British tried to bully Iranian National Movement for 
nationalising oil under the leadership of Muhammad Mosadegh and many 
traditionally-inclined scholars went completely silent. In this context he based on his 
understanding of Koran argued that God would not change the fate of a nation if they 
don't change their own state of affairs. In other words, we don't need to wait for 
Imam Mahdi (who is belived by Shias to be in a long occultation) to come in order to 
get rid of these colonialists from Russia and Britain but we should change our minds 
and hearts. He realized that Iran is a deeply religious society and nothing could be 
accomplished if religion was not taken into account. Because he realized that 
Akhunduf, Kasravi and Talbof, for instance, were all great minds but they did not 
address the main question and that was religion. Akhunduf, despite 
his intellectual 
ability could not but end up at the service of Russian 
Tzar and Talbof disappeared in 
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Daghistan by choosing a quiet life and Kasravi ended up dead by antagonizing society 
without getting to the roots of social ills that surrounded Iranian culture then. 
Shariati never dismissed any religious notion but worked through them and 
fundamentally re-elaborated religious concepts in relation to his own time and society. 
The idea of waiting for Imam Mahdi has always been part of religious life of Shia 
Muslims but he criticized scholastic thinkers by arguing that they have distorted this 
revolutionary idea. He argued that a person who waits is not calm but anxious and in 
complete agony and all the time waits for the awaited one, as he may enter anytime. 
In the religious literature there is no time decided for when Imam Mahdi may return 
but it says firmly that he surely will reappear on this earth. A person who is a Shia 
should always be prepared for the final battle, as it may occur anytime but look at the 
state we are in now today, argued Shariati. (Shariati, Collected Works, 7, p3 1) We 
have become accustomed to oppressions and despotism and since the dawn of 
modernity to Colonialism too. How could we call ourselves Shias who are waiting for 
the return of Imam? In other words, Shariati by going to the roots of the ideology of 
waiting (Intizar) for Imam through a social-psychological analysis proves that we 
have distorted even this much cherished article of faith that mostly distinguishes us 
from our Sunni-brethren. 
Within the traditional frame of understanding religion in Iran people have 
been accustomed to think of religion as a shield at the fringes of their 
life and 
approached it instrumentally. I don't mean to propose that 
Shariati suggested Muslims 
have already bygone the modernity and learned how to use religion 
in rational terms 
as instrumental approach is one of the 
by-products of rationalization of culture. On the 
contrary, in his view, religion was not at the centre of 
life but a culture that was 
enmeshed with many other things such as magic, 
illusion, metaphysical day-dreaming 
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and so on and so forth. In other words, we are faced with two understandings of 
religion; one is the religion of conviction which is carried by the conscious subject to 
its highest possible form and a catalyser of revolutionary (Enghelabi) change and the 
other is a religion, which has turned into a culture where everything fits into each 
other. Sheikh and Shah (Priest and King), Zar and Zur (Money and Power), and 
Tazvir and Tasbih (Hypocrisy and Beads) all go hands in hands in silencing people in 
finding the ways of salvation. Here Shariati criticizing two fronts; one is the 
traditional defender of religion and the other is the modern offender of religion but 
each on different account and both for the same reason of distortion. He critiques the 
traditional defenders of status quo for their lack of understanding the true spirit of 
Islam (as Iqbal described in his lecture on the spirit of Islam) and making a fool of 
personalities of Islam and ideals of Shia-tradition. But at the same time he was 
criticizing the offenders of religion for their lack of sociological analysis- which 
should be at the service of truth (as natural science is at the service of finding the 
truths in the natural domain) but in the hands of modem priests has turned into a new 
ideology (that of materialism)- by taking this foolishly distorted image for the noble 
reality of Islam. (Shariati, Collected Works, 28, p 545) Not understanding Hitler, for 
instance, very well might not hurt humanity at all times and at all places but losing or 
even worse depriving humanity from understanding the true message of Muhammad, 
real personality of Ali, actual message of Hussein, noble tidings of Fatima, and eternal 
songs of Imam Sajjad would be a great crime against humanity, as they are all 
mountains of beauty, goodness and truthfulness, which we need to know, love and 
stand upon. (Shariati, Collected Works, 8) 
308 
This is the very title of one of his lectures (Mader, Pedar Ma Mottahamim), 
where he says we have committed crime and in the court of history we have to answer 
how could we turn such great sources of inspiration into inert idols of veneration? 
(Shariati, Collected Works, 26) Ali is a man who earned his reputation in the battle of 
life through putting his life at the service of community of God. But, in Shariati's 
view,, traditional scholars have turned the whole story upside down by inscribing the 
attributes of such a great historical person into the tabula of Asatir, i. e. Myth. The 
idea of Taghdir in Islam was proposed against the pagan notions of Fate, which was 
blind and could strike us at any time without any reason. But Islam brought in its 
stead the idea of Taghdir, which has to do with Qadr, i. e. merit and measurement. In 
other words, this world, this life, human existence, divine providence and whatever 
that make up the very wheels of this colossal being is not based on whims and 
blindness. On the contrary, it has a Qadr (geometrical accuracy based on merit) and 
when one follows the right path and aspires to the right model then the result is not 
out of calculation and incidental. This idea of destiny was in total contrast to the 
Arabian notion of fate where one could cheat or buy the mercy of the Fate by finding 
shortcuts without earning any virtues. It is not impossible to create Ali-like people 
again in our Urnma provided we follow the right path and what is the right path? 
Shariati does not go silent on this account either. He suggests a way out of this 
dilemma too by looking at the two diametrical ways one could approach the paradigm 
of Kerbela and the story of Hussein. (Shariati, Collected Works, 19) 
In the traditional account of the Kerbela Imam Hussein knew from the 
beginning that he had to go to Kufa in Iraq and be slaughtered and hence a model for 
all freedom lovers. In this account Imam Hussein 
is so devoid of any human feelings, 
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emotions, sense of choice, sense of anxiety, sense of fear for unknown and many 
other issues and predicaments that we may face and go through when we embark on 
important missions in life. Then, how, Shariati asks, could such a demigod serve as a 
model for us mortals? (Shariati, Collected Works, 28, p 35) 
This view of Imam Hussein turns him from a source of Inspiration to a 
fountain of veneration and this is why we cannot act Husseini (=be freedom lover, 
creative, courageous, unselfish and socially conscious or politically aware) but have 
become communities of mourners who cry for Hussein. What was supposed to be a 
source of revolutionary action has sadly turned into a straitjacket and reason for 
inaction. In order to combat this state of mind, Shariati under influence of 
demythologization of Protestant Theology attempts to demythologize the history of 
Kerbela. In order to achieve a complete reverse of mentality in relation to the 
principles of revolutionary Islam from inaction to 'harakate enghelabi' (revolutionary 
action) he takes the well-known personalities who played major roles in Kerbela in 
the ninth and tenth of Muharram 61 after Hijra such as Hurr ibn Riyahi by turning 
them into Islamic role models. (Shariati, Collected Works, 24) 
Who is Hurr? First, in the best tradition of historical narration, Shariati tries to 
give an accurate historical account about the person of Hurr and his position in 
Ummayad society. Hurr is a general in the army of Yazid, who was supposed to stop 
Hussein before entering Kufa to meet the host of dissidents who were allegedly 
waiting eagerly for Hussein's arrival in the city. This general is in the 
battle but 
something is bothering his conscious and annoying him since the very 
day he meets 
imam Hussein. Everything this Imam does is opposite to the propaganda that has been 
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spread about him. Hurr was told that he will meet a host of rebels who turned to 
paganism and looking for trouble and are none but a bunch of adventurists. On his 
surprise he finds out that this man, who he is supposed to stop is the grandson of 
Prophet Muhamad, the son of Fatima (the beacon of light and the paragon of virtue in 
the words of prophet himself) and the son of Imam Ali (who is the true symbol of 
teachings of Islam who grew in the house of Revelation since he was 9 years old). 
Hussein is from this family and those who are around him are old men (mainly from 
the companions of Prophet Muhammad such as Habib ibn Madhahir) and young men 
(mainly from the House of Prophet) that are, despite of many hardships of the battle, 
saying their prayers and act in no way in violation of principles of Islam. Hurr thinks, 
reflects, and looks around and goes in deep internal conversation and his conscience 
has not left him yet. He lived in Damascus and had seen the palace of Yazid by his 
eyes (the long nights of festivals, drinking, dancers and etc) but on the opposite he 
sees Hussein who did not even cut the water from his enemies and allowed them to 
approach the river while they could have done otherwise. In the final night Hurr 
leaves the army of Yazid behind and joins the tiny battalion of Hussein and fights for 
Imam Hussein. His name in Arabic means a man of freedom and Imam Hussein when 
Hurr fell down in the battle addressed him by saying: You were born Hurr (free) and 
you died Hurr (free). 
What does Sharaiti try to achieve by this narration? What is the wit of this 
story? The whole story is about how we can be-come in the context of life what we 
are not yet through our choices. In other words, Hurr could not become what he 
became in the words of Imam Hussein if he did not choose. Now Shariati takes the 
moral of this story to a wider context and applies 
it to our contemporary state of 
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affairs by arguing that if Muslim Umma finds herself in such a miserable state (note 
that when Shariati was writing Communism was a threat and colonialism was a socio- 
political reality in great many parts of Muslim world such as Algeria, Afghanistan, 
Bosnia, Central Asia, Caucasus, Chechnya and so on) the way out of this is not 
resignation but 'Khodsazi Enghelabi' (Revolutionary Plan for rebuilding ourselves 
and our communities). (Shariati, Collected Works, 2) If we don't make a choice as 
Hurr did then we should be certain that Muslim Umma will degenerate even further 
and there would not be better days ahead but our worse nightmares have not arrived 
yet. 
Shariati did not only stop at working on grand issues but believed that Islam is 
a religion that permeates all aspect of life and Muslims are enveloped by this sacred 
canopy. But he also believed that this canopy has been gravely misunderstood and 
instead of serving as a source of guidance turned into a recipe of laxity and political 
indifference. Why should such a political religion turn into opium for the masses in 
the hands of Pharaohs? Although he was a sociologist nevertheless he did not forget 
the role of individuals in the scheme of revolution, which has always two aspects: 
Payam (Message) and Khun (Blood). The blood could not be shed if there was not a 
committed person who is supposed to carry the burden of ideology. In other words, 
you need to have people, who are deeply committed and conscious about what they 
want in the process of revolution. However you cannot make these individuals ex 
nihilo but you have to look for the causes of such widespread in-activism that 
Muslim 
Umma was suffering from. For this he turned to the notion of resignation' that plays 
a great deal in Islamic belief The Koranic word for this term is 'Tavakol' that could 
be rendered as resignation in English. But Shariati argued that traditional scholars and 
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hypocritical dervishes (Gnostics) turned even this revolutionary concept into a recipe 
for political inaction and social indifference. Tavakol in Koran refers that one should 
rely on God in the ultimate ontological sense. Why? Because a Muslim penetrates 
through knowledge to find the sources of all phenomena and s/he finally finds out that 
the chain of command is not in the hands of X or Y but the Almighty, who always 
acts in accordance to Haq (=Right). If, for instance, Muslims are in an inferior 
position vis-a-vis Gharb (West) this inferiority is not based on fate and is not 
insurmountable. (Shariati, Collected Works, 5, p 29) 
In other words, the purported tavakol (reliance on) is not a reliance on God but 
a product of our 'Batil' (distorted and wrong) approach to reality. We tend not to 
analyze the reasons for our backwardness by wrongly ascribing our laziness to 
reliance on God (Tavakol), which, in reality, has nothing to do with such a state of 
spirit that, in its truest form, could serve as a catalyser of change. Shariati thinks time 
and again that we need to purge Islam from traditional understandings and put 
forward a clear picture of Islam based on 'Irfan, Barabari and Azadi. (Razavi, 1376) 
A. 'Irfan or The Fundamentals of Human Spirit 
The term has been translated into English as Sufism, Mysticism, and 
Gnosticism. (Lings, 1975, pp 11-12) Although Shariati understands the term in similar 
fashion nevertheless there is always something novel (or Shariatian= peculiarly 
related to Shariati's approach) in his conceptualization of this term, which differs 
from many who wrote on 'Irfan. It does not represent an order (like Sufl Orders) for 
him but an inner mode that could not be realized through Murid and Muradi 
relationship (master and disciple relationship, which is a common pattern among Sufi 
orders). On the contrary, the word has a deep connection with 'Arafat (a place nearby 
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Mecca where Muslims visit during Hajj period) that contains in itself the most 
significant thing that Shariati always thinks is relevant to religion, i. e. shenakht 
(knowledge). In other words, 'Irfan arises 
from the fundamental nature of human being. The most general meaning of the word is the 
inner sense of apprehension people have while they are here in the world of nature. (Shariati, Collected 
Works, 2, p 50) 
B. Barabari or The Foundation of Just Society 
In the nineteenth century the advent of the machine intensified class 
polarization, oppression and the gap between rich and poor. And, as religion proved to 
be on the side of the oppressors in this schism, socialism emerged as the human quest 
for equality and justice. Socialists felt that: 
If a socialist system were realized in society, humanity would be freed from the bonds of 
materialism, and class differences and conflicting interests would cease to exist. They felt that without 
these contradictions, there would be no war, and without war and exploitation, all of the powers of 
humanity would be united and placed at the service of human development and spiritual growth. 
(Shariati, Collected Works, 2, p 117) 
However, by reducing man to a merely social entity, socialism was unable to 
respond to all human needs. There are needs which are deeply troubling man; needs to 
which socialism and its materialistic view of the world can not respond: 
We see that Socialism removes from man all limbs and branches except one, but 
it so 
encourages that one to spread out that it outgrows root and trunk. 
Thus, it makes man one-dimensional, 
however lofty and sublime that one dimension may be. (Shariati, Collected Works, 2, p 118) 
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Historically speaking also, Shari'ati contends, socialism as an ideological 
movement has betrayed the very goals that it had originally set itself to achieve: 
We have seen how that very socialist system that was to set the people free, assumed the 
forms, first, of worshipping personality and party, and then the worship of the state. (Shariati, Collected 
Works, 2, p 107) 
C. Azadi or The Essence of Divine Humanity 
Existentialism has sought human freedom by rejecting all gods, earthly and 
heavenly alike. The essence of existentialism is to reject all bases for human choice 
outside man's own self Freedom of choice is the founding principle of existentialism. 
Religion, argues an atheist existentialist, looks to God for what it seeks, whereas 
socialism gives legitimacy to the state (and the collectivism) for determining right and 
wrong, hence, both negate the authenticity and freedom of human person. 
Existentialism, on the other hand, tells humanity that: 
choice and freedom are yours unconditionally, All values exist when this freedom exists. 
However, should this freedom be taken away from you, these values would cease to be, you would 
become a slave to other powers: God or the state. (Shariati, Collected Works, 2, pI 11) 
With its rejection of both socialism and religion, therefore, existentialism 
gives human person absolute freedom in choosing her/his own destiny. But, Shariati 
adds, if both the collective sense of choice and the transcendental basis of existence 
are rejected, then what is to stop a hedonistic form of self-falfilment. Such a choice 
produces precisely those social consequences which existentialism was intended to 
challenge and provide an answer for. In order to reach its goals this philosophy would 
need an ethical ground which would justify altruistic action. Indeed, contemporary 
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existentialist schools of thought are by their nature unable to provide such an 
axiology: 
Existentialism, however much it may turn on the primacy of man and human freedom, ... 
leaves man suspended in mid-air ... Existentialism lacks a basis on which to answer my questions. 
Now I am bent on a course of action where I may either sacrifice myself to the people or sacrifice the 
people to myself (Ibid. ) 
This Shariatian critique could not be achieved if he does not resort to a kind of 
hermeneutic that ultimately usher into an ideology or meta-narrative. Let me explain 
what I mean in concrete terms. He thinks of Islam as a Maktab (ideology), which has 
a specific logic and based on a particular frame of reference. To understand it one 
needs to have a method, which would enable us to have a clear picture of the internal 
coherency of Islam as an ideology. As the world of reality is based on Qadr and prone 
to be measured (note I don't mean by measurement any quantitative approach to 
reality but a sense of logic that reigns supreme over all domains of reality human or 
else) then we need to have a geometry of our ideology 22 (tasvire hendesi az maktab). 
(Shariati, Collected Works, 16, p 10) Muslims should be the most rational of people 
in their social life as their God has not created this world without any rules and laws. 
Even, for instance,, the very direction a Muslim takes for his/her prayers needs an 
accurate measurement and could not be achieved if he or she was oblivious to 
22 It is interesting to note that Shariati believed that he was drawing upon a French philosopher 
and social thinker on 'ideological geometry', namely Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962). In his work on 
Islamic History called Islamology, Shariati has this to say about Bachelard, who, in Shariati's view, is 
the one who first spoke about the geometry of thought: 
I present a geometrical figure of a school of thought and an ideology which every 
Islamologist and aware Muslim should 
have of Islam, not only as explanation of their religious belief but as a 
logo of a school of thought and ideology. Gaston 
Bachelard, one of the greatest thinkers of ourage, comparable to Descartes and Plato, who, unfortunately 
died a few years 
ago being quite unknown, believed that when an 
idea can be conceptualized in a geometric form, it has found its proper 
language in which to express and explain itselL That is, when an idea finds geometrical expression, this 
idea has found 
thebest language of its expression. (Shariati, Collected Works, 16, p 8) 
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mathematical/geographical indices of natural world. How could then such a religion 
be oblivious to matters of community and society? If Shariati could make this 
connection then it does not take much to divert the attention of people to 
contemporary issues in pre-1979 Iran during oil nationalization, where a British 
company was ruling the whole resources of Iranian people as it did earlier on during 
the Great Games (or as it was called in relation to Ottoman Empire as 'Eastern 
Question') by playing a colonial politics vis-a-vis Russia which resulted in cessation 
of great many parts of Iran such as Caucasus, Central Asia and Heart provinces and so 
on and so forth. (A. Wynn, 2004) 
We have presented Shariati, as we did earlier with Iqbal, in a sociological 
context in comparison to people such as Goffman and Giddens. There are not many 
works where one cannot find in-depth analysis on Shariait as a sociologist and it 
seems most appropriate after analysing his ideas in details in the previous chapter and 
this one to turn to him in relation to sociological dimensions such as what are the 
foundations of his sociology. Now let's look at some aspects of Shariatis' sociology. 
2. Shariati and Sociology: The foundations of Shariati's sociological theories 
One could argue that Shariati is a sociologist, who works within the 
framework of critical analysis. If one looks for an apt sociological epithet then one 
could best choose the title of Weberian Sociology for his theoretical position. Because 
his sociological analyses would surely fall outside the context of Classical Marxism; 
due to the fact he has serious critiques towards Marxism such as Marxism's inability 
to foresee the emergence of Fascism or its inability to understand the essential 
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importance of Nationalism. On the other hand, he does not think that the Classical 
Weberianism is sufficient in the analysis of social problems either. In order to 
overcome the shortcomings of both these positions due to his religious point of 
departure and as he viewed the context of Iran he embarked upon constructing his 
novel sociological theory. The best label we can endow upon Shariati's sociological 
theory is 'Critical Theory' that demonstrates the influence of neo-Marxism and post- 
War 11 Weberian social theory. 
The critical sociological theory of Shariati is composed of few fundamental 
elements that will be briefly discussed below: 
1. His theory is based on a critique of Marxism, Positivism, Scientism and 
Natural scientific inclinations in human sciences. In other words, to find out 
the clear pattern of his sociological understanding one cannot condition 
Shariati's theory on one or another sociological position within secular social 
theory but a synthesis of then current positions within disciplinary social 
sciences based on a religious point of departure. 
2. His critical social theory is construed in a conscious critique vis-a-vis 
Capitalism. His major attempt was based on demonstrating the shortcomings 
of Capitalism in the West and more importantly in the Third World. That is 
the main reason for his critical approach to questions such as Westoxication 
(Gharbzadegi), Self-alienation (Az Khodbiganegi), and Assimilation 
(Assimile), which are global characteristic of modem world and direct 
consequences of Capitalism. 
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The axis of his sociological approach is humanocentric (Ensan-Madar). In his 
view there is no mentioning within Marxism about the role of human agency 
and this significant dimension is forgotten. Being influenced by religious 
teaching of Islam and being aware of the shortcomings of modern sociology in 
relation to the question of human agency, he was of understanding that we 
need to have more of humanism (Jahatgiri Ensani), historical (Tarikhi), and 
philosophical (Falsafl) inclinations within our approaches to matters of human 
society and community. 
4. The importance of Dialectical Method: By being influenced by Russian 
sociologist based in France G. Gurvitch, who favoured dialectical approach in 
social and cultural issues, Shariati attempted to find out the very mechanisms 
of emergence and transformation of social phenomena. 
5. The relation between Individual (Fard) and Society (Jame'h): Shariati is 
critical of Durkheimian sociology (where everything is reducible to the 
'Social') but, on the other hand, not an endorser of psychological inclinations 
within sociology either. He thinks that religious (Islamic) social theory in 
relation to paradoxes between individual and society is different than the 
secular positions in proposing that society is based on clear laws but 
individuals, at the same time, have 'Eradeh' (will), 'Ensaniyet' (Humanity, 
Creativity), and 'Ekhtiyar' (Choice). In explicating his position in regard to 
Individualism versus Collectivism debates he argues that society is not either 
an amalgamation of individuals or something without individuals. Human 
society is an objective reality that has an external life independent of 
individuals, but this life is 'Itebari' (relational and relative). In other words, 
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the society is not either a mental construction (like a human whole) or a real 
entity (such as individual persons). 
6. The relation between Subject (Zehniyat) and Object ('Eyniyat): Shariati 
criticized both positions of materialism and idealism by arguing that there is 
no contradiction between subject and object as in social life and movements 
we can discern two dimensions, i. e. the material as well as the ideal 
(subjective). This is an idiosyncratic feature of human being that both poles 
are one and the same in him/her. 
7. By analyzing various aspects of modern social theory and philosophy Shariati 
presented his historiography of social theory. In his view there are four kinds 
of sociology (Jame'hshenasi): a) the classical sociology that the major 
determinants are society and nature and one can find prominent trends of this 
sociology in Plato's and Aristotle's works; b) the critical sociology of 
Prodhon, Saint Simon, Marx and Luckas, where one can discern a sociology 
with communistic and socialistic inclinations; c) the scientific or analytical 
sociology in the works of Durkheim, Pareto, Gurvitch, which has its own 
characteristics such as 'biimani ve bieteghadi' (lack of faith and belief), 
ýzeddiyat ba ensaniyat' (anti-humanistic), 'bavar be adame vujud ideologl' 
(belief in the non-existence of ideology), 'tahghigh ve Barresi keh hakemiyat 
sarmayedari ra der bardarad' (research and analysis which are at the service of 
Capitalism and dominant classes), 'baravord konandeh khodkhahi asatid ve 
ameli jahate sargarmi elmi daneshjoyan' (satisfying the egoistic sense of 
professors and a scientific entertaining force for students) and in one word a 
sociology that does not provide 'direction', 'norms', or 'existential answers'; 
d) Islamic sociology, it is a social theory that is rooted within the soil of Islam 
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and extracted from the worldview of Koran and called by Shariati religious 
sociology. This religious sociology is normative as it finds out what a divinely 
human community should be and what direction it should take. Religious 
sociology is an ilm (knowledge= a description of reality as it is), which 
exhorts the sociologist to acquire knowledge for 'aqida' (faith) and not 
knowledge for the sake of knowledge and indifferent to truth and nonchalant 
to the prophetic mission, which is 'Hidayat' (illumination and leading to 
truth). (CW, 17.289; CW, 18.150; CW, 16.125) 
3. Shariati and Modern Debates 
D. Critique of tradition and Modernity 
The purpose of my considerations on Shariati's thought is to introduce one of 
its most novel aspects, namely his dialogue with modem secular thought from a 
religious standpoint. By considering the content of his Published works, Shariati can 
be characterised as a modem critical Muslim intellectual with strong historico- 
sociological concerns, unlike, for instance, Seyyed Hossein Nasr or Syed Naghib al- 
Attas not mentioning contemporary European Muslim thinkers such as F. Schuon 
(Sheikh Isa), R. Guenon (Sheikh Yahya) and M. Lings (Sheikh Abu Bakr Seraj al- 
Din)-who strongly opposed historical analysis in matters of theology, metaphysics, 
religion and transcendence. Although every one of these elements in this 
characterization is a fruitful interpretative approach in its own right, yet each one is 
valid only in its association and dynamic interaction with the others. Therefore, it is 
the totality that is meaningful and not each individual element separate from such 
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totality. As a religious thinker, Shariati understood Islam as a source of individual 
self-discovery and social emancipation. He, on the other hand, relates to problems 
such as >machinism< and human alienation, which are essentially modern in origin. 
Also, by critical notions such as >>religion against religiono, estehmar (obscurantism) 
and assimilation he has presented a critical view of both Aradition< and >modernity<. 
As an alternative vision, however, he has presented constructive 'Irfan as a synthesis 
of equality, liberty and libertarianism (with Gnostic flavours). 
As a non-European thinker, Shariati's conceptualizations of )tradition< and 
>modernity< could not resemble that of a European intellectual. Having a totally 
different historical experience with both tradition and modernity, Shariati made an 
explicit distinction between their intellectual and the institutional dimensions and 
heritages. His views regarding these two were expressed in his notions of >>religion 
against religiom and >>emancipatory awareness<<, when treating tradition; the notions 
of >>machinism<<, >>modern humanismo and >>assimilationo, when treating modernity; 
and notion of )>civility<< when treating modernization (Tajadod). 
Shariati has a dialectical conception of religion as a tradition. Intellectually, 
Shariati conceives of tradition as a way of relating to human problems and considers it 
to be authentic only when it has something for us and not because of what it is, or 
claims to be, in-itself Shariati considers religious tradition as the historical 
manifestation of a worldview (Jahan Bini) that not only is antithetical to oppression, 
but provides the basis for theoretical and practical negation of oppression. As such, 
religion is considered to be a worldview consisting of morality, awareness, 
responsibility and emancipative tendency. The history of religion (Deen or Mazhab), 
however, is a dialectical process of self-negation. Such an interpretation is explicitly 
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expressed by Shariati through his notion of 'religion against religion' (Mazhab 
'Aleyhe Mazhab). (Shariati, Collected Works, 22) 
Shari'ati defines religion in terms of 'awareness' (Agahi), 'morality' (Axlagh), 
'responsibility' (Masoliyat) and 'free will' (Extiyar). He refers to two types of 
awareness, 'human' and 'social'. 'Human self-awareness' regards a unique existential 
sense of being in the world: 
It is what the Greeks called >sophia< and Hindus call >vidia< (vision). >Sepantame'no< (sacred- 
white reason) in ancient Iran and )hikma< (wisdom) in Islam have had the same connotation. Human 
awareness or )hikma< is enlightening, creative,... source of existential responsibility and a value that 
gives man a new )understanding< and a different sense of needs and ideals. (Shariati, Collected Works, 
pp 24,221-223) 
The second type of awareness is social, that is 'a sense of historical and social 
responsibility'. (Shariati, Collected Works, 20, pp 165-202) 
Morality (Axlagh) is also of two kinds: socio-historical ethics and human 
morality (Shariati, Collected Works, 14, p, 243). The first type includes traditions and 
codes of behaviour that are products of social, historical and cultural systems of a 
nation or a historical stage. As such they are transitive and relative. ComPared with 
social ethics, however, 
'Human morality' ... 
is composed of values emanating from human nature ... and 
human 
evolution throughout history has been directed towards them. Actually human genre has started with 
these values. For, it is only human being who creates values. (Collected Works, 2, p 96) 
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Consisting of awareness and moral consciousness, religion would lead to 
responsibility: 
For a theist, responsibility flourishes from the deep world of existence and is rooted in 
objective reality that is free from personal subjectivity and collective tradition. (Ibid, 94) 
In fact, responsibility is in itself a sign of human existential freedom: 
Responsibility is born from freedom; and since man is free s/he is responsible. (Collected 
Works, 15, p 303) 
E. Religion against Religion 
According to Shari'ati, the roots of modern antagonism towards religion go 
back, first to the Greek mythology of human struggle with the mythical gods, and then 
to the historical experience of Medieval Christianity. Neither of these, however, 
Shari'ati has argued, have anything to do with religion in itself. In its original form 
religion has been the foundation for the greatest historical examples of human 
emancipation that is an undeniable virtue of monotheistic religion in the Abrahamic 
tradition. 
However, although Abrahamic message is essentially emancipatory, it has still 
been subject to the dialectics of historical development. Although tawhid (unity) 
emerged as a dialectical negation of tazad (contradiction) it has not, as a historical 
force, been free from the dynamics of history. The original message of Abrahamic 
tawhid, including the Islamic message, has experienced the process of disintegration 
into a historical religion. The message of tawhid, Shari'ati says, has practically been 
changed into the established shirk (stratification). Therefore, historical religion can 
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not be the basis for judgement about the nature of religion in-itself. In fact, the 
emancipative character of religion has always been negated in history by its 
institutionalization (Shariati, Collected Works, 12, p 16). 
With the notion of >>religion against religiono, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Shari'ati has tried to reveal a tragic irony of the historical simultaneity of the 
liberating and oppressing roles of religion (it is interesting to note that this oppressing 
role of religion has been greatly conceptualized by Shariatians such as Eshkevari, 
Aghajeri and Ehsan and Susan Shariati). To him, the history of religion is 
encompassed in the dialectic of revolt and decay. Originally a means for human 
emancipation, religion has persistently been abused as the instrument of oppression. 
Therefore, Shari'ati says: 
If I speak of religion, it is not the )religion< which has prevailed in human history, but a 
religion whose prophets rose for the elimination of [the religion ofl social polytheism. I speak of a 
religion, which is not realised yet. Thus our reliance on religion is not a return to the past, but a 
continuation of history. (Collected Works, 22, p 18) 
Such an understanding of religion is fundamentally linked with certain 
conception of human being, history and society. Shari'ati has elaborated his views on 
religion through a dialectical conception of history and a critical social-theo logical 
ontology, which bears great resemblance to Christian Liberation Theology in Latin 
America. (F. Esack, 2002) 
F. Dialectics of Man and History 
Deriving his conception of man from his interpretation of the Qur'an, Shari'ati speaks 
of a dialectics between man and history consisting of three moments. The first 
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moment is man-in-himself, a dialectical being without determined and fixed nature. 
The second moment is the material development of the human condition, which in 
essence resembles the inner-dialectical characteristic of man. Finally, the moment of 
socio-historical developments composed of the first two. This conception is explained 
by reference to the symbolic language of the Qur'an. According to the Qur'an, 
Shari'ati says, man is a two-dimensional being, a being which: 
is composed of mud (hamae massnun) and divine spirit, a two-dimensional being, a creature 
with a dual nature, in contrast to all other beings which are one-dimensional ... Every man is endowed 
with these two dimensions, and it is his will that enables him either to descend toward the pole of 
sedimentary mud ... or to ascend toward the pole of exaltation ... (Algar, 1982b, p 74) 
Shari'ati further develops this anthropological dialectic into a foundation for a 
philosophy of history and his historiographical critique in relation to Islamology. 
History, then, is the battlefield in which the anthropological struggle takes an 
objective form. This struggle is not between two potential forces within man; it is 
rather the actual confrontation between two historical forces, each manifesting one or 
the other tendency within human species. To explain this struggle, Shari'ati, as 
indicated in the previous chapter, refers to the myth of Cain and Abel: 
Abel represents the age of a pasture-based economy, of the primitive socialism that preceded 
ownership; and Cain represents the system of agriculture and individual ownership. When Abel the 
pastural was killed by Cain the landowner, the period of common ownership of the sources of 
production ... [and] the spirit of 
brotherhood and true faith, came to an end and was replaced by ... 
religious trickery and transgression against the rights of others ... (Ibid., p 99) 
Human history, therefore, is consisted of two stages, the Awo curves of 
history<<, )Ahe stage of collectivismo and >Ahe stage of private ownership<<. Unlike the 
first stage that was the era of social equality and spiritual oneness, the second stage, in 
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which we now live, has thus far been essentially one of social domination and 
exploitation of ))the many<< by ))the fewo. The second stage, as the result of which a 
new social formation came into existence, began with the emergence of private 
ownership. As a turning point in history, private ownership has been the starting point 
for social domination. Although this new formation has had private ownership as its 
founding element, the forms that it has taken at different points in history have varied. 
Slavery, serfdom, feudalism, and capitalism are only some of its forms. Hence, there 
is no more than one foundation; and this is not bourgeoisie, feudal, capitalist, 
communist, serfdom or slavery. It is merely ownership that is of two kinds: private 
(monopoly) and social (public) (Algar, 1980, p 37). Unlike the stage of social 
ownership, when all material and spiritual resources were accessible to everyone, the 
emergence of private ownership polarized the human community. Private ownership 
created new ills by transforming people's solidarity and love to duplicity, deceit, 
hatred, exploitation, colonization, and massacre (Algar, 1980, p 39). No wonder, then 
that the first serious reflections and expressions of discontent in history actually 
appeared at exactly the same juncture of the triumph of private ownership. It is in this 
relation that distinguished historical figures such as Buddha, Lao Tze, Confucius, and 
Zoroaster in the East, and Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in the West, were all 
contemporaries, because: 
They appeared in reaction to the deteriorating conditions of their societies which were created 
mainly by the change from social ownership to private ownership ... (Algar, 
1980, p 32) 
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G. History of Religion and Social Theory 
According to Shariati a similar >>curveo can be observed in the history of 
religion. The first historical form of the religious view was a primitive form of 
oneness (tawhid, unicity). Such a religious perspective was by its nature in harmony 
with the objective characteristics of a social formation, namely, communalism. 
However, with the emergence of private ownership and with the development of a 
hierarchical-social structure, a polytheistic world-view began to emerge to justify the 
objective tazad (contradiction) within the social formation of private ownership. To 
put it differently, the historical sources of polytheism were concrete socio-historical 
developments that were subsequently reflected on the theological level: 
Social objectivity created religious subjectivity in order to let the latter manifest itself as the 
creator of the former. This is how the hierarchy which was imposed in the existential world created a 
polytheistic world-view to explain the intrinsic hierarchy in the social system. (Collected Works, 25, p 
30) 
The first historical challenge to polytheism was the Abrahamic monotheism 
(tawhid). Abrahamic monotheism was not a response to atheism, but a challenge 
against polytheism, which had emerged with the appearance of private ownership and 
the ascendancy of the historical Cain. Polytheism, then, is the religion of social 
stratification. Monotheism, therefore, is not the beginning of religion, 
but its 
reorientation. The struggle between monotheism and polytheism 
is not a theological 
dispute but a challenge to polytheistic social formation (class domination, racism, 
etc. ) Unlike monotheism (tawhid), which is rooted in ittehad 
(solidarity, oneness), 
polytheism was rooted in domination of some by others through 
divisions of hearts 
and minds. 
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As a monotheistic worldview (Jahan Binie Tawhidi), tawhid rejects the 
division of the world into dichotomous categories like 'natural' and 'supernatural', 
ýmatter' and 'idea', 'body' and 'spirit', or 'this world' and 'the other'. Tawhid is the 
negation of all dichotomies, in both the celestial and the social plane. Celestially, it is 
a living totality in process toward unity; socially, it is the foundation for unity and 
harmony in human relations. Tawhid, then, is the negation of all forms of 
antagonisms. Since domination is anti-unity and tawhid is anti-domination, the social 
expression of tawhid is a dialectics of unity. 
Tawhid, in its social and historical expression, is the struggle for human 
emancipation from the historic dialectic of deception, a deception rooted in the 
projection of historical-social stratification on ontology. For, in its original form, the 
human community was a harmonious partnership, an expression of celestial harmony. 
At this stage, social reality reflected the ontological foundations of the existential 
world. Therefore, there has always been a struggle in history between the oppressed 
family of Abel, the Mustawfin (the oppressed), and the oppressive clan of Cain, the 
Mustakberin (the oppressors), historically symbolized in the trinity of (Zar) wealth, 
(Zur) power, and (Tazvir) hypocrisy. It has been out of this contradiction (tazad) that 
the Abrahamic tawhid (unicity) has emerged as the negation of the oppressive 
domination of Cain. 
H. The Paradigm of Modernity 
Instead of refuting modem consciousness from the standpoint of religious 
thinking Shari'ati relates to it sympathetically. Existentialism, Scientism, Socialism, 
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Marxism, and other Western perspectives are not )enemies< -but fallacies- to his mind 
and spirit and he tries to understand them and learn from them. He, in fact, deeply 
shared with them the need to challenge the established norms, truths, myths, and 
mentalities. Yet he challenged modern perspectives for not being open to the 
possibility of theism (Collected Works, 24, p 23). In challenging modernity for its 
shortcomings, he analyses some of its intellectual and objective dimensions. 
1. Humanism and Religious Thinking 
Shari'ati highlights the main premises of modem humanism by identifying 
their intellectual foundations in Greek mythology. He believes that Greek mythology 
emanated from a certain historical experience of human person in confrontation with 
non-human forces. Since these forces had been given divine attributes, human 
bondage was perceived as the work of anti-human gods: 
Of course, such a bond of enmity between men and gods was altogether natural and logical to 
the Greek myths; and from a certain point of view even proper and progressive. Since gods in these 
myths constitute archetypes and expressions of natural forces ... The war 
between gods and men was 
in reality the latter's war against dominance of the physical forces that rule over human life, his will, 
and his fate ... (1982a, p 
18) 
This mythological treatment of the human predicament, Shari'ati says, led to 
an anthropocentric understanding of the universe, a view in which man himself has 
become the basis for moral and aesthetic judgements. Greek humanism, 
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through its denial of gods, disbelief in their rule, and severance of the bond between man and 
heaven, struggled to arrive at an anthropocentric universe, to make man the touchstone of truth and 
falsity, to take the human form as the criterion of beauty, and to assign importance to the components 
of life that enhance human power and pleasure. (Ibid, p 19) 
Another historical reason which contributed to the formulation of this world 
view was Catholicism in the Middle Ages which: 
set Christianity (regarded as religion per se) at odds with humanity: it maintained the same 
opposition between heaven and earth that had obtained in ancient Greece and Rome; and, with its 
Greek-style exegeses of original sin and man's expulsion from paradise, it represented man as 
helplessly condemned because of divine displeasure to an inferior world, and declared him to be an 
abject, reprehensible, and weak sinner. (Ibid, p 26) 
Therefore, with the philosophical standpoint of the Church and the Greek 
mythological heritage in mind, the new intellectual movements in early modem 
Europe took the road of secular humanism. By doing so, modern humanists 
committed a grave mistake, which resulted in a profound fallacy. Secular humanism 
has developed its view in opposition to the )historical< rather than the original, 
)human< religion. Modern humanists, Shari'ati says, have equated khe mythical world 
of ancient Greeceo with the original world of the Abrahamic heritage. Whereas in 
contradistinction with Greek mythology, in which the relation between man and gods 
required human bondage and suffering, in the Abrahamic tawhid the relation between 
humanity and the sublime is that of a dynamic process of love (Eshgh) and 
emancipation (Azadi). 
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K. On Modern Societal Formation 
In its latest stage of development, private ownership has led to machinism. 
As a new social order, machinism began to emerge in the 19th century. By then 
handicrafts were being left behind and the emerging machine age was creating new 
anxieties and myriads of new predicaments. The machine, Shari'ati argues, is not a 
marketable commodity but the engine of modernity: 
Machinism is a sociological phenomenon. It is a particular social order, not a marketable, 
consumable, or technical product or commodity. (1980, p 35) 
The societal order of modernity, Shari'ati further argues, has extended itself 
within various domains of Western life and also beyond the geographical borders of 
the West. Machinism has come to dominate all spheres of modem life. In a sense 
machinism is the sophisticated version of the social formation that was created by the 
emergence of private ownership. Just as a new world vision was formulated with the 
emergence of private ownership, with the machine too a new conception of the world 
began to develop. Elaborating this point, Shari'ati looks into the historical 
development of machinism: 
After the French Revolution the bourgeoisie pushed aside the medieval aristocracy and began 
to rule as it got hold of science. ... The 
bourgeoisie sums up all of existence in one word: 
Consumption, the more the better. Life's purpose lies in consumption and the satisfaction of material 
and economic needs. .., Since the 
bourgeoisie provides society's material needs, naturally the 




M. On Modernization and Civilization 
In Shariati's view, during the past two centuries non-Western societies have 
suffered from various internal and external forces of domination and exploitation. 
Imperialism (Est'emar), tyranny (Estebdad), economic exploitation (Estesmar), and 
cultural colonization (Estehmar) have together inflicted deep wounds on the peoples 
of the Third World and justified them by the alleged necessity for )modernization<. 
Third World modernization, therefore, is simply a historical extension of the process 
that began with the emergence of private ownership and was then intensified by 
machinism. Having already gained control over a vast part of the world by colonial 
domination, Europe now had more reasons to sustain its economic grip over these 
areas. The emergence of manufactured goods in large quantities created new needs, 
'the need for productions and the production of needs', with global impacts: 
Since the machine compulsively produces excess goods, it must step over all national 
boundaries and push goods into the world market ... When in the eighteenth century the capitalists 
gained control of machinery, as well as technology and science, man's destiny was determined. Every 
single human being on the face of the earth was to be coerced into becoming a consumer for the 
produced merchandise. European goods had to go to Africa and Asia. Asians and Africans had to 
consume the surplus European products. (Shariati, 1979, p 11) 
Accordingly, Shariati makes a distinction between 'civilization' (Tamadon ve 
Farhang) and 'modernization' (TaJadod ve Farang). In his view, unlike civilization 
that involves a long process of development within a community, contemporary Third 
World: 
... modernization is a apocryphal 
form of progress. In fact such modernization is symptomatic 
of a fundamentally destructive tendency within the contemporary non-Western world. (Ibid. ) 
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Shari'ati, like his predecessor Iqbal, therefore, neither accepts the established 
interpretation of tradition nor adapts to the modern paradigm, but rather, calls for an 
encounter between the two. Hence, he cannot be conceptually dichotomised as 
r. modernist' (if that is equal to secularism a la Arani, Pishevari, Albert Sohrabian. or 
Kianori within Iranian Communist-Tudeh party) or as 'traditionalist' (if that is 
tantamount to conservatism a al Nasr or Naghib al-Attas in Muslim intellectual 
tradition) but somebody who calls for transcending the reified tradition and dominant 
modemity through a synergy of 'Irfan, Barabari and Azadi. 
N. Emancipative Religious Humanism 
According to the vision presented by Shari'ati, religion, as ethical awareness, 
allows man to move from the 'instinctive heaven' to the 'promised paradise', to 
ascend (me'raj) from an earthly to a divine being. Such an ascent is in fact an 
existential responsibility, a Divine Trust (Amana) imposed upon human being. Such 
characteristic is the core of what Shari'ati calls Islamic Humanism. As such: 
Islam bases its divine humanism on tawhid; on the scientific level it defines man as of the 
earth while on the level of existential analysis it raises him from dust toward God and absolute 
transcendental values. (Shariati, 1979, p 85) 
Based upon such a conception of humanity, and deriving his ideas, unlike 
another revolutionary Muslim intellectual (Morteza Muttahari, who disputed such an 
understanding of Koranic story of Genesis by calling it as a grave distortion of 
traditional understanding of Islam) from the notion of the 'forbidden fruit of 
awareness , Shari'ati 
introduces his view of Islamic humanism. According to him, 
334 
human authenticity is rooted in 'the pain of existence', (darde vujud) a pain that is the 
outcome of human awareness (Agahi): 
To the degree that one attains this fruit, one finds oneself more and more contained by the 
earthly life. It is out of this pain and the need for that which is )absent< that man comes to rebel against 
the )will of God(, the will that is manifested, through the )four prisons of man< in the natural, historical, 
social, and physiological laws. (Shariati, Collected Works, 32, p 16) 
Human rebellion against these 'prisons' would ultimately lead human self to 
unity with God. As man frees himself more and more from these 'prisons', the world 
declines more and more for him by losing its worth in itself. Transcending these 
ýprisons' creates higher and more sublime needs, needs which in man's loneliness 
would be met only in his return (tawba) to God, a 'return' which is the realization of 
man's becoming. The Quranic conception of essentials of human existence, hence: 
... resembles a reciprocal relationship between God and man. A relationship which takes 
values as the emanation of divine attributes in the human sphere and defines man's self-perfection in 
terms of the self s awareness of its return to God. We see that in the philosophy of Islam ... self- 
knowledge and knowledge of God come to be synonymous, where the former functions as a 
preliminary to the latter; as the Iranian Mystic [Bayazid Bastami] puts it in a profound remark: For 
years I sought God and found myself, now that I seek myself, I find God. So, quite to the contrary [of 
the materialist philosophy of Feuerbachl, it is not humanity that has made God, reposed its proper 
values in Him, and worships Him; it is rather God Who has made humanity, reposed His proper values 
in it, and praises it. (CW, 32, p 88) 
Such a perspective, Shari'ati then notes, stands in opposition to both 
materialist and providentialist determinism. While it avoids materialist determinism 
by conceiving of free will as an essential facet of human existence, it simultaneously 
remains free from providentialism by attributing to man the character of rebellion. In 
explaining these dimensions of religious humanism, Shari'ati argues that in Islam: 
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The society possesses ordering principles, and the continuous evolutionary movement of 
human history is based upon scientific laws. But because it considers the human will to be a 
manifestation of the universal will of being (and not an unwitting product of the exigencies of 
production or of society), Islam never hurls into the terrible pit of materialistic determinism. Likewise, 
by proclaiming the principle of >assignation< or >descent< [huboot], it frees mankind from the bond of 
divine determinism in which the Eastern religions are caught. ... In this way, by presenting man as an 
aware being possessed of a will and freed from the captivity of heaven and earth alike, [Islam] arrives 
at true humanism. (CW, 32, pp 85,90) 
Therefore, in Islam, Shariati contends, human being or 'Insan' carries the 
divine responsibility (Amana) of making his/her own self and the world in the image 
of God. (CW, 32, pp 88-89) 
4. Concluding Remarks 
As a revolutionary religious thinker, who designed the parameters of cultural 
change in Iran (and some may argue in Muslim World and beyond), Shariati has 
regarded abstract acceptance or rejection of the divinity as essentially alike. It is, he 
believed, the social and historical significance of these two that distinguish them from 
each other. According to Shari'ati, religious concepts should be studied in relation to 
concrete human problems, and instead of reducing present problematic to the 
conditions of the revelation, those revelations should be extended to one's own time. 
In his view, the historical contexts of revelations would lose their relevance unless 
they share their significance with us. Otherwise, to define problems in terms of the 
historical past would only make revelation irrelevant (CW, 4, p 205). This was a point 
made earlier by Iqbal too, who argued that Koran (as a revealed text) should not be 
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read as though it was revealed to Prophet in the past (and devoid of any sense of 
Eternal Now) but in a manner that as though it was for the first time revealed to the 
reader each time one is encountered with the Word of God. 
As an intellectual encountered by modernity, learning about modern notions of 
reason, freedom, existence, while experiencing modem forms of despotism, 
imperialism, colonialism and assimilation, Shari'ati came to have particular 
understanding of 'tradition', (sunnat) 'modernity' (tajadod) and 'emancipation' 
(azadi). Any form of speculation, be it theological, philosophical, or scientific, he 
believed, which does not challenge domination and oppression is a mere scapegoat for 
ignorance (estehmar). Accordingly, with an intra-paradigmatic critique of tradition 
and a paradigmatic critique of modernity, he opened a way for exchange between the 
two. He, therefore, can be considered to be a forerunner for the dialogue between 
religious and secular thought in an intercivilizational context. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Intercivilisational dialogue in the prism of existentialicism 
The principal protagonists reconsidered 
There is no doubt that sociology would benefit greatly if Goffman were 
contextualised and his contributions meticulously analysed in relation to the themes 
and concerns of his time. The same applies to Giddens, Iqbal and Shariati. But the 
problem with this approach is that it ignores the historical trans-relevance of these 
authors' ideas by defining their intellectual concerns in terms of disciplinary 
aspirations, objectives and purposes. It is important to distinguish between the 
disciplinary discourses of Giddens and Goffman and the pre-disciplinary or non- 
disciplinary forms of thinking Iqbal and Shariati. To choose to write within a 
'discipline', however, should not to be misinterpreted as the author's desire to write 
about disciplinary issues as if they contained a life of their own, without any vital 
connection to external reality. 
If one argues that the disciplinary approach is the best way to address the 
existential problems of humanity, this, in itself, is a testimony that thought, either 
disciplinary or otherwise, is an attempt to solve the real problems of real people. But 
most of the critiques or forms of appropriation of Goffman, Giddens, lqbal and 
Shariati in the contemporary literature seem to suggest that their respective discourses 
are only relevant to issues current in their respective immediate environment (either 
material or intellectual). Only on very rare occasions (see O'Donnell, 2003) does one 
come across intellectual engagements questioning, for example, Giddens' views on 
human nature or authenticity or Goffman's views on religion. 
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On other hand, there seems to be a notable lack of studies looking at Shariati 
and lqbal in terms of social theory and the schools that accommodate various social 
theoretical inclinations under broad ideological umbrellas such as poststructuralism, 
postmodernism, modernism, liberalism, Marxism, liberation theology, Islamic 
socialism, and so on. It may be that one of the inherent problems preventing 
researchers from embarking upon such projects is the lack of a disciplinary approach 
in Iqbal and Shariati. Modem education is based on 'disciplinary thinking' and 
researchers are taught to think and analyse in disciplinary form. This in itself creates a 
problem in constructing a view of Shariati or lqbal as a social theorist or a sociologist. 
How is it possible to consider Shariati as a social thinker, for example, when his own 
analyses have not been constructed in the 'disciplinary mode' of modem thinking? 
One of the reasons why current literature is disengaged with Muslim thinkers 
within the context of social theory is the lack of what is considered within a modern 
frame of reference as the watershed between thinking and reflecting, ie 
disciplinarisation of thinking. But there is another problem with comparing 
intellectuals across cultures in terms of concerns and themes that have dominated 
contemporary times (eg the plight of the human being, the environmental crisis, the 
clash of notions surrounding human rights), which cannot be explained in the context 
of metatheoretical incommensurability of disciplinary versus non-disciplinary (or 
even pre-disciPlinary) paradigms. 
As mentioned earlier, the main features of interpretation within contemporary 
literature are to distil the sources of inspiration of the writer, to determine how they 
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are conditioned with respect to current disciplinary themes, or how modern or 
postmodern they are in their overall thinking. To demonstrate, for instance, that 
Shariati has been influenced by Marxism or Iqbal by Bergson is a very useful research 
project. To fail to go beyond this scholarly concern, however, and connect these traces 
of influence to the human impulses used to resolve conflicts, tensions, divergences, 
contradictions and disputes both intellectually and socially is to ignore a crucial aspect 
of thinking that is not disciplinary in nature - namely how to create a vision of a good 
life. It is correct to argue that for Giddens, the main philosophical trends in modernity 
are caught in a subject-object dualism, just as social theory is captured by a structure- 
agent dichotomy, but this does not reveal any fundamental aspects of how Giddens as 
a human being thinks of life. 
One of the differences between disciplinary thought and non-disciplinary 
thinking could be the distinction between the public self and private self, ie one does 
not need to take into consideration the complex dynamic of private self in 
constructing an informed view about a discourse or a writer. For example, a scholar 
could spend many years writing publicly about racism but he or she could lead a racist 
life privately. Although it is important to acknowledge that Goffman, for example, is a 
dramaturgical theorist, nevertheless what is significant to me is how he views Man in 
the overall scheme of life and what kind of dangers he feels are looming for human 
existence in an era that has been singled out as one of the most distinguished 
in 
human history. Another problem with literature is the absence of cross-cultural studies 
within a sociological framework where one can compare theoretical approaches to 
human nature and complex issues of social theory in authors 
from different 
intellectual traditions. A further setback within current literature is the lack of 
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comparative engagement with different authors in the context of a sociologically 
relevant paradigm based on a converging problematique of possible intercivilisational 
significance. 
For instance, I have argued that one can find traces of existential concerns 
within the writings of Goffman, Giddens, lqbal and Shariati. Although they may not 
always have termed their particular approaches as such, it is undeniable that one can 
find a sense of 'me aning- search' in their respective discourses by analysing the threat 
to human autonomy posed by the modern world system. Existential concern is an 
apprehensive unease that arises when an individual confronts certain basic issues of 
existence. This is evident in all four authors in this thesis in the very basic fact that 
they all chose an intellectual route in their life, which is distinguished from any other 
by 'being engaged' at a non-mundane level. What are the basic existential concerns? 
Yalom (1980) describes four such issues (or 'ultimate concems') - death, 
freedom, isolation and meaninglessness. Goffman, Giddens, Iqbal and Shariati each in 
their own way struggle with a sense of crisis and confusion both in themselves and in 
the world they live in and hence they attempt to search for clarity and meaning. 
Shariati, for instance, in encouraging people to return to their roots, Iqbal by 
reconstructing the parameters of religious thinking, Goffman in depicting the detailed 
life of self and how it is threatened by total institutions, and Giddens in explaining the 
structural causes of fragmentation of self in global modernity by 
laying bare the 
processes that disempower the self by reducing living to a meaningless 
dilemma are, 
thený respectively attempting to construct possible ways of confronting existential 
concems. 
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One may question how an intercivilisational dialogue could work in relation to 
particular themes and issues. There are certain issues such as 'alienation% self- 
realisation' and 'morality' that are of profound significance within both traditions 
(Muslim intellectual tradition and secular intellectual tradition) and could prove 
I 
instrumental in such a dialogue within a contemporary global context. But the 
important thing is to reconstruct the discourse of each author based on a paradigmatic 
category of dialogue that has the preconceived aim of establishing the dignity of 
human self in a world community composed of various differing traditions. Some 
may argue that the proposed preconceived aim is not analytically demonstrable but 
moralistic in nature. To this argument, one could level two different counter- 
arguments, each related to one level of abstraction. 
The first is that the 'moral' is of prime importance within the human 
community, even in the context of scientific activity, which cannot be sustained in an 
immoral context where civic rules and moral considerations are disregarded. The 
second is that in terms of human issues demonstrability is not always analytical in 
nature. The problems are most often hermeneutic in nature and require a profound 
sense of existential understanding that is virtually impossible when reduced to one 
module of comprehension, namely analytical demonstration. The preconceived aim is 
based on two dimensions: one of an empirical affirmative nature and the other of an 
existential declarative kind. 
The first is related to the contemporary global composition of human planetary 
context, where the complex fabric of cultures, traditions, civilisations, intellectual 
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inclinations and ideological camps should sensitise the dialogical intercivilisational 
scholar to a complex understanding of the dynamics of human culture in all its 
manifestations (in the case of this thesis, intellectual tradition). The second is based 
on an 'immediate principle' that takes 'peaceful co-existence' as a 'good quaesitum' 
not based on rational demonstration but on non-apodictic proof That is to say, no 
sound mind could argue that peaceful co-existence based on dialogue is not a 
desirable state to aspire to even it is not possible to prove it rationally. 
To conduct such a dialogue one needs to consider the problems that affect 
humanity, regardless of race, ethnicity, nationality, colour, denomination and 
tradition. In both the Western tradition of Goffman and Giddens and the Muslim 
tradition of Iqbal and Shariati, the integrity of the individual is of supreme importance 
and whatever belittles or endangers the biography of this entity by annihilating its 
ýmeaningful centre of experience' is a cause for concern, despite the many 
metatheoretical differences that exist between these writers (see Chapters Three to 
Six). It would take a separate work to examine for the purposes of an 
intercivilisational analysis all the contemporary issues of existential significance that 
have preoccupied the hearts and minds of our selected authors. But to demonstrate in 
sociological terms what an intercivilisational dialogue can achieve, we can choose one 
sociological problem that also has and existential feature. 
In previous chapters, I analysed the thoughts of our selected authors in relation 
to self and community, whereby the former represents the individual dimensions of 
communal life and the latter the collective nature of the social canopy. Here I focus on 
the question of alienation, which is of great significance within contemporary 
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literature in relation to the social system. It has been always argued that alienation 
arises wherever the social system is adverse to the organic growth of the human 
individual. Whatever the merits of this argument, it is undeniable that the concept of 
alienation is of both existential and sociological significance, and employable in an 
intercivilisational dialogue, because it affects all human individuals regardless of the 
cultural indicators listed earlier on. Although it is correct to argue that culture 
determines the 'shape', 'form', 'content', and 'intensity' of alienation, nevertheless it 
is incontestable that it produces the same pain in all human individuals. As all spheres 
of modern human society are influenced by external factors (the economy, politics, 
science, film, literature, religion, etc), there is no doubt that 'pure forms' of alienation 
are very rare; modem methods of communication and mass immigration have 
produced hybrid or ghetto forms of alienation in modem societies. As a result, the 
concept of alienation has to be taken into account in a true intercivilisational dialogue 
based on existential concerns. 
Goffman, Giddens, IqbaI and Shariati all address the problem of alienation 
based on their respective traditions but they never address the issue of how it may 
affect the 'other', eg how does Shariati discern Giddens' view of alienation and vice 
versa? It seems that they use their intellectual tradition as a divisive point of departure 
rather than as a tool for dialogue, preventing Giddens and Goffman, for instance, from 
asking why the Muslim mind is in such turmoil in the contemporary world. On the 
other hand, Sharlati and lqbal do not provide any means of seeing difference as an 
asset to humanity. There must be other ways to be one's self than demonising the 
other in order to stay authentic. If this is the only way to stay authentic, 
it would be 
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better to forget authenticity altogether and find other ways to solve the problems of 
creativity and self-consciousness. 
Let us now take the question of alienation as a model for intercivilisational 
dialogue. The idea of alienation comes up frequently in the context of the problems of 
the contemporary era. 'Alienation' is analysed mainly from two perspectives. One 
focuses on the referent of alienation: from what is the individual alienated? Referents 
may include interpersonal relations, the political system, geopolitical realities, the job 
or workplace, school, or other social institutions and organisations. The second 
focuses on the meaning of alienation: what do we mean when we say an individual is 
'alienated"? What, specifically, is the nature of the relationship between the alienated 
individual and the referent? The quality of this relationship defines the sense in which 
the individual feels alienated. For example, an individual may feel unable to affect 
important decisions (in the country or in economy, for instance), that officials or 
authorities are corrupt, that he or she is alone and racially despised, or that particular 
activities in which he or she is required to engage do not reflect his or her true needs 
and potential. To be more concise, these attitudes might be described as a sense of 
powerlessness, cynicism, anomie and self- e strangement. 
In Goffman and Giddens, what estranges an individual is a lack of 
socialisation or the absence of a socialised notion of the self, creating 
forms of 
alienated interaction (Goffman) or dilemmas of the self in global modernity 
(Giddens). However, there is no concept of alienation based on religion, ie the idea 
that the absence of religion might lead to alienation. By religion, I do not mean the 
sociological notion of religion based on the highly contestable assumption of the 
345 
disenchantment of existence due to modernity. For many years, sociologists predicted 
that religion would slowly fade into the background of myth and legend, as modern, 
industrialised societies grew increasingly rational and secular. In spite of this, the 
modem, rational, industrial and technologically advanced twentieth century has 
become more, not less, enchanted with religion. lqbal and Shariati argue that 
alienation within individuals and cultures will occur when God-consciousness 
declines or disappears altogether. For them, alienation is separation from God and 
from the God-given rules of social organisation: inspired leadership (Iqbal) and 
inspired guardianship (Shariati). 
The Goffmanian-Giddensian theory of alienation fits within a larger, structural 
social theory. Indeed, their approach is one of the most notable in the field, creating a 
distinctly sociological social psychology on which to ground their theory of 
alienation. This is not to diminish the importance of the lqbalian-Shariatian socio- 
theological approach, which locates alienation in separation from Hukumate Adle Dini 
(egalitarian religious governance). 
For IqbaI and Shariati, alienation is defined and measured by the gap between 
objective knowledge and religious understanding. If we only understood the true 
meaning of religion (what Shariati calls noble religiosity or Shia Alavi or what Iqbal 
calls spiritual monotheism) and the larger laws of history and society, we could 
organise ourselves to fit within them and thus put an end to all the pain and problems. 
Contrary to this line of inquiry is the position of Goffman and Giddens, which rejects 
religious theories of alienation in favour of social sources of alienation - the processes 
by which false consciousness (in accordance with Marxist theories) arises and defeats 
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human emancipation (dilemmas of the self in Giddens; total institutions via stigma in 
Goffman). 
As stated earlier, alienation can be analysed from two angles, ie the 'referent 
of alienation' and the 'meaning of alienation'. By following the Goffman-Giddensian 
model, we can conclude that the referent of alienation (based on their respective 
notions of self) and meaning of estrangement are both socially conditioned and a 
rational and post-religious approach is required to put an end to alienation. In the 
Iqbal-Shariati model, the object of alienation and the meaning of estrangement are not 
confined to 'social dimensions' alone but are also considered in the context of their 
history in theology, philosophy, social criticism and mystic discourses (Sufism). 
What, then, is the practical use of using these two models in the context of social 
theory? 
Our world is a disharmonious assemblage of diverse factors that affects our 
way of life and what we hold to be the ultimate truth. To consider the meaning of 
alienation by reference to the social, though important, is not enough. The current 
religious fervor evident all over the world is a testimony to the fact that it is 
insufficient to focus on dominant themes in the research on alienation that based on 
the contemporary secular (po st- Christian) paradigm alone. As intellectuals, we have at 
our disposal a diverse legacy that can potentially contribute to both the richness of the 
intellectual tradition (in a global sense) and the ambiguity that currently surrounds 
dilemmas of the self. Although it would be a mistake to conclude that the Iqbalian- 
Shariatian approach is superior to Goffmanian-Giddensian method, it would also be 
inaccurate to depart from a Goffmanian-Giddensian approach in assessing the 
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contemporary conundrum of global challenges or attempt to reduce the complex 
issues of 'religious quest' (not only at individual level but at communal and political 
levels) to the 'sociall. 
Using this argument, an intercivilisational approach is an attempt to merge the 
long history in theology, philosophy and social criticism with contemporary social 
science. This is because the existential roots of alienation (which is only one example 
of the many possible existential concerns at our disposal) vary in different individuals 
and cultures and there is no other way of addressing them without resorting to 
'sociological indices' such as 'false consciousness. ' This is the key to dialogue and 
such a dialogue will open our eyes intellectually to the existential concerns that could 
prove to be important to an intercivilisational approach between thinkers in various 
traditions and countries. As human individuals, we all need to find a way to co-exist 
peacefully and settle our differences based on authentic actions (ie actions authentic to 
an individual's desires and displayable as such to others), which would ultimately 
lead to a relative decrease of dilemmas of the self (Giddens, 1991) and a return to 
existential rather than theatrical life (ie performing acts in social institutions and not 
in terms of what one is inside) (Goffman, 1959). 
2. The 'social' versus the Deen: epistemological discourses and ontological 
divergence 
It should not be assumed that the participants in a dialogue all are (or should be) of 
the same opinion about any aspects of reality or even how to conceive the same 
reality. As the saying goes, if everyone is thinking alike, then somebody isn't 
thinking. If it is assumed that Goffman and Giddens follow a model of social inquiry 
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best designated as the paradigm of the 'social' and that lqbal's and Shariati's model of 
social investigation is one of Deen, then there are certainly fundamental differences 
that will affect the substantial aspects of dialogue. These differences and the extent of 
their influence also vary. 
In general, the Goffman-Giddensian model views religion as part of society 
and culture,, ie religion as a social phenomenon, while the Iqbalian-Shariatian model 
views society as a part of a transcendent religion, ie society as a religious 
phenomenon. This fundamental difference has come to be identified as an ideological 
difference between religious and secular approaches within human sciences. That is to 
say, in the latter approach reality is viewed not in a positive light but rather from the 
back of an ideological lense that corrupts the very assumptions of objective 
investigation. There is a counter-argument to this within the lqbalian-Shariatian 
paradigm, however, which could be reconstructed and employed to minimise the 
importance of Goffman-Giddensian model in human sciences. 
This counter-argument is based on the emphasis on 'inward life' in the Iqbal- 
Shariatian model. This inner life is not equivalent to a preference of subjectivity over 
objectivity as it is construed within modern discourses. It is not even equivalent to a 
withdrawal from the world or its renunciation, but an attitude of detachment that 
allows one to remain in the world but to escape from its hold. The inner life of an 
individual or of a nation, based on the lqbal-Shariatian model, needs nourishment that 
comes not from wealth, prestige or domination, but by turning ones' attention 
inwards, by, as Iqbal says, temporarily suppressing the efficient self and giving free 
scope to the appreciative self. It is as if the window towards the world is shut 
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temporarily and the window towards the inner self opened. It could rightly be 
assumed that the Goffman-Giddensian model has no room for such an experience, 
which could be dismissed as an ideology rather than a deconstruction of the 
phenomenal reality. 
However, to settle for this approach without investigating the real issues that 
create such positions, would be tantamount to turning this whole study into a futile 
narration of differences and shortcomings without any sense of understanding the 
'background assumptions' - something that can prove fatal in intellectual debates 
across cultural boundaries. To my knowledge, none of these four authors, apart from 
Giddens to certain extent, wrote explicitly on the philosophy of science and how their 
respectively tacit adherence to the dominant view of the nature of knowledge could 
have influenced their particular views on the nature of reality. But the absence of such 
discourses does not alter the fact that these authors respectively held a particular 
philosophy of science dear to their hearts when making sense of the overall pursuit of 
knowledge. If this claim has any validity, it will allow us to deconstruct the very 
background assumptions that might have led to the 'social approach' and the 'Deen 
approach' and the differences between them. 
Goffman and Giddens as well as Iqbal and Shariati write respectively from 
within particular intellectual traditions that can subsequently be defined as 
epistemological and ontological. Of course, there are great many overlapping features 
in their respective discourses, but generally speaking one could argue that Goffman's 
and Giddens' approach is more epistemological than ontological, as it derives from 
Anglo-American philosophy, where the main concerns are 'How do I knowT and 
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'What do you meanT, in other words the primacy of epistemology over ontology. 
However,, it should be borne in mind that the primary claim of Positivism has been 
modified in the post-positive philosophy of Goffman and Giddens and this is one of 
the many reasons why strictly non-epistemological issues have found their way into 
their respective discourses. Nevertheless, it is right to argue that they are still 
functioning within the Anglo-American philosophical paradigm, where metaphysics 
is rejected, and, at the same time, positivist claims about the 'truth' and 'goal of 
science' are profoundly modified in a critically realist sense. Iqbal and Sharaiti, on the 
other hand, though not unmindful of the correct use of language, consider ontological 
problems the proper subject matter of intellectual activity and the most accurate point 
of departure in terms of human predicaments (that in their view constitute the very 
essence of human sciences). 
To add to the differences between the Goffman-Giddensian and lqbal- 
Shariatian models, one should refer to the question of methodology (not in the sense 
of methods but in relation to the philosophy of methodical approach and the means of 
knowledge). In the 'Deen paradigm', both temporal and spiritual dimensions are 
fields of intellectual concern, whereas in the 'social paradigm' the idea of soul is 
banished altogether and reducible to non-scientific problems, ie unimportant 
epistemologically. This difference in approach is connected to the way one views 
creligion' in the scheme of reality. 
In the first approach, (ie the Goffman-Giddens approach) religion is a 
'departmental affair', ie one aspect of reality, while in the second model, religion is 
neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is the expression of the 
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whole man (Iqbal, 1986, p 2). It employs all three modes of consciousness in arriving 
at the knowledge of reality. Besides revelation it uses sense perception for the 
knowledge of things concrete, intellect for the knowledge of things abstract, and 
intuition for the knowledge of things spiritual. It does not confine its epistemology to 
any one of these sources, for in that case it would cease to be the expression of the 
whole man (which is an ontological reality) and would be reduced to a truncated 
expression of one or the other part of his/her nature, at the expense of the remaining 
part or parts of it. 
When all these differences are considered systematically in relation to each of 
the authors selected in this study, we arrive at some interesting conclusions. First, in 
Goffman and Giddens we can discern a detailed preoccupation of self (and all the 
engaging aspects of self-realisation along the previously proposed lines such as the 
csocial', 4secular',, etc) based on 'narrative'. In lqbal and Shariati, on the other hand, 
there is an engaging debate on 'eschatology' intertwined in their respective narratives 
on self In other words, in Goffman and Giddens, the story of human existence is 
based on 'narrative',, ie the meaning of existence and the existence of meaning. The 
intricacies that have evolved out of this conundrum are all reducible to cultural 
dimensions without any recourse to transcendental values, as, generally speaking, the 
idea of soul was spurned by Hume, and the logical positivists who followed in his 
wake outlawed this idea. But in Goffman and Giddens, there are certain tendencies 
towards existential concerns that do not sit within the boundaries of 'received 
tradition', ie the argument that a person is able to make choices as a free, self- 
responsible being, while both have been oblivious about the spiritual life that might 
consist in self-transcendence. 
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Then there is the idea of 'eschatological narrative' in the work of lqbal and 
Shariati. The idea of human self is based on a spiritual life that may consist in self- 
transcendence, which should be creative and not simply repetitive. There is no doubt 
that Goffman and Giddens would agree with the idea of a self that has ability to be 
creative and at the same time self-transcending, but the question is what are the 
aspects that embody the grammar of human existence? 
To answer this question I suggest constructing a model that will enable us to 
study fully the various human discourses available to us across cultures, civilisations 
and traditions. In my view, we can categorise human discourse into four different 
classes: biography, sociography, gnosisography and sacrography. Of course, they can 
all contain elements of each other, and sometimes all elements are present at the same 
time, for instance a historical account about the founding father of Judaism would 
certainly include biography (ie where Moses was bom), sociography (ie the social 
relations that constituted the overall feature of the society Moses was bom into), 
gnosisography (ie the individual processes of spiritual nature that Moses went 
through) and sacrography (ie what Moses brought as a revelation or new religion with 
all its new codes of conduct and what is termed Torah). 
While Goffman and Giddens say a lot in terms of biography and sociography, 
which are part and parcel of the paradigm of narrative and indicative of secular 
discourses, they are silent on gnosisography and sacrography. In lqbal and Shariati, 
there are traces of biography, gnosisography and sacrography, while the analysis in 
relation to sociography is simplistic in lqbal and polemical in Shariati. Having said 
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that, it is hard to detect the empirical connections between these four dimensions in 
Iqbal and Shariati, especially where both men emphasise the importance of 'inductive 
reasoning' at the expense of 'deductive reasoning' in their respective discourses. In 
other words, they do not explain how these four dimensions are related, not only 
ontologically but also epistemologically. If one could view the Goffmanian- 
Giddensian paradigm through an Iqbalian-Shariatian perspective, one would probably 
argue that modern secular thought has lost all cognisance of the divine dimension. But 
there are serious issues that could be raised in terms of the discourse of Iqbal and 
Shariati from a Goffmanian-Giddensian perspective, such as the plausibility and the 
feasibility of Islamic Renaissance based on 'modern rationality', which is the overall 
aim of lqbal's reconstructive and Shariati's revolutionary approach. In other words, 
how to reconcile the contemporary moral decadence of Muslim societies with the 
ideological pretence of superiority, while at the same time looking to the West for 
inspiration but camouflaging this with an ideological offensive? 
The identification of the difficulties and differences that exist between these 
two paradigms, which are not of mono-causal but multi-causal in nature, should not 
result in a holistic approach where dialogue fails and the participants get caught up in 
the sweeping generalisations of fundamentalism (Giddens), Western fallacies 
(Shariati), traditional society (Goffman), and democracy as a malady of the brain 
(Iqbal). This may have been possible in the past but today intercivilisational dialogue 
is an existential necessity in a generic sense. In other words, in today's global village, 
where religion (Deen paradigm or religious thinking) and naturalistic understanding 
of the world (social paradigm or secular thinking) are beginning to interact and to 
compete with each other on a global scale, the human response to the world - 
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intellectual, moral and aesthetic - based on these two great traditions has only just 
begun (Thrower, 1999, p 198). 
3. Towards a sociological intercivilisational dialogue 
What makes an approach sociological is the source of creative tension within the 
discipline. For instance, is Marx a sociologist and, if the answer is yes, on what 
grounds could one exclude, for example, Shankara, Aristotle, Maister Eckhart, Vico 
or Ibn Khaldun from the canon of sociology? These are important and significant 
questions in reflecting over the question of classicism and canonisation within social 
and human sciences. But here this question is not important per se. What is important 
is how we can extract aspects of an intellectual's discourse (ie Goffman, Giddens, 
Iqbal and Shariati) in a manner that helps establish the paradigm of 'intercivilisational 
dialogue' without losing the 'sociological significance' and being able to address 
existential questions cross-culturally. 
In order to achieve such a dialogue we need to demonstrate how these four 
discourses can be brought together under one single umbrella (intercivilisational 
dialogue) that has sociological and existential significance as well as having non- 
Eurocentric and non-Oriental inclinations. In Goffman's work one can identify a 
concern with 'moral agent'; in Giddens an anxiety in relation to the question of 
'authentic self; in Iqbal a metatheoretical inclination to distinguish between social 
problems by discriminating between 'intellectual problems' and 'vital concerns'; and 
in Shariati a claim that could be employed as a trans -denominational tool in 
addressing the spiritual adventures of human communities and individuals by 
referring to what is termed 'gnostic substance'. These four concepts may assist us in 
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addressing 'human problems' in a global context based on an existential reading of 
intercivilisational problernatiques. How is such a reading possible? 
Goffman argues that 'individual is a moral being' (1959, p 24). By that he 
refers to the very existential fact that human being has a sense of 'worth' that should 
not be stripped by circumstantial expedients. Although the age of Enlightenment saw 
a questioning of religious and traditional values that constituted the very backbone of 
morality, nevertheless post-Christian thinkers (moral philosophers, social theorists, 
sociologists, etc) did not deny the significance of morality in the constitution of self 
and society. On the contrary, intellectuals attempted to demonstrate how any rational 
being would agree to universal moral laws. The influence of this line of thinking has 
been enormous and Goffman's considerations fall within this parameter. But this, in 
itself, is not a Eurocentric idea, as no sensible thinker would dismiss the concept of 
'human worth and human dignity'. One may argue that Muslim thinkers do extract the 
idea of morality from religion but it would be a mistake to suggest that the latter 
refutes the credibility of the former. 
In other words, the genealogy of Goffman's understanding may be Eurocentric 
but the proposal is universally valid, rather than 'Western' or 'Eastern'; consider this, 
for example, in the context of extreme situations such as war, famine or earthquakes. 
What matters if you are taken prisoner is not whether you are from the bourgeoisie or 
the working classes but that you are treated with a minimum sense of 'worth' and 
'dignity' regardless of the 'contingent indices' that are genealogically traceable. It 
should be borne in mind that 'intercivilisational dialogue' is not a paradigm of 
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thought (or settling the issues with the maximum benefit) but a strategy by 
intellectuals for settling for the minimum within a turbulent world order. 
Giddens suggests that the civic notion of life is possible "only if the person is 
able to develop an inner authenticity", as shifting social events and changing external 
circumstances in a post-traditional order may lead to the disintegration of the self in a 
global context (1991, p 215). The idea of 'person' in Giddens could be connected to 
the notion of Goffman's morally impregnated 'individual being', as Giddens argues 
that life politics are not possible without the creation of morally justifiable forms of 
life that will promote self-actualisation in the context of global and in the absence of 
traditional orders (1991, pp 214-15). What is 'inner authenticity'? It is the ability to 
develop existential meaning that endows coherence upon individual life by providing 
a sense of orientation in the face of existential questions that haunt the finite ego in a 
post-traditional order. This existential and post-traditional ability can lead to what 
Giddens calls self-actualisation, which is inevitable for the sustenance of life politics. 
How is it now possible to fuse the concerns of Muslim thinkers to this Giddensian 
project? 
It is true that Shariati and lqbal do not favour the elimination of religion in 
social life, but it would be a mistake to suggest that they wish to promote a traditional 
interpretation of religion that would be instrumental in the re-establishment of what 
Giddens attempts to overcome as 4post-traditional'. In other words, an anti-regressive 
interpretation of religion (postcolonial as well as post-Kalifat by Iqbal and post- 
imperial/post-communism and post-kingship by Shariati) is what these two thinkers 
promote by their ideas of the 'creative self (as the cornerstone of reality; lqbal) and 
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ýgnostic substance' (as the cornerstone of self in reality; Shariati). The idea of 'inner 
authenticity' in Giddens that is tied to the morally impregnated individual being in 
Goffman is not, in principle, opposed to the model of communal self in lqbal-Shariati 
that strives to promote a sense of 'self-realisation' in society. This idea of self- 
realisation may not be metaphysically similar to what Giddens attempt to promote, ie 
self-actualization in a post-traditional order against the backdrop of existential 
questions, but it is horizontally congruent with Iqbal's and Shariati's quest for the de- 
traditionalisation of religion or emancipation of Islam from 'feudal mentality'. 
On the other hand, we have the distinction between 'intellectual facts' and 
4vital facts' within Iqbal that could be related to the sociological distinction between 
ýrational' and 'irrational' or what is termed the 'return of the repressed' or 'return of 
the irrational' in discussions on the revival of religions or the contraction of the 
rational sphere vis-a-vis the expansion of irrational sphere. In other words, lqbal's 
distinction can help shed light upon the vital issues of humanity that may not be 
intellectually significant, in particular, when the concerns of intellectual activity are 
disciplinarily determined and rationally territorialised. The very fact that we have 
disciplined the inquiring mind in the pursuit of knowledge does not automatically 
erase the existential problems that challenge the very life that intellectual activity is 
part of. If we choose to consider the upsurge of so-called 'irrational questions' as 
problems that should be either 'absolved' or 'neglected' as aptly captured in the title 
of Freud's famous The Future of an illusion (1985), then will be more clash theorists 
in the future than we witnessed in the past. Instead we can choose an 
intercivilisational dialogical path by arguing that the inner authenticity of the moral 
agent is possible when the needs of both self and society are neither wholly 
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rationalised nor totally irrationalised but given sufficient space for an interaction 
between intellectual needs and vital concerns. 
In our global world, there seem to be many traditions and cultures that have 
too much of one or too little of the other. The dialogical path may help us to view 
ourselves through the 'eyes' of the others, which is an excellent opportunity to see 
how others see us and we see others. This is what 'reflexive mode' is all about is not 
something that can be labelled Eurocentric, Western, bourgeois, or anything else. It 
may have originated in its institutional form in Europe but this does not disqualify its 
universal relevance, as all categories of human mind arise somewhere on this planet. 
This has never been a problem within the long history of humankind (eg alphabet in 
Mesopotamia) and it should not be a problem today. 
Finally, we have Shariati, who proposes the notion of 'gnostic substance'. This 
is a universal aspect of individual being, a universal human attribute like 'hearing', 
C seeing' and speech', The idea of 'inner authenticity' of the self in Giddens (based on 
Goffman's moral being) aimed to create a form of life that would elevate the project 
of self- actualisation within human society. This is an attempt to build an ideal form of 
life, where dilemmas of self are encountered through coherent approaches in 
countering tribulations of the self (fragmentation, powerlessness, inauthenticity, 
meaninglessness and commodification). One can see the parallels with this in Shariati, 
where he suggests that life politics (what Giddens calls an ideology) are essential for 
promoting the development of the ideal individual, liberating God and his love from 
the monopoly of religion, freedom from the monopoly of capitalism, and 
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egalitarianism from the monopoly of Marxism (Shariati, Collected Works 2, pp 48-9). 
But how is such a project of self ever possible? 
It is possible because Shariati believes in the self-realisation of the human 
individual and this is not confined to the cultural unit of Islam. The 'gnostic 
substance' is a universal attribute of the human individual and its nurture helps one 
reach the highest human capabilities, which is exactly what Giddens' life politics aims 
to achieve through the creation of morally justifiable forms of life. In other words, the 
idea of 'gnostic substance' is instrumental in addressing issues of spiritual 
significance in human societies globally without falling into the trap of 
fundamentalism or Eurocentrism. As such, Shariati's conceptual tool could prove 
intercivilisationally dialogical. It is true that both Iqbal and Shariati use a vernacular 
that might be alien to many Westerners, who have been accustomed to a world where 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre have formulated the problems of uniformity and the 
threats to authenticity without any principal connection to religion. However, it would 
be a mistake to consider these Muslim thinkers' intellectual engagements as 
metaphysical (and intra-theo logical); Iqbal and Shariati, as Robert D. Lee (1997, p 
192) argues, attempt to wrestle with a set of modern problems that constitute the core 
of dilemmas of modernity. However, there is a need to galvanise the intellectual 
dialogue between various intellectual traditions using a model that does not stop at 
description but encompasses prescriptive engagement, because it seems that, in 
contrast to Muslim intellectuals, the towering figures of Western sociology do not 
engage with the works of other intellectual traditions that exist without their orbit. 
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What I have attempted to demonstrate how it is possible to extract conceptual 
tools from the work of each of our selected authors for constructing an 
intercivilisational dialogue. It is hoped that such a dialogue may help unravel the 
perplexities of global humanity based on existential concerns, in so far as our 'gnostic 
substance' constitutes the framework of our individuality as a 'moral being' with a 
sense of 'inner authenticity' and concern for the 'vital issues' that determine the scope 
of our self-actualisation. Furthermore, I have attempted to argue that human beings 
share a 'basic structure of existence' that could include themes such as 'lived 
experience', 'intersubjectivity', 'contingency', 'fear of death' and 'agency and 
meaning'. Of course, it should be stated that these themes are part and parcel of the 
existential social theory that has offered important counter-traditions to the scientific 
mainstream within social science disciplines (Burston, 2000). What is important 
within the parameters of intercivilisational dialogue is the pragmatic contribution this 
position offers at a time when difference is all the rage. Existentialicism reminds us 
that despite variations in historical and intellectual situation, gender, class and race, 
all hwnan beings share a throwness, contingency, and the need to confer value on and 
to impart meaning to life, regardless of its source (the social or the Deen), through 
their action and decision, thus taking responsibility for their individual destiny. These 
are themes that can bring us together and intellectuals have a special role to play in a 
global context in authorising knowledgeable avenues of dialogue cro ss -culturally and 
intercivilisationally. 
While obvious enough in one sense, it is worth finally underlining the almost 
total absence of intellectual engagement in both Goffman and Giddens (and other key 
sociological theorists) with intellectual traditions that lie beyond the Western 
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episteme. This practice may be justified by some in terms of the peculiarity of the 
subject matter of sociology, such as 'structures' and 'agency' or 'social reality' and 
ýsocial institution'. But this would be to ignore the cornerstone of sociological 
reasoning, which is the pursuit of ideas as they manifest themselves in intellectual 
activities,, and ideas are no less important topics for empirical engagement. 
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CONCLUSION 
The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking 
new landscape but in having new eyes 
M. Proust 
The Enlightenment tradition brought a set of assumptions that transformed the very 
structures of our worldview in general and self-understanding in particular. As a 
revolt against the 'scholastic mind', the 'Enlightenment reason' set a new agenda 
whereby the rational subject did not need to ponder 'determinants' but could expand 
its horizons freely. With the emergence of Enlightenment, the old debates on free will 
and determinism took a very different turn by unchaining the previously conceived 
determinants of the rational subject and diverting energy into freedom. This mode of 
thinking seems to have come full circle where the prophets of freedom have come to 
realise that a minimum number of determinants are necessary within the vast scheme 
of life. But the question is how to settle on a minimum that is both universally 
acceptable and locally efficient. On a more abstract level, one could argue that the 
transformation of intellectual culture within Europe (and gradually America, Russia 
and what has come to be called the Third World) that led to the emergence of 
modernity is essentially the replacement of 'essence' by 'existence'; on other words, 
within the religiously imbued seats of knowledge, the world of being has been 
conceived on three levels: the material world, the archetypal world and the intelligent 
world. Modernity is based on this grandiose concept, and it would be fair to say that 
Goffman and Giddens write within the structures of such a paradigm, ie a purely 
materialistic notion of being that is anti-essentialistic, anti-deterministic, with an 
emphasis on human existence and anti-intellectualism, and finally socially grounded. 
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But the problem is how to interpret Iqbal and Shariati, who seemingly endorse a 
religious point of view that should naturally display a profound affinity with 
essentialist discourses? 
These two authors have tried to solve three different epistemological problems 
by turning the history of ideas in Islamic tradition upside down. First, by arguing that 
Muslim thinkers have traditionally been under the spell of Platonic philosophy, 
preventing them from seeing the worldview of the Quran, they try to justify the move 
from essence to existence based on their particular reading of Islamic canon. Second, 
by contending that modernity is at fault in conditioning the basic structures of being 
within the frame of material reality, they attempt to reinterpret the idea of modem 
existence in terms of being or ultimate reality that rescues them from falling back on 
materialism. They do this by arguing that the religious worldview of Islam is not 
based on a three-fold scholastic vision, but on 'the visible world' (alam shahadat) and 
'the invisible world' (alam ghayb). This distinction aims to enable them to reconcile 
their modem version of theology with modem science, where the invisible world can 
be extended to include all aspects of what cannot be seen at present but will be seen 
with the progress of science. Although this has proved to be a semantically interesting 
point, nevertheless it did not solve the epistemological questions asked of a religious 
intellectual by a sceptical Enlightenment audience. On the other hand, one can discern 
a strong anti-essentialist trend in both lqbal and Shariati, where 'personal 
involvement I, anti-determinisM' and an 'emphasis on human existence' based on 
4 anti-intellectualism' and 'freedom and creativity' are highly valued. But this calls to 
question the very basis of the society they both tried to depict, ie a community based 
on religious ideals that have been already codified, decided, determined, chosen and 
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established. If there is no universal essence and Islamic reasoning is based on 
ýexistence', then how is it that the form and content of community and society have 
already been determined by past 'historical incidents' (The City of Prophet: Iqbal; 
The Imamate: Shariati)? 
On the other hand, we have the overarching claim of Enlightenment (Man's 
release from his self-incurred tutelage), which does constitute the very broad spirit of 
the ideal society that Goffman and Giddens write for, but little seems to move towards 
that ideal when one looks at contemporary era individually and socially. Furthermore, 
one cannot help but question the notion of Enlightenment in the absence of 'regulative 
ideals' that are not imposed from without but are sources of inspiration from within 
the individual person. This brings to mind the very basis of human existence, which 
must be a universal ideal. If one does not recognise the reality of this fact, or cannot 
even find the means to recognise it, then how is Enlightenment possible? Finally, 
there seems to be tendency in both lqbal and Shariati towards what Masson (1985) 
(with regard to Gung Yu-Lan, who takes issue with modernity based on Chinese 
tradition) calls 'the transmission of modernity'. With this in mind, one should assess 
the work of Iqbal and Shariati in the light of one overall question, namely, do they try 
to transmit the ethos of modernity into the body of Islamic culture? On the other hand, 
we have Goffman and Giddens seemingly engaged in transmitting the ethos of 
cosmopolitanism into the body of modem Western culture (the former by being silent 
and the latter by being active). But how successful have both of these traditions been 
in this transmission? 
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These are vital questions and I do not think we can answer them by relying on 
one tradition or discipline, as theY concern the fundamental predicaments of human 
existence. This is why we need an intercivilisational approach, where intellectuals 
across all civilisations come together for a serious dialogue. We now have all the 
technological paraphernalia one could ever wish for, but in order to achieve the 
spiritual growth of humankind on a global scale we need to believe that by acting in 
the right way we can use these tools at our disposal to enrich our life and expand our 
horizons. Here the sociological tradition reinvented on an intercivilisational basis 
could bring fundamental changes into the very fabric of intellectual engagements. One 
may imagine a sociology of 'ultimate concerns' where the role of transcendence and 
spirituality in the 'individual person' and the 'communal body' are taken into account, 
not only within the parameters of the 'private self but in the public sphere too. 
As mentioned in Chapter Seven, thought paradigms in Goffmanian- 
Giddensian and lqbalian-Shariatian models are different, as the former are 
disciplinary and the latter non-disciplinary, which causes us to ask whether 
transcendence can be both sociological and religious? Sociologists and religious 
thinkers seem to conceive of 'transcendence' differently, something that could be 
explored more fully within the parameters of intercivilisational dialogue. In my view, 
sociologists and religious thinkers have understood transcendence and other vital 
matters of life differently, but both the language and concepts of religious paradigm 
and secular thinking, including transcendence, reside at the core of postmodern 
philosophy. This interaction between religious and secular points of departure is a 
process that develops in time. Through adjustment, renewed interpretation and 
concrete application, the meaning of the intercivilisational dialogue could unfold with 
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time. Time is an infinite source of new meanings and interpretations and certainly 
new generations of intellectuals, through increased exposure to the global sensitivity 
at all levels of existentiality, will regard dialogue not as an 'imposed necessity' (as 
many of us do today) but as a fundamentally important choice. For today's human 
problem, as P. D. Mehta says, is 
less a problem of doing and much more a problem of being.... (1976, p 7) 
Could this be a replacement of a cultural God by an existential God on a 
global scale? If this were the case, what would become of our cosmology? The 
cosmology of the industrial revolution gave us an ethos of productivity at any cost. 
The cosmology of corporate capitalism advocates an ethos of consumption at any 
cost. The cosmology we need to find should produce first and foremost an ethos that 
advocates the harmonious biological health of the individual in the context of the 
harmonious biological health of the environment. In order to co-create this 
cosmology, we can no longer rely on a single mind or even on one single tradition. 
The complexity and responsibility of the world and the life within it is too much for 
one person or one intellectual tradition to bear. The only way forward is together. We 
need research that will discover what it takes to enable us to operate in webs of 
consciousness in mind networks. We need at least a small group of prepared minds to 
seek to merge dreams and behold visions. These people would serve as 'socio- 
psychonauts' and work with minds in other regions. We are quite underdeveloped in 
this area. We have limited understanding of how others really think, act and live. 
While there are immense technological advances in military systems and lethal 
weapons of mass destruction, our understanding of how to handle conflict resolution 
and fundamental differences is limited. These issues need to be addressed in the future 
search for meaning within the intercivilisational paradigm. Otherwise, as German 
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historian Hagen Schulze warned: "[W]hat is not worked through in our [communal as 
well as individual] memory will re-emerge as neurosis or hysteria" (cited in Lee, 
2000, p 221). 
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